OPINION COMMENTARY A SHORT COURSE IN THE SECRET WAR

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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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• Publication Date: May 13, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

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13 Way 1983
Opinion. Commenta
A Short Course in the Sed.
00001-1
Washington.
MHE VOTE by the House Select Corn-
mittee on Intelligence to cut? off funds
...for the Central Intelligence Agency's cam-
--paign of covert action 'against Nicaragua
comes exactly 35 years after the United
States first began such secret operations.
Paradoxically, covert action was not in-
cluded as one of the missions foreseen for
the CIA in its charter. The National Secu-
rity Act of 1947, which established the
agency ,(a.s well as the national security i I
Council) does not specifically mention or
By Nathan Miller
-
authorize secret operations of any kind.
Yet, within a year'? by mid-1948 ?co- 1
vert action had become a key element-of
the CIA's operations and a vital arm of
American foreign policy. This transforma-
tion resulted from the heating up of the
Cold War between the Soviet Union and
the United States, with some officials fear-
ing that the Russians were on the verge of I
seizing control of Western Europe. 1
Alarmed at the prospect of a Ccimmu-'
-nist victory in the Italian parliamentary
elections scheduled for April 1948, such ar-
dent Cold Warriors as Defense Secretary
James V. Forrestal premed President
Truman to use the CIA to prevent it from
happening. As authority, they pointed to a
"catch-all" proyision in the .1947 act that
_clirected the agency to "perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security. ." ? -11::
Heated debate raged over?the proposal
thin the National Security Council:
-mirth Rosen H. Hillenkoetter, the CIA's
-first director, was reluctant to launch co-
:vert operations. Disdainful of uncovention-
el warfare, he was convinced that the high'
-risk of exposure was not worth it.?Instead,
he thought the CIA should concentrate on
:collecting and evaluating intelligence.
The activists prevailed, however; and
Admiral Hillenkoetter was 'ordered to
,make -certain that the pro-Western Chris-
? ?tianMemocrats remained in power. The
.,tasit was assigned to the CIA's Office of
jSpecial Operations which handled secret
intelligence activities. .
'Backed by $10 million in secret funds,
the OSO launched a well-coordinated cam-
-- paign. Christian Democrat propaganda was
? financed by the CIA, friendly candidates
were -given 'bonuses," anonymous pam-
phlets were distributed defaming Commu-
? nist candidates, and politicians were given
"walking around"- money? .to get out the
vote:Tens of thousands of Americans of
Italian ancestry were persuaded to appeal
to friends and relatives at borne .to vote
Christian Democratic.
. These activities were -enough to keep
the Communists out of power, and the suc-
tess ?of the campaign created demands for
similar actions elsewhere. In June 1948, a
new :Office of Policy Coordination was
organised to do worldwide what the OSO
had done in Italy. OPC's -charter was Na-
tional Security Council Directive 10/2 and
its latitude was was sweeping.
To counter,the "vicious covert activities
of the U.S.S.R..," OPC:Fwas "to engage in a
- back-alley struggle against -the Soviets.
_ Propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage
and the inObilization of secret armies to
overthrow hostile governments were all to
be part of its stock in trade.
The only limitation was "deniability,"
or the proviso that if- any of these opera-
tions was:"blown," ranking American offi-
cials -should be -able to plausibly disavow,
any knowledge?. - -
- Despite the sensitive riatUre.of V3PC's
-assigned task, the agency was scburesuctet-
arporrisly 'without sufficient controls.'
tkiough its director was to be chosen by the -
secretary of State, policy guidance was di-
vided between the secretaries of State and
Defense. The CIA supplied budgetary sup-
port but its chief had -no authority over
OPC. The net result Was that no one had
ultimate authority for riding herd on OPC
and a strong director could do almost any-
thing he wanted.
Frank G. Wisner, the swashbuckling
former member of the wartime Office of
Strategic Services chosen to head OPC,
was just. such a man. Energetic and adven-
turous, he threw off ideas for rolling back
the Soviet empire ? some good and others
wildly impractical ? like a human pin-
wheel. As far as he was concerned, Admiral
Hillenkoetter and his intelligence analysts
were "a bunch of old washerwomen ex-
changing gossip while they rinse through
_the dirty linen:"
Although in theory he was limited to
contingency planning, Mr. Wisner immedi-
ately began organizing bands of guerrillas
and secret armies that were to-operate be-
hind the Iron Curtain. And with the exam-
ple of military intelligence ? which was
making use of such Nazi war criminals as
Klaus Barbie ? before him, Mr. Wisner re-
cruited Eastern Europeans who had col-
laborated with the Nazis and had commit-
ted war crimes. Over the years, most of the
OPC operations to infiltrate Eastern Eu-
rope failed with bloody results because
some of Mr. Wisner's recruits-were working
for both sides.
OPC had access to unlimited funds and
manpower. -As early as 1949, it had 302
agents in five stations and a budget of $4.7
million. By 1952,the number of employees
had jumped ,to about 4,000 in 47 stations
and the budget had reached $82 million.
Other intelligence agencies 'feared and
'enviedthe sill-encompassing .0PC and
there was amsiderable" infighting among
them.
Gengal Walter Bedell Smith, who had
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STAT
Guatemala as Cold War
RICHARD H. IMMERMAN
With the increasing accumulation of interpretive scholarship on
international relations following World War II, most episodes in the cold war
have been written and rewritten, evaluated and reevaluated. One striking excep-
tion, however, is the 1954 American intervention in Guatemala, which led to the
overthrow of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman's constitutionally elected government.
This article studies the antecedents, events, and consequences of that coup.
Analyses of hitherto unavailable archival data and of interviews with Ameri-
can participants in the coup who were privy to the covert aspects of the opera-
tion suggest that this event was a significant link in the unfolding chain of cold
war history. Writings to date on the overthrow of Arbenz tend to be short on
detailed documentation and analysis and to treat the coup illustratively. These
accounts depict the United States intervention in Guatemala either as a back-
ground incident in the escalating cold war, as an example of the inordinate in-
fluence of economic interests (in this case the United Fruit Company [UFC01)
on American foreign policy, or as a way station in the evolution of the Central
Intelligence Agency. These treatments fail to emphasize sufficiently that the
coup typified the foundations of cold war diplomacy, providing a model to be
emulated, and resisted, in subsequent years.'
The most widely cited source remains Ronald Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, /944-/954
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), although more recent studies such as Cole Blasier, The
Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 151-77; Max Gordon, "A Case History of U.S. Subversion:
Guatemala, 1954," Science and Society 35 (Summer 1971); 129-55; and Stephen Schlesinger, "How
RICHARD H. IMMERMAN is associate director of the Presidency Studies Program in Princeton
University's Politics Department. He is currently completing a book on the CIA's 1954 intervention
in Guatemala as well as collaborating on a biography of Milton Eisenhower and a comparative
study of the Eisenhower and Johnson presidencies.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 95 Number 4 Winter 1980-81
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Patrick J. Buchanan
?
odds are now
given as even money. that Justice .will
move to indict . former Central Intelli-
gence .Agency director Richard Helms
for misleading a Senate committee con--
.cerning CIA involvement in Chile. . .
Beforei. the President and Atty.. Gen..
? - .
? The report proved inaccurate.; ? Its ? What. Sort of nation have we become?
source, .a 32-year-old travel agent named Helms, who has served his country hon-
Harry -A. Jarvinen, was, indicted by. a- 'orahly for decades, is facing this posai?
federal grand jury. .TwO CIA agents, ble indictment, while the turncoat Philip
Miller. Holland -and Wayne IL Richard-e. Agee, who fingered dozens or CIA agents
son, were called to testify. Both stone' abroad, one of whom was subsequently
walled, with Richardson refusing to tes- .:? assassinated, is told by the same justice
' "- he
?
:Griffin Bell . allow- this senseless ham- . tify. !'on orders of my Superior." Along ., Department..
. .
. rio
rner ' blow to fall . upon the.,intelligence.e. with Miller, he was sentenced to 15 days ? ,comes home to a country whose secietsa -
community, they might review a how in prison for 'contempt. - : e .:- ?:, , e . .s., he betrayed. - -? . : e e-e-j.,-,:-...5... -.a:P. ...e. ei--
. President Truman ? 'handled a similar. . t... ? :?-...1' ? ..' .? ? . ? ?? * . -.. -,',:-..:, e 1 Indicting Richard Helms,. along :with .
. matter 25 years ago.!-'- . ,. - e .. -,. BUT THIS was unacceptable t? Harry. .., John. Kearney of the FRI, would further:' -
.....
in 192 the -CIA- passed along to .the Truman Quietly -bypassing Ju.stice, the?a-demoralize these already battered secua -
Federal: Bireatt. of Investigation and President issued pardons to both' men, *-, rity agencies-It would. necessitate: open
State a report,' picked up in Seattle, that. ,
- since, the President's, proclamation on .. ing the most sensitive strategic' victory ;
'Prof.'. 0wen? Lattimore was planning a Richardson 's- behalf, ,?. . ... it has been jot. those, here and abroad,. who want ?-?
trip to Moscow [On July 3, Bea Leta?
made- to appear ? to me that the said .' 'the FBI and CIA further .smeared, if not' , ?
: ,
, more ,Was Characterized by a Senate' Wayne Richardson at the time ..of the ?
- subcommittee as a"conscious articulate - aforesaid trial . was an agent of.. the
..instrument of .- the Soviet- conspiracy."] .' United States .and acting in obedience to
Receiving the- Seattle report, the Depart- ....what he believed to be a lawful. order
'tient of State alerted customs officials , , from his official superior. .., . ..",?.:....?.e: .',
to block Lattimore'sdeparture.!' The . In passing on the President's clemen-
broke into print:.;,..., . , . cy petitions CIA director Walter C. [Be-
e ,?
'*: . , dell.] Smith, went further: .
STAT
matter
. "That our conduct was correct and
hOnorabl?is recognized by the President
, in;grantinn this pardon," wrote Smith to
? agent Richardson. "In the eyes of- the
law;' your record is as if the incident
had'never? occurrOd. In the eyes of the
teagency; Your meticulous compliance -
,With. orders made an enduring contribu-
fion,t6 the national intelligence and the .
functioning -of the Central Intelligence , *
Agency.
Legally and morally, no fault exists,
and. yetue, conscience can be clear that -
youi. cenduct was honorable and in the
best traditions of government. service.".
:::,...Trurrian's.precedent is there foi Car,
let: to follow-.: '
CLEARLY, testifying before that Sen-
ate committee, Helms was confronted
with a serious moral dilemma; Should
he protect at grave legal risk to himself
the secrets he was sworn to protect; or
- should he spill the "whole truth" about
CIA involvement and thereby cripple his
?
agency', and perhaps his country? This 7
is an issue to be debated in ethics courses
in postgraduate seminars, not a matter
for a federal indictment. e Smith: Praised honor:
4
destroyed.
If" Carter alloWs this travesty to pro- ?.
ceed, it will demonstrate. that he lacki -
utterly . that sense of priorities which .;-?
Truman showed. But, then,- whom ,the.e.
gods destroy, they first make mad..
1 - New York Times, SPeciai Features. ,`
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ON PA G TOBER 197bE 41_.,
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Bernhard, 134.3, business and the CIA/By Robert ci-ieer
STAT
secret way than many a man who
moved to the sound of trumpets and
the howl of motorcycle sirens."
Both Retinger and F;ernhard had
influential contacts in the United States, .
and after agreeing on the scheme, the
duo went off to America to enlist
support. A portrait of Bernhard in the
December 1970 issue of Fortune
magazine described that trip:
. . Retinger joined him [Bernhard
ii Washington, and they proceeded,
with the help of Bernhard's wartime
comrade, Walter Bedell Smith, then
director of the CIA, C. D. Jackson, a
vice-president of Time Ince and the
tate John Coleman of Burroughs. to
recruit an American group."
Bernhard's connection with
There was absolutely no
publicity. The hotel was ringed by
security guards, so not a single
journalist got within a mile of the place.
The participants were pledged not to
repeat publicly what was said in the
discussions. Every person present.
prime ministers, foreign ministers,
leaders of political parties, head; of
great banks and industrial companies
and representatives of such
international organizations as the
European Coat and Steel Community:
as well as academicians, was
magically stripped of his office as he
entered the door... . ?From
BERNHARD Prince of the Netherlands,
by Alden Hatch. Doubleday, 1962
- Recent revelations of illicit ties
between Prince Bernhard of the
Netherlands and the Lockheed
Corporation toilet' only a corner of this
man's murky career?a career made
possible oniy by the support of various
American presidents; top corporate
leaders and the large tax-exempt
foundations. The CIA, hard evidence
indicates, was the catalyst in
organizing this coalition behind the
prince.
. The CIA connection was hinted
at in one recent New York Times story
which stated that the prince had ,
maintained an account in a CIA-funded
Dutch bank that was set up by one of
his closest aides, General John von
Houghton, who "reportedly had ties to
the CIA." The Times noted that "Prince
Bernhard was also a close friend of
Allen W. Dulles, founder of the CIA."
The Times also cited "one reliable
source close to the government" as
saying that when the Dutch prime
minister confronted Bernhard about
wrongdoing in connection with -
Lockheed, the prince denied it, but
added, "If you would ask me about my
relations with the CIA, that would be a
different matter"?which is where the
Times let the matter drop. So far as I
can determine, no one has asked the
prince or the CIA about their
relationship, which revOlves around the
prince's leadership of the very
influential Bilderberg conferences (The
Ruling Class, September 17, 1976).
- ? The Bilderberg meetings, which
have occurred every year since 1954,
have been the most secretive,
Secretary of State Kissinger. Far
removed from the public view, they
have initialed such significant
developments as the European
Common Market, basic changes in
trade, tariff and currency regulations
and Western positions on "hot spots"
such as Cuba and Vietnam. But I have
come across evidence that none of this
.would have occurred had it not been
. for the timely intervention of the CIA in
assisting Prince Bernhard in the
formation of his Bilderberg group.
A shadowy character by the
name of Joseph H. Retinger thought up
Bilderberg and peddled the idea to
- :Bernhard. Retinger, a Polish exile, was
?-?
involved in numerous clandestine cold
war operations and had extensive
1,e,iYe77.7.!
.1f
International fixer Bernhard, right,
with Lockheed sales exec Fred Meuser.
contact with virtually all Western
intelligence agencies. One early Bilder-
bergenthe late C. D. Jackson, who was
vice-president of Time Ince-once
described Retinger as a "sort of
eminence grise of Europe, a Tallyrand
without portfolio." Alden Hatch's
. laudatory biography of Bernhard,
based on extensive taped
conversations with the prince and
researched with the full support of the
royal household, says of Retinger,
"Certainly he had almost as many
exclusive and influenti
gathering of the \Neste ?PegIRS ReWAIMPPIA
_TrOktieri-??9
American corporate 'and political Bond. . . . Though his name is
elite?including President Ford, virtually unknown except to the
C.D. Jackson of Time Inc.; the CIA's.
head turned Bilderberg over to him,
Bedell Smith and the CIA is described
in greater detail in the prince's.
biography, which states that the .
Bilderberg idea at first received a coot
response from such e...-Averelt
Harriman, who thought it was too
controversial. Said Harriman: "l_won't
touch it. It's dynamite." Bernhard.
according to his biographer, ". . . saw
a number of American politicians. After
'several more rebuffs he went to his_
friend Bedell Smith, whowas then head
of the CIA. Smith said, 'Why the hell
0 ilkObatddribOblfMin the first
piace?TheneraTSthith.th-en "turned
the matter over to C. D. Jackson. and ? ?
things really got going." It is interestino
RAMPART S
STAT
a- '1973,
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An Inside Look:
aria
'IL (21
r
1)
La T1, AG.
"Are these men really former men or are
they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The
CIA would like to have it one way, and then to
have it overlooked the other way."
xplosive as the Watergate revelations have been, no
disclosure has been more ominous than the 1970
Domestic Intelligence Plan attributed to the pen of
Tom Charles Huston. The plan, as revealed last
J me, provided for the use of electronic surveillance, mail
coverage, undercover agents and other measures to an ex-
tent unprecedented in domestic intelligence-gathering. This
program was to be directed by a committee of representa-
tives from all of the national intelligence agencies. It goes
far toward justifying the worst paranoia Americans have
felt during the past quarter century over the growth of
secrecy and deception in our government. Much of this
anxiety relates to what might be called "the CIA Men-
tality," the stealthy abuse of power and the practice of
deception of the American public?all performed under the
cloak of secrecy and often in the name of anticommunism
and national security. In fact, wnat makes the Watergate
Fletcher Prouty was the Air Force officer in charge of Air Force
support of the CIA, a position he held from 1955 to 1963. His
office put hun in constant contact with the top officers of the
in telli?i cc cstablittnient. and he has traveled to over -10 countries
at Cbi requet. 11e is one of the few people wtth inside knowledi:e
of the CIA Wilt) Wa5 001 reqUirCti 10 take a lifetime oath of silence.
His book, Jut S,..cret team, is bfished Ity Prentice-Hall.
case different from other scandals is that the system and
methods used, the means by which it was all planned,
staffed with experts, financed clandestinely and carried out
was all taken from the operating method of the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency was created, and its
powers and responsibilities defined, by the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947. Its character was developed over a span of
11 years by its greatest mentor and guiding spirit, Allen
Welsh Dulles. The "Frankenstein" product of this implau-
sible union of a \yell-intentioned law and of a scheming
opportunist is the agency as we lipd it today.
Before 195$, when Dulles became the Director, Central
Intelligence (DCI), the. ('IA was primarily concerned with
performing, its assigned task: as the central auth.ority for all
of the various intelligence organizations of the govern tnont ,
the CIA's business was to collect and interpret information
gathered by other intelligence units. But that all soon
changed.
In 19-15, President Truman established a committee to
review the CIA, to make recommendations for improve-
ment and to evaluate its past Nriortnance. The members of
this committee were Allen Dulles, Nlathias Correa, and Wil-
ham Jackson, and their report was without question the
most important single document on this subject eqr pub-
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by L. Fletcher Prouty
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THE SONNENFELDT CASE --
The pre6s, led by the N.Y. TIMES and the Washington POST, has charged to the rescue of Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, an insider whose steady rise in the behind- he-seenes bureaucracy ruling the American people
may be coining to the end, now that he has emerged from behind-the-scenes. While the Senate Finance
Committee is considering his nomination as Under Secretary of the Treasury, the House. Internal. Security
Committee is checking into his subversive background. Powerful forces are bringing pressure to bear to have
Sonnonfeldt, top assistant to henry Kissinger, confirmed in spite of his previous espionage activities.
President Nixon nominated the 46-year old Sonnenfeldt to be Under Secretary of the Treasury in which
post Sonnenfeldt would have the responsibility of shaping the Administration's plans for increasing
East-West trade and for establishing a new international monetary system dm would include Communist
nations. Several former Foreign Service career officers filed objections and testified against the nomination
which was referred to the Senate Finance Committee for confirmation hearings on.May 15, 1973.
On July 26,1973, Congressman john M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Senior Republican Minority member of the
House Internal Security Committee, opened hearings on the Federal Civil Employees Loyalty Security
Program. The hearings are being held in executive session and informed sources state that Otto Otepka's
testimony about security risks employed by the State Department will be shocking when published. Mr.
Otepka personally handled one of the investigations on Helmut Sannenfeldt, which involved a 24-hour a
day surveillance, a legal wiretap on his telephones and the interviewing of numerous witnesses. It was
conclusively determined that on more than one occasion Sonnenfeldt had turned over secret documents
and confidential information to unauthorized persons among whom were agents of a foreign power.
Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, who is in charge of the Criminal Division of the
Department or Justice, recently testified before the Senate Watergate Committee and was in complete
support of President Nixon's innocence in connection with Watergate. He is also in complete support of
Sonnenfeldt. When Petersen's attention was called [0 Paul Scott's syndicated colunm which revealed details
of Sonnenfehlt's act of turning over secret documents to foreign agents, he replied as follows: (Quote)
This is in response to your recent letter to the Attorney General concerning a recent newspaper article by
Paul Scott discussing the nomination of Mr. Helmut Son mien MCI t to be Under Secretary of the Treasury
Department and whether lie would be a suitable candidate for that position.
Executive Order 10150 requires that an be made of all employees of the executive branch
before they can be accepted for a position. The Order further requires that all persons privileged to he
employees in the executive branch must be loyal to the United Stales, and that no one may hold such a
sensitive position with the government unless his employment is determined to be clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security. These requirements apply, of course, to all presidential nominees,
including those io he an Under Secretary.
In accordance Nvith that Order, the Federal llurcau of lnvesti!.;ation has conducted a niunLer of
investiations of Mr. Smitten lehICS character and loyalty in cornice lion with various positions he has held in
that ex.cculive hranell in the past. In all of those case, the results were determined to be favorable. l'hus,
althoult we cannot diAdosc the contents of any of the l'utrcati's investitotivc files to olio oilkshk the,
Federal goverinivApprbueaftfr Relelase WONAR41 clAcRIPFt9.1 4:TRW WOR?P9tP9PPP14 ion in his artide
-
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Ube ciNCralb
or ifree
BOX 3 ZAREPHATH N.J. 06890 AUGUST 17, 1973
UNITED SOVIET STATES OF A
Nelson Roe
Republican n
and now he hi
be taken or
lifetime ambii
R. Harris Si
Central Intelli
General Waits
Central Intel
Dwight D. I
Communist. '
replete with
Communists. As pointed out in our Confidential
Intelligence Report ofJune 1973,J. Edgar Ilaorer
in 1945 dispatched agents who hand delivered to
then Assistant Secretary of State Nelson
Rockefeller two top Secret F.B.I. reports on Alger
Hiss and Harry Dexter White which documented
the fact that both were Communists and Soviet
agents. This was during the formation of the
United Nations Organization. The top secret
F. B.!. reports were handed over to Rockefeller at
his hotel. Rockefeller later admitted he destroyed
both reports. Had this information been made
public, the parts- played by Alger Hiss and his
associates in the. formation of the U.N. would also
have been made public and the Congress of the
U.S. consequently would have been alerted to the
conspiracy which ultimately resulted in a
Communist-controlled U.N., its headquarters
located on property donated by the Rockefellers.
Almost immediately after his election to the
presidency, Richard Nixon appointed as his top
presidential ad\ iser on national security. Dr.
lanry A. Kissiner who hod been a protege of
s.\.elson Rockeleller since Kissinger's student days
at 1 lar\ ord. Once issiiTer's position was es-
tahlkhed, lc set up w hat amounts to a parallel
,..!o\ernineilt under his contiol \\ ith a stHt of 110
people \\ or king dircetiv for him. K issingei , along
with a number 01 his associates, was known in
The above title is taken from a chapter in a book
entitled -"Toward a Soviet America," written in
1932 by William Z. Foster, then national chairman
of the Communist Party, USA. The book was a
blueprint for the take-over of the United States.
through force and violence.
Subsequently the international Communist
hierarchy in Moscow decided that, instead of
battering down the ramparts from without, vic-
tory now was to be-achieved from within. Trojan
horse tactics would be employed. In the face of this
altered strategy, a book that advocated violence
became a liability. Obviously then "Toward a
Soviet America" had to be swept under the rug and
the Communists endeavored to reclaim every copy
of the book.
In 1961, after the copyright had expired, the
book was republished through the efforts of the
late Francis F. Walters, Chairman of the House
Un-American Activities Committee. The new
book contained a commentary by Maurice Reis, a
consultant to the committee, and a foreword by
Congressman Walters.
The success of the Communists in the take-over
of Czechoslovakia without resorting to force and
violence became a blueprint for .2oining power
through internal subversion. This required that
key people in government be Communists. Com-
? munist agents or persons under Communist con-
trol through blackmail, bribery or other devious
means.
When President Nixon was defeated in the race
for governor of California. he \?..ls totally without
Financial resources and it seemed that he had
reached the end ol his political career. At the
invitation of Nelson koekeft:lier, Nixon vi ent to
Ncw York, rno\ into
mcnt rouse to R(?el:e!-e11-..1- and itironi;11
Rockefeller was made a p;ii tiler in a Li tirin in it
salary ()I '.,;20usciio ciir. 1 1 is (int:....s weie few other
than to promote Rockefeller inter CMS and
Programs. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-PIDPI9it,00901.4300600300001Mirity risk --thus we
STA1
00600300001-1
Approved For Release 2005/44i1:4?FtIALI4b150090
1;
FE3 1073
P!.1Ir 4
_
C,0
.1 /\?
,t 0 0
'!"...(?11 Tr Ti
12, 6. 9 .Lt. .1'. L. j 9
WASIIINGTON?Since the Bay of
Pigs, when the United States lost its
gamble under the Kennedy administra-
tion to overthrow Fidel (;-1.stro, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has suffered in
many areas of public opinion.
It has also, suffered internally, going
thru a succession of directors and los-
ing.other hey people under three Presi-
dents [starling with Kennedy] who did
not totally believe what the CIA reports
were saying.
The CIA was created in 1948 by the
late President Truman [as the Central
Intelligence Group] from the skeleton
of the wartime Office of Strategic Stud-
ies, It was formed in an effort to col-
, 'beet information lor spy] on other na-
tions as much as they did on us. From
the start, it was an agency cloaked in
semi-secrecy noted for generating de-
bate
An early director, m. Roscoe H.
-c-- Ad
1illenl:oettcr, had warned the Truman
administration of the then impending
Communist invasion of, South Korea--
and apparently was replaced for his
accurate p,reciiction by Gen. Walter Be.-
dell Smith.
Smith then grabbed headlines Idurin-7
the Sen. Jowph B. McCarthy .periodl
by stating in public there was a "mwal
certainty" that Communi:A spie
penetratcd C Cry securi:y agency in
WashinVm.
Smith did not last long at the CIA
after that and was replaced by the
pipe-smoking Allen W. Dillies, brother
of John Foster Dulles, President Risen-
hev..cr's secrol.wy of state. Dulles put
..leCarthy down after the senator
charged there were double agents oper-
ating within the CIA.
.the first, civilian chief of the
CIA, came off as sort of a super-spy
because of Ins exploits in the 055 dur-
ing World War II. After staving off
McCarthy, he continued to build the
CIA froM a small agency [starting with
1,500 agents] to a worldwide network
that began to do more than make esti-
mites of what foreign por:crs might
do.
.Still, the Hoover commission looked
into the operations of the agency and
c.,me up with a report sayir,g,it was
lacking in collecting "intc:Iligence data
from behind the Iron Curtain." Alea
while, ',The CIA squabbled with the. ioug-
e:;tablis:led intelligence arms of the
three military services. In one cisc it
had enough clout to ''E;et the Army's
chief of intelliftence fired.
By 1953 the i?per.d?!10
.:3.50,C00,C,00 a 'year ;now it is spcuilfll
about:c42 billion]. A year later it was
warnind that there v, as an inten,r,i...e
Corrimunit drive nouer,,vay in latin
America. And then the reof began to
Ill in en thn agotry after its yo,t-el
spy ph:ne, thn shot down a.
liusii.'Yho incident catimsd even ci
di.ama and the cancellaticn of a VI
State,-BuAzin summit meeting,
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA RD
R000600300001-1
. y
, .
A STAT
?
4
1
,
will a public trial of pilot Francis G:
1),;0 ers.
The public clamor really began, tho,
alter the attempted invasion of Cuba
ordered by te late President Kennedy.
The late Pobert F. Kennedy personally
ran an inve:-..tition of the agency as
Winne fc-: tie fiasco began to fall on .?
the CIA for furnishing faulty data. Aft-
er a :?..ho,rt period of grace, Dulles left
as director to be replaced by John A.
:',IcCone. a business executive,
Adm. William F. [Red] Raborn fol-
lov.od in the Johnson administration.
It.:?`,.tarn's biggest early flap was a charge
tic ciA got involved in an Incluesian.
pvernment upheaval. But the involve-
ment also spread to the Congo, Viet
Nam, and apparently to some domestic
intelligence activities. The deputy direel. 1,/
tar then was Richard Helms, a career
.;overninent ?reano.f:Tinent expert.
Helms moved no to director during
the Johnson era of td5, assurincc, Con-
gress that the CIA. did not create for-
eign polieY. Ilelms continued to feel
public heat because of the. CIA finane-
jog of foundation.; and student activi-
ties, lie was defended by Sen. Kennedy
at the tirno.
When Mr: Nixon became Prc:-ident,
one of his first moves ''as to install a
trusted associate of long standing?Ma-
rine Gen. Robert Cushion?as deputy
director of the CIA. After. getting his
own reading on the agency, the Presi-
dent promoted Cushman to comman-
d:mt. of II:e corps--and is sending
1h:dais to Iran as zoill,11...;sadm.. Tenor-
STAT
row we will repit. n. on the :ley: director,
P91 00901R000600300001 1
WASHINGTON .STAR ?
Approved For Release 2005/1g/t4CCIXRDP91-00901R00060030
? ?
It isn't official yet, but our usually
Impeccable official sources tell us that
-Richard M. Helms will soon be stepping
:clown after six years as director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, presumably
to take on a new and important assign-
inent in the Nixon administration.
Whatever his future job may be, he will
be sorely missed in the one which he Is
leaving.
f: Of the men who have-headed the CIA
iince its inception in 1947, Helms stands
Out as the one truly professional intelli-
gence . expert. His career in the spy busi-
ness covers a span of 29 years, beginning
with a four-year stint with the Office of
Strategic Services in World War II. After
transferring to the newly-formed CIA,
he 'served as deputy director for plans
under ?General Walter Bedell Smith and
John A. McCone, previous CIA heads.
As director, Helms brought a coolness
of judgment and great administrative
talent to one of the most sensitive and
difficult jobs in the federal government.
'Under his leadership, the performance
of the agency, in contrast to past years,
Exit 1.%...crharel Elehns.
has been highly discreet and;
tent that such things can' be judged,
effective. It is suggested that his depar-
ture from the CIA may have resulted in
part from a dispute within the intelli-
gence community regarding the deploy-
ment of Russian. nuclear missiles. Yet
from all the 'available evidence, his as-
sessment of the world situation ? and
particularly in Indochina, where the CIA
has borne heavy responsibilities has
been remarkably accurate.
The highly essential business of in-
telligence-gathering, being necessarily
secret and to some minds distasteful,
requires the kind of public confidence
that Helms has been able to provide. As
President Johnson remarked at his
swearing-in .ceremony: "Although he
has spent more than 20 years in public
life attempting to avoid publicity, he has
never been able to conceal the fact that
he is one of. the most trusted and most
able and most dedicated professional ca-
reer men in this Capital." As director of
the CIA, Richard Helms has fully justi-
fied that assessment.
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Approved For Rele' Riahigt4N.ItiA)-14-15P-94409
13 October 1972
Secret and nonsensical
it: HARRIS smiTH: . ? ?
68S
458pp. University of California
Press (I I3EC;).
Cicneral Walter Bedell Smith once
Startled a postwar dinner party by
tiuggesting the war might have been
won much earlier had the United
States diverted the time, money and
inen expended on the Office of Strate-
gic Services ," and the rest of that
damn secret nonsense " to the regular,
forces.' :It was a singular speculation.
for a man, who had been General ?
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and, later,
Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
R. Harris Smith's OSS, however.,
is evidence that Bedell Smith was
displaying his usual horse sense. The
picture of the OSS during and
?immediately a fter?the Second World
War is a depressing one. Its succes-
sor, the CIA, has its faults. But the
OSS, as depicted in this hook, was a
mixture of idealism, naivety, in-
competence and. intrigue seldom
matched in the annals of govern-
'tient in America or anywhere else, ?
Mr Smith's wide reading and
extensive research have not saved the
book from ingenuousness and error,
Ile begins by labelling .his work
" the secret history " of the org,ani-
,zation, but there is little of note in it
that has not been written before and
often much better. He gets things
wrong. It was the American Navy,
not the Royal Navy, that was
responsible for landing General Pat-
'.ton's .forces in Morocco in 1942.
The Purple Clang operated in. De-
troit, not Philadelphia. Stephen
Bailey is not, nor has he been,
.".President? of Syracuse University ",
-which is headed by a chancellor. ?
.. Mr Smith." main problem seems
to be his tendency to write about the
OSS and :its operations in North
Africa, Europe and the Far East in
absolutes. Men and organizations
arc heroic or dastardly, faithful or
treasonable. The story is told in
blaeks and whites, whereas the dirty,
dangerous game played by the OSS
is best described in varying shades
.of grey ?
;Nor does Mr Smith pay enough
,.attention to .one of the more impor-
tant decisions taken at the outset by
. General William " Wild Bill " DODO-
van, the founder and director of .the
OSS. lie was determined to consoli-
date within the organization all op-
? .erations?espionage, sabotage, assis-
tance to guerrilla movements. This
was an error, The OSS planned
operations based on intelligence-re-
ports produced by the OSS. There
was little objective study of these
reports ; if they were the organiza-
'tion's, the assumption was, then they
must be accurate. They often were
not, and the operation failed. Oddly,
the CIA, despite the sorry record of
its .vredeees.sor, has continued this
d-ii!anThafib'n,Willi''' epli!S'ilihir
sults,.---such as the fiasco at the Bay
of 'Pigs. ?- ?
Mr Smith's 'villains include not
only the Germans, Japanese and
Italians, but the British intellieencc
services; any official who seemed to
? doubt the OSS's competence and its
right to order the political end of
- the war as'it saw fit, and, of course,
all' colonialists ". The style is an
'extraordinary ,mixture of.. exaggera-
tion and parochial m. ?
? Mr Smith writes that. `,` the British
-Army?: took a. respite of several
months from the war against Hitler
to suppress the revOlt " of the EAM-
F.LAS partisans in Greece. This was
the period when Second Army was
fighting bitterly in: North-West
Europe and the Eighth Army was
heavily engaged in Italy..
Perhaps the best chapter in the
book is that devoted to the OSS
operations in Yugoslavia?best, be-
cause it provides a fairly clear
picture of the bewildering situation
that arose from the presence of two
resistance movements and of the
naivety of OSS officers. One of
these was confident that Tito " was
planning no Communist revolution
for his country ".
Surprisingly, the book is weakest
when it deals with the OSS in China
during and 'after the war and with
?American intelligence operations ,in
Algeria in 1942-43. In both cases Mr
Smith tends to adopt the easy expla-
nation of what happened and a
somewhat austere attitude towards
those officers whose standards dif-
fered from his. Association with a
New York law firm or bank did not
.necessarily sour an operator's judg-
ment. ..In retrospect the OSS prob-
ably got more from this type of man
that ? it did from the wild-eyed left-
overs from the Abraham. Lincoln
.Brigade in Spain.
? There are some brig,ht,spots how
?often Winston Churchill cut through
the red tape to Save a promising
. operation ; a good story about Gen-
eral Donovan and David Bruce in
Normandy ; the gradual profession-
alization of some members of OSS
a good, although incomplete, picture
of Allen Dulles, who is dubbed " the
master spy ". But these are not
sufficient to save?the book: The .OSS
imust. wait for a more objective and
sophisticated chronicler.
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
STAT
71AVINGTON POST
Approved For Release 200i/UT41:961A-RDP91-00901R000
STAT
a ithew BafrL Heded
CIA Training rogream
Matti ew Baird, 70, retired
director of ? training for the
, Central: Intelligence Agency,
'died Tuesday at his home in
1;3ethany Beach, Del.
Born in Ardmore, Pa., Mr.
Baird was a graduate of Hay-
erford School in Haverford,
Pa., and earned his bachelor's
' and master's degrees from
, Princeton University. He also
' held a bachelor's degree in lit-
erature from Balliol College,
, Oxford.
- He was headmaster of the
? Arizona Desert School in Tuc-
son from 1930 to 1937, then
- worked for three years as a re-
'search economist with the Sun
IOil Co. in Philadelphia.
: Mr. Baird owned and oper-
ated the Ruby Star Ranch in
Tucson from 1940 to 1942, then
Served as a colonel in the
Army Air Corps during World
War IL ..
He returned to the Ruby
Star in 1945, where he became
a recognized authority on
Brahman cattle. He had an-
other tour of duty with the
Air Force from 1950 to 1953,
during which time he was de-
tailed to CIA.
The then CIA director, Gen.
Walter Bedell Smith asked
Mr. Baird in 1951 to join the
agency as director of training,
with the task of further organ-
izing and developing a train-
ing program worldwide in
scope.
_ Until his retirement in 1965,
- Mr. Baird initated and imple-
mented proposals that led to
the creation of what is consid-
ered an outstanding training
ipstitution within the CIA. At
the time of his retirement, he
was presented the CIA's high-
est award, .the Distinguished
Intelligence Medal. .: J
600300001-1
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AT
TAT
LUILC U t.,;
STAT ?
? ? 2 2 APR 1972
511204 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0
mra C/4 '7 DI11r%
uenien: 5py of the Century
by E. H. Coo146dge ? ?
(Random House; $10) .
The'General Was a Spy
by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling
(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; $8.95).
A year before Winston Churchill's "Iron
Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri,
which formally stated the theme of Act I
of the Cold War, a prologue was being
written and played backstage in Europe
by Americans and Germans. They had
already identified Soviet Communism
as Enemy Number One, not primarily
because Russia had Eastern Europe in
its grip, but because Soviet Commu-
nism was satanic and was set on con-
quering the world. And as Hugh Trevor-
Roper remarks in his introduction to
The General Was a Spy, "it is legitimate
to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan."
Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy
stories describe how and why, with the
collapse of the German armies, ? the
Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of
Intelligence .against the Soviet Union
and underwrote his postwar espionage
operations.
Reinhard Gehlen was a professional,
an experierwed, single-minded anti-
Communist with exceptional contacts.
Those who hired him were not of the
breed of Henry Stimson; who once said
quaintly that gentlemen don't . read
other people's mail. They were what
came to be called realists, and they
dominated US foreign policy for the
next quarter of a century. The US gov-
ernment secretly financed General Geh-
len to the amount of $200 million, and
when he finally left his American super-
visors and went to work directly for the
Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells
us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden
handshake in appreciation of the great
work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of
250,000 marks had been authorized.
Dulles added the not entirely serichisly
meant condition that Gehlen should
use the money to buy a fine house
somewhere in the Bavarian moctiptain.s."
o !
For the $200 mill5Rer(aN recreivevie
mountains of paper and thousands of
clandestine tips on Eastern Europe and
the USSR. Toward the end, it learned
that much of the information was use-
less; and it learned something more
disturbing: the Gehlen organization had
been penetrated by the Soviets. By the
early '60s, Washington's interest had
cooled.
The General Was a Spy is drawn from a
series of articles written by two German
journalists for Der Spiegel. Gelder!: Spy
of the Century is the product of a Euro-
pean educated British journalist who
was himself an intelligence agent in
World War II and was imprisoned by
the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer a
more detailed and dispassionate ac-
count and focus more sharply on the
intricacies of the postwar intelligence
network inside Germany; they are less
revealing than Cookbridge, however,
on the American involvement and on
the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen's
associates.
Gehlen served any master who served
his purpose, which was the undermin-
ing and the destruction of Communism.
When it could no longer be doubted
that the German armies were defeated,
Gehlen. turned to the Werewolfs, the
young terrorists who were to carry on
after Hitler's collapse. The Werewolf
project had been discussed at one of
Gehlen's last meetings with the Fuhrer,
whom Gehlen found "most charming."
They had also discussed Hitler's order
that "gramophone records with sound
effects of combat noise and rolling tanks
. . . be distributed to front line com-
mands and played from dugouts as near
as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler
was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen
accepted this. order, as all the others,
knowing it was too late to stave off
OW/000112/1*14Dlikt-RDFS1W369,01
e did not desert until. there was
nothing to desert from. He played no
0600300001-1
iii any k.,erman plot against the
Nazi leaders. He waited until the end
and then escaped to Bavaria, in early
1945, taking with him files he knew
would interest the Americans? to whom
he intended -to surrender at a price. He
met with Brigadier General Edwin L.
. Sibert, senior intelligence officer of the
American Zone, who (report llohne and
Zoning) "while fighting was still in
progress in France . . . had been pre-
'pared to make use of Adolf Hitler's
officers in the cause of 'American strat-
egy" and who "had a most excellent
impression of him fGehlenJ at 'once."
Sibert promptly took up with General 1
Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's
proposal to set up a German intelligence
service "financed by the US and directed ?
against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith
"okayed" the project, according to
Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform.
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander,
who had forbidden fraternization with .
Germans. After lengthy interrogation
in Germany, Gehlen was flown to
Washington.
Though friendship with Moscow was
then 'official US policy, Cookbridge
points out, Gehlen 'knew that "many
generals, above all General George V.
Strong, the chief of G-2 army intelli-
gence, and Sibert, were very far from
regarding the Soviet Union as a future
ally. In fact, a vastly different vision was
taking place at the Third Army head-
quarters at Bad Toelz, near where he
[Gehlen] had buried his ... files. There
General Patton was dreanling of rearm-
ing a couple of Waffen SS divisions to
incorporate them into his Third Army
and 'lead them against the; Reds.'"
Said Patton: "We're going to have to
fight them sooner or later. Why not now
while our army is intact and we can
kick the Red army back into Russia? We
can do it with my Germans. . . . They
hate those Red bastards." %
That, of course, went way beyond
anything Gehlen's captors had in mind.
They wanted information; Gehlen had
it. So, says Cookbridge, they treated
him with great courtesy, "wooing him
like a wayward lass who can bring a
large dowry to offset the blemishes of
her past. ... Gehlen bargained his way
into the gray dawn of Cold War espio-
nage, conceding or compromising on
some points, using pressures near to
"blackmail to gain others. It says much
for his shrewdness, self-assurance and
persistence that he was able to take on
Rat0961aNOMIAn array of top-rank-
ing American experts." They agreed to
covertly subsidize "an autonomous .
P.(17112
Approved For Release 20A51/14 :41&-RDP91-009
"Dear Reinie"
THE GENERAL WAS A SPY
by HEINZ OHNE and HERMANN ZoLLING
377 pages. Coward-McCann
& Geoghegan. $8.95. ?
GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY
? by E.H. COOKRIDGE
402 pages. Random House. $10.
THE GAME OF THE FOXES
by LADISLAS FARAGO
696 pages. McKay. $11.95.
While waiting for further commu-
niques from th?-, nostalgia front?Rich-
ard Burton's Mussolini and
the return of the crew cut, per-
haps?the American public is
being deafened by old spies
and their chroniclers whisper-
ing: "Now it can be told."
An alert literary scavenger
.named Ladislas Farago dug
a tin box of German intel-
ligence papers out of the Na-
tional Archives; and recycled
them into a bestseller: The
Game of the foxes. The book,
an almost day-to-day account
of German agents at work in
Britain and the U.S. during
World War II, is a stunning
proof of the incredible cost
and even more incredible in-
efficiency of most espionage
networks. Of the many Ab-
wehr agents smuggled into
England, fot example, not
one was still operating at the
? time of the Normandy in-
vasion in 1944.
Diaries are negotiable cur-
rency, too. Tire London Jour-
nals of General Raymond E.
Lee, 1940-41 (Little, Brown)
are bringing $12.50 on the open mar- helped certify his anti-Nazi posture
ket, mostly for predicting?you read afterward.
it here!?that Russia will prove too ? Nothing suggests Gehlen's sublime
much for Hitler. So it's "Once more insolence better than what he did when
into the attics, fellow soldiers." Even everything fell apart in 1945 He dis-
old memos are worth their weight in guised himself as jolly Dr. Wendland,
gold, and that, given the art of mil- collected the microfilms of his files,
itary memo writing; is ? saying some- and buried them in a Bavarian moun-
V thing. In 1945 Sir John Masterman, tai meadow. Then he waited for the
peacetime Oxford don, wartime coun- American troops. Whisked to Wash-
n
terspy, was ordered to write an of- ington, the archenemy of only a few
ficial report about the remarkable sue- months before convinced his conquer-
cess British intelligence enjoyed turning ors that they should appoint him (and
around German spies in England and those files) as their primary espionage
deploying them as double agents. Yale source against the Soviet Union. The
University Press has simply reprinted Gehlen Organization, or simply the
this surprisingly readable document "Org," set up in what had been an
(The Double-Cross System in the War SS model housing development, out-
of 1939 to 1945) on the coded doings side of Munich. To a number of re-
of Garbo; Tricycle 'and the rest, and cruits?ex-SS men and Gestapo agents
bargain-priced the instant book at may have run as high as 30%?it
$6.95. ? was just like home.
The No, AppdtvedeFot filel 0A t"
4
etrse 20 eiSAIIIIStegO
processed cloak and dagger act, how- $3,000,001During IP e c- 4ital
ever, promises to be Reinhard Geh- Gehlen worked exclusively for the
ln 14 ow rnn von unstaee a man who CIA, another $200 million in Annerican
was Hitler's favorite intelligence of-
ficer, then after the war played "Dear
Reinie" to his CIA chief Allen Dulles.
Born in 1902, just too late for
World War 1, he marked time as an ar-
tillery and cavalry officer until World
War H brought out his special talents.
He was one of those who could put war
on paper. Statistics and maps filled him
with a passion to organize them. By
1942 he was chief of intelligence on the
eastern front. Toward the end, when ac-
curacy meant prognosticating defeat,
Gehlen's accurate reports earned him
one of Hitler's temper tantrums. Big
this last-minute fall from favor only
A,
LIEUT. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (1944)
Just like home.
i,RonoRnmnonni-1
money funded the Org. Bi 1948 the
Org numbered 4,000 agents and sup-
plied an estimated 70% of the U.S.
Government's information on the So-
viet military. Once Gehlen had the
fidea.of putting 432 simultaneous wire-
taps on East Berlin phones. New Jer-
sey Bell Telephone supplied the switch-
board, courtesy of the CIA, at a total
cost of $6,000,000.
When the Org became the official
espionage service of West Germany
in 1956. Gehlen became a global ca-
terer. He and the BND?the Org's new
name?discreetly contracted them-
selves out to Tanzania, Afghanistan
and the Congo. The secret services of
Israel and Egypt alike found occasion
to use Gehlen's services.
British Author Cookridge and Ger-
mans fliihne and Zoning have com-
piled dossiers on Gehlen that might
satisfy the Org itself. Cookriclge, an
old agent who makes a living out of
spy chronicles like The Truth About
Kim Philby, tends a bit to trade
on man-in-the-shadows glamour.
Gehlen turned the gentleman's av-
ocation of spying?Sir John Master-
man still compares it to cricket?into
big business. But Hohne and Ziilling
argue that, despite all his thermos-
flask cameras and secret, secret ink,
he still couldn't keep up with the
times. Forced into retirement in 1963,
he sat in his study on Lake Starnberg
with a death mask of Frederick the
Great looking down and wrote his
memoirs (due out later this year) rath-
er like Buffalo Bill after the frontier
went thataway. For spying, like es&
erything else, has gone automated.
"They expect you to be able to say
that a War will start next Tuesday at
5:32 p.m.," Walter Bedell Smith com-
plained when he was head of the CIA.
While he lasted,. Gehlen gave his cus-
tomers what they thought they.wanted.
In the cold war he catered to their sense
of sinister conspiracy, then by a more
or less relevant act or report relieved
the anxiety he had helped create. He
predicted the Hungarian revolt, for in-
stance, and the Israeli-Arab Six-Day
War. But these events occurred any-
way. Sentiment dictates that Gehlen be
treated as the last of the Scarlet Pim:
pernels. He was, in fact, more like the
last of the Prussians?a nostalgia t
TAT
own
timIdcoeu.ld hardly afford even in h
w
? Melvin Maddocks
STAT
00600300001-1
IV
Approved For Release 298414 : CIA-RDP91-00901
March 1972
4,:t"?.?
'el01122
Some al:m-7'.7-rv
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140 1/4.0.14. j
ichaLd
Wasn't asked?
by Petei.Dale Scott'
7:77-1 rofessor.Samuel Eliot IN
e?
. 1903 Theodore Roost
? national law and mor
US Navy to support the "11
Panama from Colombia. The:
to the Canal Zone treaty, is de
"Panama businessmen, agenl
[which stood to gain $40 mill
the treaty] and United States a
to add that the "agents" of
Company were New York in
Seligman and their Washingt4
who organized and financed
suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.
In some ways, the Panar
partition is .an instructive pre
involvement in Indochina.' Le
be different today; for many
preparing for revolution anC
'awed, under sections 956-6(
In theory, at least, responsibi
of American "interests" is nt
But in' fact, the CIA still rm
J. & W. Seligman and similar
These contacts have beer
from Wall Street which succ
CIA into its first covert ope
who created the CIA in 19
unhappiness at the deflection
gence function: "I never had any thougoht . when I set
up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-
and-dagger operations."' His intentions, however, count-
ed. for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York v.
corporation lawyer and President of the Council on
Foreign Relations. The Administration became con-
cerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian ?
? elections:.
Forrestal felt that -a secret counteraction was vital, hut
his initial assessment was that the Italian operation
would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists
in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing
. ? reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was
passed ? at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen
Dulles felt the .problem could not be handled effec-
tively in private hands. He urged strongly that the
. government establish a covert organization with un-
youchered funds, the decision was made to clez,-4te
under ih National Security Council.'
STAT
R000600300001-1
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
wEsuiTON POST .
FEB '1972
Approved For Release 2uu5/12/14 : C1A-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
After it Lein , Inconclusive Trai . . .
STAT
A Non-Communist S. Vietnam Cannot Le Guaranteed
Tn 1962 in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong re-
marked to French journalist Bernard Fall
that "Americans do not like long, inconclu-
sive wars and this is going to be a long, in-
conclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in
the end." A decade and three Presidents
later it is still an inconclusive war. And
Pham Van Dong is still the North Vietnam-
ese Premier.
During that same visit to Hanoi Ho Chi
'Minh told Fall that "it took us eight years of
bitter fighting to defeat you French in Indo-
china . .. The Americans are much stronger
than the French, though they know us less
'well. It may perhaps take 10 years to do it
. . ." Ho is dead but clearly his spirit, and
hiti aim, live on.
It seems to me that Americans today must
keep such remarks as these in mind as they
assess the disclosures by President Nixon of
Henry Kissinger's secret negotiations with
the North Vietnamese and the peace propos-
als put to Hanoi. We suffer from a baseball
Syndrome; we want to see the final score
and then go home to dinner. The North Viet-
namese don't think that way; to them there
Is no final out until their side has won.
eiNs
There is an aphorism from the American
side that can be applied to the current situa-
tion in Indochina. In-1954 when he returned
to Washington from the Geneva Conference
that decreed the "temporary" division of
Vietnam, Undersecretary of State Walter
Bedell Smith remarked that "it will be well
to remember that diplomacy has rarely been
able to gain at the conference table what
cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."
In truth, neither side has prevailed on the
battlefield. And there is stalemate at the
conference table. The American eight-point
peace plan, in sum, must seem to Hanoi to
be a proposal for surrendering their victory
aim. The North Vietnamese nine-point plan,
judging from Kissinger's description of it
since it has yet to be published, in sum,
seems to Washington to be a proposal for
surrendering South Vietnam to the control
of ,the Communists. ?
, There are, as the Nixon administration
contends, some new elements in the Amer-
ican proposals. But the sum of. it is that
Hanoi must take its chances on an election
In the South in which the Vietcong or Na-
tional Liberation Front would compete. It is
probable that the Communists would end up
as 'a minority; they know that and so do
Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger. I have never
thought the Communists would participate
In an election except as a Mechanism to con-
By Chalmers M. Roberts
firm a deal already set that would give them
key Cabinet and other posts in a Saigon re-
gime. Wide-open, nation-wide elections as
the West knows them are both abhorrent to
Communist regimes and foreign to the Viet-
namese, North and South, as a technique for
distributing power. Past elections in the
South have been more of a charade than a
reality ? the result of Americanization of
that part of Vietnam?despite all the trum-
peting in Washington about them.
04.9
Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese
told him that there could be no solution that
did not include a political element and that
they asked the United States for "an indi-
rect overthrow" of the Saigon government;
-4..
.PHAM VAN DONG
in short, that the United States cooperate in
turning over South Vietnam to the Commu-
nists. A perusal of Hanoi's public statements
supports that reading; presumably the nine-
point program, once we see the text, will
too.
President Nixon is not prepared to do so,
any more than was President Johnson of
whom the same thing was asked. It is illu-
minating that, according to Hanoi's spokes-
man in Paris, Kissinger remarked at the se-
cret talks that "yon must not nourish the
illusion that we can settle the problem of
?
the war only because of the question of the
prisoners of war." Secretary of State Rogers
some months ago publicly said substantially
the same thing. In effect, both were saying
that Mr. Nixon will not make a deal to turn
the South over to the Communists simply to
get back the POWs.
Now it is being said that Mr. Nixon has
made a "generous" offer. But Hanoi does
not want just a chance to win in the South;
It wants a certainty. Mr. Nixon is willing to
give Hanoi at least some chance but not any-
thing like a certainty. And from what has
been reported .from Saigon one can imagine
that President Thieu's agreement to resign
before a new election is based either on his
belief that the procedure offers him a near
certainty or his estimate that Hanoi will not
accept anything less than near certainty for
its side and therefore that there is not going
to be any such election.
Where does this leave us? With the likeli-
hood of a continuing inconclusive war, with
-a continuatim of the withdrawal of Ameri-
can forces but with the probability of a re-
sidual force remaining in the South at elec-
tion time next November plus the certainty
that American planes will stay in adjacent
areas outside Indochina. This is not, of
course, absolutely certain for Mr. Nixon be-
fore election day could dramatically pull out
the last man. But how would he square that
with' past declarations that some forces will
remain until the prisoners are released?
044
The POWs are hostages and hostages not:
just for complete American withdrawal but
for a political settlement favorable to Hanoi.
There are conceivable ways to reach that
kind of 'a settlement such as a deal, con-
firmed by a sham election, to replace the
Thieu regime with some form of coalition
giving the Communists real power in Saigon
and the strong expectation of eventual total
power. But that deal is not likely one to be
made by Mr. Nixon. If it is made it will be
made by anti-Thieu South Vietnamese who
manage by coup or otherwise to displace
him and probably only when they are sure
Washington is powerless to prevent such a
deal.
The truth of the matter is that the United
States, despite the vast expenditure of blood
and treasure, has failed to guarantee the
survival of a non-Communist South Viet-
nam. If the Nixon administration, or its suc-
cessor, is determined, as Kissinger put it, to
end the division at home over the war it can
only pull out completely, hope Hanoi then
will release the POWs and leave it to Saigon
and Hanoi to settle the political issue._ _
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
TIM LONDON DAM .Y TEL =,111
Approved For ReleaR4-240B/1-214 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
M111.( Qrs)
STAT
As British influence in Africa declined, so did British secret serv
, sending hundreds of agents to African capitals like Accra, Lag
to buttress "sensitive" states against communism and protect
his exclusive series on the CIA
E. H. Cookridge continues
HE adventurous operations
often bordering on the bizarre
which the Central Intelligence
Agency pursued in many parts
of the world are usually /
ascribed to one man: Allen Dulles. J
They culminated in the abortive in-
vasion of Cuba in 1961. When Dulles
departed from the directorship of CIA
after the Bay of Pigs debacle, he
certainly left an indelible stamp of his
influence as the architect of the mighty
CIA edifice and its worldwide rami-
fications.
The policy of his successors has,
however, been no less forceful. CIA
activities under its present director,
Richard McGarr-all Helms, may
appear less aggressive because they are
? being conducted with greater caution
and less publicity, and because they
have been adroitly adjusted to the
changing climate in international poli-
tics. In the past CIA gained notoriety
by promoting revolutions in Latin
American banana republics, and sup-
porting anti-communist regimes in
South-East Asia. Its operations in
Africa were more skilfully camou-
flaged. For many years they had been
on a limited scale because the CIA had
relied on the British secret service to
provide intelligence from an area
where the British had unsurpassed ex-
perience and long-established sources
of information. But with the emergence
of the many African independent
countries, the wave of "anti-colonial-
ist" emotions, and the growing in-
filtration of Africa by Soviet and
Chinese "advisers", British influence
declined. Washington forcefully
stepped, through CIA, into the breach:
with the avowed aim of containing
communist expansion.
?
? Financial investments in new in-
dustrial and mining enterprises, and
lavish economic aid to the emerging
governments of the "underdeveloped"
countries, paved the road for the influx
of hundreds of CIA agents. Some com-
bined their intelligence: assignments
with genuine jobs as technical, agri-
cultural and scientific advisers.
The British Government - parti-
cularly after the Labour Party had
come topower in 1964 - withdrew
A bloodless coup in Uganda in January last 3
and installed Major-General Id] Amin as milli
a section of his troops). How far was the C
protest in Santa Domingo. A pro-rebel poster
STAT
Army Intelligence officers, were firmly
men began hurriedly to establish their
"stations" in Accra, Lagos, Nairobi
Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, the
"sensitive areas" in danger of slipping
under communist sway.
By the mid-1960s several senior CIA
officials, such as Thomas J. Gunning
and Edward Foy, both former U.S.
ng served for many years as a skilful
FBI agent before joining CIA and
being employed at Addis Ababa,
Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam, acquir-
ing fluency in Swahili. By 1965 the
Accra CIA Station had two-score
active operators, distributing largesse
among President Nkrumah's secret
adversaries.
most of their SIS and MI5 officials established at Accra. They were later
The Americans had every intention
from African capitals, though some joined by William B. Edmondson, who
remained, at the requAkrifdiAdr% of helping Ghana's economy by build-
rulers, to organise their own new in- Africa, an
riRgleltiNqeMItteseigklikr609inocioettiReueltoipbOt
te a avis, an Itish con-
rulers,
and security services. CIA attractive, motherly woman, whom in-
sortium, the Vo ta am, t us provid-
g hydro-electric power for the
no one would have suspected of hay- _
VEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Approved For Release 2%0V4/1/firCIA-RDP91-00
The CHA's New Cover
The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95
Richard J. Barnet
In late November the Central Intel-
ligence Agency conducted a series of
"senior seminars" so that some of its
important bureaucrats could consider
its public image. I was invited to
attend one session and to give my
views on the proper role of the
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate
activities were limited to studying
newspapers and published statistics,
listening to the radio, thinking about
the world, interpreting data of recon-
naissance satellites, and occasionally
publishing the names of foreign spies. I
had been led by conversations with a
number of CIA officials to believe that
they Were thinking along the same
lines. One CIA man after another
eagerly joined the discussion to assure
me that the days of the flamboyant
covert operations ; were over. The
upper-class amateurs of the OSS who
stayed to mastermind operations in
jGuatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else-
where?Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt,
Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert
Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald?had died
or departed.
In their place, I was assured, was a
small army of professionals devoted to
preparing intelligence "estimates" for
the President and collecting informa-
tion the clean, modern way, mostly
with ,sensors, computers, and sophis-
ticated reconnaissance devices. Even
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now
be as much a museum piece as Mata
-Hari. (There are about 18,000 em-
? ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the
entire "intelligence community" itself.
? The cost of maintaining them is some-
where between $5 billion and $6
billion annually. The employment
figures do not include foreign agents or
mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-
*man hired army in Laos.)
A week after my visit to the "senior
seminar" Newsweek ran a long story
,i6/
n "the new espionage" with a picture
of CIA Director Richard Helms on the
cover. The reporters clhaAlx than the CIA." Moreover, soon after ,
to some of the same Feii5
NON ReliWfti5/11)(f4 Senator Allen
adventurer has passed in the American
spy business; the bureaucratic age of
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe-
cialists has settled in." I began to have
an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's
article was a cover story in inore than
one sense.
_Elle
Opt
the
ing
knt
ing
vot
An
ceil
It has always ?been difficult to fail
analyze organizations that engage in
false advertising Shout themselves. Part of
of the responsibility of the CIA is to tarl
spread confusion about its own work.
The world of Richard Helms and his
"specialists" does indeed differ .from
that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ-
izations, in spite of their predilection
for what English judges used to call
"frolics of their own," are servants of
policy. When policy changes, they
must eventually change too, although
because of the atmosphere of secrecy
and deception in which they operate,
such changes are exceptionally hard to
control. To understand the "new
espionage" one must see it as ipart of
the Nixon Doctrine which, in. essence,
is a global strategy for maintaining US
power and influence without overtly
involving the nation in another ground
war.
But we cannot comprehend recent
th
be4
ize
He
ov
Jig
At
Bi
th
cc
ov
vi
A
in
re
li
developments in the "intelligence COM- n
munity" without understanding what fl
Mr. Helms and his employees actually P
do. In a speech before the National n
Press Club, the director discouraged/
journalists from making the attempt.
"You've just got to trust us. We are
honorable men." The same speech is
made each year to the small but
growing number of senators who want
a closer check on the CIA. In asking,
on November 10, for a "Select Com-
mittee on the Coordination of United
States Activities Abroad to oversee
activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington
noted that "the .subcommittee having
oversight of the Central Intelligence
Agency has not met once this year."
Symington, a former Secretary of
the Air Force and veteran member of
the Armed Services Committee, has
also said that "there is no federal
agency in our government whose activ-
ities receive less scrutiny and control
301R000600300001-1
Newsweek said, "The gaudy era of the
901R000600300001-1
?
STAT
Approved For
.11)1. dij.)
rrr/
kLA.:111_,
By .02(ili.ter.:7 115: Ilobertg
The writer; w7io. retired Test stonMer
tenior diplomatic' correspondoit of
The Washingtoo, Post, covered the 1954
VC17.6.VC1 MilerenCE3 on Bidoehina.
1TUST HOW SERIOUSLY did. the
(I) United States consider military in-
tervention in Indochina in 19517 The
publication of the Pentagon Papers?
first in the neWspapers and more re-
cently in the 43-volume official edition
published as 12 books by the House
Armed Sc..,rv.i.cos Committee?has made
the historian's task in answering that
question both; easier end more diffi-
cult. ? -
It lc easier because there Is now
available a, mass of new material on
the key year 1931, as well as for many
other yearn.- Much of it is confirma-
tory, of course, but there are new bits
,
and pieces, and above all a sense of
the urgency with which events were
perceived at the time.
- It is more difficult because the new
documents zdo not resolve all the out-
at:ending questions that have been
raised in the many books and articles
'written about the period. And while
the possibility that a key pieceof The
-puzzle may still be withheld through
censorship cannot be ruled out, a close
reading of Books-9 and 10 of the House
edition which- cover this period leaves
the , impression that the censors were
wholly capricious.
? From the 859 pages, dealing, with
1953 and 1951 (and these are pages of
documents, not the analyst's summa-
1%),f?,a
Release 2005/.12/14 :CIA-RDP61-009
z 4 uul 19/1
the censor did. not cut out the summa-
ries of the five documents, excised but
in Book 10 the summaries were cut out
for the two documents ,omitted, It so
happens that tamong ,the, Pentagon Pa-
pers made available to Tho Washington
'Post are coPles of the live documents
from Book 9,- ???
' ' ? ????
Tho Pentagon's explanation of t1ie.
"declassified i;eryle.e. (printed in each:
book) states that "some of the material.
has- been declassified solely on the
basis of prior disclosures." Yet one of
the excised documents was printed in,
full In the New York Times, Further-
more, It WAS simply en advance report
from Under Secretary of State Walter.
Bedell Smith in Geneva. to Secrete'
of State John Foster Dulles in Wash-
ington on an important ? Associated
Press dispatch written by - Seymour
Topping, now a Now York -Times edi-
tor. The ? more sioniiicant talegram
from Smith to Dulles on the following / 11, four days after tho fall ,of thenbion.
day revealing Topping:13 Chinese Como(
phu and three days after the -Geneva
'risunist mace Is included in the book! conference -opened, the French were
.(The informant, incidentally, was
--- "advised" ? that President Eisenhower
Huang Hue who is the new Peking am- "would be disposed to ask -Congress
bas.sedor to Canada and who may be. for authority to use the armed forces
the first envoy to Washington.) ,? of tho United States" under certain
Another censored ? document ? re-, conditions, This ((possibility," said
counts a Dulles conversation at Ge- Dulles on Aug. 3, "lapsed" on Juno 20
neva with Britain's Foreign Secretary, when Frame? ? decided to -accept the ?
Anthony Eden. This -cable reflects cease-fire that took another month to
Dulles'. unhappiness with Eden' and negotimjt.
British policy but far less so than some lqurecrous French writers, roost no-
of the printed telegrams. Still another tably Philippe Devillers and Joan Da.-,
excised message, from Dulles in Paris
couture in "End of a War," have do-
te). Washington, in July of 1934, details tailed the French pleas for Int-croon?
the agreed U.S.-11tronch position just time. American writers such as John
before the end of tho Geneva confer- Robinson Beal in "John Foster Dulles"
once but there is nothing in it that has have told it from the American side.
not long ago been known and widely. Most recently Robert F. Randle, a Co-
printed. ? lumbla University professor, in ."GoL,.
. Finally, the 'other two excised docu- nova 1954," has taken something of
limits of which Tho Post has copies revisionist line. Randle concluded that
deal with American conversations with Dulles in. fact was vetoing tho Inter-
two French generals, Paul Ely find vontion plans of Adm., Arthur Radford,.
Jean Witty. Both were Pentagon con- then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
vornations, both were pessimistic but Staff, and ho Wrote that "my analysis
neither Sc remarkable. . and conclusions ?differ substantially
A note should bo added her,o,about from those of Mr. Roberts" hi The
tho issue of code.s. At the time the Post and in a widely reprinted Re-
Nixon administration went to court to porter magazine piece titled "The Day
pm-censor publication of the Pentagon We Didn't Go to War." ,
Papers there was much talk that their In. reading the. Duller telegoams
use in tote would compromise crypto- against my own accounts and memo-,
graphic codes because the messages rim of many conversations with Dulles
gave exact dates and times and cable and ethers at the time I am have no
control numbers. But tho censors ex- doubt that he wanted to Intervene to
eicci none of this 1"1?I'mati?" from "save" Indochina from communism,
the hundreds of messages printed. ., He was stopped, essentmy, by two
Nor did the censors eliminate Amen- factors: the Democratic congressional
can officials' assessments of Chou En- leaders who insisted (as did the Repub.
les performance at Geneva, t though Beans as well) on allies, and by Eden,
Chou soon is to be President Nixonis
who ? refused, with Primo Minister
host in Peking.
Churchill's full backing, to let Britain
, be the key ally in any "united action."
01R000600300001-1
ihA
STAT
'ones' YA-.(
:cp,N 'ME CENTRAL question of Jim
? close the Eisenhower administra
Um came to Military interventlor
in 1954, Book 10 includes a then-Toi
Secret summary by Dulles on "French
Requests Involving Possible 'Unite(
States Belligerency in Indochina," In it
he listed, end detailed, April 4, 23 and
21 as "the three occasions when
French officials suggested United
States armed intervention in ?Indb-
ehina." Dull'- summary; drafted ? on
Aug. 3, just after Geneva had pro-
duced a -cease-fire, states American-
"cOnditions" for intervention (never
'fulfilled) but does not go beyond that ?
?perhaps because the draft WAS in-
tended for publication although it
never was published in this form.
This stunraL7,. however, does - add
-something.- Dillies stated that on May.
tion) the censors cut %1615? OrblcifFor Release 2005/12/14: CIA7RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
covering 18 pages. In Boo:, 9, nowever, 44-
,; Oat, D,1110Ct
STAT
Sf: 170;TI,D PLTORT
ii our Ibril
Approved For Release 2005712/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R00060
n IF
?
, ? /7
71) ti Ei-\\ 1.1.1 'N\ 11, t r
? ps., . L,
1
sts
Just how valid are .the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency?
guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight,control? A point-by-poin
fense of the organization conies from a man who served in top posts for 13 y
7.0111
?
Following is cm analysis of inIelligence operations
by Lyman 13. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive direc-
tor-comptroller of. the ?COntrol Intelligence Agency:
The Central intelligence Agency was created by the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 as .an independent agency in the
executive branch of the United .States Govi.:rnment, report-
ing to the President. Ever since that late it has been sub-
jected to criticism both at home and abroad: for ?vhat it has
allegedly done, as yell as for what it has failed to do.
Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the
press and. the right to protest. Jr is not only a right, but an
;obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and
no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary
that criticisin be responsible, objective and. constructive.
If. should be recognized that as Americans we have an
inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always
a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization de- ?
scribed as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.
? it was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA
?fivst as inspector general, then. as executive director-
comptroller?to insure that all responsible criticisms of the
CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when
'required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice
has been followed by my successors, not because of any
direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for
more than two decades, and this is how he operates. ?
It is with this as background that I comment on the cur-
rent allegations, none of which are original with this critic but
' any of which should be of concern to any American citizen..
?
CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too f3ig,
This raises the questions of how much we are willing to
- pay for national security, and how much is enough.
First, . what are the reSponsibilities of the CIA. and the
'other intelligertce organizations of our Government?
Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with in-
suring that the United States learns as far in adN;ance as pos-
sible of any potential threats to our national interests: A
moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this ac-
tually fineans. It can range all the way from Plussian missiles
A
pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, STAT
to -expropriation of American properties, to clangers to any
one of our allies whon,1 we are pledged by treaty to protect: - -
It is the interface of world competition between superior STAT
powers. Few are those; who have. served in the intelligence
system who have not wished that there could be some limita-
tion of responsibilities 'or some lessening of encyclopedic Te-
quircm6nts about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our
senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of
required information could be Jess and that hot every dis-
turbance in every part of the world came into their purview. ?
- (Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning
cc that the
U. S. means to intervene, It does, mean that when there is a
Mr. Kirkpatrick
Lyman ? 13. Kirkpatrick, Jr.,
now professor of political
science at Brown University,
joined the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in 1947 and
advanced to assistant three-
tor, inspector generaland ex-
ecutive director-comptroller
before leavin in 1965. He
has written extensively on
? intelligence and espionage.
Among other honors, he holds '
the President's Award for
'Distinguished Federal Civil-
ian Service and the Distin-
guished Intelligence Medal.
boundary dispute or major disagreement between other na-
tions, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help
solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion
against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. policy?
makers that they be kept informed.)
. What. this means for our intelligence system is world-
wide coverage.
To knowledge, there has not been an Admin-
istration in Washington that has not been actively concerned'
with the size arici cost of the intelligence system. All A chnin-
istrations have kept the intelligence agencies mider.tight.con-
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cony; nued
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000
: BROCKTON, MASS.
ENTERPRISE?TIMES
? E 55,308
OCT 5 19ii
he "My AffEnr
WHEN THE RUSSIANS hit back at the English for ;
-.their expulsion of 105 Soviet spies masquerading as cliplo-
mats,...and technicians, the name of Kim Philby.catne back
ia the news. He is the one who is supposed td have
furnished_ Izvestia with a .list of British spies throughout the
Arabworld.
-l:7?British traitor Harold A. K. (Kim) Philby was a Soviet
anent-for 30 years, becoming head of the American Depart-
naen?in London May 1, 1950,? and continuing his role for
14'years -afterward. .As the "third man" he tipped off co-
...,
cpspirators Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess so that they
could escape from Washington to Moscow.
?,...-,Desplte the fact that General Bedell. Smith, director of
tlab.CIA, sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the
Blltish ('Tire Philby or we _break off the intelligencc.. re-
lationship"), he' was exonerated in 1955 by then foreign
'keretary Harold MacMillan. So Philby could play the part
ofinjurcd hero and good-tempered martyr to security for
'several more years.. ? I
Most of Britain's intelligence recruits are drawn from !
, Oxford and Cambridge, and the inbred nature of the. secret '
sawices has had one, grave defech?the refusal to believe ;
? that _anyone with the same school tie could be a traitor to
Eland. Thus .the affair tells us a good deal about the
role :of privilege in our society, and the degree to which
the'insignia of Social and economic status can be fatally
mis-
tahen for political acceptability.
'.0n, the credit side, the Philby affair brought about con-
siderable reform of the British intelligence services.
STAT '
00300001-1
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YWK TIYES
P511,i)
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.
A
?.-1' #.?'; - ? 1-i ? ;:- 7 0
;1, V 0 e. -
71"
to ? 1
iTS5 6), r
.
'Also a I (10 ? r.1:.
Diralor of taiV
cold' hives b-11,?m! In,
. . .
Spr:2701 to allo NCA1 York Times
TU.C.SON, Aria. Sept. 28---
William H. Jackson, former
deputy director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, 'died today
after a long illness'. He was 70
-yeat's
Mr. Jackson married twice,
in 1929 Elizabeth Lyman and in
1951 Mary Ito Pitcairn. Both
marriages ended in divorce.
He is survivied by two sons
of the first marriage, William H.
and Richard Lee, and two sons
of the second marriage, Bruce
P. and Howell E., and four
grandchildren.
- Jr funeral service vill be held
In Nashville, on Friday or
Saturday.
. ,
Mlidy lk?gun in Enly'S Ws
--The problem of setting up a
psychologicalwarfare organiza-
tion in a democracy was the
task put before William Hard-
ing Jackson.
In The early nineteen-fifties,
lid headed a committee appoint-
ed by 'President Eisenhower to
study how to mount psycho-
logical warfare to give it "a
dynamic thrust in the cold
war." ? ?
In his report, Mr. Jackson
stated that "psychblogical strut-
egy" does not exist as an in-
dependent medium. He recom-
mended that the Presidenti
abolish the Psychological Strat-
egy Board, which in 1953 had
been floundering for two years.'
The Jackson committee asked,1
Instead, that the President set1
up an "operations coordinating
board" within the Natidnal Se-
curity .Council.
The mission of this new unit
would have bean to plan de-
tailed actions for carrying on
not mere propaganda or pay-
chological .v,aryare but ciefini-
tive national-sec,urity policies;
In effect, the Jackson report
stated that the nation should
refrain from propaganda stunts,
contrived ideas unrelated to
Stated policy, in the ideological
warfare . against the Soviet
Union. The report was accepted
and the operations board was
formed.
. . .
V13 Sc.?, YcrkTrnos
William IL Jackson
-:Behind this major effort wa...;
a: long carom' in intelligence
wo?Jz that made Mr. Jackson
the ideal man to be the corn-
n)ittee's chairman. Ills World
War II service was chiefly in
various phases of intelligence,
with a brief period in the' Of-
fice of Strategic Sctvices.:.,-
? joined Army as Captain
He entered the Army' as a
captain in February,' 1942, and
was assigned to the Army Air
Force Intelligence School at
Harrisburg, Pa. This was fol-
lowed by antisubmarine service
and assignment to intelligence
in January, 1944,. Mr. Jack-
son went to London to join
the intelligence section of
American Military Headquar-
ters, serving as chief of intel-
ligence to Gm Jacob L. Devers
and, later, as deputy chief of
intelligence for Gen. Omar
Bradley. He was discharged
from the Army in August, 1945,
as a colonel.
Upon his return, he rejoined
Iii s law firm, Carter, Ledyard
Milburn, where he had become
a senior partner, but left two
years later, because, as he
put it:
? "My prewar work wasn't
satisfying any more. ? A great
many civilian soldiers felt the
same way I did."
He became a partner in the
investment fir, . of john Hay
Whitney and also its managing
director. Before l?ng, -hov
he was back in
\vork. ' ?
In 1949; he was ?imri
the National Security Ct.
to serve on a committee with
Allen W. Dulles and Mathias
F. Correa to investigate the
intelligence service of the
United States.
.Appointed Deputy Director
The following August he was
named deputy director of the
Central; ,Intelligence Agency,
with Mont. Gen, Walter 13.
Smith. ?
In January, 1950,. President
Eisenhower .named Mr. Jackson
as a'special assistant, succeed-
ing-Nelson A. Rockefeller. His
job was "to -assist in the coor-
dination and timing of the ex-
ecution of foreign policies in-
volving more than one depart-
ment or agency."
Some months later, he was
named special assistant to the
President for national security
affairs. He recornThended to the
President that Richard M.
Nixon, then the Vice President,
be made chairman of the Up-
motions Coordinating Board, a
unit whose job jt was to see
that Presidentid." decisions, rec-
ommended by the.. Security
Council, were closely and
quickly followed.
While Mr. Eisenhower waz
sympathetic. 'to the idea, joint
Foster Dulles, the Secretary of
State, was opposed, and the
proposal \vas rejected.
Mr. Jackson was born in
Nashville on March 25. 1901,
the son of William Harding
.Jackson and the. former Anne
Davis Richardson. The family
had been farmers for five gen-
erations. A grandfather, a West.
Point graduate, was a Civil
War veteran.
The youth was graduated
from St. Mark's School, South-
boroug,b, Mass., in 3920. He re-
ceived a D.A. from Princeton in
1924 and an LI,13%. from. Har-
vard Law School in 1928:
Admitted to Bar in 1932 ;
He joined the law firm of
Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft in 1928 and move.d:to Car-
ter, Led yard & Milburn in 1930:
He was admitted to the bar in
New York in .1932 and two
years later became a.partner of
Carter, Le.dyard. ?
Mr. Jackson was a trustee of
the Millbrook School for Boys
and of St. Mark's. He also was
a director of the Spencer-Chem-
ical Company, the Great North-
elm Paper Company and the
Bankers Trust Company.
00001-1
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Septanbej' 15, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL R CO R D E,Nic1751-0PS 0
lea that now exists In inany countries. we
will also urgc that such a system eliminate
the inequitable "reverse preferences" that
now discriminate against Western -Hemis-
phere countries.
The President was certainly correct
when he said that?
.
United .mates trade policies often have a
very heavy impact on our.nelghbors.
As an example, Mexico imported
$1.505 billion worth of American goods,
mostly 'manufactured items, last year.
The United States imported $833 million
worth of Mexican goods, resulting in a
plus U.S. trade balance of $832 million.
, Mexico, like most of the developing
nations hi Latin America, is striving to
build its manufacturing capabilities in
order to create jobs and raise its GNP.
President Nixon has not? only
broken his promise to "press for a
liberal system of generalized tariff prefer-
ences for all developing countries, in.-
eluding Latin America," hut he has
slapped Mexico and our other neighbors
with a surcharge- of 10 percent on their
exports tothe United States.
Surely the President 'was correct when
he said dining the economic package an-
nouncement,- that the "temporary" sur-
charge was aimed at trading nations
with under-valued currencies. Given
that, why did he break his promises to
our developing, neighbors and levy Pre-
? eisely the same surcharge against them
as he applied to the developed nations?
But the levying of the surcharge was
not the only broken promise. In order
to increase the drama involved n an-
nouncing such a comprehensive econom-
ic package, President Nixon broke his
express 'promise to have "advance con.-
isultation on trade matters" which he
made in. the Inter-American Press As-
sociation speech. a? .
In a speech delivered yesterday before
the U.S. Governors Conference San
Juan, PR., OAS Secretary General Gale
Plaza stated:
The new economic policy announced by the-
the United States Government last 'month
Jun. understandably, not been well received
in Latin Arnerica. The surcharge on imports
fiCOMS to undercut both the general U.S.--
commitment toward freer trade and the
Specific U.S. commitment to. help Latin
America expand and diversify its -exports.
I find Secretary General Gab o Plaza
to be most diplomatic indeed. Ile might
have stated simply: "P'resident Nixon
lied to us."
? ? I would remind President Nixon and
the Members of this body, of one or two
economic facts of life: .
? First. Latin America is the only Major
world area in which the United States
maintains a favorable trade balance.
Second. That, favorable trade balance
amounted to $790 million last year.
Third. The United States exported al-
most $5 billion worth of goods to Latin
America in 1900.
Fourth. The old days when the Latin
Amerlean nations had nowhere else to
go for their imports are over, West Gah-
many, Japan, Prance, Great Britain, and
even the Soviet Union are accelerating
their exports to Latin American nations.
As an example, in a recent closed session
of the -Foreign Relations Committee in
one of the houses of the Brazilian 'Con-
gress, the Foreign. Minister of Brazil
stated that last year, for the first tilde in
its history, Brazil traded more with the
Com.mon Market nations than it did with
the United States.
This morning the Washington Post
published an editorial which is very ger-
mane to the subject of the impact of the
10-percent import surtax on our south-
ern neighbors. The editorial entitled,
"Who Pays the Tariff?" follows:
Wno WArars THE TArn.ny?
In the current pushing and shoving among
Site- world's greai; trading nations, a lot of
small countries are getting hurt. Latin
America illustrates the point. The United.
States did not really intend to harm the Latin
economies last month when it imposed its
IO per cent surtax on imports. Tho truth
is that the White House and the Treasury
were not thinking about Latin America at all.
But intentional or not, the damage is real
and the- consequences are going to be seri-
ous.
President Nix,on -worked. Out, his economic
program with the advice of a special 'com-
mit:tee of. able and experienced citizens,
headed by Albert Williams, whose report has
now been published. Thit in the matter of
tariffs the. President overrode this committee,
which urged him to move toward removal
of all barriers to international trade. The
Williams committee Is right on this issue,
and the President is wrong. The evidence is
already visible to the south.
The Latin Americans protest, with good
logic, that it Is unjust to make them pay a
surtax designed tO remedy a trade crisis in
which they played no part. Latin America has
tradlticmally bought more from the United
'States than it sells here. The Latins are not
the people to see about revaluing the yen
and the Dotftschemark. But the United States
meets all objections with a shrug and the
observation that it can't start making ex-
ceptions now.
Mr. Nixon attempted this week to placate
the Latins with the decision that, for them
alone, he would cancel the 10 per cent re-
duction in foreign aid; it had originally been
part of the program announced a month ego,
with the surtax. But the countries getting
the most aid are 'not those hardesthit by the
surtax.
The extreme exaMple3 are Mexico and
Brazil. Mexico does more business with the
United States than any other 'country in
Latin America and will be more severely
damaged by the surtax than any other. But
Mexico takes no direct aid from the United
States. On the other hand, the United States
gives more aid to Brazil than to any other
La-tin country. Brazil does half as 11111011 busi-
ness with the United States as Mexico does.
Since coffee is exempt, the surtax applies
only to about 15 per cent of Brazil's exports
to this country. But it applies to fully 450 per
cent of Mexico's ekports here.
Less than two years ago Mr. Nixon dolly.'
clod a glowing, speech on this country's le-
sponsibilities to Latin America. "They need,"
ha said then, "to be assured of access to the
expanding markets of the industrialied
world." . He promised them advance con-
sultation on trade matters, and he also.
promised to pursue, worldwide-, "a liberal
system of generalized tariff preferences."
Thy got no consultation on the surtax, oh-.
viously, and now they see the United States
taking the lead in raising tariffs. Unfor-
tunately the price of these moves conies high,
and much of it is nhimately paid by snu',1l
nationS that cannot afford their large ncrigh.-
b ors' m istakes.
Remaiws
BILDITR3-2,Enc, : taIIE COLD
. INTL:P.:NATIONALE
HON, JON
OF 7.0UISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT
Wednesday, Septeniber 15, 1971- STAT
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, on several
occasions during recent months, I called
the attention of our colleagues to ac-
tivities of the Bildf.:irbergers--an elite in-
ternational group comprised of high Gov-
ernment officials, ititeniation.1 finana .
ciers, businessmen and Opinio?makers?
see CONGRESSIONAT, RNC011?, litfOl. 6-8 of
May 5, 1911, entitled "Bilderliergers'
Woodstock Meeting;" 113701 to 713707 of
May 10, 1971., entitled "U.S. Dollar
Crisis?A Dividend of Internationalism;"
E4.919 to E4985 of May 24, 1.9'11, entitled
"Secret Bilderberg Meeting and the
Logan Act;" and I17780 to E7187 of July.
16, -1971, entitled ."Bilderberg Case:
Reply From U.S. Attorney General's Of-
flee."
This exclusive international aristocracy
.holds highly secretive meetings al?1110.1.1y
or more often in various countries, The
limited information available about 'what
transpires at these meetings reveals that
they discuss Matters of vital importance
which affect the lives of all citizens.
Presidential. Advisasr. Henry Kissinger,
who made a secret visit to Peking fro
Jitly 9 to 11, 1971, and arranged for a
-Presidential visit to Red China, was re-
Ported to be in attendance at the Most
recent Bilderberg meeting he'd in Wood-
stock, 'Vt., April 23-25, 1971. The two
points reportedly discussed at the Wood-
stock meeting were "the contribution of
business in. dealing with current prob-
lems of social instability" and "the pos-
sibility of a change of the American role
in the world and its consequences."
,Following these secret discussions,
which are certainly not in keeping with
the 'Western political tradition of "open
covenants openly arrived at," the par-
ticipants return to their respective coun-
tries with the general public -left -unin-
formed, notwithstanding the attendance
of some news media representatives, of
any of the recommendations and plans
agreed upon as a result of the discus-
sions--or for that matter even the oc-
enrollee, of .the meeting itself.
Because the Areeric,an people have a
right to know of any projections for a
change in. America's role in the world
and because -henry Kissinger and other
Government officials and influential
Americans met with high Government
officials and other powerful foreign lead-
ers, I sought to have more information
about the recent 13ilderberg meeting
made public by raising the question to
the U.S. Attorney General of a possible
violation of the Logan Act by American
participants and asked if the j.ustice De-
partment anticipated taking any action
in the matter.
STAT
The reply from. the Justice Depart-
ment, in effect, was that all of the Cie-
ments constituting a violation of the Lo-
gan Act were present' and that the De-
partment contemplated no aid ion but
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Approved For Release1:106511121W: ZIKARLIP91-0090
N+9 19 1971 ?
?t,
"...Aithaegh pis entire series of ?
ctis-
eesons wns "of` the record", the
sehjeet of eiseessien for this prirtiet...-
ler meeting one especi:aily 'sensitive
Tud ubject to the previously nn- -
noenser3 restriczies."
?C. De.vg:es Mien
,Dy Croup
?
The Central. Intelligence Agency is
one of the few governmental agencies
.whose public image has actually im-
proved as a result of the publication of
j the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclo-
sures.of "The Agency's" role in assassi-
? nations, sabotage, and coup d'etatS
consciously intended to subvert Intei?na-
. tional law, A meric.a's secret agent ry
has actually emerged in some quarters
:with the veneration due prophets, or at
? least the respect. due its suggested effi-
ciency and aCcuracY.
Virtually every newspaper editor, not
to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has
heaped praise on the CIA for the accu-
racy of its estimates detailing the U.S.
defeat in Vietnam.;Time and aghin, the
Agency's "level headed professional-
ism' has been contrasted with the esca-?
lation-overkill orientation of the Penta-
'On or the President's advisors. The
j. 'editor of the Christian Science Monitor
even Called upon policy makers to son-
'suit the CIA more, calling it a "re-
markably accurate source of informa-
%ion." But such backhanded praise for
'e.onspirators confuses public under-
Standing of the important and closely
;integrated role which the CIA plays in
advancing the Pax Americana on a
;global scale..
For. many,'tlie Pentagon Papers
provided a. first peek into the inner
;sanctum of foreign policy making. As
the government's attempt to suppress;
the study illustrates,' the people are not
supposed to have access to the real
plans of their government. On close
inspection, what emerges is not an "inv-
? isible government" but an indivisible
system in which each agency offers its
own specialized input, and is delegated
its own slice of responsibility. Coordi-
nated inter-departmental agencies work
out the division of imperial labor. There
rivalries, to be sure, butonce the deci-
sions are readted at the top they are
carried out with the monolithic tone of
state power. .
;
The' intelligence community now
plays a.'n expanded and critical role in
creating and administering the re,al-_
stuff of American foreign policy: CIA
Director Richard Helms presides over a,
U.S. Intelligence Board which links the
secret services of all govermnent agen-
cies, including the FBI. In the White
House, Henry Kissinger presides over
an expanded National Security Council
structure which 'further 'centralizes
covert foreign policy planning. It is here
that the contingency plans are cooked'
Up and the "options" ;so carefUlly
worked out. It is in these closed chum-
.be.rs, and strangelovian "situation
rooms" that plans affecting the lives of
millions are formulated for subsequent,
execution by a myriad of U.S. con-
trolled agencies and agents. ,
increasingly, these schemes rely on
covert tactics whose full rheanitig is sel-
dom perceived by the people affected -:-
be they Americans or people of foreign
countries. The old empires, with, their
colonial, administrators., and civilizing
mission have given way to the more
subtle craftsman of intervention. Their
manipulations take place. in 'the front
rooms of neo-colonial institutions and
the parlors of dependent third World
elites. In this world of realpolitik, ap-
pearances are often purposely deceptive
and political stances intentionally mis-
leading. The U.S. aggression in Viet-
nam, lest anyone forget, began as a
'covert involvement largely engineered'
by the CIA. Similar covert interven--
tions now underway elseWhere in the
world may- be fueling tomorrow's Viet-.
na ms. .
.
It. is for. this reason that the Africa
Research 'Group, an independent radi-
cal research collective:, is. now making
public Major excerpts from a document
which offers an informed insider's ,view
of the 'secret workings of the American
intelligance apparatus abroad. Never
intended for publication, it was Made
available to the Group which will ot pub-
tliton iscoM138-?
are disagreemen lo
ts- akipived-eFori Re kepeel gpp?mtt4RiciA13,ppmq9soit4o- i
?
1R000600300001-1
CIA manipulations.
Richard Bissell, the man who led the 1
STAT
Cottncil discussion that night, was well
eqv.ipped to talk about the CIA. A one-
time Yale professor and currently an
executive of the United Aircraft Corpo-
ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep.-.
uty-:Director until he "resigned'1 in the
wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of
Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which
he spoke included.a number of intellig-
ence experts including Robert Amory,.
Jr.:. another former Deputy Director,
and?the late CIA chief,Allen Dulles,
Jong. considered the grand -Old man of
American' espionage. Their presence
was important enough an occasion for
international banker Douglas Dillon to
*The complete text of the document will
be available for 81 in late October from
Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213,
?
flom,
flU,Od.
o
NATIONAL GUARDIAN
Approved For Release 20104/4244 rAA-RDP91-00901R
"
11 II -0 - .- ri ri
,;,,-,--,A rt.-1,,?,'rifill'-').iiiTrill
,,' -;-HHHITh /:;.,11
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cq,i) CIA IL.:-.)'''',.'?-?,1' 'e.SLv..ic,(;) '-A___AJ
. ? ?
s By Richard E. Ward
Third of a FMes of articles
..
?
Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued, to
the public characteristically have charged the Viet-
namese with the crimes actually being committed by the
.U.S. From 1954 to. the present, day, among the U.S.
ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of
North Vietnamese .aggression and violations of the 1954
Geneva settlement.
". Although U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the
"Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well
over a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in
? the New York Times was, last month in its final
- installment of documents and reports from the Penta-
gon's history ofU.S. intervention in Vietnam.
. Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien-
bienphu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses
elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the neees-
, sity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its
forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained
provisions . for .a durable peace in Indochina. But as
quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began
its direct interventiOn., preventing essential provisions of
?
the Geneva .agreement from being carried out.
Arrnad resistance bccins
As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet Ngo.
Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the
settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs
financed and largely. conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem
instituted- a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots
who had served in the anti-French resistance were
assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed struggle
became the only road to survival; this developed
. spontaneously in sonic regions or under the direction of
locals 'cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance
began with the formation of .the N:ttional Liberation
Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was
? headed by a representative cross-section of the leader-
ship of democratic sand progressive organizationsin the
: South.
In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely
challenged (except to give a partially true picture as
? Diem nearedhis end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were
treated-as the lef,,,itimatc rulers, threatened by subversive
agents acting on. behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according
to Wanington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not
intervening in ,Victnam while "foreign aggression" was
carried out by Vietnamese. ?
Unfortunately the press has only published a small.
amount of Material from the Pentagon study _on the.
period following the Geneva settlement. However, there
is sufficient information from the Pentagon report to
idemonstrate that Washington consciously ,and deliberate-
;ly was. trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and
that virtually every public statement was-nothing but a
tissue .of lies designed-to conceal U.S. activities frornthe
AmeriCan people.
At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have
blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At
the ? conference itself the chief U.S. delegate,: Walter. /
Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. wotrtd _mit up. e
them by force. Officials APPIT9X0I-E9JBOAks% 05/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1
ambiguous, hardly concealing their dissatisfaction.- Dis-
satisfied they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial
?
:.? . .
!instructions from President Eisenhower and Secs
State John- Foster Dulles opposed any international
recognition Of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
which had existed for 'nearly nine years and led the
resistance-against the French.
in; policies- ?
Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington
policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in 111(10-
-china as "a military victory" for the French, whose
armies were on their last legs---indicating the lack of
realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the
U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. Tiffs was evident
at the time, to anyone who wanted to see what was
happening in Vietnam.
Clearer than before, the -.newly available documents
show that the U.S. never intended to respect-the Geneva
settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the
Geneva conference concluded, the National Security
Council discussed' Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox
Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by
the [National Security.] Council were 'to maintain a
friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and `to prevent
a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.' " ?
Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S.
"connived" with Diem to prevent national elections,
Butterfield noted that Washington bad made its desires
known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the
elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The
Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem
remained in power by virtue of U.S.- backing, although
the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured,
particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression. for
which U.S. was ultimately responsible.
Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva
settlement was stated by John Foster Dulles'in a cable to.
the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we
should' certainly take no step to speed up the present
process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should
we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them." ?
Perhaps the most 'revealing new document from the
post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities
of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col.
Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous
members of the group, there is no doubt that the report
which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. LUIS-
dale's-activities were .described in. fiction by Graham
Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvin-
'ism and callousness might also be compared to the comic
strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force
Matinued?
STAT
STAT
ligA5Q4 PitS
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TA7 7,.,,,,..4A.
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Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the
Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in
the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.. Except where
excerpting is specified, the documents appear verbatiM, with
; only un4ni,stc. ikable typographical errors corrected.
:Report of Ho's Appeals td J.S.
In '46 to Support Independence
. Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified as Landoh, to
State Department, Feb. 27, 1946',,as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.
? Ho Chi Minh handed Me 2 letters ad-
dressed to President of USA, China,
-...Russia, and Britain identical copies of
.which were stated to have been for-
warded to other governments n'amed.
In 2 letters" to Ho Chi Minh 'request
'ZIA es one of United Nations to Sup-
port idea of Annamese independence
? accordthge to Philippines example, to
examine the case of the Annamese, and
to take steps necessary to maintenance
of world peace which is being endan-
? gered by French efforts to reconquer
? Indochina. He asserts that Annamese
will fight until United Nations inter-
fered in support of Annamese independ-
ence. The petition addressed to major
; United Nations contains:
; A. Review of French relations with
:Japanese where French Indochina al-
legedly aided Japs:
B. Statement of establishment on 2
So
lo
th
Pa
pr
wi
th
ea
In
ca
fu
th
and Ii
source
pro duc
.tegical
rice ex
and Ho
signific
import
d. Th _ ..... sees a.sa Ls, ,,spe-
daily of Malaya and Indonesia, could re-
sult in such economic and political pres-
sures in Japan as to make it extremely
difficult to prevent Japan's eventual ac-
commodation to communism.
3. It is therefore imperative ?that an
overt attack on Southeast Asia by the
Chinese Communists be vigorously op-
posed. In order to pursue the 'military
courses of action envisaged in this paper .
to a favorable conclusion within a
reasonable period, it will be necessary to
divert military strength from other areas
thus reducing our military capability in
those areas, with the recognized in-
creased risks involved therein, or to in-
crease our military forces in being, or
both. ?
? 4. The danger of an overt military
attack against Southeast Asia is in-
herent in the existence of a hostile and
aggressive Communist China, but such
an attack is less probable than con-
tinued communist efforts to achieve
domination through subversion. The
'primary threat to Southeast Asia accord-
ingly arises from the possibility that the
situation in Indochina may deteriorate as
a result of the weakening of the resolve
of, or as a result of the inability of
the governments of France and of the
Associated States to continue to oppose
the Viet Minh rebellion, the millitary
strength of which is being steadily in-
creased by virtue of aid furnished by
the Chinese Communist re,ginne and its
allies. ,
5. The successful defense of Tonkin
is critical to the retention in non-Com-
munist hands ot mainland Southeast
September 1945 of PENW Democratic
Repubic of Viet Minh:
C. Summary of French conqu,est of
Cochin China began 23 Sept 1945 and
still incomplete:
D. Outline of .accomplishments of An-
namese Government in Tonkin includ-
ing popular elections, abolition of un-
desirable taxes, expan.siop of education
and resumption as far at. possible of
normal economic activities:
E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to inter-
vene and stop the war in Indochina in
order to mediate fair settlement and
(2) to bring the Indochinese issue be-
fore the United Nations organization.
The petition ends with the statement
that Annatnese ask for full independ-
ence in fact and that in interim while
awaiting UNO decision the Annamese
will continue to fight the reestablish-
ment of French imperialism. Letters and
petition will be transmitted. to Depart-
ment soonest.
1952 Policy Statement by U.S.
On, Goals in. Southeast Asia
, .Staternent of Policy by the Nationnt Security Council, early 1952; on "United
States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia."
:According to a footnote, the ciodument defined Southeast .Asia as "the area
embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia,"
?? seriously endanger in ' the short term,
Objective and critically endanger in the longer
term, United States security interests.
a. The loss of any of the countries
of Southeast Asia to communist aggres- ?
sion would have critical psychological,
political and economic consequences. In
the absence of effective and timely
counteraction, the loss of any single
the free world.
country would probably lead to rela-
tively swift submission to or an align-
General ConsicleAoljo?
d FocReleiaise02005/412/114theCr6T-it9
? 2. Communist domination, ? by what- countries of this group. Furthermore, r n
eye.r means, of all Southeast Asia would: alignment with communism of the rest qf'
I. To prevent the countries of South-
cast Asia from passing into the com-
munist orbit, and to assist them to de-
velop will and ability to resist com-
munism from within and without and
' to contribute to the strengthening of
Asia. However, should Burma come un-
1 -6
#40i1.1.1r.at domination, a communist
'''?64?31--00134k1 Thailand
might make Indochina, including Tonl-cin
militarily indefensible. The execution of
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Special La The New Ye21-: Titne3
JERUSALEM, June 29?Rich-
ard Helms, director of the Unit-
ed States Central Intelligence
Agency, has arrived in Israel
for meetings with Government
.analysts, reliable Israeli sources
said today. ?
This is understood to be the
first visit to Israel of a C.I.A.
director.
.2 The trip has not been an-
nounced, and tight censorship_
regulations were imposed on
publication of news in Israel of
Mr. Helms's activities. The For-
Fign Ministry declined to com-
ment when asked about his
presence in the country, and ,a
spokesman for the United
States Embassy said he had
"no inftrmation" on the reports.
Among the main purposes of
Mr. lIehns's visit is believed to
be an examination with Israeli
authorities of the growing So.
-viet role hi. the Arab world and
1 .1
....,....
Cr.11orl Press Inlernalienal
Eieliat'd Helms
the eastern Mediterranean. He
is also expected to gather infor-
mation for the Nixon Adminis-
tration's Current assessment of
. . I
?
lsrael's security needs_ over the
coming year and beyond.
The United States Ambassa-
dor, Walworth Barbour, is said
to be personally arranging the
schedule ? of meetings _during
Mr. Helms's three- or four-day
?
It is unusual for the 'director
of intelligence to travel abroad,
largely because American diplo-
mats 'believe that his public
presence could embarrass other
governments. On the other
hand, some diplomats believe
that such a personal interest is
also a signal of United States
interest and commitment in an-
other country that is not likely
to go unnoticed. .
In most countries, including
Israel, persons in such a posi-
tion are not publicly known fig,
tires,. though United States Ad-
ministrations have not _followed
this practice.
Israeli sources said there had
been a possibility up to the last
minute that Mr. Helms's visit
might be canceled, particularly
if. there had been premature
publicity. Several times previ-
ously, suchAmerican officials
.as Gen. Walter Bedell Smith
-and Allen W. Dulles, beth of
.whom had directed the C.I.A.,
are known to .have 'canceled
scheduled visits to Israel short-
ly before they were to have
taken place.
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4 MAY 01?
POLLUTION ") - 0 .. ? I ;
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? By AUDREY TOPPING
Special to The Star
PEKING ? Chou En-lad, the
prime minister of Communist
China, expressed concern over
the increasing problem of water
and earth pollution during a re-
cent informal chat with an old
friend.
"The greatest pollution has
taken place in the most ad-
vanced industrial countries,"
Chou said speaking with Ches-
ter Ronning, retired Can
diplomat whom Chou had invited
to Peking. "Developing coun-
tries; like China, which are net
as far advanced industrially can
benefit from the experiences of
these countries to avoid similar
problems."
"That is very true,". Ronning
replied, in fluent Mandarin, a
language he learned as a child.
"Aside from our political prob-
lems, pollution may be the most
important one."
"Actually, this problem is re-
lated to politics," Chou said,
.without elaborating on the
connction.
"Younger Generation"
, "Pollution is also due to cer-
tain aspects of our economic
system, Ronning continued.
."The solution to this problem
depends on whether we can
make the necessary changes in
our economic system."
"Well, I guess we will have to
?
Audrey Topping is a freelance jour-
nalist-photogrophor currently visit-
ing China with her father, a
Conadi,en diplcmat invited to Peking
by Chou Es-Id.
leave that to the younger gener-
ation," Chou said jokingly, ges-
turing toward me and my sister,
Mrs. Sylvia Cassady of Cam-
rone, Alberta, Canada, who ac-
companied our father on the
trip.
Chou personally welcomed our
party to China on May Day. He
received us in the spacious re- ing head of the Canadian Mega-
cention room of the Hall of the con.
People on Tien-an ,,len Spare. The discussion turned briefly
Later, they joined Chairman to that conference when Chou Invited to Return
l',Iao Tse-tun, members,. of the had opposed the; permanent As Ronning was departing,
government and other alriittar-, closin,Y of fine meeting. He had Chou invited him to return for a
his on the rostrum of the Gate o proposed instead that the con- more serious discussion of prob.
Heavenly Peace to witness the ference be adjourned, subject lems of mutual concern. "This
spectacular display of fireworks time I wanted only to welcome
to bciing reconvened by the co-
commemorating May Day. chairman at a more appropri- have some photos of the occa-
you and your daughters and to
,
,?
Strains of music and noises , .
from the half-million people as- mon," Chou said.
sembled in the square drifted Recalls Bedell Smith After their meeting, the two
into the hall where Chou and
If we had accepted your pro- went to the Gate of .Heavenly
Ronning spoke and posed for Peace where Chou introducedl
pictures.
posal," Ronning said, we could
have had a peace treaty." Ronning tO Li Hsien Nien, vice!
Chou was in a jovial mood, prime minister, and . Huang.
looking younger than his 73 Chou nodded and laughed a Yung-shenl', ivlioni Chou called
years. He asked Penning, whom little, waving his arm. "I still officials from the "province of
he often referred to as "laoteng r e in e nib e r how Mr. Smith Hupein"
yu" (old friend), why he had waved his arm at me and We are scheduled to accompany
retired from the diplomatic closed the conference," he said, our father on May 8 to Fancheng
service so early. ??referring to Gen. Walter Bedell in Hupeli, his birthplace.
t7:1 d
R000600300001-1
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7.7.1 osi
0
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"I did not retire early," Ron- Smith who headed the Ameri-
ning replied. "I remained in the
Foreign Service until I was 71.
Canadians are supposed to retire
at 65." Howling is now 76.
Chou smiled, "Well, you an-Il ?
are exceptions to the rule. Take into . the conversation, but we
me now, why should I retire?" were too busy taking pictures.
The two men first met in Chou laughed aloud when my
Chungking in 1946 and again in father. explained that we were
IN sinking when Relining was intected by a recurring disease
charge d'affaires of the Collodi- called "camera-itis."
an Embassy from 1949 to 1951. This initial meeting included
They met again in 1954 at the Huang Hua, the Chinese ambas-
Gpneva Conference' on Korea sador-designate to Canada; and
when Chou headed the Chinese Wang Ku-chuan, leading mean-
delegation and Re:111Mo' was act- ben of the Chinese People's As-
sociation for Friendship with
Foreign' Countries.
can delegation.
tunic suit, smoked a Central
Flowery Kingdom cigarette and
tried to. bring my sister and I
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; NEWPORT
iBVIS.,2
10. 1 2
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61.0)-111 (-71E' 71 C? r/ 7-0 1
etat N ti _1.1 i'121 .1% .
:The Central . Intelligence
Agency has "an impossible job"
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick,
professor of political science at
Brown University told the
Newport Discussion Club last
night at the Hotel Viking. The
former executive director of
comptcoller of the CIA said the
was to direet "the. total. United
States intelligence effaat" Elml
to coordinate the activities of 9
other intelligence agencies; as
directed under the National
Security Act of 1317. '
Its duty is not only to gather
inforina lion, the former
newspa,oerman said, but it is to
t-i,sk of the intelligence agency . predict "what the Soviet Union
aaa or Chiu:i is going to be doing
five years from now" and so
inform the President, the
? secretary of defense and the
secretary of state. It is this
: prophetic aspect of its duties
that make it an "impossible
job". he emphasized.. Ile made
it evident, however, that he
thought it one of the "finest
agencies in our federal
government."
Kirkpatrick acknowledged
that the CIA is not a popular
organization Americans
"abhor secrecy", he replied.
They have the feeling there is
something "slightly dirty"
. about espionage. The also feac
its unchecked power. They
wonder if responsible control
over its activities is adequate.
The former CIA executive
assured his audience there are
?wally pay.verful cheeks on the
activities of the intelligence
organization. Some of them
were inaugurated by President
Eisenhower 20 years ago.
1.,-President Kennedy estplished
? the Foreign Intelligence Ad-
? visory Board consisting of
prominent military men who
are free to probe its activities.
The Bureau of the Budget may
? investigate its "managerial
control" as well as its finances.
.? And finally there is Congress.
Three .subcommittee.t in
Congress are constantly in-
formed about important moves
of the CIA.
' The public sometimes 'worries
about whether there is adequate
control over individual agents
/ at work abroad. Kirkpatrick
sd command Of CIA in
(kV:wt., 111;3, he "straightened
things out in a hurry." Smith
was a :strict disciplinarian who
&Mended absolute ceintrol of
operations. Tile speaker ap-
proved of thtis attitude, saying
that espionage is "too
dangerous not to be
disciplined." "There is no
action takenby an agent abroad
which is not cleared at home."
he declared.
Another apprehension of the
publie is that we are being
.watched at home, that dossiers
are beingrun up on people. This
is another unfounded fear,
according to Kirkpatrick. CIA
actit.ities arc - focused ex-
clusively oalside the U.S, he
said. -
Ile ? acknowledged ."an
aggressive recruiting
program" on college campuses.
A copstar.t. flow of bright new
young CCD!pas into the CIA is an
absolute necessity.
In comparing Russia's
espionage efforts with- this
country's, he said their per-
sonnel outinimbered ours 10- to 1
or perhaps even 103 to 1. Russia
has the? greatest- espionage
ell'ort ever supported by any
country; he declared. Even its
cultural exports such as the
Bolshoi Ballet engage in
espionage. In answer to a
question about.. Russian
trawlers, the speaker said about
18 might be operating; off our
? coasts. Two or three, perhaps,
are listenina to naval reports
right now off Newport.
' Stalin had the most complete
intelligence information before
World V,'ar H began that any
leader ever tad, but he refused
to use it. Kirkpatrick said a man
was?orderei shot by the Soviet
leader because he reported
troops ware moving .across the
border into Russia when the
Germans be-aan their offense in
Weald War II, although Stalin
Approved For Releases2005142a4.:\CWRIDP91-00001R0006003000041-1
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_chief of staff during world War
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