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May 13, 1983
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.1" I OLE - 74roved For Relei-sWOU5/112/341\0CIAZZI5P921,7-00901g6i6003 13 Way 1983 Opinion. Commenta A Short Course in the Sed. 00001-1 Washington. MHE VOTE by the House Select Corn- mittee on Intelligence to cut? off funds ...for the Central Intelligence Agency's cam- --paign of covert action 'against Nicaragua comes exactly 35 years after the United States first began such secret operations. Paradoxically, covert action was not in- cluded as one of the missions foreseen for the CIA in its charter. The National Secu- rity Act of 1947, which established the agency ,(a.s well as the national security i I Council) does not specifically mention or By Nathan Miller - authorize secret operations of any kind. Yet, within a year'? by mid-1948 ?co- 1 vert action had become a key element-of the CIA's operations and a vital arm of American foreign policy. This transforma- tion resulted from the heating up of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, with some officials fear- ing that the Russians were on the verge of I seizing control of Western Europe. 1 Alarmed at the prospect of a Ccimmu-' -nist victory in the Italian parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1948, such ar- dent Cold Warriors as Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal premed President Truman to use the CIA to prevent it from happening. As authority, they pointed to a "catch-all" proyision in the .1947 act that _clirected the agency to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security. ." ? -11:: Heated debate raged over?the proposal thin the National Security Council: -mirth Rosen H. Hillenkoetter, the CIA's -first director, was reluctant to launch co- :vert operations. Disdainful of uncovention- el warfare, he was convinced that the high' -risk of exposure was not worth it.?Instead, he thought the CIA should concentrate on :collecting and evaluating intelligence. The activists prevailed, however; and Admiral Hillenkoetter was 'ordered to ,make -certain that the pro-Western Chris- ? ?tianMemocrats remained in power. The .,tasit was assigned to the CIA's Office of jSpecial Operations which handled secret intelligence activities. . 'Backed by $10 million in secret funds, the OSO launched a well-coordinated cam- -- paign. Christian Democrat propaganda was ? financed by the CIA, friendly candidates were -given 'bonuses," anonymous pam- phlets were distributed defaming Commu- ? nist candidates, and politicians were given "walking around"- money? .to get out the vote:Tens of thousands of Americans of Italian ancestry were persuaded to appeal to friends and relatives at borne .to vote Christian Democratic. . These activities were -enough to keep the Communists out of power, and the suc- tess ?of the campaign created demands for similar actions elsewhere. In June 1948, a new :Office of Policy Coordination was organised to do worldwide what the OSO had done in Italy. OPC's -charter was Na- tional Security Council Directive 10/2 and its latitude was was sweeping. To counter,the "vicious covert activities of the U.S.S.R..," OPC:Fwas "to engage in a - back-alley struggle against -the Soviets. _ Propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and the inObilization of secret armies to overthrow hostile governments were all to be part of its stock in trade. The only limitation was "deniability," or the proviso that if- any of these opera- tions was:"blown," ranking American offi- cials -should be -able to plausibly disavow, any knowledge?. - - - Despite the sensitive riatUre.of V3PC's -assigned task, the agency was scburesuctet- arporrisly 'without sufficient controls.' tkiough its director was to be chosen by the - secretary of State, policy guidance was di- vided between the secretaries of State and Defense. The CIA supplied budgetary sup- port but its chief had -no authority over OPC. The net result Was that no one had ultimate authority for riding herd on OPC and a strong director could do almost any- thing he wanted. Frank G. Wisner, the swashbuckling former member of the wartime Office of Strategic Services chosen to head OPC, was just. such a man. Energetic and adven- turous, he threw off ideas for rolling back the Soviet empire ? some good and others wildly impractical ? like a human pin- wheel. As far as he was concerned, Admiral Hillenkoetter and his intelligence analysts were "a bunch of old washerwomen ex- changing gossip while they rinse through _the dirty linen:" Although in theory he was limited to contingency planning, Mr. Wisner immedi- ately began organizing bands of guerrillas and secret armies that were to-operate be- hind the Iron Curtain. And with the exam- ple of military intelligence ? which was making use of such Nazi war criminals as Klaus Barbie ? before him, Mr. Wisner re- cruited Eastern Europeans who had col- laborated with the Nazis and had commit- ted war crimes. Over the years, most of the OPC operations to infiltrate Eastern Eu- rope failed with bloody results because some of Mr. Wisner's recruits-were working for both sides. OPC had access to unlimited funds and manpower. -As early as 1949, it had 302 agents in five stations and a budget of $4.7 million. By 1952,the number of employees had jumped ,to about 4,000 in 47 stations and the budget had reached $82 million. Other intelligence agencies 'feared and 'enviedthe sill-encompassing .0PC and there was amsiderable" infighting among them. Gengal Walter Bedell Smith, who had Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0006 4'7a-in& ick Cearvetc. ti4RiTeky /7 STAT Guatemala as Cold War RICHARD H. IMMERMAN With the increasing accumulation of interpretive scholarship on international relations following World War II, most episodes in the cold war have been written and rewritten, evaluated and reevaluated. One striking excep- tion, however, is the 1954 American intervention in Guatemala, which led to the overthrow of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman's constitutionally elected government. This article studies the antecedents, events, and consequences of that coup. Analyses of hitherto unavailable archival data and of interviews with Ameri- can participants in the coup who were privy to the covert aspects of the opera- tion suggest that this event was a significant link in the unfolding chain of cold war history. Writings to date on the overthrow of Arbenz tend to be short on detailed documentation and analysis and to treat the coup illustratively. These accounts depict the United States intervention in Guatemala either as a back- ground incident in the escalating cold war, as an example of the inordinate in- fluence of economic interests (in this case the United Fruit Company [UFC01) on American foreign policy, or as a way station in the evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency. These treatments fail to emphasize sufficiently that the coup typified the foundations of cold war diplomacy, providing a model to be emulated, and resisted, in subsequent years.' The most widely cited source remains Ronald Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, /944-/954 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), although more recent studies such as Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 151-77; Max Gordon, "A Case History of U.S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954," Science and Society 35 (Summer 1971); 129-55; and Stephen Schlesinger, "How RICHARD H. IMMERMAN is associate director of the Presidency Studies Program in Princeton University's Politics Department. He is currently completing a book on the CIA's 1954 intervention in Guatemala as well as collaborating on a biography of Milton Eisenhower and a comparative study of the Eisenhower and Johnson presidencies. Political Science Quarterly Volume 95 Number 4 Winter 1980-81 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 1.29 '6iiTor Release 2094/12,11.4 Tc)4113PP91-0090 11 October 1977 1R000600300001-1 Patrick J. Buchanan ? odds are now given as even money. that Justice .will move to indict . former Central Intelli- gence .Agency director Richard Helms for misleading a Senate committee con-- .cerning CIA involvement in Chile. . . Beforei. the President and Atty.. Gen.. ? - . ? The report proved inaccurate.; ? Its ? What. Sort of nation have we become? source, .a 32-year-old travel agent named Helms, who has served his country hon- Harry -A. Jarvinen, was, indicted by. a- 'orahly for decades, is facing this posai? federal grand jury. .TwO CIA agents, ble indictment, while the turncoat Philip Miller. Holland -and Wayne IL Richard-e. Agee, who fingered dozens or CIA agents son, were called to testify. Both stone' abroad, one of whom was subsequently walled, with Richardson refusing to tes- .:? assassinated, is told by the same justice ' "- he ? :Griffin Bell . allow- this senseless ham- . tify. !'on orders of my Superior." Along ., Department.. . . . rio rner ' blow to fall . upon the.,intelligence.e. with Miller, he was sentenced to 15 days ? ,comes home to a country whose secietsa - community, they might review a how in prison for 'contempt. - : e .:- ?:, , e . .s., he betrayed. - -? . : e e-e-j.,-,:-...5... -.a:P. ...e. ei-- . President Truman ? 'handled a similar. . t... ? :?-...1' ? ..' .? ? . ? ?? * . -.. -,',:-..:, e 1 Indicting Richard Helms,. along :with . . matter 25 years ago.!-'- . ,. - e .. -,. BUT THIS was unacceptable t? Harry. .., John. Kearney of the FRI, would further:' - ..... in 192 the -CIA- passed along to .the Truman Quietly -bypassing Ju.stice, the?a-demoralize these already battered secua - Federal: Bireatt. of Investigation and President issued pardons to both' men, *-, rity agencies-It would. necessitate: open State a report,' picked up in Seattle, that. , - since, the President's, proclamation on .. ing the most sensitive strategic' victory ; 'Prof.'. 0wen? Lattimore was planning a Richardson 's- behalf, ,?. . ... it has been jot. those, here and abroad,. who want ?-? trip to Moscow [On July 3, Bea Leta? made- to appear ? to me that the said .' 'the FBI and CIA further .smeared, if not' , ? : , , more ,Was Characterized by a Senate' Wayne Richardson at the time ..of the ? - subcommittee as a"conscious articulate - aforesaid trial . was an agent of.. the ..instrument of .- the Soviet- conspiracy."] .' United States .and acting in obedience to Receiving the- Seattle report, the Depart- ....what he believed to be a lawful. order 'tient of State alerted customs officials , , from his official superior. .., . ..",?.:....?.e: .', to block Lattimore'sdeparture.!' The . In passing on the President's clemen- broke into print:.;,..., . , . cy petitions CIA director Walter C. [Be- e ,? '*: . , dell.] Smith, went further: . STAT matter . "That our conduct was correct and hOnorabl?is recognized by the President , in;grantinn this pardon," wrote Smith to ? agent Richardson. "In the eyes of- the law;' your record is as if the incident had'never? occurrOd. In the eyes of the teagency; Your meticulous compliance - ,With. orders made an enduring contribu- fion,t6 the national intelligence and the . functioning -of the Central Intelligence , * Agency. Legally and morally, no fault exists, and. yetue, conscience can be clear that - youi. cenduct was honorable and in the best traditions of government. service.". :::,...Trurrian's.precedent is there foi Car, let: to follow-.: ' CLEARLY, testifying before that Sen- ate committee, Helms was confronted with a serious moral dilemma; Should he protect at grave legal risk to himself the secrets he was sworn to protect; or - should he spill the "whole truth" about CIA involvement and thereby cripple his ? agency', and perhaps his country? This 7 is an issue to be debated in ethics courses in postgraduate seminars, not a matter for a federal indictment. e Smith: Praised honor: 4 destroyed. If" Carter alloWs this travesty to pro- ?. ceed, it will demonstrate. that he lacki - utterly . that sense of priorities which .;-? Truman showed. But, then,- whom ,the.e. gods destroy, they first make mad.. 1 - New York Times, SPeciai Features. ,` Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 00600300001-1 :4.Rricrp .appEAREOpproved For ReleaseR5_/71i/T4'.: CIA,-RDP91-009 u ON PA G TOBER 197bE 41_., )1R000600300001-1 Bernhard, 134.3, business and the CIA/By Robert ci-ieer STAT secret way than many a man who moved to the sound of trumpets and the howl of motorcycle sirens." Both Retinger and F;ernhard had influential contacts in the United States, . and after agreeing on the scheme, the duo went off to America to enlist support. A portrait of Bernhard in the December 1970 issue of Fortune magazine described that trip: . . Retinger joined him [Bernhard ii Washington, and they proceeded, with the help of Bernhard's wartime comrade, Walter Bedell Smith, then director of the CIA, C. D. Jackson, a vice-president of Time Ince and the tate John Coleman of Burroughs. to recruit an American group." Bernhard's connection with There was absolutely no publicity. The hotel was ringed by security guards, so not a single journalist got within a mile of the place. The participants were pledged not to repeat publicly what was said in the discussions. Every person present. prime ministers, foreign ministers, leaders of political parties, head; of great banks and industrial companies and representatives of such international organizations as the European Coat and Steel Community: as well as academicians, was magically stripped of his office as he entered the door... . ?From BERNHARD Prince of the Netherlands, by Alden Hatch. Doubleday, 1962 - Recent revelations of illicit ties between Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and the Lockheed Corporation toilet' only a corner of this man's murky career?a career made possible oniy by the support of various American presidents; top corporate leaders and the large tax-exempt foundations. The CIA, hard evidence indicates, was the catalyst in organizing this coalition behind the prince. . The CIA connection was hinted at in one recent New York Times story which stated that the prince had , maintained an account in a CIA-funded Dutch bank that was set up by one of his closest aides, General John von Houghton, who "reportedly had ties to the CIA." The Times noted that "Prince Bernhard was also a close friend of Allen W. Dulles, founder of the CIA." The Times also cited "one reliable source close to the government" as saying that when the Dutch prime minister confronted Bernhard about wrongdoing in connection with - Lockheed, the prince denied it, but added, "If you would ask me about my relations with the CIA, that would be a different matter"?which is where the Times let the matter drop. So far as I can determine, no one has asked the prince or the CIA about their relationship, which revOlves around the prince's leadership of the very influential Bilderberg conferences (The Ruling Class, September 17, 1976). - ? The Bilderberg meetings, which have occurred every year since 1954, have been the most secretive, Secretary of State Kissinger. Far removed from the public view, they have initialed such significant developments as the European Common Market, basic changes in trade, tariff and currency regulations and Western positions on "hot spots" such as Cuba and Vietnam. But I have come across evidence that none of this .would have occurred had it not been . for the timely intervention of the CIA in assisting Prince Bernhard in the formation of his Bilderberg group. A shadowy character by the name of Joseph H. Retinger thought up Bilderberg and peddled the idea to - :Bernhard. Retinger, a Polish exile, was ?-? involved in numerous clandestine cold war operations and had extensive 1,e,iYe77.7.! .1f International fixer Bernhard, right, with Lockheed sales exec Fred Meuser. contact with virtually all Western intelligence agencies. One early Bilder- bergenthe late C. D. Jackson, who was vice-president of Time Ince-once described Retinger as a "sort of eminence grise of Europe, a Tallyrand without portfolio." Alden Hatch's . laudatory biography of Bernhard, based on extensive taped conversations with the prince and researched with the full support of the royal household, says of Retinger, "Certainly he had almost as many exclusive and influenti gathering of the \Neste ?PegIRS ReWAIMPPIA _TrOktieri-??9 American corporate 'and political Bond. . . . Though his name is elite?including President Ford, virtually unknown except to the C.D. Jackson of Time Inc.; the CIA's. head turned Bilderberg over to him, Bedell Smith and the CIA is described in greater detail in the prince's. biography, which states that the . Bilderberg idea at first received a coot response from such e...-Averelt Harriman, who thought it was too controversial. Said Harriman: "l_won't touch it. It's dynamite." Bernhard. according to his biographer, ". . . saw a number of American politicians. After 'several more rebuffs he went to his_ friend Bedell Smith, whowas then head of the CIA. Smith said, 'Why the hell 0 ilkObatddribOblfMin the first piace?TheneraTSthith.th-en "turned the matter over to C. D. Jackson. and ? ? things really got going." It is interestino RAMPART S STAT a- '1973, Approved For Release 2005/1m LI 14 : tAkk-RDP91-0090 An Inside Look: aria 'IL (21 r 1) La T1, AG. "Are these men really former men or are they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The CIA would like to have it one way, and then to have it overlooked the other way." xplosive as the Watergate revelations have been, no disclosure has been more ominous than the 1970 Domestic Intelligence Plan attributed to the pen of Tom Charles Huston. The plan, as revealed last J me, provided for the use of electronic surveillance, mail coverage, undercover agents and other measures to an ex- tent unprecedented in domestic intelligence-gathering. This program was to be directed by a committee of representa- tives from all of the national intelligence agencies. It goes far toward justifying the worst paranoia Americans have felt during the past quarter century over the growth of secrecy and deception in our government. Much of this anxiety relates to what might be called "the CIA Men- tality," the stealthy abuse of power and the practice of deception of the American public?all performed under the cloak of secrecy and often in the name of anticommunism and national security. In fact, wnat makes the Watergate Fletcher Prouty was the Air Force officer in charge of Air Force support of the CIA, a position he held from 1955 to 1963. His office put hun in constant contact with the top officers of the in telli?i cc cstablittnient. and he has traveled to over -10 countries at Cbi requet. 11e is one of the few people wtth inside knowledi:e of the CIA Wilt) Wa5 001 reqUirCti 10 take a lifetime oath of silence. His book, Jut S,..cret team, is bfished Ity Prentice-Hall. case different from other scandals is that the system and methods used, the means by which it was all planned, staffed with experts, financed clandestinely and carried out was all taken from the operating method of the CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency was created, and its powers and responsibilities defined, by the National Secu- rity Act of 1947. Its character was developed over a span of 11 years by its greatest mentor and guiding spirit, Allen Welsh Dulles. The "Frankenstein" product of this implau- sible union of a \yell-intentioned law and of a scheming opportunist is the agency as we lipd it today. Before 195$, when Dulles became the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), the. ('IA was primarily concerned with performing, its assigned task: as the central auth.ority for all of the various intelligence organizations of the govern tnont , the CIA's business was to collect and interpret information gathered by other intelligence units. But that all soon changed. In 19-15, President Truman established a committee to review the CIA, to make recommendations for improve- ment and to evaluate its past Nriortnance. The members of this committee were Allen Dulles, Nlathias Correa, and Wil- ham Jackson, and their report was without question the most important single document on this subject eqr pub- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 by L. Fletcher Prouty ii k wc6130:9Y,K510-91Waggalatti , . 01 IF I D '11 i ---,r t, j ''' .1 ...L.1 ..,.....-, ... Jr ,it. 'L....../ 1 ' '' - EN n z- -1-1 -.'" 7 - ,----, F j STAT .k,, N.: _Lai. *1/4-1 AN. i 1 '\''-'4Dryp m of The Herald. of Freedom r .'' c) 91-00901R000600300001-1 THE SONNENFELDT CASE -- The pre6s, led by the N.Y. TIMES and the Washington POST, has charged to the rescue of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, an insider whose steady rise in the behind- he-seenes bureaucracy ruling the American people may be coining to the end, now that he has emerged from behind-the-scenes. While the Senate Finance Committee is considering his nomination as Under Secretary of the Treasury, the House. Internal. Security Committee is checking into his subversive background. Powerful forces are bringing pressure to bear to have Sonnonfeldt, top assistant to henry Kissinger, confirmed in spite of his previous espionage activities. President Nixon nominated the 46-year old Sonnenfeldt to be Under Secretary of the Treasury in which post Sonnenfeldt would have the responsibility of shaping the Administration's plans for increasing East-West trade and for establishing a new international monetary system dm would include Communist nations. Several former Foreign Service career officers filed objections and testified against the nomination which was referred to the Senate Finance Committee for confirmation hearings on.May 15, 1973. On July 26,1973, Congressman john M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Senior Republican Minority member of the House Internal Security Committee, opened hearings on the Federal Civil Employees Loyalty Security Program. The hearings are being held in executive session and informed sources state that Otto Otepka's testimony about security risks employed by the State Department will be shocking when published. Mr. Otepka personally handled one of the investigations on Helmut Sannenfeldt, which involved a 24-hour a day surveillance, a legal wiretap on his telephones and the interviewing of numerous witnesses. It was conclusively determined that on more than one occasion Sonnenfeldt had turned over secret documents and confidential information to unauthorized persons among whom were agents of a foreign power. Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen, who is in charge of the Criminal Division of the Department or Justice, recently testified before the Senate Watergate Committee and was in complete support of President Nixon's innocence in connection with Watergate. He is also in complete support of Sonnenfeldt. When Petersen's attention was called [0 Paul Scott's syndicated colunm which revealed details of Sonnenfehlt's act of turning over secret documents to foreign agents, he replied as follows: (Quote) This is in response to your recent letter to the Attorney General concerning a recent newspaper article by Paul Scott discussing the nomination of Mr. Helmut Son mien MCI t to be Under Secretary of the Treasury Department and whether lie would be a suitable candidate for that position. Executive Order 10150 requires that an be made of all employees of the executive branch before they can be accepted for a position. The Order further requires that all persons privileged to he employees in the executive branch must be loyal to the United Stales, and that no one may hold such a sensitive position with the government unless his employment is determined to be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. These requirements apply, of course, to all presidential nominees, including those io he an Under Secretary. In accordance Nvith that Order, the Federal llurcau of lnvesti!.;ation has conducted a niunLer of investiations of Mr. Smitten lehICS character and loyalty in cornice lion with various positions he has held in that ex.cculive hranell in the past. In all of those case, the results were determined to be favorable. l'hus, althoult we cannot diAdosc the contents of any of the l'utrcati's investitotivc files to olio oilkshk the, Federal goverinivApprbueaftfr Relelase WONAR41 clAcRIPFt9.1 4:TRW WOR?P9tP9PPP14 ion in his artide - iligir.milryv111.11.71.11/11.17.11,71,milri.717,117.7,77.7,77 1, ? 1,? litAidetweloo6lddbi .!.?.. ? ? Ube ciNCralb or ifree BOX 3 ZAREPHATH N.J. 06890 AUGUST 17, 1973 UNITED SOVIET STATES OF A Nelson Roe Republican n and now he hi be taken or lifetime ambii R. Harris Si Central Intelli General Waits Central Intel Dwight D. I Communist. ' replete with Communists. As pointed out in our Confidential Intelligence Report ofJune 1973,J. Edgar Ilaorer in 1945 dispatched agents who hand delivered to then Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller two top Secret F.B.I. reports on Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White which documented the fact that both were Communists and Soviet agents. This was during the formation of the United Nations Organization. The top secret F. B.!. reports were handed over to Rockefeller at his hotel. Rockefeller later admitted he destroyed both reports. Had this information been made public, the parts- played by Alger Hiss and his associates in the. formation of the U.N. would also have been made public and the Congress of the U.S. consequently would have been alerted to the conspiracy which ultimately resulted in a Communist-controlled U.N., its headquarters located on property donated by the Rockefellers. Almost immediately after his election to the presidency, Richard Nixon appointed as his top presidential ad\ iser on national security. Dr. lanry A. Kissiner who hod been a protege of s.\.elson Rockeleller since Kissinger's student days at 1 lar\ ord. Once issiiTer's position was es- tahlkhed, lc set up w hat amounts to a parallel ,..!o\ernineilt under his contiol \\ ith a stHt of 110 people \\ or king dircetiv for him. K issingei , along with a number 01 his associates, was known in The above title is taken from a chapter in a book entitled -"Toward a Soviet America," written in 1932 by William Z. Foster, then national chairman of the Communist Party, USA. The book was a blueprint for the take-over of the United States. through force and violence. Subsequently the international Communist hierarchy in Moscow decided that, instead of battering down the ramparts from without, vic- tory now was to be-achieved from within. Trojan horse tactics would be employed. In the face of this altered strategy, a book that advocated violence became a liability. Obviously then "Toward a Soviet America" had to be swept under the rug and the Communists endeavored to reclaim every copy of the book. In 1961, after the copyright had expired, the book was republished through the efforts of the late Francis F. Walters, Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The new book contained a commentary by Maurice Reis, a consultant to the committee, and a foreword by Congressman Walters. The success of the Communists in the take-over of Czechoslovakia without resorting to force and violence became a blueprint for .2oining power through internal subversion. This required that key people in government be Communists. Com- ? munist agents or persons under Communist con- trol through blackmail, bribery or other devious means. When President Nixon was defeated in the race for governor of California. he \?..ls totally without Financial resources and it seemed that he had reached the end ol his political career. At the invitation of Nelson koekeft:lier, Nixon vi ent to Ncw York, rno\ into mcnt rouse to R(?el:e!-e11-..1- and itironi;11 Rockefeller was made a p;ii tiler in a Li tirin in it salary ()I '.,;20usciio ciir. 1 1 is (int:....s weie few other than to promote Rockefeller inter CMS and Programs. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-PIDPI9it,00901.4300600300001Mirity risk --thus we STA1 00600300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/44i1:4?FtIALI4b150090 1; FE3 1073 P!.1Ir 4 _ C,0 .1 /\? ,t 0 0 '!"...(?11 Tr Ti 12, 6. 9 .Lt. .1'. L. j 9 WASIIINGTON?Since the Bay of Pigs, when the United States lost its gamble under the Kennedy administra- tion to overthrow Fidel (;-1.stro, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency has suffered in many areas of public opinion. It has also, suffered internally, going thru a succession of directors and los- ing.other hey people under three Presi- dents [starling with Kennedy] who did not totally believe what the CIA reports were saying. The CIA was created in 1948 by the late President Truman [as the Central Intelligence Group] from the skeleton of the wartime Office of Strategic Stud- ies, It was formed in an effort to col- , 'beet information lor spy] on other na- tions as much as they did on us. From the start, it was an agency cloaked in semi-secrecy noted for generating de- bate An early director, m. Roscoe H. -c-- Ad 1illenl:oettcr, had warned the Truman administration of the then impending Communist invasion of, South Korea-- and apparently was replaced for his accurate p,reciiction by Gen. Walter Be.- dell Smith. Smith then grabbed headlines Idurin-7 the Sen. Jowph B. McCarthy .periodl by stating in public there was a "mwal certainty" that Communi:A spie penetratcd C Cry securi:y agency in WashinVm. Smith did not last long at the CIA after that and was replaced by the pipe-smoking Allen W. Dillies, brother of John Foster Dulles, President Risen- hev..cr's secrol.wy of state. Dulles put ..leCarthy down after the senator charged there were double agents oper- ating within the CIA. .the first, civilian chief of the CIA, came off as sort of a super-spy because of Ins exploits in the 055 dur- ing World War II. After staving off McCarthy, he continued to build the CIA froM a small agency [starting with 1,500 agents] to a worldwide network that began to do more than make esti- mites of what foreign por:crs might do. .Still, the Hoover commission looked into the operations of the agency and c.,me up with a report sayir,g,it was lacking in collecting "intc:Iligence data from behind the Iron Curtain." Alea while, ',The CIA squabbled with the. ioug- e:;tablis:led intelligence arms of the three military services. In one cisc it had enough clout to ''E;et the Army's chief of intelliftence fired. By 1953 the i?per.d?!10 .:3.50,C00,C,00 a 'year ;now it is spcuilfll about:c42 billion]. A year later it was warnind that there v, as an inten,r,i...e Corrimunit drive nouer,,vay in latin America. And then the reof began to Ill in en thn agotry after its yo,t-el spy ph:ne, thn shot down a. liusii.'Yho incident catimsd even ci di.ama and the cancellaticn of a VI State,-BuAzin summit meeting, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA RD R000600300001-1 . y , . A STAT ? 4 1 , will a public trial of pilot Francis G: 1),;0 ers. The public clamor really began, tho, alter the attempted invasion of Cuba ordered by te late President Kennedy. The late Pobert F. Kennedy personally ran an inve:-..tition of the agency as Winne fc-: tie fiasco began to fall on .? the CIA for furnishing faulty data. Aft- er a :?..ho,rt period of grace, Dulles left as director to be replaced by John A. :',IcCone. a business executive, Adm. William F. [Red] Raborn fol- lov.od in the Johnson administration. It.:?`,.tarn's biggest early flap was a charge tic ciA got involved in an Incluesian. pvernment upheaval. But the involve- ment also spread to the Congo, Viet Nam, and apparently to some domestic intelligence activities. The deputy direel. 1,/ tar then was Richard Helms, a career .;overninent ?reano.f:Tinent expert. Helms moved no to director during the Johnson era of td5, assurincc, Con- gress that the CIA. did not create for- eign polieY. Ilelms continued to feel public heat because of the. CIA finane- jog of foundation.; and student activi- ties, lie was defended by Sen. Kennedy at the tirno. When Mr: Nixon became Prc:-ident, one of his first moves ''as to install a trusted associate of long standing?Ma- rine Gen. Robert Cushion?as deputy director of the CIA. After. getting his own reading on the agency, the Presi- dent promoted Cushman to comman- d:mt. of II:e corps--and is sending 1h:dais to Iran as zoill,11...;sadm.. Tenor- STAT row we will repit. n. on the :ley: director, P91 00901R000600300001 1 WASHINGTON .STAR ? Approved For Release 2005/1g/t4CCIXRDP91-00901R00060030 ? ? It isn't official yet, but our usually Impeccable official sources tell us that -Richard M. Helms will soon be stepping :clown after six years as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, presumably to take on a new and important assign- inent in the Nixon administration. Whatever his future job may be, he will be sorely missed in the one which he Is leaving. f: Of the men who have-headed the CIA iince its inception in 1947, Helms stands Out as the one truly professional intelli- gence . expert. His career in the spy busi- ness covers a span of 29 years, beginning with a four-year stint with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. After transferring to the newly-formed CIA, he 'served as deputy director for plans under ?General Walter Bedell Smith and John A. McCone, previous CIA heads. As director, Helms brought a coolness of judgment and great administrative talent to one of the most sensitive and difficult jobs in the federal government. 'Under his leadership, the performance of the agency, in contrast to past years, Exit 1.%...crharel Elehns. has been highly discreet and; tent that such things can' be judged, effective. It is suggested that his depar- ture from the CIA may have resulted in part from a dispute within the intelli- gence community regarding the deploy- ment of Russian. nuclear missiles. Yet from all the 'available evidence, his as- sessment of the world situation ? and particularly in Indochina, where the CIA has borne heavy responsibilities has been remarkably accurate. The highly essential business of in- telligence-gathering, being necessarily secret and to some minds distasteful, requires the kind of public confidence that Helms has been able to provide. As President Johnson remarked at his swearing-in .ceremony: "Although he has spent more than 20 years in public life attempting to avoid publicity, he has never been able to conceal the fact that he is one of. the most trusted and most able and most dedicated professional ca- reer men in this Capital." As director of the CIA, Richard Helms has fully justi- fied that assessment. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 Approved For Rele' Riahigt4N.ItiA)-14-15P-94409 13 October 1972 Secret and nonsensical it: HARRIS smiTH: . ? ? 68S 458pp. University of California Press (I I3EC;). Cicneral Walter Bedell Smith once Startled a postwar dinner party by tiuggesting the war might have been won much earlier had the United States diverted the time, money and inen expended on the Office of Strate- gic Services ," and the rest of that damn secret nonsense " to the regular, forces.' :It was a singular speculation. for a man, who had been General ? Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and, later, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. R. Harris Smith's OSS, however., is evidence that Bedell Smith was displaying his usual horse sense. The picture of the OSS during and ?immediately a fter?the Second World War is a depressing one. Its succes- sor, the CIA, has its faults. But the OSS, as depicted in this hook, was a mixture of idealism, naivety, in- competence and. intrigue seldom matched in the annals of govern- 'tient in America or anywhere else, ? Mr Smith's wide reading and extensive research have not saved the book from ingenuousness and error, Ile begins by labelling .his work " the secret history " of the org,ani- ,zation, but there is little of note in it that has not been written before and often much better. He gets things wrong. It was the American Navy, not the Royal Navy, that was responsible for landing General Pat- '.ton's .forces in Morocco in 1942. The Purple Clang operated in. De- troit, not Philadelphia. Stephen Bailey is not, nor has he been, .".President? of Syracuse University ", -which is headed by a chancellor. ? .. Mr Smith." main problem seems to be his tendency to write about the OSS and :its operations in North Africa, Europe and the Far East in absolutes. Men and organizations arc heroic or dastardly, faithful or treasonable. The story is told in blaeks and whites, whereas the dirty, dangerous game played by the OSS is best described in varying shades .of grey ? ;Nor does Mr Smith pay enough ,.attention to .one of the more impor- tant decisions taken at the outset by . General William " Wild Bill " DODO- van, the founder and director of .the OSS. lie was determined to consoli- date within the organization all op- ? .erations?espionage, sabotage, assis- tance to guerrilla movements. This was an error, The OSS planned operations based on intelligence-re- ports produced by the OSS. There was little objective study of these reports ; if they were the organiza- 'tion's, the assumption was, then they must be accurate. They often were not, and the operation failed. Oddly, the CIA, despite the sorry record of its .vredeees.sor, has continued this d-ii!anThafib'n,Willi''' epli!S'ilihir sults,.---such as the fiasco at the Bay of 'Pigs. ?- ? Mr Smith's 'villains include not only the Germans, Japanese and Italians, but the British intellieencc services; any official who seemed to ? doubt the OSS's competence and its right to order the political end of - the war as'it saw fit, and, of course, all' colonialists ". The style is an 'extraordinary ,mixture of.. exaggera- tion and parochial m. ? ? Mr Smith writes that. `,` the British -Army?: took a. respite of several months from the war against Hitler to suppress the revOlt " of the EAM- F.LAS partisans in Greece. This was the period when Second Army was fighting bitterly in: North-West Europe and the Eighth Army was heavily engaged in Italy.. Perhaps the best chapter in the book is that devoted to the OSS operations in Yugoslavia?best, be- cause it provides a fairly clear picture of the bewildering situation that arose from the presence of two resistance movements and of the naivety of OSS officers. One of these was confident that Tito " was planning no Communist revolution for his country ". Surprisingly, the book is weakest when it deals with the OSS in China during and 'after the war and with ?American intelligence operations ,in Algeria in 1942-43. In both cases Mr Smith tends to adopt the easy expla- nation of what happened and a somewhat austere attitude towards those officers whose standards dif- fered from his. Association with a New York law firm or bank did not .necessarily sour an operator's judg- ment. ..In retrospect the OSS prob- ably got more from this type of man that ? it did from the wild-eyed left- overs from the Abraham. Lincoln .Brigade in Spain. ? There are some brig,ht,spots how ?often Winston Churchill cut through the red tape to Save a promising . operation ; a good story about Gen- eral Donovan and David Bruce in Normandy ; the gradual profession- alization of some members of OSS a good, although incomplete, picture of Allen Dulles, who is dubbed " the master spy ". But these are not sufficient to save?the book: The .OSS imust. wait for a more objective and sophisticated chronicler. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 STAT 71AVINGTON POST Approved For Release 200i/UT41:961A-RDP91-00901R000 STAT a ithew BafrL Heded CIA Training rogream Matti ew Baird, 70, retired director of ? training for the , Central: Intelligence Agency, 'died Tuesday at his home in 1;3ethany Beach, Del. Born in Ardmore, Pa., Mr. Baird was a graduate of Hay- erford School in Haverford, Pa., and earned his bachelor's ' and master's degrees from , Princeton University. He also ' held a bachelor's degree in lit- erature from Balliol College, , Oxford. - He was headmaster of the ? Arizona Desert School in Tuc- son from 1930 to 1937, then - worked for three years as a re- 'search economist with the Sun IOil Co. in Philadelphia. : Mr. Baird owned and oper- ated the Ruby Star Ranch in Tucson from 1940 to 1942, then Served as a colonel in the Army Air Corps during World War IL .. He returned to the Ruby Star in 1945, where he became a recognized authority on Brahman cattle. He had an- other tour of duty with the Air Force from 1950 to 1953, during which time he was de- tailed to CIA. The then CIA director, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith asked Mr. Baird in 1951 to join the agency as director of training, with the task of further organ- izing and developing a train- ing program worldwide in scope. _ Until his retirement in 1965, - Mr. Baird initated and imple- mented proposals that led to the creation of what is consid- ered an outstanding training ipstitution within the CIA. At the time of his retirement, he was presented the CIA's high- est award, .the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. .: J 600300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901000600300001-1 AT TAT LUILC U t.,; STAT ? ? ? 2 2 APR 1972 511204 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0 mra C/4 '7 DI11r% uenien: 5py of the Century by E. H. Coo146dge ? ? (Random House; $10) . The'General Was a Spy by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; $8.95). A year before Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, which formally stated the theme of Act I of the Cold War, a prologue was being written and played backstage in Europe by Americans and Germans. They had already identified Soviet Communism as Enemy Number One, not primarily because Russia had Eastern Europe in its grip, but because Soviet Commu- nism was satanic and was set on con- quering the world. And as Hugh Trevor- Roper remarks in his introduction to The General Was a Spy, "it is legitimate to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan." Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy stories describe how and why, with the collapse of the German armies, ? the Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of Intelligence .against the Soviet Union and underwrote his postwar espionage operations. Reinhard Gehlen was a professional, an experierwed, single-minded anti- Communist with exceptional contacts. Those who hired him were not of the breed of Henry Stimson; who once said quaintly that gentlemen don't . read other people's mail. They were what came to be called realists, and they dominated US foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. The US gov- ernment secretly financed General Geh- len to the amount of $200 million, and when he finally left his American super- visors and went to work directly for the Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden handshake in appreciation of the great work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of 250,000 marks had been authorized. Dulles added the not entirely serichisly meant condition that Gehlen should use the money to buy a fine house somewhere in the Bavarian moctiptain.s." o ! For the $200 mill5Rer(aN recreivevie mountains of paper and thousands of clandestine tips on Eastern Europe and the USSR. Toward the end, it learned that much of the information was use- less; and it learned something more disturbing: the Gehlen organization had been penetrated by the Soviets. By the early '60s, Washington's interest had cooled. The General Was a Spy is drawn from a series of articles written by two German journalists for Der Spiegel. Gelder!: Spy of the Century is the product of a Euro- pean educated British journalist who was himself an intelligence agent in World War II and was imprisoned by the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer a more detailed and dispassionate ac- count and focus more sharply on the intricacies of the postwar intelligence network inside Germany; they are less revealing than Cookbridge, however, on the American involvement and on the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen's associates. Gehlen served any master who served his purpose, which was the undermin- ing and the destruction of Communism. When it could no longer be doubted that the German armies were defeated, Gehlen. turned to the Werewolfs, the young terrorists who were to carry on after Hitler's collapse. The Werewolf project had been discussed at one of Gehlen's last meetings with the Fuhrer, whom Gehlen found "most charming." They had also discussed Hitler's order that "gramophone records with sound effects of combat noise and rolling tanks . . . be distributed to front line com- mands and played from dugouts as near as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen accepted this. order, as all the others, knowing it was too late to stave off OW/000112/1*14Dlikt-RDFS1W369,01 e did not desert until. there was nothing to desert from. He played no 0600300001-1 iii any k.,erman plot against the Nazi leaders. He waited until the end and then escaped to Bavaria, in early 1945, taking with him files he knew would interest the Americans? to whom he intended -to surrender at a price. He met with Brigadier General Edwin L. . Sibert, senior intelligence officer of the American Zone, who (report llohne and Zoning) "while fighting was still in progress in France . . . had been pre- 'pared to make use of Adolf Hitler's officers in the cause of 'American strat- egy" and who "had a most excellent impression of him fGehlenJ at 'once." Sibert promptly took up with General 1 Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's proposal to set up a German intelligence service "financed by the US and directed ? against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith "okayed" the project, according to Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, who had forbidden fraternization with . Germans. After lengthy interrogation in Germany, Gehlen was flown to Washington. Though friendship with Moscow was then 'official US policy, Cookbridge points out, Gehlen 'knew that "many generals, above all General George V. Strong, the chief of G-2 army intelli- gence, and Sibert, were very far from regarding the Soviet Union as a future ally. In fact, a vastly different vision was taking place at the Third Army head- quarters at Bad Toelz, near where he [Gehlen] had buried his ... files. There General Patton was dreanling of rearm- ing a couple of Waffen SS divisions to incorporate them into his Third Army and 'lead them against the; Reds.'" Said Patton: "We're going to have to fight them sooner or later. Why not now while our army is intact and we can kick the Red army back into Russia? We can do it with my Germans. . . . They hate those Red bastards." % That, of course, went way beyond anything Gehlen's captors had in mind. They wanted information; Gehlen had it. So, says Cookbridge, they treated him with great courtesy, "wooing him like a wayward lass who can bring a large dowry to offset the blemishes of her past. ... Gehlen bargained his way into the gray dawn of Cold War espio- nage, conceding or compromising on some points, using pressures near to "blackmail to gain others. It says much for his shrewdness, self-assurance and persistence that he was able to take on Rat0961aNOMIAn array of top-rank- ing American experts." They agreed to covertly subsidize "an autonomous . P.(17112 Approved For Release 20A51/14 :41&-RDP91-009 "Dear Reinie" THE GENERAL WAS A SPY by HEINZ OHNE and HERMANN ZoLLING 377 pages. Coward-McCann & Geoghegan. $8.95. ? GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY ? by E.H. COOKRIDGE 402 pages. Random House. $10. THE GAME OF THE FOXES by LADISLAS FARAGO 696 pages. McKay. $11.95. While waiting for further commu- niques from th?-, nostalgia front?Rich- ard Burton's Mussolini and the return of the crew cut, per- haps?the American public is being deafened by old spies and their chroniclers whisper- ing: "Now it can be told." An alert literary scavenger .named Ladislas Farago dug a tin box of German intel- ligence papers out of the Na- tional Archives; and recycled them into a bestseller: The Game of the foxes. The book, an almost day-to-day account of German agents at work in Britain and the U.S. during World War II, is a stunning proof of the incredible cost and even more incredible in- efficiency of most espionage networks. Of the many Ab- wehr agents smuggled into England, fot example, not one was still operating at the ? time of the Normandy in- vasion in 1944. Diaries are negotiable cur- rency, too. Tire London Jour- nals of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940-41 (Little, Brown) are bringing $12.50 on the open mar- helped certify his anti-Nazi posture ket, mostly for predicting?you read afterward. it here!?that Russia will prove too ? Nothing suggests Gehlen's sublime much for Hitler. So it's "Once more insolence better than what he did when into the attics, fellow soldiers." Even everything fell apart in 1945 He dis- old memos are worth their weight in guised himself as jolly Dr. Wendland, gold, and that, given the art of mil- collected the microfilms of his files, itary memo writing; is ? saying some- and buried them in a Bavarian moun- V thing. In 1945 Sir John Masterman, tai meadow. Then he waited for the peacetime Oxford don, wartime coun- American troops. Whisked to Wash- n terspy, was ordered to write an of- ington, the archenemy of only a few ficial report about the remarkable sue- months before convinced his conquer- cess British intelligence enjoyed turning ors that they should appoint him (and around German spies in England and those files) as their primary espionage deploying them as double agents. Yale source against the Soviet Union. The University Press has simply reprinted Gehlen Organization, or simply the this surprisingly readable document "Org," set up in what had been an (The Double-Cross System in the War SS model housing development, out- of 1939 to 1945) on the coded doings side of Munich. To a number of re- of Garbo; Tricycle 'and the rest, and cruits?ex-SS men and Gestapo agents bargain-priced the instant book at may have run as high as 30%?it $6.95. ? was just like home. The No, AppdtvedeFot filel 0A t" 4 etrse 20 eiSAIIIIStegO processed cloak and dagger act, how- $3,000,001During IP e c- 4ital ever, promises to be Reinhard Geh- Gehlen worked exclusively for the ln 14 ow rnn von unstaee a man who CIA, another $200 million in Annerican was Hitler's favorite intelligence of- ficer, then after the war played "Dear Reinie" to his CIA chief Allen Dulles. Born in 1902, just too late for World War 1, he marked time as an ar- tillery and cavalry officer until World War H brought out his special talents. He was one of those who could put war on paper. Statistics and maps filled him with a passion to organize them. By 1942 he was chief of intelligence on the eastern front. Toward the end, when ac- curacy meant prognosticating defeat, Gehlen's accurate reports earned him one of Hitler's temper tantrums. Big this last-minute fall from favor only A, LIEUT. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (1944) Just like home. i,RonoRnmnonni-1 money funded the Org. Bi 1948 the Org numbered 4,000 agents and sup- plied an estimated 70% of the U.S. Government's information on the So- viet military. Once Gehlen had the fidea.of putting 432 simultaneous wire- taps on East Berlin phones. New Jer- sey Bell Telephone supplied the switch- board, courtesy of the CIA, at a total cost of $6,000,000. When the Org became the official espionage service of West Germany in 1956. Gehlen became a global ca- terer. He and the BND?the Org's new name?discreetly contracted them- selves out to Tanzania, Afghanistan and the Congo. The secret services of Israel and Egypt alike found occasion to use Gehlen's services. British Author Cookridge and Ger- mans fliihne and Zoning have com- piled dossiers on Gehlen that might satisfy the Org itself. Cookriclge, an old agent who makes a living out of spy chronicles like The Truth About Kim Philby, tends a bit to trade on man-in-the-shadows glamour. Gehlen turned the gentleman's av- ocation of spying?Sir John Master- man still compares it to cricket?into big business. But Hohne and Ziilling argue that, despite all his thermos- flask cameras and secret, secret ink, he still couldn't keep up with the times. Forced into retirement in 1963, he sat in his study on Lake Starnberg with a death mask of Frederick the Great looking down and wrote his memoirs (due out later this year) rath- er like Buffalo Bill after the frontier went thataway. For spying, like es& erything else, has gone automated. "They expect you to be able to say that a War will start next Tuesday at 5:32 p.m.," Walter Bedell Smith com- plained when he was head of the CIA. While he lasted,. Gehlen gave his cus- tomers what they thought they.wanted. In the cold war he catered to their sense of sinister conspiracy, then by a more or less relevant act or report relieved the anxiety he had helped create. He predicted the Hungarian revolt, for in- stance, and the Israeli-Arab Six-Day War. But these events occurred any- way. Sentiment dictates that Gehlen be treated as the last of the Scarlet Pim: pernels. He was, in fact, more like the last of the Prussians?a nostalgia t TAT own timIdcoeu.ld hardly afford even in h w ? Melvin Maddocks STAT 00600300001-1 IV Approved For Release 298414 : CIA-RDP91-00901 March 1972 4,:t"?.? 'el01122 Some al:m-7'.7-rv edinekileaCeS 11-Vng i/Iit" rr itIA(z.. 12) ? p 1r; q.71 4.14,14.4.?40.1. SeVaral I ? mezrafifs 017 tf47. av.4C)Ca. 0771) ?i'.4t?so- 177 ?Tr.-.) 0 ? . 4. ? "1"w'r.", 'n#1""? 1 ja. olt. itiat.4?0?;i? , 1 i t ' . , fr.* 4,1L IlaSt4=0:22.Ce r 'azazaz.,:w-ra .r---'1 " 11 i b27 17, er71 ccarn. au? C.'S "" e?Ne4"+-Q V Y C-01411 11.)11: k?NP. ? ? Laic .r.trz\ Tri?rin rat if=:crer0 ? 140 1/4.0.14. j ichaLd Wasn't asked? by Petei.Dale Scott' 7:77-1 rofessor.Samuel Eliot IN e? . 1903 Theodore Roost ? national law and mor US Navy to support the "11 Panama from Colombia. The: to the Canal Zone treaty, is de "Panama businessmen, agenl [which stood to gain $40 mill the treaty] and United States a to add that the "agents" of Company were New York in Seligman and their Washingt4 who organized and financed suite in the Waldorf-Astoria. In some ways, the Panar partition is .an instructive pre involvement in Indochina.' Le be different today; for many preparing for revolution anC 'awed, under sections 956-6( In theory, at least, responsibi of American "interests" is nt But in' fact, the CIA still rm J. & W. Seligman and similar These contacts have beer from Wall Street which succ CIA into its first covert ope who created the CIA in 19 unhappiness at the deflection gence function: "I never had any thougoht . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak- and-dagger operations."' His intentions, however, count- ed. for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York v. corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became con- cerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian ? ? elections:. Forrestal felt that -a secret counteraction was vital, hut his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing . ? reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed ? at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the .problem could not be handled effec- tively in private hands. He urged strongly that the . government establish a covert organization with un- youchered funds, the decision was made to clez,-4te under ih National Security Council.' STAT R000600300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 wEsuiTON POST . FEB '1972 Approved For Release 2uu5/12/14 : C1A-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 After it Lein , Inconclusive Trai . . . STAT A Non-Communist S. Vietnam Cannot Le Guaranteed Tn 1962 in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong re- marked to French journalist Bernard Fall that "Americans do not like long, inconclu- sive wars and this is going to be a long, in- conclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in the end." A decade and three Presidents later it is still an inconclusive war. And Pham Van Dong is still the North Vietnam- ese Premier. During that same visit to Hanoi Ho Chi 'Minh told Fall that "it took us eight years of bitter fighting to defeat you French in Indo- china . .. The Americans are much stronger than the French, though they know us less 'well. It may perhaps take 10 years to do it . . ." Ho is dead but clearly his spirit, and hiti aim, live on. It seems to me that Americans today must keep such remarks as these in mind as they assess the disclosures by President Nixon of Henry Kissinger's secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese and the peace propos- als put to Hanoi. We suffer from a baseball Syndrome; we want to see the final score and then go home to dinner. The North Viet- namese don't think that way; to them there Is no final out until their side has won. eiNs There is an aphorism from the American side that can be applied to the current situa- tion in Indochina. In-1954 when he returned to Washington from the Geneva Conference that decreed the "temporary" division of Vietnam, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith remarked that "it will be well to remember that diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield." In truth, neither side has prevailed on the battlefield. And there is stalemate at the conference table. The American eight-point peace plan, in sum, must seem to Hanoi to be a proposal for surrendering their victory aim. The North Vietnamese nine-point plan, judging from Kissinger's description of it since it has yet to be published, in sum, seems to Washington to be a proposal for surrendering South Vietnam to the control of ,the Communists. ? , There are, as the Nixon administration contends, some new elements in the Amer- ican proposals. But the sum of. it is that Hanoi must take its chances on an election In the South in which the Vietcong or Na- tional Liberation Front would compete. It is probable that the Communists would end up as 'a minority; they know that and so do Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger. I have never thought the Communists would participate In an election except as a Mechanism to con- By Chalmers M. Roberts firm a deal already set that would give them key Cabinet and other posts in a Saigon re- gime. Wide-open, nation-wide elections as the West knows them are both abhorrent to Communist regimes and foreign to the Viet- namese, North and South, as a technique for distributing power. Past elections in the South have been more of a charade than a reality ? the result of Americanization of that part of Vietnam?despite all the trum- peting in Washington about them. 04.9 Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese told him that there could be no solution that did not include a political element and that they asked the United States for "an indi- rect overthrow" of the Saigon government; -4.. .PHAM VAN DONG in short, that the United States cooperate in turning over South Vietnam to the Commu- nists. A perusal of Hanoi's public statements supports that reading; presumably the nine- point program, once we see the text, will too. President Nixon is not prepared to do so, any more than was President Johnson of whom the same thing was asked. It is illu- minating that, according to Hanoi's spokes- man in Paris, Kissinger remarked at the se- cret talks that "yon must not nourish the illusion that we can settle the problem of ? the war only because of the question of the prisoners of war." Secretary of State Rogers some months ago publicly said substantially the same thing. In effect, both were saying that Mr. Nixon will not make a deal to turn the South over to the Communists simply to get back the POWs. Now it is being said that Mr. Nixon has made a "generous" offer. But Hanoi does not want just a chance to win in the South; It wants a certainty. Mr. Nixon is willing to give Hanoi at least some chance but not any- thing like a certainty. And from what has been reported .from Saigon one can imagine that President Thieu's agreement to resign before a new election is based either on his belief that the procedure offers him a near certainty or his estimate that Hanoi will not accept anything less than near certainty for its side and therefore that there is not going to be any such election. Where does this leave us? With the likeli- hood of a continuing inconclusive war, with -a continuatim of the withdrawal of Ameri- can forces but with the probability of a re- sidual force remaining in the South at elec- tion time next November plus the certainty that American planes will stay in adjacent areas outside Indochina. This is not, of course, absolutely certain for Mr. Nixon be- fore election day could dramatically pull out the last man. But how would he square that with' past declarations that some forces will remain until the prisoners are released? 044 The POWs are hostages and hostages not: just for complete American withdrawal but for a political settlement favorable to Hanoi. There are conceivable ways to reach that kind of 'a settlement such as a deal, con- firmed by a sham election, to replace the Thieu regime with some form of coalition giving the Communists real power in Saigon and the strong expectation of eventual total power. But that deal is not likely one to be made by Mr. Nixon. If it is made it will be made by anti-Thieu South Vietnamese who manage by coup or otherwise to displace him and probably only when they are sure Washington is powerless to prevent such a deal. The truth of the matter is that the United States, despite the vast expenditure of blood and treasure, has failed to guarantee the survival of a non-Communist South Viet- nam. If the Nixon administration, or its suc- cessor, is determined, as Kissinger put it, to end the division at home over the war it can only pull out completely, hope Hanoi then will release the POWs and leave it to Saigon and Hanoi to settle the political issue._ _ Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 TIM LONDON DAM .Y TEL =,111 Approved For ReleaR4-240B/1-214 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 M111.( Qrs) STAT As British influence in Africa declined, so did British secret serv , sending hundreds of agents to African capitals like Accra, Lag to buttress "sensitive" states against communism and protect his exclusive series on the CIA E. H. Cookridge continues HE adventurous operations often bordering on the bizarre which the Central Intelligence Agency pursued in many parts of the world are usually / ascribed to one man: Allen Dulles. J They culminated in the abortive in- vasion of Cuba in 1961. When Dulles departed from the directorship of CIA after the Bay of Pigs debacle, he certainly left an indelible stamp of his influence as the architect of the mighty CIA edifice and its worldwide rami- fications. The policy of his successors has, however, been no less forceful. CIA activities under its present director, Richard McGarr-all Helms, may appear less aggressive because they are ? being conducted with greater caution and less publicity, and because they have been adroitly adjusted to the changing climate in international poli- tics. In the past CIA gained notoriety by promoting revolutions in Latin American banana republics, and sup- porting anti-communist regimes in South-East Asia. Its operations in Africa were more skilfully camou- flaged. For many years they had been on a limited scale because the CIA had relied on the British secret service to provide intelligence from an area where the British had unsurpassed ex- perience and long-established sources of information. But with the emergence of the many African independent countries, the wave of "anti-colonial- ist" emotions, and the growing in- filtration of Africa by Soviet and Chinese "advisers", British influence declined. Washington forcefully stepped, through CIA, into the breach: with the avowed aim of containing communist expansion. ? ? Financial investments in new in- dustrial and mining enterprises, and lavish economic aid to the emerging governments of the "underdeveloped" countries, paved the road for the influx of hundreds of CIA agents. Some com- bined their intelligence: assignments with genuine jobs as technical, agri- cultural and scientific advisers. The British Government - parti- cularly after the Labour Party had come topower in 1964 - withdrew A bloodless coup in Uganda in January last 3 and installed Major-General Id] Amin as milli a section of his troops). How far was the C protest in Santa Domingo. A pro-rebel poster STAT Army Intelligence officers, were firmly men began hurriedly to establish their "stations" in Accra, Lagos, Nairobi Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, the "sensitive areas" in danger of slipping under communist sway. By the mid-1960s several senior CIA officials, such as Thomas J. Gunning and Edward Foy, both former U.S. ng served for many years as a skilful FBI agent before joining CIA and being employed at Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam, acquir- ing fluency in Swahili. By 1965 the Accra CIA Station had two-score active operators, distributing largesse among President Nkrumah's secret adversaries. most of their SIS and MI5 officials established at Accra. They were later The Americans had every intention from African capitals, though some joined by William B. Edmondson, who remained, at the requAkrifdiAdr% of helping Ghana's economy by build- rulers, to organise their own new in- Africa, an riRgleltiNqeMItteseigklikr609inocioettiReueltoipbOt te a avis, an Itish con- rulers, and security services. CIA attractive, motherly woman, whom in- sortium, the Vo ta am, t us provid- g hydro-electric power for the no one would have suspected of hay- _ VEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS Approved For Release 2%0V4/1/firCIA-RDP91-00 The CHA's New Cover The Rope Dancer by Victor Marchetti. Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95 Richard J. Barnet In late November the Central Intel- ligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of recon- naissance satellites, and occasionally publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they Were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations ; were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in jGuatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else- where?Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald?had died or departed. In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting informa- tion the clean, modern way, mostly with ,sensors, computers, and sophis- ticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata -Hari. (There are about 18,000 em- ? ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. ? The cost of maintaining them is some- where between $5 billion and $6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000- *man hired army in Laos.) A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" Newsweek ran a long story ,i6/ n "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clhaAlx than the CIA." Moreover, soon after , to some of the same Feii5 NON ReliWfti5/11)(f4 Senator Allen adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- cialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's article was a cover story in inore than one sense. _Elle Opt the ing knt ing vot An ceil It has always ?been difficult to fail analyze organizations that engage in false advertising Shout themselves. Part of of the responsibility of the CIA is to tarl spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ .from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- izations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as ipart of the Nixon Doctrine which, in. essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war. But we cannot comprehend recent th be4 ize He ov Jig At Bi th cc ov vi A in re li developments in the "intelligence COM- n munity" without understanding what fl Mr. Helms and his employees actually P do. In a speech before the National n Press Club, the director discouraged/ journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Com- mittee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the .subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year." Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activ- ities receive less scrutiny and control 301R000600300001-1 Newsweek said, "The gaudy era of the 901R000600300001-1 ? STAT Approved For .11)1. dij.) rrr/ kLA.:111_, By .02(ili.ter.:7 115: Ilobertg The writer; w7io. retired Test stonMer tenior diplomatic' correspondoit of The Washingtoo, Post, covered the 1954 VC17.6.VC1 MilerenCE3 on Bidoehina. 1TUST HOW SERIOUSLY did. the (I) United States consider military in- tervention in Indochina in 19517 The publication of the Pentagon Papers? first in the neWspapers and more re- cently in the 43-volume official edition published as 12 books by the House Armed Sc..,rv.i.cos Committee?has made the historian's task in answering that question both; easier end more diffi- cult. ? - It lc easier because there Is now available a, mass of new material on the key year 1931, as well as for many other yearn.- Much of it is confirma- tory, of course, but there are new bits , and pieces, and above all a sense of the urgency with which events were perceived at the time. - It is more difficult because the new documents zdo not resolve all the out- at:ending questions that have been raised in the many books and articles 'written about the period. And while the possibility that a key pieceof The -puzzle may still be withheld through censorship cannot be ruled out, a close reading of Books-9 and 10 of the House edition which- cover this period leaves the , impression that the censors were wholly capricious. ? From the 859 pages, dealing, with 1953 and 1951 (and these are pages of documents, not the analyst's summa- 1%),f?,a Release 2005/.12/14 :CIA-RDP61-009 z 4 uul 19/1 the censor did. not cut out the summa- ries of the five documents, excised but in Book 10 the summaries were cut out for the two documents ,omitted, It so happens that tamong ,the, Pentagon Pa- pers made available to Tho Washington 'Post are coPles of the live documents from Book 9,- ??? ' ' ? ???? Tho Pentagon's explanation of t1ie. "declassified i;eryle.e. (printed in each: book) states that "some of the material. has- been declassified solely on the basis of prior disclosures." Yet one of the excised documents was printed in, full In the New York Times, Further- more, It WAS simply en advance report from Under Secretary of State Walter. Bedell Smith in Geneva. to Secrete' of State John Foster Dulles in Wash- ington on an important ? Associated Press dispatch written by - Seymour Topping, now a Now York -Times edi- tor. The ? more sioniiicant talegram from Smith to Dulles on the following / 11, four days after tho fall ,of thenbion. day revealing Topping:13 Chinese Como( phu and three days after the -Geneva 'risunist mace Is included in the book! conference -opened, the French were .(The informant, incidentally, was --- "advised" ? that President Eisenhower Huang Hue who is the new Peking am- "would be disposed to ask -Congress bas.sedor to Canada and who may be. for authority to use the armed forces the first envoy to Washington.) ,? of tho United States" under certain Another censored ? document ? re-, conditions, This ((possibility," said counts a Dulles conversation at Ge- Dulles on Aug. 3, "lapsed" on Juno 20 neva with Britain's Foreign Secretary, when Frame? ? decided to -accept the ? Anthony Eden. This -cable reflects cease-fire that took another month to Dulles'. unhappiness with Eden' and negotimjt. British policy but far less so than some lqurecrous French writers, roost no- of the printed telegrams. Still another tably Philippe Devillers and Joan Da.-, excised message, from Dulles in Paris couture in "End of a War," have do- te). Washington, in July of 1934, details tailed the French pleas for Int-croon? the agreed U.S.-11tronch position just time. American writers such as John before the end of tho Geneva confer- Robinson Beal in "John Foster Dulles" once but there is nothing in it that has have told it from the American side. not long ago been known and widely. Most recently Robert F. Randle, a Co- printed. ? lumbla University professor, in ."GoL,. . Finally, the 'other two excised docu- nova 1954," has taken something of limits of which Tho Post has copies revisionist line. Randle concluded that deal with American conversations with Dulles in. fact was vetoing tho Inter- two French generals, Paul Ely find vontion plans of Adm., Arthur Radford,. Jean Witty. Both were Pentagon con- then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of vornations, both were pessimistic but Staff, and ho Wrote that "my analysis neither Sc remarkable. . and conclusions ?differ substantially A note should bo added her,o,about from those of Mr. Roberts" hi The tho issue of code.s. At the time the Post and in a widely reprinted Re- Nixon administration went to court to porter magazine piece titled "The Day pm-censor publication of the Pentagon We Didn't Go to War." , Papers there was much talk that their In. reading the. Duller telegoams use in tote would compromise crypto- against my own accounts and memo-, graphic codes because the messages rim of many conversations with Dulles gave exact dates and times and cable and ethers at the time I am have no control numbers. But tho censors ex- doubt that he wanted to Intervene to eicci none of this 1"1?I'mati?" from "save" Indochina from communism, the hundreds of messages printed. ., He was stopped, essentmy, by two Nor did the censors eliminate Amen- factors: the Democratic congressional can officials' assessments of Chou En- leaders who insisted (as did the Repub. les performance at Geneva, t though Beans as well) on allies, and by Eden, Chou soon is to be President Nixonis who ? refused, with Primo Minister host in Peking. Churchill's full backing, to let Britain , be the key ally in any "united action." 01R000600300001-1 ihA STAT 'ones' YA-.( :cp,N 'ME CENTRAL question of Jim ? close the Eisenhower administra Um came to Military interventlor in 1954, Book 10 includes a then-Toi Secret summary by Dulles on "French Requests Involving Possible 'Unite( States Belligerency in Indochina," In it he listed, end detailed, April 4, 23 and 21 as "the three occasions when French officials suggested United States armed intervention in ?Indb- ehina." Dull'- summary; drafted ? on Aug. 3, just after Geneva had pro- duced a -cease-fire, states American- "cOnditions" for intervention (never 'fulfilled) but does not go beyond that ? ?perhaps because the draft WAS in- tended for publication although it never was published in this form. This stunraL7,. however, does - add -something.- Dillies stated that on May. tion) the censors cut %1615? OrblcifFor Release 2005/12/14: CIA7RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 covering 18 pages. In Boo:, 9, nowever, 44- ,; Oat, D,1110Ct STAT Sf: 170;TI,D PLTORT ii our Ibril Approved For Release 2005712/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R00060 n IF ? , ? /7 71) ti Ei-\\ 1.1.1 'N\ 11, t r ? ps., . L, 1 sts Just how valid are .the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight,control? A point-by-poin fense of the organization conies from a man who served in top posts for 13 y 7.0111 ? Following is cm analysis of inIelligence operations by Lyman 13. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive direc- tor-comptroller of. the ?COntrol Intelligence Agency: The Central intelligence Agency was created by the Na- tional Security Act of 1947 as .an independent agency in the executive branch of the United .States Govi.:rnment, report- ing to the President. Ever since that late it has been sub- jected to criticism both at home and abroad: for ?vhat it has allegedly done, as yell as for what it has failed to do. Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and. the right to protest. Jr is not only a right, but an ;obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticisin be responsible, objective and. constructive. If. should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization de- ? scribed as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all. ? it was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA ?fivst as inspector general, then. as executive director- comptroller?to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when 'required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Cen- tral Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates. ? It is with this as background that I comment on the cur- rent allegations, none of which are original with this critic but ' any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.. ? CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too f3ig, This raises the questions of how much we are willing to - pay for national security, and how much is enough. First, . what are the reSponsibilities of the CIA. and the 'other intelligertce organizations of our Government? Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with in- suring that the United States learns as far in adN;ance as pos- sible of any potential threats to our national interests: A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this ac- tually fineans. It can range all the way from Plussian missiles A pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, STAT to -expropriation of American properties, to clangers to any one of our allies whon,1 we are pledged by treaty to protect: - - It is the interface of world competition between superior STAT powers. Few are those; who have. served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limita- tion of responsibilities 'or some lessening of encyclopedic Te- quircm6nts about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be Jess and that hot every dis- turbance in every part of the world came into their purview. ? - (Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning cc that the U. S. means to intervene, It does, mean that when there is a Mr. Kirkpatrick Lyman ? 13. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelli- gence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant three- tor, inspector generaland ex- ecutive director-comptroller before leavin in 1965. He has written extensively on ? intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds ' the President's Award for 'Distinguished Federal Civil- ian Service and the Distin- guished Intelligence Medal. boundary dispute or major disagreement between other na- tions, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. policy? makers that they be kept informed.) . What. this means for our intelligence system is world- wide coverage. To knowledge, there has not been an Admin- istration in Washington that has not been actively concerned' with the size arici cost of the intelligence system. All A chnin- istrations have kept the intelligence agencies mider.tight.con- ? Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 cony; nued Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000 : BROCKTON, MASS. ENTERPRISE?TIMES ? E 55,308 OCT 5 19ii he "My AffEnr WHEN THE RUSSIANS hit back at the English for ; -.their expulsion of 105 Soviet spies masquerading as cliplo- mats,...and technicians, the name of Kim Philby.catne back ia the news. He is the one who is supposed td have furnished_ Izvestia with a .list of British spies throughout the Arabworld. -l:7?British traitor Harold A. K. (Kim) Philby was a Soviet anent-for 30 years, becoming head of the American Depart- naen?in London May 1, 1950,? and continuing his role for 14'years -afterward. .As the "third man" he tipped off co- ..., cpspirators Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess so that they could escape from Washington to Moscow. ?,...-,Desplte the fact that General Bedell. Smith, director of tlab.CIA, sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the Blltish ('Tire Philby or we _break off the intelligencc.. re- lationship"), he' was exonerated in 1955 by then foreign 'keretary Harold MacMillan. So Philby could play the part ofinjurcd hero and good-tempered martyr to security for 'several more years.. ? I Most of Britain's intelligence recruits are drawn from ! , Oxford and Cambridge, and the inbred nature of the. secret ' sawices has had one, grave defech?the refusal to believe ; ? that _anyone with the same school tie could be a traitor to Eland. Thus .the affair tells us a good deal about the role :of privilege in our society, and the degree to which the'insignia of Social and economic status can be fatally mis- tahen for political acceptability. '.0n, the credit side, the Philby affair brought about con- siderable reform of the British intelligence services. STAT ' 00300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 YWK TIYES P511,i) Approved For Release 2O1: -RDP91-00901R00060 . A ?.-1' #.?'; - ? 1-i ? ;:- 7 0 ;1, V 0 e. - 71" to ? 1 iTS5 6), r . 'Also a I (10 ? r.1:. Diralor of taiV cold' hives b-11,?m! In, . . . Spr:2701 to allo NCA1 York Times TU.C.SON, Aria. Sept. 28--- William H. Jackson, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 'died today after a long illness'. He was 70 -yeat's Mr. Jackson married twice, in 1929 Elizabeth Lyman and in 1951 Mary Ito Pitcairn. Both marriages ended in divorce. He is survivied by two sons of the first marriage, William H. and Richard Lee, and two sons of the second marriage, Bruce P. and Howell E., and four grandchildren. - Jr funeral service vill be held In Nashville, on Friday or Saturday. . , Mlidy lk?gun in Enly'S Ws --The problem of setting up a psychologicalwarfare organiza- tion in a democracy was the task put before William Hard- ing Jackson. In The early nineteen-fifties, lid headed a committee appoint- ed by 'President Eisenhower to study how to mount psycho- logical warfare to give it "a dynamic thrust in the cold war." ? ? In his report, Mr. Jackson stated that "psychblogical strut- egy" does not exist as an in- dependent medium. He recom- mended that the Presidenti abolish the Psychological Strat- egy Board, which in 1953 had been floundering for two years.' The Jackson committee asked,1 Instead, that the President set1 up an "operations coordinating board" within the Natidnal Se- curity .Council. The mission of this new unit would have bean to plan de- tailed actions for carrying on not mere propaganda or pay- chological .v,aryare but ciefini- tive national-sec,urity policies; In effect, the Jackson report stated that the nation should refrain from propaganda stunts, contrived ideas unrelated to Stated policy, in the ideological warfare . against the Soviet Union. The report was accepted and the operations board was formed. . . . V13 Sc.?, YcrkTrnos William IL Jackson -:Behind this major effort wa...; a: long carom' in intelligence wo?Jz that made Mr. Jackson the ideal man to be the corn- n)ittee's chairman. Ills World War II service was chiefly in various phases of intelligence, with a brief period in the' Of- fice of Strategic Sctvices.:.,- ? joined Army as Captain He entered the Army' as a captain in February,' 1942, and was assigned to the Army Air Force Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pa. This was fol- lowed by antisubmarine service and assignment to intelligence in January, 1944,. Mr. Jack- son went to London to join the intelligence section of American Military Headquar- ters, serving as chief of intel- ligence to Gm Jacob L. Devers and, later, as deputy chief of intelligence for Gen. Omar Bradley. He was discharged from the Army in August, 1945, as a colonel. Upon his return, he rejoined Iii s law firm, Carter, Ledyard Milburn, where he had become a senior partner, but left two years later, because, as he put it: ? "My prewar work wasn't satisfying any more. ? A great many civilian soldiers felt the same way I did." He became a partner in the investment fir, . of john Hay Whitney and also its managing director. Before l?ng, -hov he was back in \vork. ' ? In 1949; he was ?imri the National Security Ct. to serve on a committee with Allen W. Dulles and Mathias F. Correa to investigate the intelligence service of the United States. .Appointed Deputy Director The following August he was named deputy director of the Central; ,Intelligence Agency, with Mont. Gen, Walter 13. Smith. ? In January, 1950,. President Eisenhower .named Mr. Jackson as a'special assistant, succeed- ing-Nelson A. Rockefeller. His job was "to -assist in the coor- dination and timing of the ex- ecution of foreign policies in- volving more than one depart- ment or agency." Some months later, he was named special assistant to the President for national security affairs. He recornThended to the President that Richard M. Nixon, then the Vice President, be made chairman of the Up- motions Coordinating Board, a unit whose job jt was to see that Presidentid." decisions, rec- ommended by the.. Security Council, were closely and quickly followed. While Mr. Eisenhower waz sympathetic. 'to the idea, joint Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, was opposed, and the proposal \vas rejected. Mr. Jackson was born in Nashville on March 25. 1901, the son of William Harding .Jackson and the. former Anne Davis Richardson. The family had been farmers for five gen- erations. A grandfather, a West. Point graduate, was a Civil War veteran. The youth was graduated from St. Mark's School, South- boroug,b, Mass., in 3920. He re- ceived a D.A. from Princeton in 1924 and an LI,13%. from. Har- vard Law School in 1928: Admitted to Bar in 1932 ; He joined the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in 1928 and move.d:to Car- ter, Led yard & Milburn in 1930: He was admitted to the bar in New York in .1932 and two years later became a.partner of Carter, Le.dyard. ? Mr. Jackson was a trustee of the Millbrook School for Boys and of St. Mark's. He also was a director of the Spencer-Chem- ical Company, the Great North- elm Paper Company and the Bankers Trust Company. 00001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP9-1-00901R000600300001-1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91700901 Septanbej' 15, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL R CO R D E,Nic1751-0PS 0 lea that now exists In inany countries. we will also urgc that such a system eliminate the inequitable "reverse preferences" that now discriminate against Western -Hemis- phere countries. The President was certainly correct when he said that? . United .mates trade policies often have a very heavy impact on our.nelghbors. As an example, Mexico imported $1.505 billion worth of American goods, mostly 'manufactured items, last year. The United States imported $833 million worth of Mexican goods, resulting in a plus U.S. trade balance of $832 million. , Mexico, like most of the developing nations hi Latin America, is striving to build its manufacturing capabilities in order to create jobs and raise its GNP. President Nixon has not? only broken his promise to "press for a liberal system of generalized tariff prefer- ences for all developing countries, in.- eluding Latin America," hut he has slapped Mexico and our other neighbors with a surcharge- of 10 percent on their exports tothe United States. Surely the President 'was correct when he said dining the economic package an- nouncement,- that the "temporary" sur- charge was aimed at trading nations with under-valued currencies. Given that, why did he break his promises to our developing, neighbors and levy Pre- ? eisely the same surcharge against them as he applied to the developed nations? But the levying of the surcharge was not the only broken promise. In order to increase the drama involved n an- nouncing such a comprehensive econom- ic package, President Nixon broke his express 'promise to have "advance con.- isultation on trade matters" which he made in. the Inter-American Press As- sociation speech. a? . In a speech delivered yesterday before the U.S. Governors Conference San Juan, PR., OAS Secretary General Gale Plaza stated: The new economic policy announced by the- the United States Government last 'month Jun. understandably, not been well received in Latin Arnerica. The surcharge on imports fiCOMS to undercut both the general U.S.-- commitment toward freer trade and the Specific U.S. commitment to. help Latin America expand and diversify its -exports. I find Secretary General Gab o Plaza to be most diplomatic indeed. Ile might have stated simply: "P'resident Nixon lied to us." ? ? I would remind President Nixon and the Members of this body, of one or two economic facts of life: . ? First. Latin America is the only Major world area in which the United States maintains a favorable trade balance. Second. That, favorable trade balance amounted to $790 million last year. Third. The United States exported al- most $5 billion worth of goods to Latin America in 1900. Fourth. The old days when the Latin Amerlean nations had nowhere else to go for their imports are over, West Gah- many, Japan, Prance, Great Britain, and even the Soviet Union are accelerating their exports to Latin American nations. As an example, in a recent closed session of the -Foreign Relations Committee in one of the houses of the Brazilian 'Con- gress, the Foreign. Minister of Brazil stated that last year, for the first tilde in its history, Brazil traded more with the Com.mon Market nations than it did with the United States. This morning the Washington Post published an editorial which is very ger- mane to the subject of the impact of the 10-percent import surtax on our south- ern neighbors. The editorial entitled, "Who Pays the Tariff?" follows: Wno WArars THE TArn.ny? In the current pushing and shoving among Site- world's greai; trading nations, a lot of small countries are getting hurt. Latin America illustrates the point. The United. States did not really intend to harm the Latin economies last month when it imposed its IO per cent surtax on imports. Tho truth is that the White House and the Treasury were not thinking about Latin America at all. But intentional or not, the damage is real and the- consequences are going to be seri- ous. President Nix,on -worked. Out, his economic program with the advice of a special 'com- mit:tee of. able and experienced citizens, headed by Albert Williams, whose report has now been published. Thit in the matter of tariffs the. President overrode this committee, which urged him to move toward removal of all barriers to international trade. The Williams committee Is right on this issue, and the President is wrong. The evidence is already visible to the south. The Latin Americans protest, with good logic, that it Is unjust to make them pay a surtax designed tO remedy a trade crisis in which they played no part. Latin America has tradlticmally bought more from the United 'States than it sells here. The Latins are not the people to see about revaluing the yen and the Dotftschemark. But the United States meets all objections with a shrug and the observation that it can't start making ex- ceptions now. Mr. Nixon attempted this week to placate the Latins with the decision that, for them alone, he would cancel the 10 per cent re- duction in foreign aid; it had originally been part of the program announced a month ego, with the surtax. But the countries getting the most aid are 'not those hardesthit by the surtax. The extreme exaMple3 are Mexico and Brazil. Mexico does more business with the United States than any other 'country in Latin America and will be more severely damaged by the surtax than any other. But Mexico takes no direct aid from the United States. On the other hand, the United States gives more aid to Brazil than to any other La-tin country. Brazil does half as 11111011 busi- ness with the United States as Mexico does. Since coffee is exempt, the surtax applies only to about 15 per cent of Brazil's exports to this country. But it applies to fully 450 per cent of Mexico's ekports here. Less than two years ago Mr. Nixon dolly.' clod a glowing, speech on this country's le- sponsibilities to Latin America. "They need," ha said then, "to be assured of access to the expanding markets of the industrialied world." . He promised them advance con- sultation on trade matters, and he also. promised to pursue, worldwide-, "a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences." Thy got no consultation on the surtax, oh-. viously, and now they see the United States taking the lead in raising tariffs. Unfor- tunately the price of these moves conies high, and much of it is nhimately paid by snu',1l nationS that cannot afford their large ncrigh.- b ors' m istakes. Remaiws BILDITR3-2,Enc, : taIIE COLD . INTL:P.:NATIONALE HON, JON OF 7.0UISIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT Wednesday, Septeniber 15, 1971- STAT Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, on several occasions during recent months, I called the attention of our colleagues to ac- tivities of the Bildf.:irbergers--an elite in- ternational group comprised of high Gov- ernment officials, ititeniation.1 finana . ciers, businessmen and Opinio?makers? see CONGRESSIONAT, RNC011?, litfOl. 6-8 of May 5, 1911, entitled "Bilderliergers' Woodstock Meeting;" 113701 to 713707 of May 10, 1971., entitled "U.S. Dollar Crisis?A Dividend of Internationalism;" E4.919 to E4985 of May 24, 1.9'11, entitled "Secret Bilderberg Meeting and the Logan Act;" and I17780 to E7187 of July. 16, -1971, entitled ."Bilderberg Case: Reply From U.S. Attorney General's Of- flee." This exclusive international aristocracy .holds highly secretive meetings al?1110.1.1y or more often in various countries, The limited information available about 'what transpires at these meetings reveals that they discuss Matters of vital importance which affect the lives of all citizens. Presidential. Advisasr. Henry Kissinger, who made a secret visit to Peking fro Jitly 9 to 11, 1971, and arranged for a -Presidential visit to Red China, was re- Ported to be in attendance at the Most recent Bilderberg meeting he'd in Wood- stock, 'Vt., April 23-25, 1971. The two points reportedly discussed at the Wood- stock meeting were "the contribution of business in. dealing with current prob- lems of social instability" and "the pos- sibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences." ,Following these secret discussions, which are certainly not in keeping with the 'Western political tradition of "open covenants openly arrived at," the par- ticipants return to their respective coun- tries with the general public -left -unin- formed, notwithstanding the attendance of some news media representatives, of any of the recommendations and plans agreed upon as a result of the discus- sions--or for that matter even the oc- enrollee, of .the meeting itself. Because the Areeric,an people have a right to know of any projections for a change in. America's role in the world and because -henry Kissinger and other Government officials and influential Americans met with high Government officials and other powerful foreign lead- ers, I sought to have more information about the recent 13ilderberg meeting made public by raising the question to the U.S. Attorney General of a possible violation of the Logan Act by American participants and asked if the j.ustice De- partment anticipated taking any action in the matter. STAT The reply from. the Justice Depart- ment, in effect, was that all of the Cie- ments constituting a violation of the Lo- gan Act were present' and that the De- partment contemplated no aid ion but Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP9.1100901R000600300001-1 Approved For Release1:106511121W: ZIKARLIP91-0090 N+9 19 1971 ? ?t, "...Aithaegh pis entire series of ? ctis- eesons wns "of` the record", the sehjeet of eiseessien for this prirtiet...- ler meeting one especi:aily 'sensitive Tud ubject to the previously nn- - noenser3 restriczies." ?C. De.vg:es Mien ,Dy Croup ? The Central. Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies .whose public image has actually im- proved as a result of the publication of j the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclo- sures.of "The Agency's" role in assassi- ? nations, sabotage, and coup d'etatS consciously intended to subvert Intei?na- . tional law, A meric.a's secret agent ry has actually emerged in some quarters :with the veneration due prophets, or at ? least the respect. due its suggested effi- ciency and aCcuracY. Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accu- racy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.;Time and aghin, the Agency's "level headed professional- ism' has been contrasted with the esca-? lation-overkill orientation of the Penta- 'On or the President's advisors. The j. 'editor of the Christian Science Monitor even Called upon policy makers to son- 'suit the CIA more, calling it a "re- markably accurate source of informa- %ion." But such backhanded praise for 'e.onspirators confuses public under- Standing of the important and closely ;integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a ;global scale.. For. many,'tlie Pentagon Papers provided a. first peek into the inner ;sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress; the study illustrates,' the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "inv- ? isible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordi- nated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There rivalries, to be sure, butonce the deci- sions are readted at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power. . ; The' intelligence community now plays a.'n expanded and critical role in creating and administering the re,al-_ stuff of American foreign policy: CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a, U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all govermnent agen- cies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which 'further 'centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked' Up and the "options" ;so carefUlly worked out. It is in these closed chum- .be.rs, and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent, execution by a myriad of U.S. con- trolled agencies and agents. , increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full rheanitig is sel- dom perceived by the people affected -:- be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with, their colonial, administrators., and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place. in 'the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third World elites. In this world of realpolitik, ap- pearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally mis- leading. The U.S. aggression in Viet- nam, lest anyone forget, began as a 'covert involvement largely engineered' by the CIA. Similar covert interven-- tions now underway elseWhere in the world may- be fueling tomorrow's Viet-. na ms. . . It. is for. this reason that the Africa Research 'Group, an independent radi- cal research collective:, is. now making public Major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's ,view of the 'secret workings of the American intelligance apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was Made available to the Group which will ot pub- tliton iscoM138-? are disagreemen lo ts- akipived-eFori Re kepeel gpp?mtt4RiciA13,ppmq9soit4o- i ? 1R000600300001-1 CIA manipulations. Richard Bissell, the man who led the 1 STAT Cottncil discussion that night, was well eqv.ipped to talk about the CIA. A one- time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corpo- ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep.-. uty-:Director until he "resigned'1 in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included.a number of intellig- ence experts including Robert Amory,. Jr.:. another former Deputy Director, and?the late CIA chief,Allen Dulles, Jong. considered the grand -Old man of American' espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to *The complete text of the document will be available for 81 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, ? flom, flU,Od. o NATIONAL GUARDIAN Approved For Release 20104/4244 rAA-RDP91-00901R " 11 II -0 - .- ri ri ,;,,-,--,A rt.-1,,?,'rifill'-').iiiTrill ,,' -;-HHHITh /:;.,11 ? 1 - - . .1 r? k,Li Li D - - cq,i) CIA IL.:-.)'''',.'?-?,1' 'e.SLv..ic,(;) '-A___AJ . ? ? s By Richard E. Ward Third of a FMes of articles .. ? Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued, to the public characteristically have charged the Viet- namese with the crimes actually being committed by the .U.S. From 1954 to. the present, day, among the U.S. ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of North Vietnamese .aggression and violations of the 1954 Geneva settlement. ". Although U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the "Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well over a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in ? the New York Times was, last month in its final - installment of documents and reports from the Penta- gon's history ofU.S. intervention in Vietnam. . Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien- bienphu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the neees- , sity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained provisions . for .a durable peace in Indochina. But as quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began its direct interventiOn., preventing essential provisions of ? the Geneva .agreement from being carried out. Arrnad resistance bccins As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet Ngo. Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs financed and largely. conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem instituted- a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots who had served in the anti-French resistance were assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed struggle became the only road to survival; this developed . spontaneously in sonic regions or under the direction of locals 'cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance began with the formation of .the N:ttional Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was ? headed by a representative cross-section of the leader- ship of democratic sand progressive organizationsin the : South. In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely challenged (except to give a partially true picture as ? Diem nearedhis end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were treated-as the lef,,,itimatc rulers, threatened by subversive agents acting on. behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according to Wanington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not intervening in ,Victnam while "foreign aggression" was carried out by Vietnamese. ? Unfortunately the press has only published a small. amount of Material from the Pentagon study _on the. period following the Geneva settlement. However, there is sufficient information from the Pentagon report to idemonstrate that Washington consciously ,and deliberate- ;ly was. trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and that virtually every public statement was-nothing but a tissue .of lies designed-to conceal U.S. activities frornthe AmeriCan people. At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At the ? conference itself the chief U.S. delegate,: Walter. / Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. wotrtd _mit up. e them by force. Officials APPIT9X0I-E9JBOAks% 05/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 ambiguous, hardly concealing their dissatisfaction.- Dis- satisfied they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial ? :.? . . !instructions from President Eisenhower and Secs State John- Foster Dulles opposed any international recognition Of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which had existed for 'nearly nine years and led the resistance-against the French. in; policies- ? Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in 111(10- -china as "a military victory" for the French, whose armies were on their last legs---indicating the lack of realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. Tiffs was evident at the time, to anyone who wanted to see what was happening in Vietnam. Clearer than before, the -.newly available documents show that the U.S. never intended to respect-the Geneva settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the Geneva conference concluded, the National Security Council discussed' Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by the [National Security.] Council were 'to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and `to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.' " ? Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S. "connived" with Diem to prevent national elections, Butterfield noted that Washington bad made its desires known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem remained in power by virtue of U.S.- backing, although the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured, particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression. for which U.S. was ultimately responsible. Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva settlement was stated by John Foster Dulles'in a cable to. the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we should' certainly take no step to speed up the present process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them." ? Perhaps the most 'revealing new document from the post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col. Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous members of the group, there is no doubt that the report which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. LUIS- dale's-activities were .described in. fiction by Graham Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvin- 'ism and callousness might also be compared to the comic strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force Matinued? STAT STAT ligA5Q4 PitS Approved For Release -2005/1.F1ALCWFDP91 00901R000600300001-1 TA7 7,.,,,,..4A. k4 ic fficzk, JL .") FAG \1"e%???? ;141 .4-A kr -r4,1 Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents appear verbatiM, with ; only un4ni,stc. ikable typographical errors corrected. :Report of Ho's Appeals td J.S. In '46 to Support Independence . Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified as Landoh, to State Department, Feb. 27, 1946',,as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. ? Ho Chi Minh handed Me 2 letters ad- dressed to President of USA, China, -...Russia, and Britain identical copies of .which were stated to have been for- warded to other governments n'amed. In 2 letters" to Ho Chi Minh 'request 'ZIA es one of United Nations to Sup- port idea of Annamese independence ? accordthge to Philippines example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being endan- ? gered by French efforts to reconquer ? Indochina. He asserts that Annamese will fight until United Nations inter- fered in support of Annamese independ- ence. The petition addressed to major ; United Nations contains: ; A. Review of French relations with :Japanese where French Indochina al- legedly aided Japs: B. Statement of establishment on 2 So lo th Pa pr wi th ea In ca fu th and Ii source pro duc .tegical rice ex and Ho signific import d. Th _ ..... sees a.sa Ls, ,,spe- daily of Malaya and Indonesia, could re- sult in such economic and political pres- sures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual ac- commodation to communism. 3. It is therefore imperative ?that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously op- posed. In order to pursue the 'military courses of action envisaged in this paper . to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized in- creased risks involved therein, or to in- crease our military forces in being, or both. ? ? 4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is in- herent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than con- tinued communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The 'primary threat to Southeast Asia accord- ingly arises from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the millitary strength of which is being steadily in- creased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist re,ginne and its allies. , 5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention in non-Com- munist hands ot mainland Southeast September 1945 of PENW Democratic Repubic of Viet Minh: C. Summary of French conqu,est of Cochin China began 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete: D. Outline of .accomplishments of An- namese Government in Tonkin includ- ing popular elections, abolition of un- desirable taxes, expan.siop of education and resumption as far at. possible of normal economic activities: E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to inter- vene and stop the war in Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring the Indochinese issue be- fore the United Nations organization. The petition ends with the statement that Annatnese ask for full independ- ence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablish- ment of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted. to Depart- ment soonest. 1952 Policy Statement by U.S. On, Goals in. Southeast Asia , .Staternent of Policy by the Nationnt Security Council, early 1952; on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia." :According to a footnote, the ciodument defined Southeast .Asia as "the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia," ?? seriously endanger in ' the short term, Objective and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist aggres- ? sion would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single the free world. country would probably lead to rela- tively swift submission to or an align- General ConsicleAoljo? d FocReleiaise02005/412/114theCr6T-it9 ? 2. Communist domination, ? by what- countries of this group. Furthermore, r n eye.r means, of all Southeast Asia would: alignment with communism of the rest qf' I. To prevent the countries of South- cast Asia from passing into the com- munist orbit, and to assist them to de- velop will and ability to resist com- munism from within and without and ' to contribute to the strengthening of Asia. However, should Burma come un- 1 -6 #40i1.1.1r.at domination, a communist '''?64?31--00134k1 Thailand might make Indochina, including Tonl-cin militarily indefensible. The execution of 1/811. YORK T IMES' cA 0 if ir\1 191 Approved For Release 2 005rt 7 2f14 : tIA-RDP91-00901R000 00300001-1 if ? r r 6 ). /21.: cy 7t? ei::r 0 .t7:ci? 0111 r cr 1i. Ira t Special La The New Ye21-: Titne3 JERUSALEM, June 29?Rich- ard Helms, director of the Unit- ed States Central Intelligence Agency, has arrived in Israel for meetings with Government .analysts, reliable Israeli sources said today. ? This is understood to be the first visit to Israel of a C.I.A. director. .2 The trip has not been an- nounced, and tight censorship_ regulations were imposed on publication of news in Israel of Mr. Helms's activities. The For- Fign Ministry declined to com- ment when asked about his presence in the country, and ,a spokesman for the United States Embassy said he had "no inftrmation" on the reports. Among the main purposes of Mr. lIehns's visit is believed to be an examination with Israeli authorities of the growing So. -viet role hi. the Arab world and 1 .1 ....,.... Cr.11orl Press Inlernalienal Eieliat'd Helms the eastern Mediterranean. He is also expected to gather infor- mation for the Nixon Adminis- tration's Current assessment of . . I ? lsrael's security needs_ over the coming year and beyond. The United States Ambassa- dor, Walworth Barbour, is said to be personally arranging the schedule ? of meetings _during Mr. Helms's three- or four-day ? It is unusual for the 'director of intelligence to travel abroad, largely because American diplo- mats 'believe that his public presence could embarrass other governments. On the other hand, some diplomats believe that such a personal interest is also a signal of United States interest and commitment in an- other country that is not likely to go unnoticed. . In most countries, including Israel, persons in such a posi- tion are not publicly known fig, tires,. though United States Ad- ministrations have not _followed this practice. Israeli sources said there had been a possibility up to the last minute that Mr. Helms's visit might be canceled, particularly if. there had been premature publicity. Several times previ- ously, suchAmerican officials .as Gen. Walter Bedell Smith -and Allen W. Dulles, beth of .whom had directed the C.I.A., are known to .have 'canceled scheduled visits to Israel short- ly before they were to have taken place. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 Approved For ReleaselY0101244I: btifiARDP91-00901 4 MAY 01? POLLUTION ") - 0 .. ? I ; ? .....................-,...................................,...--........-,,..---...,.....-.......--....?......-- - ? \ A ':\ ' ' -, ?.7 6 ,1 ,-,,,,,, fi t'.--. 0. ,? , -;!'l 1 L'i 1 - .? ?-i, A ..7 o ,\. \.. 71 t. . , - ' .1 -t/ ? By AUDREY TOPPING Special to The Star PEKING ? Chou En-lad, the prime minister of Communist China, expressed concern over the increasing problem of water and earth pollution during a re- cent informal chat with an old friend. "The greatest pollution has taken place in the most ad- vanced industrial countries," Chou said speaking with Ches- ter Ronning, retired Can diplomat whom Chou had invited to Peking. "Developing coun- tries; like China, which are net as far advanced industrially can benefit from the experiences of these countries to avoid similar problems." "That is very true,". Ronning replied, in fluent Mandarin, a language he learned as a child. "Aside from our political prob- lems, pollution may be the most important one." "Actually, this problem is re- lated to politics," Chou said, .without elaborating on the connction. "Younger Generation" , "Pollution is also due to cer- tain aspects of our economic system, Ronning continued. ."The solution to this problem depends on whether we can make the necessary changes in our economic system." "Well, I guess we will have to ? Audrey Topping is a freelance jour- nalist-photogrophor currently visit- ing China with her father, a Conadi,en diplcmat invited to Peking by Chou Es-Id. leave that to the younger gener- ation," Chou said jokingly, ges- turing toward me and my sister, Mrs. Sylvia Cassady of Cam- rone, Alberta, Canada, who ac- companied our father on the trip. Chou personally welcomed our party to China on May Day. He received us in the spacious re- ing head of the Canadian Mega- cention room of the Hall of the con. People on Tien-an ,,len Spare. The discussion turned briefly Later, they joined Chairman to that conference when Chou Invited to Return l',Iao Tse-tun, members,. of the had opposed the; permanent As Ronning was departing, government and other alriittar-, closin,Y of fine meeting. He had Chou invited him to return for a his on the rostrum of the Gate o proposed instead that the con- more serious discussion of prob. Heavenly Peace to witness the ference be adjourned, subject lems of mutual concern. "This spectacular display of fireworks time I wanted only to welcome to bciing reconvened by the co- commemorating May Day. chairman at a more appropri- have some photos of the occa- you and your daughters and to , ,? Strains of music and noises , . from the half-million people as- mon," Chou said. sembled in the square drifted Recalls Bedell Smith After their meeting, the two into the hall where Chou and If we had accepted your pro- went to the Gate of .Heavenly Ronning spoke and posed for Peace where Chou introducedl pictures. posal," Ronning said, we could have had a peace treaty." Ronning tO Li Hsien Nien, vice! Chou was in a jovial mood, prime minister, and . Huang. looking younger than his 73 Chou nodded and laughed a Yung-shenl', ivlioni Chou called years. He asked Penning, whom little, waving his arm. "I still officials from the "province of he often referred to as "laoteng r e in e nib e r how Mr. Smith Hupein" yu" (old friend), why he had waved his arm at me and We are scheduled to accompany retired from the diplomatic closed the conference," he said, our father on May 8 to Fancheng service so early. ??referring to Gen. Walter Bedell in Hupeli, his birthplace. t7:1 d R000600300001-1 r 7.7.1 osi 0 fr "I did not retire early," Ron- Smith who headed the Ameri- ning replied. "I remained in the Foreign Service until I was 71. Canadians are supposed to retire at 65." Howling is now 76. Chou smiled, "Well, you an-Il ? are exceptions to the rule. Take into . the conversation, but we me now, why should I retire?" were too busy taking pictures. The two men first met in Chou laughed aloud when my Chungking in 1946 and again in father. explained that we were IN sinking when Relining was intected by a recurring disease charge d'affaires of the Collodi- called "camera-itis." an Embassy from 1949 to 1951. This initial meeting included They met again in 1954 at the Huang Hua, the Chinese ambas- Gpneva Conference' on Korea sador-designate to Canada; and when Chou headed the Chinese Wang Ku-chuan, leading mean- delegation and Re:111Mo' was act- ben of the Chinese People's As- sociation for Friendship with Foreign' Countries. can delegation. tunic suit, smoked a Central Flowery Kingdom cigarette and tried to. bring my sister and I Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300001-1 STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RIDP91-0090 ; NEWPORT iBVIS.,2 10. 1 2 , 1 . , 3 0 T-41 1' _ . . ? _ kr; 1R000600300001-1 t b /-11 r111171 111 T ? ,r .?%1 Tr-. 0 T 61.0)-111 (-71E' 71 C? r/ 7-0 1 etat N ti _1.1 i'121 .1% . :The Central . Intelligence Agency has "an impossible job" Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, professor of political science at Brown University told the Newport Discussion Club last night at the Hotel Viking. The former executive director of comptcoller of the CIA said the was to direet "the. total. United States intelligence effaat" Elml to coordinate the activities of 9 other intelligence agencies; as directed under the National Security Act of 1317. ' Its duty is not only to gather inforina lion, the former newspa,oerman said, but it is to t-i,sk of the intelligence agency . predict "what the Soviet Union aaa or Chiu:i is going to be doing five years from now" and so inform the President, the ? secretary of defense and the secretary of state. It is this : prophetic aspect of its duties that make it an "impossible job". he emphasized.. Ile made it evident, however, that he thought it one of the "finest agencies in our federal government." Kirkpatrick acknowledged that the CIA is not a popular organization Americans "abhor secrecy", he replied. They have the feeling there is something "slightly dirty" . about espionage. The also feac its unchecked power. They wonder if responsible control over its activities is adequate. The former CIA executive assured his audience there are ?wally pay.verful cheeks on the activities of the intelligence organization. Some of them were inaugurated by President Eisenhower 20 years ago. 1.,-President Kennedy estplished ? the Foreign Intelligence Ad- ? visory Board consisting of prominent military men who are free to probe its activities. The Bureau of the Budget may ? investigate its "managerial control" as well as its finances. .? And finally there is Congress. Three .subcommittee.t in Congress are constantly in- formed about important moves of the CIA. ' The public sometimes 'worries about whether there is adequate control over individual agents / at work abroad. Kirkpatrick sd command Of CIA in (kV:wt., 111;3, he "straightened things out in a hurry." Smith was a :strict disciplinarian who &Mended absolute ceintrol of operations. Tile speaker ap- proved of thtis attitude, saying that espionage is "too dangerous not to be disciplined." "There is no action takenby an agent abroad which is not cleared at home." he declared. Another apprehension of the publie is that we are being .watched at home, that dossiers are beingrun up on people. This is another unfounded fear, according to Kirkpatrick. CIA actit.ities arc - focused ex- clusively oalside the U.S, he said. - Ile ? acknowledged ."an aggressive recruiting program" on college campuses. A copstar.t. flow of bright new young CCD!pas into the CIA is an absolute necessity. In comparing Russia's espionage efforts with- this country's, he said their per- sonnel outinimbered ours 10- to 1 or perhaps even 103 to 1. Russia has the? greatest- espionage ell'ort ever supported by any country; he declared. Even its cultural exports such as the Bolshoi Ballet engage in espionage. In answer to a question about.. Russian trawlers, the speaker said about 18 might be operating; off our ? coasts. Two or three, perhaps, are listenina to naval reports right now off Newport. ' Stalin had the most complete intelligence information before World V,'ar H began that any leader ever tad, but he refused to use it. Kirkpatrick said a man was?orderei shot by the Soviet leader because he reported troops ware moving .across the border into Russia when the Germans be-aan their offense in Weald War II, although Stalin Approved For Releases2005142a4.:\CWRIDP91-00001R0006003000041-1 ? ? Smith, Eisenhower's former' cling German intentions. _chief of staff during world War ,/ STAT