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April 14, 1981
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?Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-009 1R000600210056-1 NORWICH BULLETIN (CT) 14 April 1981 Sovieis em rk in 12 anti-America By WILLIAM PARHAM -? Bulletin Staff Writer . The Bulletin has learned that a new Soviet covert action ca on a series of forgeries of U.S. official documents sugges Europeans that they are facing a new holocaust because of with the U.S. - A Reagan Administration source familiar with such campan Bulletin, "There is no doubt that if U.S.-Soviet Relations deteriox at.c - there will be more anti-U.S. propaganda and covert action of this type." The Soviet Union already spends several billion dollars a year in anti- U.S. covert action and propaganda ? the world's largest such effort. And this does not include Soviet-controlled propaganda and covert action efforts .on the part of Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Hungary and other Soviet bloc intelligence services. Last year? Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director for Operations John McMahon testified before Congress in closed committee session that the :Soviets were spending from $3 billion to $4 billion a. year on anti-U.S. covert . , action and propaganda. "The Soviets have established, a worldwide network of agents, organiza- tions, and technical facilities" to implement these programs, McMahon told the House Intelligence Committee. ' ? "That network is second W none In comparison to the major world , powers in its size and effectiveness." According to McMahon and other sources, such covert "active mea- sures", as distinguished from the normal intelligence collection and counterintelligence functions of the KGB, have included: ?Written and oral "disinformation". In May 1978, Soviet Ambassador to Zambia Solodovnikov warned Zambian President Kaunda falsely that Soviet Intelligence had learned _British and American intelligence services were plotting to overthrow him. Kaunda was advised against making a trip to Britain and the U.S., since his departure was to precipitate the coup. Soloclovnikov said falsely that the U.S. and Britain had used a similar plan to overthrow Nkrurnah of Ghana. , ? Forgeries and false rumors. A bogus U.S; Army field manual was _ _ cited by the Soviets as proof that the CIA was secretly Manipulating the terrorist Red Brigades who murdered Italian leader Aldo Moro. This happened after it was reported that the Red Brigades had received training in Czechoslovakia and had ties with the Soviet Union. "Whenever the KGB is caught red-handed in an outrageous action that threatens the Soviet Union with serious embarrassment," wrote Reader's Digest Senior Editor John Barron in his book KGB: the Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, "it hurriedly commences disinformation operations to divert , world attention from the event. Frequently the KGB simply accuses others of doing precisely what it has been shown to have done." The forged field manual used in the Moro case also was used by the Soviets to try to prove that U.S. military and intelligence liaisons abroad are used as cover to penetrate and manipulate friendly foreign governments. ? "Gray" or unattributed propoganda. Men the Soviets want to 'create an aura of authenticity around an otherwise implausible position, they use a system of press placements through non-Soviet journalists recruited to make sure Soviet articles surface in the local foreign press. , . Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-009011i000600210.056-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901 1071117CLE APP ON PAGE SOVIET AID DISPUTED IN TERRORISR STUDY A Draft CIA: Report, Novi Being Revievi' ed, Finds listifficien Evidenbe'of Direct Role"- - ' By?JUDITH MILLER. , Special to The New York Tleses WASHINGTON, March 28?A draft re- port produced by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that there is insuf- ficient evidence to substantiate Adminis- tration charges that the Soviet Union is directly helping to foment international terrorism,. Congressional and Adminis- tration sources said today. William J.. Casey; Director of Central Intelligence; has asked his analysis, the sources said, to review their conclusions; given the substantial opposition to the re- port from other agencies. . ? The draft estimate, produced by the C.I.A.'s National Foreign Assessments Center, has stirred debate within Admin- istration foreign policy circles, as foreign affairs spokesmen have publicly accused the Soviet Union of training, equipping, and financing :-,international terrorist gxouPs. ' - The review'; of the draft. estimate has once again raised questions about the relationship between intelligence offi- cials and policy makers, with some C.I.A. officials concerned that the agency is coming under pressure tor tailor its analy- sis to fit the policy views of the Adminis- tration. e . - Charges In Last Administration,y ? , Similar rbarges were made during, the Carter Administration and resulted in frequently bitter exchanges between policy makers and intelligence officials:, Bruce C. Clark, who heads the agency's assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring from the April, in what officials said was a personal decision unrelated to the dispute over the intelligence estimate on terrorism. ....."4:i , ? NEW YORK TIMES 29 MARCH 1981 One official said that a successor hac not been named, but another indicate( that Mr. Clark's successor would be th( current director of the agency's opera tionsunit, John McMahon. The special national intelligence esti mate on terrorism was begun soon atm the Administration took office,- official said. Secretary of State. Alexander Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first new: conference that the Soviet Union, as par of a "conscious policy," undertook th "training, funding and equipping" of ir temational terrorists. ? The Administration has subsegnentt said that combatting international tei rorisrn is one of its key, foreign policy at 2.` A 'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role - In addition, Richard V. Allen, Pres dent Reagan's national security advise said in an interview with ABC News thi week that "ample evidence': had been ac cumulated to demonstrate the Sovie ?.Union's involvement in international ter rorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet Union was "probably".'supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, which he said must be identified as a terrorist organization, through . financial assist- ance and through support of its "main aims." ? I: -; Finally; Mr: -Allen concluded that Is- raeli air raids into southern Lebanon should be generally recognized as a "hot pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified." - Officials said that the draft estimate contained some factual evidence to sup- port charges that the Soviet Union was di- rectly '., aiding and abetting terrorist groups, but that in. many instances the evidence of such involvement was either murky orhonexistent. The estimate, which was circulated for comment to the State Department, Na- tional Security Council, Defense Intelli- gence Agency, and the National Security Agency, stirred angry debate and re- ? ',??: 000600210056-1 commented.!' '\\.. ?-? _Other Administration and Congres- sional officials, however, voiced concern that the agency was'-once again being asked to tailor its views to fit the public pronouncements lot senior Administra- tion officials. L ? "There would not have been a review if the estimate's conclusions had totally supported the Administration's charges," the official said. ? ? Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000606210056-1 Approved For Releas021:05FRITC911A-EMEIC010033 R0006 January 1981 0210056-1 WAS SCENE.. .from the AlAA Washington Of ft ? CIA Deputy Director John McMahon, in testimony before a House Intelligence Subcommittee, estimated that the Soviet Union had spent $200 million on propaganda and covert campaigns against NATO deployment of enhanced- radiation (neutron-bomb) weapons and the modernization of theater nuclear weapons. Enhanced radiation weapons (ERVV) increase radiation while greatly reducing blast (tenfold) and heat damage to surrounding areas. Made for use in short-range, tactical nuclear weapons such as the Lance missile and 8-in. howitzer, they would probably be used against large con- centrations of Warsaw Pact tanks, a major threat to NATO. The campaign against the neutron bomb began in the summer of 1977 and was manifested in a series of coor- dinated diplomatic moves, overt propaganda, and covert political action, said McMahon. It began in the Soviet and East European press and spread to communist international front groups all over the world. "The purpose of this front- group activity was to maintain the campaign's momentum and to draw noncommunists into the campaign, particularly In Western Europe. What had begun as a Soviet effort now appeared to many as a general public reaction to the alleged horrors of the neutron bomb," said McMahon. By far the most important comments, said McMahon, appeared in the noncommunist press in the political center or on the left. "A segment of this press could be counted on to react almost automatically once the neutron bomb re- ceived attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Others in this group could be expected to react negatively for .various reasons: anti-Americanism, doubts on NATO's viabil- ity, hope for maintaining goad relations with the Soviet Union, or an honest distaste for the development of new. Veapons of mass destruction. For the Soviets the real propaganda success lay in the broad, adverse editorial treat- ment given the bomb by this second journalistic sector." A second front was formed using direct contacts between politicians and organizations on both sides of the iron curtain. "In late January 1978," McMahon continued, "every Western government announced that it had received a letter from Brezhnev warning that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb constituted a serious threat to detente....Western parliamentarians received similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet, and Soviet trade-union officials sent letters to Western union organizations and their leaders." It was clear, the CIA official said, that the So- viets were focusing their attack on our NATO allies, who had to decide whether to accept deployment of the weapons on their soil. Still other approaches were made at UN disarmament meetings, Soviet front organizations, and European Com- munist Party-sponsored meetings, said McMahon. One such meeting, the "International Forum Against the Neutron Bomb," organized by the Dutch Communist Party, drew 40,000 people from all over Europe. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 While it is difficult to assess the full impact of the anti- neutron-bomb campaign, the Carter Administration in April of 1978 deferred production of the enhanced-radiation ele- ment of the warheads indefinitely while proceeding with modifications to the warheads themselves to make them compatible with ER components. In commenting on the re- sults of the Soviet bloc campaign, the CIA testimony quoted the chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Berecz, as saying, "The political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most sig- nificant and most successful since World War 11." McMahon also noted that "the Soviet Ambassador to the Hague (Netherlands) at that time was subsequently decorated by the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in recognition of the success of the Dutch Communist Party, under his direction, in organizing the high point of the anti- neutron bomb campaign." With the neutron bomb temporarily defused, testified McMahon, the Soviet Bloc turned its efforts against the U.S.- initiated move to modernize the theater nuclear forces (TNF) by deploying the highly accurate ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and the Pershing II missile. Scheduled for de-1 ployment In late 1983, they will, for the first time, place tar- gets on Soviet soil within range of NATO ground-based mis- siles. The purpose of the modernization is to minimize the risk that the Soviets might believe they could use their long- range weapons to make or threaten limited strikes against Western Europe without NATO being able to respond in kind. The Soviet Bloc campaign Used tactics similar to those in the neutron-weapon effort, McMahon said, including con- tacts with legislators, mass meetings, and a worldwide press and poster campaign. The posters, he testified, "adorned every block and wall in Western Europe." Some of the argu- ments used against modernization of the TNF were that the transfer of cruise-missile technology was prohibited under SALT 11 and that the TNF would undermine future arms-con- trol negotiations. Despite the Soviet Bloc efforts, NATO approved TNF mod- ernization in December 1979, although the Netherlands and Belgium deferred a decision on whether to allow basing these weapons on their soil. The British government strongly supported TNF, but the leaders of its Labor Party have strongly opposed basing cruise missiles on English soil. Another witness at the hearing described the types of contacts possessed by Soviet Bloc intelligence and their ef- fectiveness in carrying out such campaigns. He was Ladislav Bittman, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Depart- ment of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. Batman I defected to the West after the Soviet invasion of his country in 1968. He gave an inside view of Soviet Bloc intelligence ac- tivities a decade earlier. His Disinformation Department had; close contacts with West European media. It put out false I stories for Western consumption, including forged docu- ments. Forgeries of documents attributed to President Car- 1 ter and Vice President Mondale were material at the hearings. Bittmann's department also operated "agents-of- influence," high-level westerners who held key positions In foreign governments or media who would aid them in their mission. Bittman said he personally controlled several mem- bers of the West German parliament and a director of a na- tional television network in a western European country. He also mentioned that the Czechs had several agents among imktifiglitinteitikbelogimiMxipithe mid-Sixties. In offering advice on flow to counteract Soviet propaganda and covert action, Bittman focused on the American phe- 1 Approved For RWINItectIOINIPPV280:f GIA4140PaigelikUltkROLI0400 10056-1 "This situation creates, of course, a great advantage for So- viet Bloc intelligence. Their officers sent to the United States are always surprised by what they call the political naivete and credulity of many Americans, politicians, and jour- nalists. From the press or accidental contacts they are able to get information for which they would have to pay a high price In any West European country." Bittman gave as an example the investigation of the CIA several years ago by the Congress and the press. "Sensitive information about CIA operations around the world, for which the KGB used to pay hundreds of thousands of dol- lars," he said, "was suddenly available In the press. The sec- retary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington clipped the infor- mation from the New York Times or the Washington Post." He added, "If somebody had at this moment the magic key that would open the Soviet Bloc Intelligence safes and looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western countries, he would be surprised....A relatively high percent- age of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in Great Britain, West Germany, or the United States is a great ? asset to communist intelligence. He can be Investigative and professionally curious. This is particularly true in the United States, with its tradition of an aggressive, adversary press." Bittman also noted that "there are important newspapers around the world penetrated by communist intelligence ser- vices. There are one or two journalists working for a particu- lar paper who are agents and who receive from time to time InstruCtions to publish this story or that story once or twice a 'year....There are newspapers In the West which are owned by Communist intelligence services. The Czechoslovak service, for example, owns several newspapers in the Western Bloc. There are publishing houses owned by the cpmmunist intelli- gence services." Bittman concluded, "I am not trying to start a new witch hunt against journalists. I am trying only to explain that journalists are one of the major targets, and journalists play ' a very important role for Communist Bloc intelligence. That is why they are a highly sought commodity." [Ed.?Like, one ; would suppose, any well placed military, government, or company employee. Spies will be spies.] Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-0090/ R000600210056 1 kil7 'ARTICLE APPIURED ON PAGE / WILMINGTON SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL 13 APRIL 1980 .watoFtwoarh?s ghi 1980, Th? C? By JOE TRENTO buting nearly 7 pounds of pure her- oirLeThe outcome of the trial forced :din to:modify his threa t. Now, he : Wants to "See RICHARD that'll:Ls. friends. .r.:and SANDZA--e- - coria 11,1.:?4 ; neither :deported to ,Iran, nor sen.:: - ;: Stall . .adenti ; e fenced to jail. One friend is the son BETHE'SDA,.;:Md,-;?-;- -...?BIoomig of the founder Of Savak, the Iranian. :-dale's is a strange place to meet a secret Police; the other is an Iranian t!:forrner CIt operative who is threat--.. restaurant owner7..,?,-eir , tening his . ex-employers -with the since the - poielication c_ of_ his _release of 7,500 agents' names and threats, the media, ,to,o, has begun other state secrets ii they don't do stalking --.--I)eneselya..-?,.? Novi : `.`60 what he wants them to do. . minotesi ).mieeewalizee, CBs, Fred Nevertheless a't precisely 11 'arm' Graham, the: Washington Post and .,-?;one day. this month, asmal! bearded . the Assmated Press call him. Den- .,. arrived at the fourth floor of eselyads stiinned by it all. - ethe White -Flint Mall, store,-ernerg- ? He cloe not seem to c6 .mPrehend. ing..through . the. stemware' depart- that his schenie to "get even" with. .:ment carrying a plastic briefcase. the U.S. governrnent has- attracted . . .? , worldnidde attention and made him a'Public- figure. He feels-himself a martyr' for an :Unknown cause. The officials he has , indeed ,harassed, for years call him men- .understand.. He doesn't say so ? but... '.tally unbalanced and a menace. Yet the faceless:justice..pursuing him they have done PotP.18 to. put him- soundi like something Out of Frani. belund bars.? ? ? ? . ..--,Kafka's novel "The - :He tarrie4 down 1."60 Minutes"!..:, Deneselya carries much of his life because he believes ? the CIA- has ":?".: around.. in . his eybrielcase, ??? docn?:, bought them off with. stories, most rnenting the reasons for his: bi tter---; recently Dan .. Rather's- expedition- n-ess,. . his 'rage and his ...altrio* " into Afghanistan. He says he talks to religions . belief . that . the CIA ? h.aS; the AP and the Sunday News Jour- ruined his. life. The feds follow hint. nalitbatts:e he believes the..CIA-.- pverywheee, he says 'fears- both news organizations. He Recent events. have triade him-? a 'offers no ? explanation' for his feel-;-, wanted man Two weeks ago, in an in interview' With this newspaper;hd. ? ? ? , ."":',;---???4- ? made public public hiS priirate threats- ? De)ieselya, despite. the magnitude. -those who run. and have run the MC, -.'of'his threat, is not bombastic. He is Leavemeandmfriendsal?neorL ..-.a.?-..rinan with- a mission, a man- who Will release thenames of 7,500 CIA- eVen with an agency he operatives," he has told the CIA and. -sh was out to ruin his life. ?'?????-e' other federal agencies. -? ?.... The -publicity-, that followed .1ha:t-.. disclosure!forced. him to seek* the anonymitY of a meeting place ?irra. .-suburban ?..Washington , shopping mall / The` friends he sought to. protect are-two Iranians:who. on, April" 3 were convicted of.Selling andclistri?;' 41. ? Donald Eugene Deneselya;-'40, 'and his. family have been haunted_ rand hunted by FBI and CIA agents for 16 years, for reasons the former, agency operative says he has yet to Stranger than all of his problems iitils.unwillinpesS to tell his per- sonal Story. "I don't want my wife and two children brought into-this:. This is between me and the CIA-," he: " Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91 After Sunday ;weed spareri \vay he reveali a4tient,54 born to in ? thei: recruit. uments from tt 1.0. tR=. to be a learn, .waspr endlen how it. walkk in th tr-ansf 'ger,ce divisio agenic) CIAdi center ? - . spies o STAT report', lie was: picked: to .be-the ...lhand4.-',1 :ho1der.7 f6r.."Lad1e," the code narne'd of an important RI:issian .defector,:i AnatohGolitsrt He was t6woi?. fOr;threeniOntlis With Golitsin, who had broughtsev-:::., ? eral? important Of inf ormation ,to tbe somegnarters sine : ?irith :revealing to-. Counterintelligence.chief'. Jam es. ??? Ari etod..jhat British a gent e e PhilbywasaiongtimSOvietspy.1n -19&3 Philby;def the Soviet4., :Union from Britain. - ? `-'? Golitsin "is ---alsb---::-credited 'detailing-pllni fora Soviet assassi-1 ?-:?riatiote of Richard Nixon if he:had - :been elected pre9ident oven Ken-: ;nedy 1950- Not only was Deneselya privy :to :highly secret- briefing papers; he also had to listen patient17.,to GolW t:sin'S". complaints- about now 'difference he found-. betwe-en-? then ?!:.CI.A.Where he bad sought refugeand thei:KGB -h-e- had .f.left -.Russia Jo.'"4 'esca November:- 1952, -:DeneseiYI Golitsin was fed up with the:; ? 's Soviet-Russia division andit'd him He took Matters into hisl own'. handie:At...;a--_,?lun-Cheon at thd4 pcy.,, he: toldE-Alleri-,Diilles;?7.theri:i 0.,?dtno UMWS director, , .COWPINTTED. ZRTICT,I? AP3-7_u3 1KAqroved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901 ,b 1.1 ON PACE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE ' 6 APRIL 1980 337 'Irma Szuic Room S-407 on the Senate side of the Capitol has more than its share of pro- tective electronic devices inside and armed guards outside. It is designed to keep its secrets. On Wednesday, Jan. 9, during the Congressional Christmas recess, a small group of Senators was summoned back to Washington to meet in S-407, the most "secure" room in all of Congress, with high officials of the Central Intelli- gence Agency_ The agenda: a presenta- tion by the C.I.A. of its plans for covert, paramilitary operations in Afghani- stan. The Senators included Birch Bayh of Indiana, chairman of the Select Com- mittee on Intelligence; Barry Goldwa- ter of Arizona, vice chairman, and Jo- seph R. Biclen Jr. of Delaware ? plus the committee staff director, William G. Miller, and the minority staff direc- tor, Earl D. Eisenhower. The C.I.A. was represented by the Deputy Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, Frank C. Carlucci, accompanied by John McMahon, Deputy Director for Opera- tions, the top man in clandestine opera- tions. ? What Mr. Carlucci spelled out at the session was a new covert aid program for the anti-Soviet Moslem guerrillas of Afghanistan. Since last November, as the Senators knew, the C.I.A. had been secretly prov5ding the rebels with lim- ited assistance ? field hospitals and communications equipment. But after the Soviet invasion of Dec. 27, the Car- ter Administration had decided to esca- late that aid program dramatically. The C.I.A. proposed to provide the Af- ghan rebels with Soviet-made AK-47 as- sault rifles from American stocks, TOW antitank weapons and SAM-7 sur- face-to-air missiles e and launchers. (The SAM's were for use against an an- ticipated spring offensive when the - weather would permit the Russians greater use of planes and helicopters; the offensive has since begun.) The Senators listened. They offered no major objections. The next day, Mr. Carlucci advised the White House of the results of the session, and President Carter signed a Presidential Decision (known as a P.D.) setting the program in motion. ? - STAT Approved For#R For all the secrecy and the high- stakes international gamble involved, that progression from Room S-407 to the signing of the P.D. was fairly rou- tine. It was a standard example of Con- ? gressional oversight of American intel- ligence work as it has developed in the ? last five years ? a balancing of the C.I.A .'s national-security require- ments and the Congress's desire to ? keep a hand in foreign-policy decisions and safeguard Americans' individual rights. According to sources in both camps, the agency has been informing the appropriate Congressional commit- tees of its clans. and the committees have, apparently with few exceptions, gone along. " Today, however, that relationship is undergoing dramatic change. The C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies are openly and successfully seeking greater independence of Congressional oversight and of a variety of other re- straints, as well. According to its crit- ics, the "unleashing" of the C.I.A. is well underway. FAI A bill that would deprive the Con- gressional intelligence committees of the right to review all C.I.A. covert operations has been approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is likely that some such legislation will be passed by Congress this year., Si A measure, once encouraged by the Carter Administration, which would for the first time have defined the powers of the intelligence agencies, is given I it- tle chance in Congress this year. CI A bill to amend the Freedom of In- formation Act to protect the agency's secrets is expected to pass the Senate. P BIgreme rEIZTIErft218hadittfkr5IVV03 up ourt ruling. ? doing the shouting. In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress took a long, hard look at the freewheeling ways of the C.I.A. The first concrete result was the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Act of 1974. According to this measure, no funds could be spent on a covert intelligence ? operation unless it was reported in a "timely fashion" to the appropriate committees in Congress. Public reports of secret, widespread and illegal C.I.A. moves against political dissenters in the United States (code-named Opera- tion CHAOS) led to the hasty creation of the Select Committee to Study Govern- mental Operations With Respect to In- teitigen-Ce ?Activities, with Senator Frank Church of Idaho as chairman. Along the way, the committee learned in detail of C.I.A. plans to as- sassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, and of the agency's crucial role in establishing a climate in which Chile's President Sal- vador Allende Gossens, a democrati- cally elected Marxist, could in 1973 be ? overthrown by the Chilean military. The committee also discovered that the agency had been conducting mind-con- trol experiments, feeding LSD and other drugs to unwitting subjects; co- vertly passing money to foreign politi- cal parties to affect the outcome of elec- tions, and recruiting American journal- ists, clergymen. and academics 00060920,0136g*ncework. Congress demanded a curtailment of the C.I.A.'s ability in effect to make- IR . P? /0 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901 ARTICLE .A AU.113.? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 03 FAGIS 3 March 1980 While Russia's diplomats talked peace and reconciliation, her secret agents were. busy concocting bogus documents to blacken America's image. A new CIA report spells out what happened. Now coming to light is the most complete disclosure yet of how the Soviet Union?even when d?nte was in full flower?systematically staged "dirty tricks" to discredit the U.S. among its allies and other nations; Details of the secret campaign were made public on Feb- ruary 19 by the House Intelligence Committee. The panel released a report by the Central Intelligence Agency that was sent to. lawmakers as congressional debate heated up over proposals to give the CIA a freer hand to conduct co- vert operations of its own. The study portrays a clandestine anti-U.S. propaganda drive that started after World War II and reached a Peak in intensity and sophistication during 1978 and 1979, t14 peri- od in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union were wrapping up a new strategic-arms-limitation treaty. Among other things, Moscow is accused of using forged documents in various attempts to link the U.S. with terror- ism around the world, including the 1978 assassination of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro. U.S. bureaucratese duplicated. The CIA says the Soviets have made near-flawless forgeries of everything from se- cret U.S. Army field manuals to classified State Department communiqu? Not only have they obtained the proper inks, paper, printing presses and letterheads, but Soviet ex- perts have become masters at duplicating the writing style of American bureaucrats. ? In the 105-page report, complete with voluminous docu- mentation, the CIA says the Soviets called a halt to their dirty tricks for four years in the mid-1970s for reasons that remain unclear. But by 1978, the Kremlin had streamlined its foreign-propaganda apparatus into an International In- formation Department, bankrolled it heavily and, as a mark of its new importance, installed as its bosS a longtime crony of President Leonid Brezhnev's. , - The agency reports directly' to the Politburo and works hand in glove with the KGB, the Soviet spy agency, as it carries out covert "disinformation" operations that rely heavily on forgery. The CIA believes that; as many as 50 KGB technicians are detailed to a forgery Squad. ; According to the CIA's reckoning, the Soviets in 1979 poured at least 200 million dollars into a variety of special campaigns?using both propaganda and covert opera- tions?to isolate the ,U.S. from its friends. "Moscow does not see any basic -incompatibility between its official policy of expanding bilateral relations with Washington and practic- ing dirty tricks," John McMahon, the CIA's deputy director of operations, testified before the panel. "The iSoviet Union' S willingness to conduct its foreign policy irii accor- , Appcoved For. Release 2005/1.i/28 :;CIA Soviets manufactured a series of authentic.looking State De- ? partment memos criticizing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and ..aqpIrtz,c,tine? fi-not fin.II Q uuresilr4 onnn hirrv dance with the served by both si tente has Among rei Doctoring a Fi? One of the slic manual that has poses. Bearing ti moreland, the n on how. the Amn Communist fore The manual si meddle in the i even use leftist ( into adopting In book appears to es?authentic in jargon and swec to the regulatior The bogus. ma but the Soviets Aldo Moro kidnappmy; Communist with ties to Soviet and agencies?published in two Madrid newspapers an article citing the manual as evidence of U.S. involvement with. the Italian Red Brigades, the terrorist killers of the Christian Democratic leader. , Excerpts from the forged: manual and the article were widely reprinted in Europe,. especially in Italy, "Within days of the Moro kidnapping, the Soviet -propaganda appa- ratus had begun a campaign of suggestion and innuendo to falsely link the U.S. to this murder," says the CIA study. "But. Moscow had enjoyed little success without proof to Cuban intelligence 21? ?' "'? 01:)RATIOINIS-tO-MORANDLIM THE D%PARTI?IF.!:: 01STACE., TROIA: Er:P.:M.:SY RO 7:J9JECT: P0L:71C0L DE77L0?:1Efl-5 ESI:P7 -C-7935-11 .77 Olth. reference to my previous- reports anCI the nee dui,d?line ditr,utacrl in:,1Jachinitan,,f hare pai'_ clove ettent inn to liatitica./.. tlevelapnentc hare vith apeciX7C'en-phati.r on Ilt.hrthe talat ic tackling the irohlent:pnx-.:,: tr'Lth-r. Janjury tiaturhanree?: An Li pa-sau, it .hernr.-c. clear that too :major factors, - ha.?127!.. trifgar the Jarronryriottl,- far the firct ? a. Jane., Preciitont Safat co-, Lp the mariner,: thc ,Cc-cinet tar,:e or Pr'eai den: StolatPt' ettee'pP7n to'hlare iha .cu.nonniZA, and; ha-cher-Sol lo:arra fa, tr ev,r,t- rc,i.niceranlg rn,7 uns - pnorly CV,N ec pra.,,,t,rit's ?eat. ? :shi4:14;:onc=not ilfr..rences Larnrration.and of vel fare open'. ihresh;.. policy ani: in hart as,ters. January, there. hav. re of fre:sifent End., 1.,a ?till in crisis.: A ,1tensive ernnamic uptu .corruptter.?Unrortunk?.. \41:. .';.ivmet by Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600 ART I CU.' Oil PACT' THE WASHINGTON POST 1 March 1980 Diplomat-sin Ousted i6i Spy ing - By Charles t. Babcock Washington POst Staff Writer The FBI's retiring counterintelli- gence chief said yesterday that five communist-bloc diplomats were qui- etly forced to leave the United States in the past year after they were caught spying. William Cregar, head' of the bu- reau's intelligence division, said that such expulsions usually are not publi- cized because the communist nations ' would feel compelled to retaliate. Cregar's remarks capped a recent series of exposures by American and allied intelligence officers of Soviet- bloc spy networks in New Zealand, Canada, Spain and Japan. It has been suggested that the stream of disclosures is part of a U.S. .policy decision to change the usual rules of international spying and re- taliate against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. ,Spokesmen for the State Depart- ment and Central Intelligence Agency refused to comment on the, matter yesterday. A White House official said he was unaware of any policy change. But it seems clear that at least some of the disclosures were orchestrated. Last month, for instance, John Mc- Mahon, the CIA's deputy director for ? operations, told a House Intelligence subcommittee in closed session about Soviet forgeries of U.S. government documents. Last week, the testimony was suddenly made public, exposing to publi&view more than 100 pages of examples of alleged Soviet-bloc propa- ganda. , The release was to "dramatize" re- cent increases in such forgeries, a sub- committee spokesman said. The Chicago Tribune reported on Monday that theeCIA-"has disclosed the names of many Soviet-bloc agents of? allied intelligence in recent weeks., ? In his testimony; McMahon noted , that a forged U.S. Army field manual, ?purporting to show plans for Anieriee ? an interference in allies' domestic afe fairs?showed up in Spain ins 1977 in the hands of a Cuban intelligence offi- cer. The Tribune story--, said the CIA ..:gave the names. 9f those involved in the- fabrication :tn.' Spanish .gence. "vs APPeallfeekfoliltrkiMbleteitv2i)&51401 :nage-network occurred ineJanuary. New Zealand, where Soviet. Ambassa- dor Vsevolod Softy:14y ewaxpelled STAT after he was accused of funneling money to a socialist political party. In retaliation, the Soviets expelled the New Zealand- ambassador from Moscow a month before the end of his scheduled tour of duty. In Canada in January, two Soviet embassy of- ficials were expelled after being charged with, pay- ing money to an American undercover agent. In Japan, the army's chief of staff resigned after a Soviet-run spy network was closed down by police. Intelligence officials refused to say yesterday whether these events were connected. There has long been a dispute within the in- telligence community about how to treat foreign diplomats caught as spies. The traditional theory is the one the FBI's Cregar noted yesterday: expel . the person quietly so the other country doesn't feel compelled to respond in kind. There's another ,argument against even quietly expelling the discovered spy, intelligence officials note. At least you know who he is and can monitor his activities. If he's kicked out, he'll be replaced by someone your, counterintelligence will. have to find all over again, they said. Last fall, in the wake of the controversy over the Soviet brigade, of troops in Cuba, coluninist Jack Anderson reported that national security af- fairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was quarreling with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance about tak- ing a hard line in generating anti-Soviet propa- ganda around the world. In a press conference at the time, .Vance took pains to say there was no dispute between State and Brzezinski. He didn't deny the anti-Soviet cam- paign was being considered, however. The last publicized expulsion of a Soviet diplo- mat from the United States occurred in 19713. Vla- dimir P. Zinyakin, an official at the Soviet mission to the United Nations, was forced to leave for his role in a spy case. ? The case involved two Soviet- employes who didn't have diplomatic immunity and were pros- ecuted for buying U.S. defense secrets; from a Navy officer cooperating with the FBI..... Attorney General Griffin B. Bell decided to press the-case to show the United States wouldn't tolerate spying by non-diplomats at all. . The FBI's Cregar said yesterday that he feels the FBI has made excellent progress in its silent counterintelligence battle with communist-bloc spies. - -- "We know more about theite methods of opera- tion.' We have a better appreciation of who their intelligence officers are and of the equipment and techniques they use against us," he said. STAT 8 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00060 ? T r.L L'./1:7? ED STAT THE BALTIMORE SUN 26 February 1980 Washington (KNT1?The Central Intel- ligence Agency anti - allied intelligence agencies have declared open season on there' KGB counOrpartS, exposing Soviet intelligence operations throughout the world,. - . . . . . In the weeks following the Soviet in-Vae siert- of Afghanistan, . there have been major exposures of Soviet spy networks in New Zealand, Spain, Canada and Japan: Agents have been exposed. 'and, in- some cases, etepelled. ; . Intelligence veterans note- that this filmy of "rollbacks" is in marked. contrast to the days of detente when the tight little world of spy versus spy simmered clan-- tie ? In adcitiont the CIA has given reporters and friendly intelligence . agencies hun- dreds of pages of previously secret docu- ments about the KGB's activities. They detail recent plots to discredit United States peace moves in the Mideast and to derail nuclear arms policy talks between the U.S. and Western European allies. " . _ "There. are always a lot of spy cases on the back burner," said a former U.S. coun- terespionage official, who kept tabs on the KGB- during the Cold War.' "Sometime? word comes down to bring them in. It's like deciding when to play your trump in a, card game." .- ;tenet::: e ? et. tt Perhaps most damaging to- the KGB iivas a hearing on Capitol Hill earlier this' month. For the first time in the CIA!s tory. testimony by the-agency's chief spy-e master, the director of covert operations, was banded to reporters. Until then, John. l'ilcMahon's identity as deputy director for operations was itself a se.cret;:,-,'? McMahon's testimonY:disciosed mass of sensitive data. It included copies of what Mr. McMahon called KGB for- geries of American diplomatic documents, ,which were part of an apparent scheme to, .undermine relations between the U.S. and Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat. Mr. McMahon told the House Oversight ;Subcommittee on Intelligence that the KGB forged a letter over the fabricated signature of Hermann F. Eilts, ambassa- . ? , dor .to Egypt, statin,g.' that the U.S. Was planning to dump Mr..Satiat.,. - ".We must repudiate him [Mr. Sadat; and get rid of him without hesitation," said the falsified letter, which was ad- dressed to Adm.- Stansfield Turner, direc- tor of central intelligence., Mr. ? McMahon 'said the letter was planted in a Syrian - newspaper October 1, and was the KGB's third forgery involving Mr. Eilts's ture." ; e' In his testimony, Mr. McMahon said, "The KGB exercises day-to-day operation responsibility for forgery efforts, but its annual and fie-to-seven-year work plans are approved by the highest levels of the Soviet political authority." ' In all, Mr. McMahon gave the subcom- mittee 18 documents he called KGB for- geries. They show the Soviet spy agency writing nonexistent press Conferences for President Carter in which he made insult- ing remarks about Greece, an Army field rnanual urging subversion of host coun- tries and many falsified- diplomatic Mr. McMahon also disclosed a CIA esti- mate of how much the KGB spends a yeari ?"our rough estimate of3 billion a year; is probably a conservative figure." ' I : The CIA estimated that the KGB spentl .$200 million last year for support to guer-, rilla groups,4100 million on clandestine radio stations and another ;200 million for "special campaigns"--including an effort to stop American plans to build the neu- ,tron bomb and place. nuclear missiles in 'EuroPe? ' .spokesman for the House subcOrn- rnittee said:, Mr. ? McMahon's t testimony; tdeliverade ml secret session February 6, t was released last week to "dramaftze"?re- cent increases in Soviet forgery schemes. Mr. McMahon said the KGB had been r using forgeries since the 1950s. ? 'iltet et'tThe new bogus documents ineltide, high-quality, technically sophisticated fal- sifications of a caliber which the Soviet and bine intelligence services were evi- dently incapable of producing in the 19503 land even the 1960s," Mr. McMahon said. "Furthermore in two cases Soviet foi?gers directly attributed false and mis- leading statements to the president and I vice president of the United States, some- thing they have refrained from "doing in the past." . . . t_tt A liouse'SOUrce:Said; the had provided allied intelligence agencies with i additional details: ? ' ? `.For example, he said, the CIA gave to Spanish intelligence the names of a tr.em-- beren,of the Spanish _Communist Party - and'a Cuban emigrant allegedly involved in faking a U.S. Army traiaing. manual. Names of sabres of other such "agents of influence" were disclosed to _intelligence agencies around the globe in recent weeks, the sources said. ; ? , e:tt. 'teat -The clandestine game of tag Ilea been played out from the South Pacific tocana- ? In New Zealand the government 'ex:. Felled Soviet Ambassador VseVolnd Sofia- ski in mid-January for supplying cash to a Socialist political party. The .case had beeta_developed several years ago, intelli- gence sources said, but only closed inI January. In Spain, last week. the manager orate Soviet airline Aeroilot, Oleg Shuranov, was expelled after he was caught carrying "documents related to Spanish security.7 Government sources said Spanish intelli- gence had been suspicious of him for .'? In Ottawa, Canadian authorities ex- pelled two Soviet embassy officials and d chauffeur. January 21. All were charged 'with paying money to an American under- cover agent to buy 'U.S. secrets. The Cana- din.s knew about the case for 16 months hut made the arrests in the wake of the. -Afghanistaminvasion.. ? In 'Japan,- the nation's army Chief of :-staff -resigned 'January 28 after police t :there. closed down a Soviet-operated spy network which. had been discovered in .1976: The case, a sensation in Japan's was the first espionage scandal -since the army was formed in 1954 after . being outlawed following World War Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600210056-1 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0 1-Lin:'/CLE ON: PAC;IL 6.? Canada to Japart\ CHICAGO TRIBUNE 24 February 1980 0600210056-1 STAT By James Coates and John Maclean Chic eeo TrIbene F'ress Service WASHINGTON ? The Central Intelli- gence Agency and allied intelligence agencies have declared open' season on their KGB counterparts, exposing Soviet intelligence operations throughout the world. ? ? ?. - ..In the weeks following the Soviet inva- sion of Afghanistan, there have been major exposures of Soviet spy networks in New Zealand, Spain, Canada, and Ja- pan. Agents have been ,exposed and, in some cases, expelled. ? Intelligence veterans note that, this flurry of "rollbacks" is in marked con- trast to the days' of detente when the tight little world of spy versus spy aim- mered clandestinely. ? In addition, the CIA has given report- ers and friendly intelligence- agencies hundreds of pages of previously secret documents about the KGB's activities. te- They detail recent plots to discredit U.S. peace moves in the' Mideast and to derail nuclear arms policy talks be- tween the U.S. and Western European allies. ? ? "There are always a lot of spy cases on the back burner," said a former U.S; counterespionage official, who kept tabs on' the KGB during the Cold War. "Sometimes word comes down to bring them in. Its like deciding when to play your trurnp in a card game." In Moscow, Tass news agency an flounced- Friday that Afghanistan's se'-? cret police had arrested an? American,'. Robert Lee, in Kabul. Tam said Lee was ,"known for his links with the.Cen- tral Intelligence Agency.". PERHAPS 'MOST - damaging.--to 'the KGB- was a:bearing on Capitol Hill ear- 'her this month. For the first time lathe CIA's history, testimony, by, the ageney's. .chief spymaster, the director of covert operations', cvds handed to reporters.7,Una tit then, 1.Itihn McMahon's identity' as deputy director for operations was itself "a secret. .7. : ? . McMahon's testimony disclosed a 'mass of sensitive data. It included co- les of ,what. 'McMahon called KGB for- geries of American diplomatic docu ments, which were part 'of an apparent ? .scheme to undermine relations between k. the U.S. and:Egyptian President' Anwar , Sadat. ? a ? --- ?, McMahon told .the HriegypiQm/4 Subcommittee on .Intelligence that .:the .KGB forged a letter.. over the fabricatedt signature of Herman Eilts, ambassador - "We must repudiate him I.Sadatl and get rid of him without hesitation," said the falsified letter, which was addressed .j to CIA Director Stansfield- Turner. , McMahon said, the letter was planted in a Syrian 'newspaper Oct. 1 last year, and, the KGB's third- forgery involving Eilts' "signature." IN BIS testimony, McMahon said, ? "The KGB - exercises clay-to-day opera- tion responsibility for forgery efforts, but its annual and 5-to-7-yehr work plans are approved by the highest levels of , the Soviet political authority.". In, . . .:.. In all, McMahon gave the subc'omniit- '1 tee 15 doeuments he called KGB forger- ies. They show the Soviet spy agency 'Writing nonexistent press conferences for President Carter in which Carter made insulting remarks about Greece, an Army field manual urging 'subversion of host countries, and: many falsified diplomatic cables. , Mc:Mahon also disclosed a CIA estimate ,.of how much the KGB spends a year :-L-: "our rough estimate of $3- billion a year is probably -a conservative figure." ' The CIA estimated the KGB spent $200' million last year for support to guerrilla grOups,- $100. million on Clandestine radio stations, and another $200 million for `'special campaigns" -- including an ef- fort to stop American plans to 'build the neutron bomb and place nuclear -inis silesin Ettrope. - .? ? .. ..':- ..,. . i ? - A: SPOKESMAN for the House 'sub- committee said ?McMahon's testimony, . delivered in secret' session Feb. 6, was ?released last week, to "dramatize" .re- c en t increases- hi" Soviet .forgery "'schemes. McMahon said ".the KGB: had been using forgeries since: the 19505:. -: ""The . new - bogus documents include' high quality, technically sciphistiCated falsifications of a caliber which the Sovi- et' and bloc' intelligence: services wer evidently incapable of producing, in the ,1950s and even .the 1960s," ,McMahon I "Furthermore, -in two 'cases. Soviet forgers directly attributed false and, mis deading.s,tatements to the President and 'Vice' Piesident of the 'United States, isornething they.have refrained from do- r ROWEaltti2CMH'i128:.; CIA4fari1- 0 -. A HotiSe. source said the CIA has pro- ? I vicled allied intelligence agencies with additional details. ? For example, he said, the CIA gave to Spanish' intelligence the names of a . member of the Spanish -Communist Par- ty member and a Cuban emigrant alleg- edly involved in faking a (IS. Army training manual. Names of scores 'of other such "agents of influence" were disclosed to intelligence agencies -around the globe in recent weeks, the sources,. said. - THE CLANDESTINE game of. tag has been played out from .the South Pacific to Canada. In New Zealand; the governinent ex- pelled Soviet Ambassador Vsevolocl So- finski in mid-January for supplying cash to a Socialist political party. The ease had been developed several years -ago, intelligence sources said, but only closed in January. . - ?? In Spain; laSt-week, the maimger -of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, Oleg gbura, nov, was expelled after he :was caught carrying "documents related to Spanish security." Government sources said 'Spanish intelligence had been suspicious of him for Months. . ? ? . In Ottawa, Canadian' authorities ex- pelled two ,Soviet embassy officials and -a chauffeur Jan,'21... All were charged with paying. money to an American un- dercover agent to buy' U.S. secrets. The- Candians knew.. about .the case for' 16 months but made the arrests :in . the. wake of the Afghanistan invasion. In Japan, the nation's .army chief Of: ,staff resigned Jan. 28 'after police there , closed down a Soviet-operated spy net.-; ;work"which had been discovered in 1976,, the case a sensation in Japan's media' was the first espionage scandal since' :the army was formed in 1554 after being -outlawed following World War If. -AT THE White House an official fa-. :miller with U.S. Intelligence _activities denied ,that Washington engineered these. 'various crackdowns :against ?the KGB. 'However, he added, "without . anybody :orchestrating anything, you cannot rule out the idea there has been a" changein 'how many .countrids:.perceire.the,world 'today-and hOw, theSt.perceiVe the.. Soviet 9010:110e60021'60584'-7'i::- - 'It is well-known-I the?Soviets dolabuse. diplomatic immunity' and do Lisa it to.? ,c.arry on clandestine activities.l'i --.? Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901 THE NEWS WORLD 17 January 1980 ).11 T1 CLZ ON PAG.14 /- ? ?? 1/q. ? , ? ; ; ? , STAT Nvw, .; ? ; 1 ; t 't'dr ". By Ted Agres7- NEWS WORtD WAsmiNGTON 9uREAt.) ? i .:-,i?Copyriglit .1986 The Nes4;y .WASHINGTQN:?Presi-. dent Cadet" ignored evidence; obtained ,the. CIA that the' 'Soviet Union. had, been. subs;, tantially involved:: in the .tal