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October 1, 1985
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ARTICLE Edward Jay Epstein ADMIRAL Stansfield Turner commanded a destroyer, a guided-missile cruiser, a carrier task force, a fleet, and the prestigious Naval War College before he was shunted away to a NATO post in Italy in 1975. When he was abruptly summoned back to Washington in Feb- ruary 1977 by his former classmate at Annapolis, President Jimmy Carter, he expected to be ap- pointed to a high naval position or to the joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead, the new President asked him to be Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Although Turner had had little previous ex- perience in intelligence, he viewed it simply as a problem of assessing data, or, as he described it to his son, nothing more than "bean counting." Ac- cepting the position of "chief bean counter," he assumed that he could bring the CIA, and Amer- ican intelligence, to the same standard of opera- tional efficiency he had brought the ships under his command. The four-year effort to achieve this goal is the subject of his book, Secrecy and De- mocracy: The CIA in Transition.' He quickly found, however, that the CIA was a far more complex and elusive entity than he had expected. To begin with, the acting CIA Director, Henry Knoche, rather than behaving like a ship's "executive officer," surprised Turner by refusing his "captain's" first order: a request that Knoche accompany him to meetings with congressional leaders. As far as Turner was concerned, this was insubordination (and Knoche's days were num- bered). When he met with other senior executives of the CIA at a series of dinners, he found "a dis- turbing lack of specificity and clarity" in their answers. On the other hand, he found the written CIA reports presented to him "too long and de- tailed to be useful." He notes that "my first en- counters with the CIA did not convey either the feeling of a warm welcome or a sense of great EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, whose books include Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald and Inquest: The War- ren Commission and the Establishment of Truth, is cur- rently completing a book on international deception. His articles in COMMENTARY include "Disinformation: Or, Why the CIA Cannot Verify an Arms-Control Agreement" (July 1982) and "The War Within the CIA" (August 1978). pproved For Rett A@ /x /14 : CIA-RDP91-00901 October 1985 Who Killed the CIA? The Confessions of Stansfield competence"-an asses ment of many of these senior officers. Turner was further frustrated by the system of secrecy that kept vital intelligence hermetically contained in bureaucratic "compartments" within the CIA. Not only did he view such secrecy as irrational, he began to suspect that it cloaked a wide range of unethical activities. He became especially concerned with abuses in the espionage division, which he discovered was heavily overstaffed wi,th case officers-some of whom, on the pretext of seeing agents abroad, were disbursing large sums in "expenses" to them- selves, keeping mistresses, and doing business with international arms dealers. Aside from such petty corruption, Turner feared that these compartmen- talized espionage operations could enmesh the en- tire CIA in a devastating scandal. The potential for such a "disgrace," as he puts it, was made manifest to him by a single traumatic case that oc- curred in the 1960's-one which he harks back to throughout his book, and which he uses to justify eliminating the essential core of the CIA's espio- nage service. The villain of this case, as Turner describes it, is James Jesus Angleton, who was chief of the CIA's counterintelligence staff from 1954 to 1974; the victim was Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who began collaborating with the CIA in 1962 and then defected to the United States in 1964, and who claimed to have read all the KGB files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The crime was the imprisonment of Nosenko, which, according to Turner, was "a travesty of the rights of the individual under the law." It all began in 1964, after Nosenko arrived in the United States. Turner states that Angleton "decided that Nosenko was a double agent, and set out to force him to confess. . . . When he would not give in to normal interrogation, Angle- ton's team set out to break the man psycholog- ically. A small prison was built, expressly for him." Nosenko was kept in this prison for three-and- one-half years, although he never admitted to be- ing a double agent. He was then released and sub- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Oei Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-0090 APPEAR E D .t!.'au ~il~ 1?~riv~_ T he CIA disclaims any responsibility for Edwin Wilson. and Frank Terpil, the two ex-agents who are now busily training and arming Libyan terrorists. But the truth is the CIA and the Justice Department have long had the legal means to put these shady . dealers out-of business. Wilson, indicted in 1980 and'81 for sell- ing explosives and murderous skills to the Kaddafi regime, joined the CIA in the. ear- ly '50s, at a time when all agency employ- ees and alumni were solemnly sworn never to assert any proprietary "claim" to what they learned on the job and never "to di- vulge, publish or reveal by any other means ... classified information, intelligence or knowledge" without. official approval. The same basic covenant was in effect when Terpil signed on in the early '60s. Two years ago, in a piling against me, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of these contracts. Though my case- involved the unauthorized publication of a book about CIA. activities, the contracts themselves make no distinction between disclosure in print and revelation by "sales pitch." Nor are their strictures limited to secrets or even knowledge gained during employment. Ac- cording to a 1977 CIA regulation "subjects deemed to be of official Agency interest [and hence subject to pre-release approval] include, but are not limited to, current and former Agency activities, foreign intelli- gence and foreign political, economic, sci- entific, technical, military, sociological and geographical matters, intludipg foreign as- pects of international terrorist activity. . A later CIA directive generously exempts "topics that are totally unrelated to intelli- gence matters, such as the manuscript of a cookbook, [or] a treatise on gardening," but warns of "gray areas" and urges signatories to err on the side of caution by letting the CIA pre-screen all utterances that might be of official concern. Changed Rules: Since I had sidestepped CIA scrutiny altogether, the Supreme Court decided I had broken my contract. For the same reason it found me guilty of having violated an "implicit obligation of trust." Normally this commercial-law con- cept is invoked only against people who sell NEw3wgEK 25 JANUARY 1982 a "breach of trust"-forfeiture of all prof- its-and was ordered to submit to CIA censorship in the future, even though the government had never once accused me of publishing anything confidential. Terpil and Wilson clearly have done no less than I. If my book was a violation of implied and explicit covenants, so is their unfettered assistance to the Libyans. The two also are guilty of one other of- fense that figured in the government's case against me. To substantiate its claim that my book had damaged the nation's security, the Justice Department argued that any such unauthorized release of intelligence- related material can undermine confidence in the CIA's security procedures and can Why hasn't the agency used its legal powers to stop former agents who work for Kaddafi? thus frighten off "sources" who might oth- erwise be cooperative. The Supreme Court agreed, declaring that the "appearance of confidentiality" is often as essential to our security as confidentiality itself. By nuzzling up to Kaddafi, Wilson and Terpil have most certainly imperiled the "appearance of confidentiality" and have discomfited intelligence sources. Why, then, weren't they sued long ago for breach of contract and trust? Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in the influence and inter- ests of the CIA's "old boy" network. Not surprisingly, Wilson and Terpil aren't its only charter members who are out peddling "Company" know-how to unauthorized consumers. Former CIA topsiders Richard Helms, Henry Knoche, Vernon Walters and Theodore Shackley are all involved in business consultancies that cash in on what they learned while on the agency's payroll. Onetime CIA security chief Robert Gam- bino has retired to train private security they were once assigned..All of these agents- turned-entrepreneurs are guilty of my "transgression"-trading on knowledge that the government claims isn't ours to exploit. But because, as a group, they com- mand more political clout than I, they've escaped prosecution. Moreover, because'of the muzziness of the employment contracts, they have been 'able to argue that they face no constraints . on their business activities. Helms has commented that it would be "against the American tradition" for the government to attempt to impose such strictures. Precedent: In fairness to -him and his fellow scofflaws, the employment contracts are not models of clarity. They have been recast at least six times since the CIA's founding and have never been consistently enforced. So it's un ders ta.n dable that a signa- tory might misconstrue his "obligation! Then too, there is the legitimate question: should Pentagon and State Department of- ficials be permitted to transfer their profes- sional expertise to the private sector while CIA veterans are forbidden to do so? That last issue (like so many others) was, in fact, resolved by the Supreme Court's ruling against me. Under the principles the Court embraced, anybody who assumes a position of trust in the government thereby exposes himself to permanent official curbs on his speech and conduct, regardless of whether he signs a contract to this effect. What remains to be seen is whether the Justice Department will. now use the power it won in my case to punish and deter the likes of Wilson and Terpil. If it does, it will admittedly set a precedent for similar suits .against Helms, Knoche, Henry Kissinger and other powerful form:erbureaucrats who are engaged in more benign business ven- tures arising from their government service. But if it doesn't-out of deference to Helms and Co.-it will make a mockery of the arguments marshaled against me and, more important, forfeit a chance to deliver a so- bering object lesson to those Federal retir- ees who would betray their public trust by . marketing their professional skills to terror- ists and disreputable foreign governments. their employers' trade secrets to competi- guards, and scores of former field opera-- Snepp, a former CIA analyst, lost a suit to tors. But in my case the Gib c>Relliaeh2fiO&2ld4l :c!ool& lag Ot90I ROiJ G@0 Gfb nt for publishing an I was slapped with the standard penalty for pursue business interests in countries where unauthorized book on the fall of Saigon. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-009 JiR a I CLE APPEARED ON PAGE U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 28 September 1981 Headlines are focused on mavericks who train terrorists, spy for hostile powers, leak vital secrets. But the vast_ majority of former agents exploit their. unique expertise for different purposes. When an American spy ends his cloak-and-dagger work r for Uncle Sam, his life in the shadows may not be over. A few maverick ex-agents have continued to lead the covert life even after "coming in from the -cold." Often operating outside the law, these onetime spies cash in on clandestine skills honed-and secrets learned-as govern- ment agents. Sometimes earning millions of dollars, they move in a mysterious, violent world -of guns, explosives, criminals and foreign agents. - - Two former operatives of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy are accused of masterminding a terrorist training school for Libya's 1,luamrnar Qadhafi and supplying him with ex- plosives and technical expertise..A third has been convicted of selling secrets to Russia-the only known case of a double agent in the agency's 34--year history. Some former CIA contract agents, free-lance operators who undertake specif- ic contracts from the agency, have been arrested on drug- smuggling charges. - While only a relative few become outlaws, these none- theless have caused headaches for the vast majority of ex- spies who go into legitimate work. As a result, sentiment is building for tighter restraints on all former agents. Experts agree that those who resort to questionable.activ ides are rare among the thousands of CIA operatives who quit the agency during the 1970s because of purges, scan- dals and disillusionment, Yet the pressures that can create a rogue are felt by all. Foremost is the difficulty of making a new life after a career spent spying, often in exotic places and sometimes amid great danger. Some say it is an addic- tive combination. - There are other problems. Many potential employers are sensitive to public hostility toward the espionage trade and worry about any CIA ties that may remain. Many agents, especially those who have spent a long time spying, lack readily marketable job skills in the business 'world. And some spies simply find themselves suited for no other work. For them, covert activity has become not just a job, but a way of life. - For a at what spies do after leaving the government, U.S.Alews & World Report has focused on a score of ex- agents who have entered private life iii recent years. While -most are respected businessmen, others operate on the wrong side of the law. Both are examined in this report. early 1970 in interna ping expl nate energy by a fede in the Mid Wilson been heaN invasion Cuban e dummy c could be communi CIA in 1? Mideast and India long prison tern f cover agent pQk* Terpil, after his world's biggest g the conflict in L Palestine Liberati In 1976, he an of other former a Middle East. Corp operation. Prosecutors say to open a terrori terrorists were set craft powerful bo alarm clock to a t The two recrui structors, includi tions experts and cret Navy facility of weaponry are ployes, later fire them obtain weal them in other wa At one point, Global TerrorisrrA* Jt 'd Rel$ase 2005/12/140: CI DF -00 A f farmer a ents ave turned to se mg cover s i s t w g e the highest bidders. Prime examples are Francis E. Terpil Ex-CIA agents Edwln Wilson. left, and FrancfsTerpil are accused Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-0090' ARTICLE API'ZA1.RED ON PAGE, ___ .4 1 By Patrick E. Tyler and Al Kamen Wavhingtnn Po Stal Wrib3ts The CIA's discovery that agency employes helped fulfill a terrorism training contract with Libya touched off a major internal houseclean- ing that led to then loss by firing, transfer, at trition or forced retirement of 820 agents in the agency's elite clandestine service. The controversial 1977 housecleaning, only a fraction of which was directly related to the Libyan operation, was initiated by then-CIA' director Adm. Stansfield Turner. It represented the major thrust of the Carter administration's attempt to get control of the agency's covert operations branch and force its agents to adhere to rigid guidelines governing their activities. The controls were mandated in the wake a host of revelations of CIA abuses during the 1960s and early 1970s. The internal shakeup was triggered when Turner learned from a press- inquiry that two active-duty CIA agents appeared to be involved in the Libyan activities of ex-CIA agents EEdwin . P. Wilson and 'Francis E. Terpil. Turner fired the two active duty agents. In unrelated cases, a third and a fourth agent were dismissed, one of them for using a private operative overseas without informing his CIA superiors. Then Turner, already predisposed to further reductions in covert staffing levels, swollen from the Vietnam-war era, launched a massive overhaul of the operations directorate. A team of systems analysts was imposed upon the highly autonomous clandestine branch and, by the time Turner was finished, 17 covert agents had been fired, 157 were asked to retire- involuntarily, 50 were transferred out of the- clandestine service to other CIA divisions and nearly 600 other clandestine jobs were elimi- nated by attrition. At the time, CIA officials insisted' that the exodus from the clandestine service was a rou- tine reduction in force. But this -account, pro- vided by senior intelligence officials, for the_ THE WASHINGTON POST 16 September 1981 first time shows a broader pure and illustrates the significance th .was attached to 'the Wilson-Te case during Turner's four-year to ure.- Turner's actions were attack by veteran intelligence officials as needless --decimation of covert in ligence-gathering capabilities. During his first month in office the spring of 1977, Turner was n -informed, of the investigations t had been initiated nine months e her bye his predecessor, George B In,September, 1976,. one of W son's partners and one of his e ployes told the.agency that Wils was exporting terrorist tr ' ? ....: . materials to Libya's radical dictat Col. Muammar Qaddafi. . Turner discovered that his pre( cessor?had investigated the charge -but had. decided not to fire the two active-duty agents. Instead, Bush officially reprimanded and teas signed-one of them as punishment - for having assisted Wilson in design- ing and building prototype delay- action timers for mass production, according to senior intelligence of- . ficials. familiar with the investigation. The second officer's disciplinary action as well as investigations into the activities of several other active- duty -agents were pending when Turner took office. . Bushwas traveling in Mexico yes- terday-and could not be reached. These,- discoveries - in- - Turner's opening, weeks as CIA director "led to a' major change"" in his approach to the clandestine service, according to one knowledgeable official. In _ his first contact with the agen- cy's internal investigative files Turner ;saw "four people out of con- trol,"-the official said, and many oth- ers who were "still playing cowboy.." Turnoris said to have believed that the -agency's covert 'operations branch.had yet to respond to a new era oftighter control. to tine rinat analysis, the agency-1 lid not respond fully to the Wilson case until Turner's attention Si 'as focused by a Washington Post inqui- ry in April, 1977, according to intel- ligence officials. Before that time, the agency had "fussed around" with several disciplinary investigations of its own agents,, according to one knowledgeable source. A single letter of reprimand and reassignment bad been ordered before Bush left office in January, 1977. Wilson and Terpil were indicted in April, 1980, by a federal grand jury here for allegedly supplying ex- plosives, delayed-action timers and terrorist training and for plotting the assassination of a prominent exile critic of Qaddafi's regime. Other in-1 dictments are expected. And other federal regulatory agen- cies are examining ' their rules and federal laws to curb what federal officials see as an epidemic of illegal arms and technology exports to hos- tile nations. ' _ - The CIA's investigation into Wil- son's dealings with - Libya = began. Labor Day weekend in 1976, when one of Wilson's partners, Kevin, P.J cQN I VUfD Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-FkDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Approved For ReI $BO&L* V(4M T&ti9O1 ROOO6 23 February 1981 Colorado corporations .are becoming increasingly worried-. about security, according to a formertop CIA official, E.. Henry plans to protect their.exeeutives, buiIdings-and trade secrets. H`'e will, direct :a new Rocky'Mountai4 division-.of Guardsmark Inc. the nation's sixth' largqt contractor of security services. Knoche said during aninterview Past week. "It's something that companies used to only worryabo atbudget time, but that is no The growth of anergy firms n Colorado and. Wyoming pro- ?; Knoche was apppoointed depot director ,of the CIA in 1976 and erv s ed,under.CIA Directors'George Bushand Stansfield. Turner: In. that,,ipacity he was, in clime of, the agency's day=today and joined Boeing Aerospace Co. i last month, Knoche was assigned to Denver. The firm lias had a' Denver :office, but it is now expanding its' operations into a' division with a complete range ofsecurity;-crime;prevention:and operating mining and drilling operations in remote areas,-Knoche said,-while high technology comp ames located along the Front Range are concerned about industrial espionage and the safety of their executives,' The bon's share of. our wor involves providing. guards," Knoche said. The, use of security guards is up 75 percent national ly since 1970, he'said, and mor Ethan $12 billion is now spent,' ."In the old days, anysecurity outfit'that could hire awarm body would strap a ;gun on him. and send him out, as a' guard," "Private security guards have no powers to arrest or detain persons, but usually just their presence is enough to deter crime:' he"said " =~ .- - ~ r investigations Guardsniark is frequently called in to perfom when a 'company is suffering from internal- theft; accordingto Approximately $5D billion is-stolen internally each year, he said, and no one knows how much crime is involved in computer theft. Consultants are called in to assist rn complicated computer Sometimes a company just 'wants' its security system as-` sensed, Knoche said, to see how difficult it' is for outsiders to get overseas,'have become increasingly vulnerable to kidnapping or' violence on the part of terrorists, executives are taught defensive driving techniques and ways to reduce their public exposure. of Chinese political affairs. He'.was stationed in' Washington throughout his career, which -later. included management of the :agency's finances...`' Knoche said his most difficult intelligence assignment was in 1975 as. liaison with., congressional committees investigating al- leged intelligence agency abuses He believes that, as-a 'result of the investigations, the, CIA -"hemorrhaged its secrets a little too widely- In intelligence work you; must have secret sources and methods of investigation, once these are revealed you're wiped out;' he said. long:..In`ou p o l i t i c T emof checks."and;balancess,'we can't Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600040001-0 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-009018009600040001-0 Former ?CIA Depu#y4Direc#or E tenry Knoche: :' The counfr , as :become more security conscious Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 ~ A TicL ptp>t or Release 2&(1'9j P#-DP-00901 oir 3 N .HIS STATE OF THE UNION AD- dress, President Carter called for the end of unwarranted restric- tions. on American intelligence agencies. "An effective intelli- gence capability," he said, "is vital to our nation's security." Although the remark drew an ovation, there have been no dramatic initiatives from the Carter administration to revitalize what is generally considered to be a demoral- ized and often dangerously ineffective American intelligence community. Yet the president's words demonstrate that the mood of the administration-and with it, by all indications, that of the country-has changed dramatically from the time when the Central Intelligence Agency was considered to be a "rogue elephant" dangerously out of control. What is required to realize the presi- dent's goals? According to those who have spent their lives in and around the intelligence business, the primary requirement is a change in, the domes- tic attitude toward the CIA. Such per- sons-including former directors and top officials of the agency-say the CIA must be freed from some of the more exaggerated forms of congressional scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which gives more than 200 senators and staff members ac- cess to agency data. They also urge that those members of government and the media who have harassed the intelligence community for the past half decade must now recognize that a vi- able intelligence agency is urgently needed. And, they say, the agency and the. intelligence community as a whole badly need the finest possible leader- ship, both from the White House and from the office of the director of central intelligence (DCI). That post is cur- rently occupied by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and in the view of an impres- sive number of intelligence experts, Admiral Turner is not able to lead the CIA back to respectability. ITHIN MONTHS OF HIS. 1977 appointment - as DCI, Stansfield Turner had acquired the nick-. name "Captain Queeg" in CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. One morning in January 1979, he came to work to find the bulletin boards and mailboxes full of a forged edition of his own "Notes From the Director." Dated January 15, it has become an underground classic in the intelligence community: - I was in my office fairly exhausted last evening after stopping work at 10 P.Ai. As is my wont Pfter a h4b,t 4 ML The Washington Quarterly. StanslieldTurner;critics say, has luUtb=d the CIA. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-0090 lil.= ,U'ri:- THE WASHINGTON POST t3 pAG _ - 1 March 1980 "Byi3iIl Peterson -,No one is?'sure.who tacked up thee'-, red, white and; blue "George Bush for President" poster. beside the entrance to the CIA'-headquarters ' in' Langley,; \ a:, recently - , : ~: --Workmen quickly `tole it ? down on.;:: the mistaken assumption that the pia ,? ter was on CIS..' property. `!'We're studrt,= iously. staying- `neutral An presiders tibl politics," said press spokesman;' Dale Peterson. But- the poster -was an important:" symbolic gestiu?e,- a-., commeutary;'on ' " the-1980 -presidential race"-and" `the; changing attitudes about - the;CI&''. Simply-, put*, no, presidential cam- paign --in .- recent:, memory-perhaps support~- ever has -attracted as.?much- from the: ntefligence:commtinity a the campaign of former CLAjdirecto?; Bush ... , One top foreign policy' and-defense adviser is Rag Cline,:a.former deputy,; director ofthe CIA and director of Irt telligence and research. at,the; State r Department- Another, defense: adviser,,,c is Lt. Gen. Sam V. -Wilson; - a former: director of the Defense Intelligence. Agency. ~?; ,., -Lt:-'Gen." Harold A:' Aaron, a fore iCr ' deputy : director of DIA, js on. Bush's?- national?steering committee, B;enry, Knoche;.Bush;s right-hand man-at the-el. CIA and:latet`-acting director of the'! agency, is quietly campaigning for Bush in the West. And Robert Gam- bino recently left.. his job-as CIA?direc for of, security to work full-time for Bushy:- At Ieast 20, othei`.'formet' intelli- gence officers-are working in various' volunteer, capacities with. the .'Bush campaign. Bruce Rounds, . director. cf- operations for Bush 'hi New. f#amp-.. shire, is a former CIA officer. -So is Tennessee finance '" chairmaif . Jon Thomas., Virginia coordinator = Jack' Coakley is a past executive director of the -Association of Former- ?- Intelli- gence: Officers, And at least' three.re tired CIA officers work on Bush's 5 search staff:- ,. 'It's sure as hell not,'a CIA' coup 'or , anything like that,'.r says Coakley for.: thet eis:.'a trery High level of; support for -George -Bush among. current ,and farmer. CIA:employes.'. . .A few years ago when'the CIA was under-.;almost daily. attack for its . abuses.,and? :excesses, no _ candidate would have dared accept such sup- port. But today Bush openly welcomes it, and at almost every stop he re- loudest applause. when_ be calls fora stronger CIA. _ Bush's -political advisers: originally were wary.of their.-candidate's CIA ties. In 'a world where secret police forces ? routinely overthrow govern- ments, they obviously didn't want him to-- become labeled -the : CIA candi- date." Some of the ex-employes themselves worried' about a backlash. "I could see the-headlines:.. Bush Sprinkles. Cam- paign With Former Spooks,". says= one cued-that the public mood on the CIA .~ was shifting. Foreign policy adviser Cline; now= director of the Center for, Strategic and" International Studies at Gedrgetown 'University; had been delivering pro=CIA lectures on college campuses and elsewhere since .1973 when he left the government in- dis- gust "over" what they :were ;doing to the intelligence agencies." `For-years, he -was heckled at almost every. stop. "I don't get any. heckling now. In. fact,' I'm quite popular," -he says. '.'I found there was a tremendous. constituency. for the CIA in'the sticks when :everyone" in Washington was still urinating all over it:' Bush bought Cline's argument- "He -felt he did .a good job at the -CIA, and the. support of.retired officers was a reflection of that," says 'press secre ` tary Peter. Teeley. 'Quite; frankly; ..CIA veteran. "I've been beating this bush since 1974 and it's just dawning on people that we need stronger Intel- ligence gathering.'-:- "It's panned out almost too good to be true," he adds:. "The country is waking up just in time for George's, candidacy.' There certainly 'isn't anything im- proper about the iinvolvement of for- mer intelligence officers in a political 'campaign: All of those working for Bush appear to be retired or ex-intelli- I gence officers. And the "old boy" in- telligence network doesn't. dominate the Bush campaign any mere than other networks of former associates .Bush developed in his days at Yale University, the Republican National Committee, of which _ he was chair- man, the State Department, (Bush was U.ti. ambassador "and envoy to China), f Congress or in the oil busipess. But there were. some rumblings of uneasiness in the intelligence net- work. 'When the Association of For-: mer Intelligence Officers held its an- niual banquet last October, former ex- ecutive director Coakley counted 180'. of the -24b persons -present wearing; George Bush buttons. And he recalls; David Phillips,, , the association) founder, declaring:-:`.'Ladies' and gent-i lemen, we have- a problem and that! problem- is George Bush-" - . ? Coakley. and other. former intelli-I gence; officers - see the support for Bush as a? perfectly natural phenome- non. "This is the first time any signifi- cant number of ? us. have ever gotten involved in a presidential race. I don't! think it's because lie's one of.us.:After: all, he was.only, at the.CIAon-e year." ' -`But he was there-,'when..everytbing 1was going downhillPeople there Per-, -ceived_ him as someone-who did, a very- -good job , .under difficult - circum- stances," he -continues. ;"Maybe-more :.important, he's.the only candidate any of.us can remember:who-has made the - agency an`issue..lie's: the guy' who' ~ralsed:the intelligence community to a- `.:national_campaignassuez, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Ll TICY:g bPY . l1CD W1 FAG~: But Critics Despair That Soy Agent Can't Do Good job. Second of two articles lay Henry S. Bradsher Wash ingtodStar Staff Writer Looking casual in a navy blue' cardigan but speaking intensely, Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass. wall of his office, atop the CIA head quarters at Langley, over the bare dusky woods toward the distant lights of Washington and exuded confidence about his organization. "I'm just very optimistic these days," Turner said. "I've been very impressed by the quality of our human intelligence activities," the CIA director said. And U.S. technical intelligence is superlative, he added. In other government offices in the city, most of them looking across concrete courtyards at other offices instead of having spacious views, in the private. offices of people who have left the government, in small restaurants, in telephone' calls from coast Ito coast, others talk about the. CIA, too. Some, like-former-CIA Director' William E. Colby and former Deputy Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk for quotation about things like re- strictions on the agency. But most prefer to discuss the agency's prob- lems from the protection of anonymity. Turner understandably is'angered by this, especially on.the most emo- tional aspect of his three-year tenure at Langley, the forced retirement of people from the clandestine serv- ices. He argues that he rejuvenated an aging agency. "The- next time someone tells you," he said, "that Turner Is'the stupid bastard who cut the size of. the agency out here, look at the color of his hair.... This is a young, man's game, and we are better equip- ped today than we were three years ago" for,clandestine operation,,. THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 5 February 1980 1 The CIA is composed of three main branches. The clandestine or opera- tions branch handles spying and covert operations, like, intervening secretly in other countries'. affairs or organizing guerrilla movements. Another branch supervises techni- cal intelligence, including recon- naissance satellite photography and communications intercepts. An. ana- lytical branch pulls information together for government policymak- ers. The controversy that has marked Turner's almost three years at the agency focuses on the operations branch. There is also widespread but less publicized distress around Washington about analysis. In both cases, Turner inherited problems. His critics say.he exacer- bated them; his supporters contend that he has done much to clear them, up: . Once Was Twice as Large "secret army" in Laos, added to worldwide spying, pushed the num-! ber of agency operatives to 8,500 in the late 1960s - roughly double its present size. As the Nixon adminis- tration began to reduce U.S. commit- ments in Indochina,'personnel had to be reduced by attrition, transfers and other means. During his brief tenure as CIA director, James R. Schlesinger speeded up a cutback. Colby, his 1 successor, continued the program, and so did George Bush during his year as director. Most sources agree that they were handled sensibly. Then President Carter took -Turner from his navy admiral's com- mand and sent him to, Langley. He arrived with what the old CIA hands considered to be a skeptical, even hostile,'attitude. This set a chilly tone to his take= over, despite his own explanations that he simply wanted to.bring bet- ter management to a sometimes un- coordinated operation. His suspi- cions of the need for drastic changes were quickly reinforced by the resignation of John Stockwell, a 40- .year-old agent in the unsuccessful .CIA effort in Angola.:.. , , ... .. sent out the' first 212 pink slips on- Oct. 31,1977. . Although smaller than previous'; cuts, this one was handled differ- ently and hit harder at lifetime professionals in the spying and para- military trades. Says Cuts Helped Agency "The cuts in personnel that every- one still complains to me about have strengthened t:he agency's covert ac- tioncapabilities,"Turnersaid. "You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action pro-:; gram with a bunch of 55-year-olds;" he said. "What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure ....a.nd doubled the input into the clandes- tine services . . . so that we have a group of young tigers, and there's enough accumulated experience and expertise around to- guide f them." This is strongly challenged by peo- ple in a position to know. t "Whatever Turner says, they can't put on a show," says a Pentagon offi- 'j cial who is very familiar with the CIA's present operational capabil- "We know that over in Ihis ities. building.".:. Other sources spell this out in; more detail. One saysthe CIA's corps, of paramilitary specialists who could { help organize, for instance, a more, effective Afghan resistance to Soviet control has declined from about 200 I to-80, and many of the 80 lack the; broad experience needed for effec-l tiveness. But Colby comments that, tf the people in an operational area feel CIA help is vital, they will find ways- to-speed it up. ? The'.worst: part of Turner's. -changes, numerous present,and re- tired officials say, is what they did to CIA morale.. While he recognizes, o ale suffered, but contends it - Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R00060 ,X lr ing. back up,- others say' that It is at best bumping along slide-_ Si':111~;G ON POST Approved For Release 2?&f,.J )/14 (JCIA-RDP91-00901 R00p600040001-0 Switch to CIA- - In the ensuing bureaucratic battle, which included a high-level meeting at, CIA' headquarters, Bush refused to be' stampeded by' the'` alarmists who turned out to,-be'wrong. -Althougli'he was CIA'directoi-he'alsogave face to some junior State 'Department partici- pants- whom =he remembered .from past diplomatic'duty . He Invited them into his office to see his Chinese rugs, leaving ?.more senior `? advisers from other agencies wondering what was:, going on.' .. .. "He's riot tie kind of. person who goes out looking for issues," added an- other CIA veteran who. knew Bush while he was at the agency; "but he really did a, tremendous job stabiliz- ing the situation, improving morale and getting people working again." "He's..not an. intellectual." this source said. -"He lives day to day and he doesn't-brood over anything. He doesn't agonize. But he's very compe- titive, He's ferocious, on the tennis court. He's got to win." - Bush's decision to resign when Pres- ' ident Carter was inaugurated troubled 'Knoche a - bit.. because that carried - with it a suggestion that-the job had been polit1cize4: But.the: deputy DCI was still impressed enough with his boss ,to award Bush the. CIA's Intel.li- ; gence Medal of Merit for his burst of activity following (arter's election.' 'In a single day,- Bush met with Pres- ident- Ford alone in the. Oval office, thed' sat down with Vice President -gockefeller.:?.'conferred with..,the, head of -'thee; Office of_ Management- and i Budget,.about &-.-money crunch,. and then flew down ,to. Plains,. Ga., with Knoche to.brief'C6rter and.V.ice Pres- identelectbTonclale: foP`six lydurs -on the- CIA's, secrets,--sources. and meth- ods. On the., flight back; Bush drafted a memo for Secretary of State Henry A.-Kissinger, :who. was to, e Carter the next. clay, land dropped ''se it off at I{issInger's house at I- a_m. Knoche, as the man.iri charge of the:CIA's day-, to-day operations, tcibk ft;uppa hint- self to give 'Bush *his medal at the daily, top-level staff meeting in Lang- ley a.fewhours later. -- nese- on - their side of -the Taiwan straits' But the: State.Dep'artrnent. dis- I puted that interpretatibitf6 el,, ull, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Bush stayed in Peking a little more than a year, when Ford asked him to return to Washington, to take over the) Central' Intelligence Agency: It was a controversial choice in the Senate be- cause of Bush's : past Identification with partisan "politics....Eventually Ford had to promise not?'to consider Bush as a running .mate. in:._1976 to convince- the' Senate to c.ouf .ri b m. - There was some puzzlerpent over why Bush would want to take-.over-the a troubled agency... Its misdeeds. and shortcomings were still. tumbling. into the- headlines as the'result, -6f -House and' Senate "investigatioiii: ;The .direc- torship of the CIA hardy=: looked' like a political 'asset; Nand..Bush.. acknowl- edged that he hoped'td'return to poli- tics one, day. Nevertheless, he said, :?he regarded the work as "desperately .important to the survival of this country-.and-to the survival of freedom around -the world. ' And-`second,'T lie .told-'the: --Senate Armed Services Committee,,"old-fash= - ioned as it may. seem,.td some; it as my duty to serve my country"' Bush pledged to keep, politics' out of Intelligence, and :many praised him for succeeding. "I was, very-concerned about his appointment,'.' recalled Sens Mathias, who was. a? member, of the In telligence committee:'`But:.it. worked out fine." William Miller, the-commit -1 tee's staff director; said Bush ".worked very hard, asked. for 'hetp. and advice .and before long-he:had:everyone's re- spect."; ~?>z ~~., r He=also-reassured, thezjveteraii Cr'4"' employes who ,were-. feeling distinctly: unloved-at the time Bush;*carne- to the,' .agency."Instead of--coming in-hostile and- suspicious-as, [Adm.'- Stansfieldi... Turner did -[aftei- :Bush]',- he' took -a -look-around the'agency;'talked- to-'peo-- . pie and decided he liked it It'was ter- ribly,. to+:have as -boss, who felt like that;' recalls E. -Henry Knoche, who` served as' deputy' direc- tor. under Bush:, . - '.+ -. Bush built a reputat[on'ainbn inteI- '=ligeni+e officersuasg -mari,~vho could listen and change his- intrid: -In_-'the ' ?summerbf ?1976;'sou-eces seYj'hIarums were'sounde&So4eeWNkt?sdrne'COn3Id- eyed- provocative -'activity' by the Chi- Approved For ReleasVflbbY1:9g4V 29 November N"FW-1dAo1ROO0600 a SC BY MARY'B g(!nce?A,gency(IA) i not at all; ille th volves informed aments on, military. eco Wnornics geography,,; political, technology, cording eta ;: forrpei apabrlitres and nten , drrectorxnow jhvrng,' Lion Y. of ,:_ foreign. j n the 25 y~ rs nfarmedg iudgm ents can be collcted for the. have been in the CIA; Ikkare given to. the resi judgments; a number have never had a single dent and his advisers, of ways: " nformation opportunity that James,} for determining f ireign, can be colt eted openly '' ' Bond ;:has, ; quipped and defenses policy for + * .by. newsp. per,, teIe= hers of the University ' 4 Rotas t:CIub: ; Knoche,,, wha r~oine he 'CIA in .`T953 and specialized in interna= tional affairs, was. CIA' 1977 to March 9, 197T.,; - ver y . _Scholar ly` oe; the . nation,;: said Objectivity portant, noted . /e,.c "aie::the, k'ing's . ''em as you see 'em .; witnout regard: rlo rignt Republican, ngrth `or south ?''"' countries a#d.?you can. governmerilTis ;thinking . -about" J r attention to-themedia. Informat on': can also'' .-be collected h ysatellites, photography, and espio- . nage "'What are the. --decisions that are being 'made behixrd`:closed' doors? h?? Knoch acknowledged'; that faire question o sk. how do you cpn&C j such any agency ? . ;CongrYe s: _ n lrnes~have t en issued,' he .'s.d ` ani '!No gov- ernment should be"le t for, anylei Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001 -0 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 600040001-0 At TICLE A?PEn2 ED ON P ^ GE__ ? ___ THE CIA: Suicide or Murder? just as he-was about to board his boat for a day's sail on Chesapeake Bay a fortnight ago, CIA consultant john A... Paisley accidentally dropped his brief- case into the water. He quickly fished it out. "It's a project I've been working on .for six months," - he explained to his friend Mike Yohn. "I've got to get the damn thing done." Paisley shoved off from shore and shortly before nightfall he radioed Yohn: "I'm just about to come back. _. Leave the lights.on for me." He never made it. The Coast Guard found the boat aground the next morning. Pais- ley was missing and his papers were scattered about- Last week, a pleasure boat came across Paisley's bloated body-with 38 pounds of divers weights around his torso and a fatal gunshot wound in his head. _ Was it suicide or murder? Because Paisley was an expert on the Soviet mili- tary budget and had access to top-secret material, there were early fears that he might have been killed by the KGB, Mos- cow's spy service. And some even enter- tained the notion that he mighthave been a double-agent forthe Russians. "If a guy kills himself and there's no apparent rea- son, you have to ask yourself, 'Has he been up to some dirty work? " said one NEWSWEEK 16 October 1978 veteran spook. But the KGB is not known ever to have killed aCIA staff official, and authorities speculate that Paisley prob- ably killed himself for personal reasons. The evidence seems to support them. Friends say Paisley, 55, was depressed two years ago when he broke up with his wife and, more recently, when his mother became ill. His girlfriend, Betty Myers, who is a psychiatric social work- er, is not convinced that Paisley commit- ted suicide, but concedes that "there were some painful things in John's life." Myers had recently taken a job in Cum- berland, Md., about two hours from Washington, and. Paisley was bothered about the separation. "I knew from little things that he minded," she says. There were other upheavals as well. Paisley had retired early from the intel- ligence agency in 1974 because, as one colleague says? "he wanted to get away from it all for awhile." But retirement didn't work out quite the way Paisley thought it would-even with his con- sulting work for The Company. "just living the life of the beachcomber and mariner was kind of disappointing to . him," says Hank Knoche, Paisley's for- mer CIA boss. - Speed Limit: Early this year, Paisley's family urged him to begin group therapy, and he later resumed full-time work with an accounting firm-because, Myers says, he needed the money. "He was falling behind a little bit," she says. "He needed a steadier income until the kids were well through school." When he turned 55 last summer, he told a friend that he was going to stay "within the speed limit." The friend thought at the time that Paisley meant he would slow down his pace of work, but in retrospect another friend thinks Paisley meant that be did not intend to live past 55. Still, there are some unanswered ques- tions. The small 9-mm handgun that Paisley kept aboard his boat is missing. If Al" Paisley on his boat: 'Leave the lights on' he shot himself, of course, it might have- fallen overboard with his body. But the Maryland police say that the bullet re. covered from Paisley's head is "slightly heavier than would normally come from that type of gun.`" it tests show that the - bullet could not have come from Pais- ley's gun, authorities might have to focus on the possibility of murder. And if - any classified documents are missing, -- Paisley's death becomes more suspect. But the CIA says that it can account for all the classified documents available to Paisley. To Betty Myers, the whole thing re- mains a painful enigma. And though sui- cide seems the most likely answer, it seems probable that no one will ever know for sure just what happened in fAT last hours of John Paisley's life. -OENNti9 A W N LUM5'Me DAV O MARTIN in W i'MgIc, _" Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600040001-0 Approved For Release 20q 2/ -l-0099 6 August 1978 starts anew 0 .by. CAROL NANNINGA. Times staff reporter Can a man who has spent. 24 years "with=: the Central Intelli- :genre-Agency, find happiness and satisfaction as a business execu- Live? That is what L.-Henry Knoche, former- deputy director of the C.I.A., has come to Seattle to find out. Last.,month Knoche/ began a' -:new administrative career with the Boeing Aerospace Co. He left .the C.I.A. a little more than a year ago because, he says, -he "did'-riot see eye-to-eye"with -.. Adm. Stanfield Turner who -be- came C.I.A director its March, 1977. "We . had a' different ap- proach;,? Knoche said. "'that out--. fit - deserves.- two . leaders ..:: who were comps-tible and did seeeye- _to-eye. "I left the C.I.A. with a great deal of agony. To leaver, It at a time when -,it was having some difficulties was not an easy thing to do. I had the feeling at the time it was almost like deserting." Knoche said investigations . of the agency, including of its role in plots to kill-Cuban President Fidel Castro and to overthrow Chile's government, did not seem. to dam agge- the` morale.- of C.A" em- ployes:- But the: arrival of Admiral - Turner did:~ti Turner, who-came into the- or-- ganization -from.- the outside,:. seemed to- be asking himself how he could make sure he had the agency, under control, Knoche said.... _ Y - w "What Turner~ didn't "kno Is: that is not a' question. you have-to' - worry about'. with the Knoche said. "People are instinc-? tively loyal upward'to the boss. C.LA. employes ertdured? all the public scrutiny only to find them- selves "confronted with this feel- ing of hostility and criticism `rom? within,."] nocheexplained.. Criticism -from -within. is a:very - .delicate matter, Knoche believes. He- citese the case of, _ Frank Snepp, a former. C.I.A. agent whose earnings from. a:book-about- the, agency have been- impounded- by"_the federal governnt P r4 Knoche- said the damage hone by such a book is unmeasurable. "It's like asking yourself;;`.'How- many sources, would have worked with the C.I.A. if all this-- hadn't happened?' , : k _x:; "As- a member of the C.I. If you were able. - to - run across. a, Russian who was willing to impart highly- critical-- information. ` about A secret matters inside' the Soviet:: Union; do you think he would join us for one minute if he thought his name was going to-be in The New.: York Times or in a book by a. C.I.A.. employe the next days "Of course he wouldn't." /': . , ; The secrecy agreement C.I.A, employes sign as a promise to protect forever their sources holds the system together, Knoche said. So the C.I.A., needs to protect the confidentiality of sources as much- as the media, he said. ? . Knoche wishes -"whistle: blow- ers" like Snepp- would. "operate- within the system to get changes made. While I wouldn't : rule out the right of anybody to take a ,case to the media, I would think that person should have first ex- hausted the system and taken pain not to divulge sources,. or ,.meth.-.. ods, he said.. ? "The C.I.A. has nevet bensored= a point of .view: Any, merican has the right.to reach conclusions; about foreign policy. "-' And. the public could _ make some. of-those decisions. better if it knew something about the -C.I.A: s budget,,:, Knoche believes.: "Some"": approximation of ? the overall fig-: ure should- berg- largely: known. think thee figure is small- enough that it . is a. bargain, - and most Americans would see. it, that way.'? But, he warns, a detailed public accounting has its. dangers. "`Foreign intelligence, services would-begin analyzing the budget and,-make rather informed ju g ments as to where the level of effort is. They they would begin to...., plan counter, moves' .;, ;