COMMAND AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600330003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1960
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

~JNITED STATES
NAVAL INSTITUTE
August, isso
Command and the Intelligence Process
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By
Ca~itain RUP'US L. TAYLOR, USN
"Hostile armies may face each other for years striaing for a victory that is decided in a single day. 7hi.s
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred
ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height,of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men,
no help to his sovereign, na master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to
strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."-SuN Tsu-
Circa 500 B. C.
"Since Intelligence constitutes a anal element in the Commander's estimate of the situation leading to a
decision, it is a basic function of Command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information."
-DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER-1946
he essence of military genius has been,
and will continue to be, foreknowledge.
The process for obtaining it is called "Posi-
tive Intelligence" (as opposed to "Counter-
Intelligence") and constitutes one of the es-
sential functions of leadership, whether mili-
tary or political. This seems so obvious as to
hardly require discussion. Yet it does. In fact
it has even required legislation. Does anyone
remember, for instance, the Pearl Harbor
investigation and its results? Here, indeed, it
appears we forgot the obvious and Congress
found it necessary to remind us alI, as Fred-
erick the Great put it, "It is pardonable to
be defeated but never to be taken by sur-
prise."
Without rehashing the Pearl Harbor hear-
ings, sufT-Ice it to say that there is room for
doubt that command at any level fully re-
alized its relationship to the intelligence func-
tion. Congress seemed to feel that unifica-
tion of command would correct the fault, and
we have moved far along that road since. But
are we still missing the obvious? Perhaps a
look at what constitutes the positive intelli-
gence process, with some historical examples
of its application and its place in the com-
mand structure today, will help answer the
question.
The Five Requirements
First of all there is The Command Require-
ment. How does a commander initiate and
co-ordinate the search for the necessary in-
formation upon. which to base his decision?
In addition to drawing on his own knowledge
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GRADUATED FAOM the U. S. Nava] Academy in
the Class of 1933, Captain Taylor served in
Naval Forces Philippines, 1941-42; Staff,
Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific, 1942-
43; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
1943-44; -and Staff, C mmander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, 1944-46~ince World War II
he has held a number of assignments in intelli-
gence and is currently Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence.
and experience, he assembles a staff to ex-
ploit the resources available and to gather,
collate, organize, and present to him the de-
tails necessary to keep him fully advised. 'The
creation of such a staff in its turn creates in-
telligence requirements, for each member of
the staff must search for necessary information
to complete his part in the staff function of
keeping his commander advised. This second
element can be termed the Staff Intelligence
Requirement.
The commander has not finished his task
when he has assembled his staff, gathered, col-
lated, evaluated, and interpreted his informa-
tion on varied subjects into a coherent whole
and made his decision. The decision requires
execution. For this, the commander also
needs a staff to transmit his-will to his sub-
ordinate elements. But the subordinates can-
not themselves operate simply on the basis of
their commander's decision. They themselves
require support in the form of "necessary in-
" formation" in order to interpret and lay
plans to carry out intelligently the will of
their commander. This process generates a
third element in the intelligence process, the
Fleet Sup~iort Requirement.
As the complexity of operations increases,
the need arises for the commander, his staff,
-and his subordinate elements to co-ordinate
their activities with other agencies, arms, and
services. Agencies, arms, and services them-
selves have intelligence requirements. This
imposes a need to exchange necessary infor-
mation amongst all elements involved in an
operation or endeavor that has a common
purpose. The inter-play brought on by this
situation requires that necessary information
be passed laterally, passed up and passed
down, so that all concerned are aware of
what the ether knows and are able to benefit
or act accordingly. This fourth element of the
intelligence process might be called the
Joint Intelligence Requirement.
A fifth intelligence requirement is that im-
posed by combinations with allies. This is
quite similar to the joint requirement de-
scribed above, but more complex and one
which requires more delicate control. It is
the Combined Intelligence Requirement.
Thus, we can say that there are essentially
five requirements to be met in any positive
intelligence effort: First, the Command Re-
quirement; second, the Staff Requirement;
third, the Support Requirement; fourth, the
Joint Requirement; and fifth, the Combined
Requirement. In organizing an effort to meet
the above requirements, the positive intelli-
gence process is broken into what amounts to
three fundamental divisions: Basic Intelligence,
Current Intelligence, and Estimative Intelligence.
The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for
Joint Usage defines basic intelligence as "gen-
eral reference material for use in planning,
concerning enemies or potential enemies,
which pertains to capabilities, resources, or
potential theaters of operations." While this
definition leaves something to be desired, it
seems to convey the idea that basic intelli-
gence is relatively static while at the same
time quite comprehensive. Current intelligence,
on the other hand, is likely to be more volatile
and of narrower scope, being confined to the
elements of necessary information required to
cope with the specific problem at hand. Nev-
ertheless, current intelligence -has to be
viewed in the light of the ever present basic
intelligence without which current informa-
tion may lose its meaning or even take an
erroneous meaning leading to incorrect de-
duction and decision. The dictionary men-
tioned above does not specifically define
current intelligence, possibly because of its
variable nature. Third among our funda-
mental divisions of the intelligence process is
what we have called estimative intelligence.
This is defined in the dictionary of U. S. Mili-
tary Terms for Joint Usage (under the head-
ing of "Intelligence Estimate of the Situa-
tion") as "an appraisal of the elements of in-
telligence relating to a specific situation or
condition with a view to determining the
courses of action open to the enemy and, when
appropriate, the sequence in which they may
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THE CONSEQUENCE OF A FAILURE IN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE PROCESS ,
USS California settles into the mud of Pearl Harbor following the Japanese surprise attack on 7 December
1941. To reduce the likelihood of a fantastically more devastating surprise attack in this day of nuclear
weapons, the United States must maintain adequate intelligence agencies, which arc appreciated and under-
stood on the proper military and political levels, as part of a sound intelligence organization.
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be adopted." 'This definition may be a little Thus, responsiveness to co~-mand may not be
restrictive, but nevertheless it conveys tor- satisfied if the commander has to rely upon
redly the idea that estimative intelligence is a people or resources not under leis control to
deductive and interpretative process by which meet his essential requirements. Such a lack
one derives useful meaning and portent from would amount to a derogation of command
the basic and current intelligence available. control and would amount to an imposition
It is in this aspect of the intelligence function of responsibility without commensurate au-
that the commander's personal appraisal bc- thority. The same is true of the estimate proc-
comes essential to a sound estimate. And it is ess. Since, however, the basic, current, and
at this point in the intelligence process that estimative divisions of the intelligence func-
thecommander must be appraised of all of the lion are confluent parts and if indeed intelli-
csscntial elements of basic and current in- Bence "constitutes a vital element of a com-
formation that might affect his conclusion as mander's estimate of a situation leading to a
to the significance of the intelligence he has decision," no commander would be justified
caused to be gathered and presented to him. in permitting any essential element of the in-
telligence function to escape from his direct
Seven Essential Steps control and thus from immediate responsive-
Seven steps must be taken to provide for Hess to his demands. These elements are in-
thc details necessary to meet the five require- eluded in the seven processes mentioned above
meats. These are: collection, collation, evalu- of which perhaps the first, collection, is the
lion, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, and most misunderstood. Without control over
dissemination. Opinions may differ as to the collection, a commander attempting to direct
order in which these seven steps should be his intelligence effort would be hamstrung
stated, but there is general agreement that from the start.
they arc the essential steps in the fulfillment Having mentioned collection as one of the
of the intelligence process. If any of them are essential processes of intelligence over which
slighted, the product may be affected ad- the commander must exercise at least general
verscly. They apply equally to any division control and supervision, brief mention of the
of the intelligence effort. There would seem other six processes and what they are would
to be little need for detailed discussion of each seem to be in order so as to provide back-
of these steps. Yet, if one is to determine ground for the discussion which will follow
whether or not he is engaged in a duplica- thereafter.
live or unnecessary effort, an examination of -The collation process, which amounts to
how he is performing these steps and what relating the known and unknown, follows
requirements they are fulfilling is about the close on the heels of, and is often concurrent
only way in which he can tell whether or not with, collection. It leads to the evaluation
he is wasting his time. process which is simply a sorting out of the
Taking collection first and referring to Gen- likely from the unlikely as a result of the evi-
eral Eisenhower's premise that "it is a basic dente derived from collation. At this point
function of command to initiate and co-ordi- analysis begins in the form of development of
Hate the search for the necessary informa- . a logical meaning of the data culled by the
lion," we recognize that the initiation and evaluation step. The analysis step, as the
co-ordination of the collection effort is a vital word implies, then provides a means of con-
element of the command function. Thus, if sidering the separate parts of the data in rela-
the commander is to have control over his lion to the whole problem on which the data
destiny, he must exert a sufficient measure bears. Thus, analysis leads to a synthesis of
of control over the collection processes that all that is known into a meaningful whole.
fulfill his vital needs to insure the responsive- This requires highly knowledgeable as well '
Hess of that process to those needs. Where as skilled inductive and deductive reasoning
that process supplies data for a basic intelli- and is the very guts of intelligence production..
Bence effort, time may not be of high im- These two steps are usually performed con- ,
portance. However, where current intelligence currently by the same individuals. Yet they
is involved, time is usually of the very essence. must be taken as separate steps and must be
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#l. S. Naval Institute Proceedings [AUGUST
susceptible of critical examination by others,
particularly the commander concerned. All
four of these steps, collation, evaluation, anal-
ysis, and synthesis are essentially staff func-
tions performed vn behalf of the commander
by his staff to relieve him of a task which can-
not be pcrformcd by him alone. Nevertheless,
the commander must satisfy himself that these
four processes arc logically, intelligently, and.
thoroughly pcrformcd and that his own famil-
iarity with the way in which they arc per-
formed is sufficient to enable him to discrim-
inate between a sound and an unsound effort,
and good and bad advice.
We then come to the interpretative process
which is the distilled essence of all of the previ-
ous steps and should include the personal ex-
pcricnce, knowledge, instinct, and judgment
of the commander's broad experience and
peculiar miliCary genius as well as that of his
staff. The cycle of the intelligence process is
then finished by dissemination of the inter-
preted product to subordinate and lateral
echelons for use in their own further plans
and decisions.
Some Historic Examples
Commanders arc not likely to be able to
devote much personal time to the routine
activity that produces the intelligence they
need. This is particularly true in the produc-
tion of basic intelligence, but they must as-
sure themselves that such routine activity is
taking place and that it is following the guide
lines prescribed. They can do this only if the
people performing these duties are under
their direct control. If commanders are
either unable or unwilling to give guidance
and direction to all phases of intelligence
process, there's no telling what the result may
be. And when a commander does have to
apply himself personally to the interpreta-
tive and estimative phase, he may well find
that he lacks basic information essential to
his own deductive processes. Consider for a
moment the effect of this sort of situation on
McGlellan's conduct of the Peninsula Cam-
paign in the Civil War. Although the people
concerned were under his control, he ap=
parently considered that the business of col-
lecting, collating, evaluating, analyzing, and
interpreting information was entirely a matter
for his G-2 and all he need concern himself
with was the end-product. Here is how John
G. Burr in his book, Tke Frameruor'k of Battle,
describes the result:
"Prom the time he [General McClellan]
took command of the Army of the Potomac
until he was removed after the battle of
Antietam, he never failed to overestimate the
strength of the Confederates facing him.
When the famous Pinkerton, acting as In-
telligence Officer, said Lee's Army consisted
of 200,000 men, Little Mac never verified or
questioned the estimate though other officers
knew it was absurd; in actuality Lee's forces
never exceeded 80,000 and, before Jackson
joined, were fewer than 65,000."
Glearly, McClellan gave inadequate atten-
tion to his intelligence activities, and it cost
his country dearly. Even the victorious Grant
had his troubles with intelligence. His failure
to see to it that sufficient knowledge was ob-
tained of terrain ruined his plan at Chatta-
nooga. Such a basic omission could hardly be
less than an indication of careless intelligence
planning for which the commander can no
more escape the responsibility than he can its
consequences.
Let's turn a few snore of Burr's pages and
consider the case of the Russians and Ger-
mans in the East Prussian Campaign of 1914.
"In 1914, the Russians and Germans faced
each other in East Prussia and Poland. The
Czarina was a German and the Russian
Court was infested with German spies and
sympathizers. Even in the Russian armies
there were enemy agents in high position. As
if that were not enough, at the start of the
,campaign the Russian High Command issued
many. orders and sent much information over
its radio-in the clear.
"Naturally, information as to the size,
.composition and location of Rennenkatnpf's
and Samsonov"s armies poured into German
headquarters. To be sure, von Prittwitz was
leery of the stuff coming over the air from
Russian headquarters, fearing it was a clever
ruse; but the Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoff
man team, knowing Russian carelessness,
greeted it joyfully and used every bit of it."
In contrast to this consider the Russo-Ger-
man situation in 1939:
"When the Germans made their pact with
Russia in 1939 they expected once again to
place their spies throughout Russia. But
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1960] Command and the Intelligence Process 31
Stalin had not forgotten 1914. Ever since he
had become head of Russia, the Soviet leader
had been busy rooting out foreign agents
from his government and army. He had no
intention of undoing that work, and the Ger-
man visitors were carefully kept where they
could learn and sec nothing. I do not mean
to say that the Nazis did not obtain a great
deal of information on the front-line Soviet
Armies. Undoubtedly they did. But they did
not learn enough about the potential Russian
strength back of those armies, and it was that
potential strength which eventually frus-
trated them.
"Von Brauchitsch was able to smash the
Polish communications so efficiently because
he knew exactly where all the nerve centers
were at all times. In France and Norway the
Allied forces and movements were known in
the greatest detail.
"Nothing escaped that net of [Nazi] spies
and informers spread over all the countries of
the world-except Russia. Stalin knew that
the more completely he -could blind his en-
emy the better chance he would have on the
battlefield."
Aside from the excellence of Russian coun-
ter-intelligence, several points of interest
stand out here. First of all is the fact that the
intelligence policy of the Germans apparently
made full provision for the gathering of in-
formation from all sources.
Next the icigh commanding generals themselaes
took the trouble to evaluate and interpret.
And last, but by no means least, they acted
upon what they considered the best informa-
tion available. Operations and intelligence
were closely allied. The policy directing one
guided the other as well.
But let's have a look at what Burr says of
another front of the 1914 war.
" ...Von Moltke was surprised by the ap-
pearance of the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary
Force] in Belgium. There was a physical as
well as a psychological reason for that sur-
prise. Shortly before World War I, British
Intelligence picked up the threads of the G~r-
man spy system in Great Britain. Very cau-
tiously Scotland Yard and the War Office un-
raveled the skein,- even locating the great ma-
jority of the Boche agents. But they didn't dis-
turb them or give them any reason to be
suspicious-ixntil war was declared. Then the
authorities pounced on the whole lot at the
same time. German GHQ was blind for many
months after that, so blind that no word of
the movement of the B.E.F. to France ever
reached von Moltke. He didn't know they
were across the Channel until his IX and III
Corps ran into them at Mons."
Here is a beautiful example of British
understanding of the importance of integra-
tion in intelligence matters. It is a practical
demonstration of the close relation between
intelligence and counter-intelligence, as well
as of the many exacting complexities of in-
telligence operations that require the most
careful integration and guidance at the high-
est command levels in order to achieve maxi-
mum effectiveness. Here also is another dem-
onstration of what lack of intelligence does. '
This has its application in a peace as well
as in a war period-a fact so often overlooked
in American efforts.
Alexander the Great dared tlic seemingly
impossible invasion of the sprawling Persian
empire because his agents had told hiin how
rotten inside it was; Elizabeth's England
challenged haughty Spain because Sir Frances
Walsingham's intelligence service (England's
first national effort) was able to obtain con-
clusive evidence of the low state of readiness
of the Armada; and George III lost the Amer-
ican colonies through underestimating the ??
temper of the colonists.
Genghis Khan's was the predecessor of the
Nazi method of war. The Mongol chieftain
never attacked a nation until he had sent
hundreds of agents as merchants, travelers,
refugees to collect all available information
and to spread morale-destroying rumors.
One would have thought that by World
War I the modern captains of war would
have learned the intelligence lesson. Some
did, but many more did not, and it is to be
regretted that an embarrassingly large num-
ber of the latter wore the uniform of the
United States of America.
Benjamin Cain makes this passing com-
meet with regard to World War I in a Lecture
of Intelligence Experiences During World War Id
delivered on 10 December 1946 before a
group of the top Allied leaders of World War
II:
"By 1916 American employment of intelli-
gence had been reduced to almost a negative
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factor. About this time I had become a big
shot, being newly promoted to Lance Cor-
poral, Iwas appointed `information soldier'
for a machine gun unit. Such work was be-
neath the dignity of the offiicers and higher
non-toms, so I got it!!"
But we were not the only ones to let our-
selves fall into such a complacent, if not
stupid, attitude. Shipley Thomas in S-2 in
Action relates the following:
"From time immemorial until 1914 there
were but two sources of intelligence of the
enemy. These were `Combat Intelligence' and
`Spies Within the Enemy's Lines.' Beginning
with 1914, three additional sources became
effective:
"1. Deep airplane reconnaissance.
2. Electrical and radio listening appa-
ratus.
3. Artillery observation.
"The failure to secure and interpret com-
bat intelligence was nowhere more strikingly
apparent than in the entire German 1914
campaign. The seemingly disregard of what
might have been learned of British and French
movements in early September, 1914, and
the failure to interpret these correctly, led to
disastrous results.
"Von Moltke (nephew of the great von
Moltke) and the whole German Army of 1914
suffered from the same basic failure to appre-
ciate and use combat intelligence. In their
long years of peace, combat intelligence had
become a dead letter. Theory, dogma and
schoolroom logic had become, as it .usually
does, the substitute for combat intelligence:"
Of course, contact with the enemy usually
brings better opportunities for the completion
of the order of battle picture. In that connec-
tion Burr relates the following:
"On the stabilized Western Front in 1914-
1918both sides built up systems which located
every unit of their opponents by number. In
each headquarters was a map showing the
location of each of the enemy divisions, which
was so thorough that its efficiency was some-
times fantastic. At one time a U. S. Division
was sent into the lines at night, as usual and
with all precautions for secrecy, only to be
greeted by a large sign over the German
trenches: `Welcome-Division !' At another
part of the front in the early days of November
1918, an observation balloon with its basket
loaded with high explosive and artistically
arranged dummies was sent aloft to give the
Boche airmen, who had been shooting down
many of our gas bags a surprise. Not a Ger-
man plane would go near it and finally an-
other sign appeared over their trenches:
`Take that damn thing down.'
"Yet, even under those conditions, where
Intelligence had every chance to obtain in-
formation, both sides succeeded in surprising
the other by thorough camouflage and swift
concentrations during the hours of darkness."
World War II Experience
One would have thought with the experi-
ence of previous wars and peaces behind us
-our concept of the role of intelligence be-
tween wars and in war would have improved
by World War II. But it didn't.
Never in its short and turbulent history has
the United States been faced with such a sud-
den and dismaying disaster as it beheld on the
morning of 7 December 1941. And never with
less excuse. All the lessons of history had been
of no avail. .
The Congressional Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack, including the additional views
of Mr. Keefe and the minority views of Mr.
Ferguson and Mr. Brewster concluded by the
79th Congress in July 1946, gives complete
testimony of what happened and why. While
this investigation had no great fault to find
with the amount and quality of the informa-
tion supplied (except as to reconnaissance)
and stressed the need for unity of command, it
did find that those in high authority failed to
properly appreciate the intelligence at hand
and failed to centralize authority as well as
to make aclear-cut allocation of responsi-
bility in intelligence matters. In other words,
the high command failed to establish a sound
intelligence policy. Why? Because it did not
have a sound understanding of intelligence.
Although both Army and Navy schools of
high and low degree had long taught history
as well as the fact that intelligence is a func-
tion of command, no effort had been made to
insure that intelligence assumed its proper
place in the staff divisions of command.
Many commanding officers took an attitude
similar to McClellan's in appointing an in-
telligence officer and then leaving the matter
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THE SUPER-BATTLESHIP YAMATO ON HER DEATH RIDE OFF KYUSHU
Naval Intelligence in the Pacific during World War II from the Battle of Midway to the surrender of Japan
was rarely perfect, to be sure, but can be rated "outstandingly good" and must be credited with saving thou-
sands of lives and greatly speeding America's victory.
completely up to him from that point on.
In the Navy Department, at the time of
Pearl Harbor, a minor feud between the
Qffice of Naval Intelligence and the War
Plans Division was being waged unchecked
by higher authority. War Plans felt that it
should collate and evaluate information and
leave only the matter of gathering it to In-
telligence. But Intelligence regarded such
matters as properly its function. Meanwhile
much time and effort that could have been
better spent otherwise was wasted on this
inter-office strife. In fact the argument wasn't
settled until June of 1943, when the Combat
Intelligence Division was established!
During this time, the then Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Fleet, was reliably reported to
have stated that all he wanted of his intelli-
gence organization was an estimate of what
the enemy might be up to two weeks hence !
Even with the war well joined and before we
could see our way clear to victory, another im-
portant officer, the senior Army Air Com-
mander in a certain theater, is said to have
remarked to the effect that he had "never
heard two intelligence officers agree on any-
thing so he just disregarded them altogether!"
Undoubtedly we got better as we went
along in World War II. The defeat of the
Japanese at Midway was due as much to the
Commander-in-Chief's personal understand-
ing of the intelligence process and the applica-
tion of his own judgment, intuition, and ex-
perience to it as it was to the intelligence
available, which was pretty sketchy, notwith-
standing many published accounts to the con-
trary.
Samuel Eliot Morison in Volume IV of his
History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II states:
"As early as 20 May Admiral Nimitz issued
an estimate of the enemy force that was ac-
curate as far as it went-and even alarming.
What he did not know was that Admiral
Yamamato himself, in the super-battleship
Yamato was to command the main body of
the Combined Fleet, comprising three new
and four old battleships, three light cruisers, a
destroyer. squadron and a light carrier, to
operate between Midway and the Aleutians
and cover both. Although the picture was not
complete the composition, approximate routes
and timetable of the enemy forces that imme-
diatelythreatened Midway were so accurately
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deduced that on 23 May Rear Admiral Bel-
linger, the naval air commander at Pearl, was
able to predict the Japanese plan of attack on
the Atoll. But for this early and abundant in-
formation and (what was equally important)
the prompt and intelligent use of it, the Pa-
cific Fleet would have had only a slim chance
of winning."
In the early morning hours of 4 June 1942
contact was made and the battle was joined.
As Morison puts it in the final paragraph of his
chapter on "Midway Preliminaries":
"The battle was on. `The whole course of
the war in the Pacific may hinge on the de-
velopments of the next two or three days,' re-
corded the CinCPac analyst on receipt of
this news. It did. The action about to be
.joined was one of the most decisive of the
war."
Another fine example of command's under-
standing of the intelligence process is available
in the Report of Operations of the U. S. First
.Army in Europe. The First Army estimate of
German capabilities and intentions prior to
the Battle of the Bulge is an excellent example
of intelligence at its best and reflects credit on
General Bradley's understanding in spite of
the disregard shown by higher command in
this case. The point is, however, that no mat-
ter how many successes are achieved, failures
are both expensive and unnecessary. Why
does one leader establish sound intelligence
policies while another in the same Armed
Forces does not? We cannot afford the luxury
of leaders who do not understand the business
of getting information of the enemy. We must
be sure that our educational system for high
command does not permit an ofricer to reach
such command without having demonstrated
a thorough understanding of intelligence.
Confusion in these matters, such as illustrated
by the following extract from Captain-now
Rear Admiral (Ret.)-Ellis M. Zacharias's
book, Secret Missions, must not be permitted
to reign where the relationship of intelligence
and command is clearly understood. This
extract is from a quoted letter dated 3 Feb-
ruary, 1942, from Colonel John W. Thomas-
son, Jr., USMC (then. in ONI) to Captain
Ellis M. Zacharias; USN:
"I would say ...that our department re-
sembles more than anything the outside edge
of a cyclonic or whirling storm. Everything is
being tossed about. ping is superimposed on
Stark having absorbed most oC ilic tatter's
functions... .
"Wilkinson has ONI, the third Chief in a
year and a half.... ~1'e arc swollen enor-
mously. Never was there such a haven for the
ignorant and well-connected. As a matter of
fact, ONI isn't bad so far as collecting in-
formation goes. But what good is information
if it isn't used? Here the museum idea seems
to prevail."
That this confusion was felt all along the line
and that a lack of any intelligence policy was
undermining the efforts of the information
gathered is evidenced by this quotation from
the same book:
"The intelligence organizations afloat and
in the field failed to recognize the future
planning value of intelligence picked up in
their operations, and after culling the immedi-
ately usable tactical data from the material to
which they obtained access in combat, they
discarded the rest." As Admiral King had
said, all they wanted to know was what the
enemy might do a short time hence.
Another amazing feature of the behavior
of some military leaders is their disregard of
the most elementary security considerations.
An example of this is to be found in publica-
tions by the United States of the famous Zim-
merman notes of 1 March 1917. Why the
Germans did not immediately realize that
their diplomatic codes were being read is not
known. Certainly the British must have felt a
good deal of apprehension for a valuable
source and no doubt took steps to see to it
that what they might give us would be ready
for publication. However, it is a dangerous
precedent. More to the point was the disclo-
sure of the Yainamato ambush in the recent
war, not to mention the Pearl Harbor hear-
ings.
Through it all, however, progress is be-
ginning to show and ranks of the ignorant are,
thinning. But still not quite enough. George S.
Pettee in The Future of American Secret Intelli-
gence says:
"Unfortunately, we were far more con-
sistent in recognizing the modern character
of enemy intelligence than we were in ap-
preciating the same facts for the management
of our own intelligence work. The history of
our own wartime intelligence methods is the
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story of how this revolution was half way car-
ried out, but was hampered at all times by
the lack of comprehension of the necessities
imposed by new conditions.... Under Sec-
retary of State Dean Acheson told the House
Appropriations Committee on November 26,
1945, that up to the beginning of the war, the
State Department's technique of gathering
information differed only by reason of the
typewriter and telegraph from the technique
which John Quincy Adams was using in St.
Petersburg and Benjamin Franklin was using
in Paris ! I is a poor excuse, however, to say
that we arc behind because we started late,
unless we also try to catch up."
Pcttcc says elsewhere that what we must
do is to " ...recruit, discipline and arrange
in functional order a number of human minds
to the effect that the result of their combined
work will approximate the result which would
have been obtained, by a single rational mind
had the task been within the scope of a single
rational mind."
That's all very well, but again it isn't
enough. We must educate our military lead-
ers to such a thorough understanding of intel-
ligence and its relationship to command that
they will establish sound intelligence policies
as readily and easily as they establish disci-
plinary regulations for their men.
Today's Need and Cost
Where do we stand today in the era of
`'peace" since 1946? We have certainly
learned a lot, it is true, but have we learned
enough? The situation we face today is quite
different from any that we have faced in the
past. In fact, it is unique. To quote a 4 De-
cember 1959 Interim Staff Memorandum of
the Sub-Committee on National Policy Ma-
chinery of the Senate Committee on Govcrn-
inent Operations:
"In the fourteen years since the end of
World War II the traditional distinction be-
tween peace and war has been obliterated by
a contest which knows no boundaries and no
limits except those imposed on world com-
munism by expediency. The competition is
total-it is military, economic, scientific, dip-
lomatic, cultural and moral."
This aptly describes that twilight zone some
call "The Cold War." But call it what you
will, it is not peace, and we may not apply to
it the measures of peace and survive. Back of
it lurks the not unlikely possibility of limited
wars as a means the Communists may pursue
(and have pursued) to gain advantage in this
competition. And back of that lurks the ever
present, deadly danger of an unlimkted war
which none may hope to survive.
In this milieu, accurate, timely information
of what our potential enemies may be up to
is vital. Indeed, because of our situation in the
world, it is also essential to know what our
friends and uncommitted nations can or may
do to either strengthen or weaken our security
in each of the three general situations we have,
or may have, to face, namely, once again the
present armed truce ("Cold War"), "Limited
War," or "Unlimited War."
This is no time "to begrudge the outlay of
an hundred ounces of silver" for information.
Nor have we, yet. The legislation that estab-
lished the CIA, the Department of Defense,
and its reorganization of 1958 are evidence of
this.
But these very. institutions bring on a new
danger to the intelligence process. That is the
critical scrutiny of budgeteers of how much
these consolidations and monoliths save in
eliminating duplication in the intelligence
process. They don't, and shouldn't, save any-
thing. They should only increase its scope
and accuracy, But because they all add people
and requirements to the structure, they
should, and do, cost more.
Careful consideration of the intelligence
process described above must reveal the crea-
tion of a commensurate expansion in re-
quirements with an expansion of the com-
mand structure. Why? Because each execu-
tive, whether military or civilian, responsible
for advice, decision, or execution of military
plans and policies must have sufFicient control
over the intelligence by which his advice,
decision, or executive act stands or falls to in-
sure to the best of his ability the soundness of
his acts.
You may argue, for example, that since the
reorganization of -1958 in the Department
of Defense places operational control of the
armed forces in the hands of the Secretary of
Defense the military departments no longer
need operational intelligence components.
This is an appealing argument, but not a.
conclusive one. At the very least it pre-
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 36 '
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN 1948
Tlie several organizational changes in the Armed Forces since World War II do not affect the basic require-
ments of the intelligence process nor alter. the intelligence needs of command at each operational level.
supposes that the function of current intelli-
gence ii-~ust then be performed by the JCS.
This wouid require that the Joint Staff
acquire at least some of the resources now in
the hands of the military departments for
that purpose. Is this economical? No, and
here's why. The SecDef through the JCS ex-
ercises operational control through unified
commanders. They in turn exercise their op-
erational control through component com-
manders who in their turn depend upon their
parent military departments for support in
intelligence matters. Thus, you might say that
so long as Admiral Felt, CinCPac, needs
Admiral Hopwood, CinCPacFlt, Admiral
Hopwood needs the intelligence resources
necessary to carry out effectively Admiral
Felt's will. Admiral Hopwood can't turn
over to Admiral Felt CinCPacFlt's intelli-
gence resources and still expect them to be re-
sponsive to him. But Admiral Felt can, and
does, expect Admiral Hopwood and his intelli-
gence resources to be responsive to CinCPac
because of his superior position of authority.
And so on up and down the chain. So if you
lengthen the chain, you expand the require-
ments at all levels. Some consolidation of the
basic intelligence process can and has been
achieved. More can be done. But such con-
solidationcan't go beyond the point where the
responsible commander can no longer judge
the reliability of that process and obtain im-
mediate, effective response from it.
It has been, and no doubt, will continue to
be argued that "agreed intelligence" would
eliminate the expanding requirement men-
tioned above and that this can be achieved
through the CIA for the government as a
whole and through the JCS mechanism for the
Defense :Establishment. In the writer's opinion
"agreed intelligence" is not worth a plugged
nickel unless such agreement is spontaneous
and unanimous. Any other method of agree-
ment in the intelligence business emasculates
the interpretive step to a dangerous degree.
Duplication here is a guarantee against con-
centration of stupidities and is to be encour-
aged. It is the commander who makes the
decision, bears the responsibility for it. He
should have all the facts. -Only in this way
will we achieve the strokes of genius necessary
to save us from disaster. We should not be-
grudge the price. The cost of defeat today is
irretrievable.
Thus, in examining our intelligence re-
quirements today, we should ask this question:
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Is the information needed as a basis for ad-
vice, decision or execution of decision for
which adviser, decider, or executor bears
full responsibility?
If so, that person must have the means of
getting the information he needs when he
needs it and of determining its validity. Be-
fore circumscribing his authority to do this,
he, together with those who have assigned him
his responsibilities, must examine the follow-
ing questions with regard to his intelligence
effort.
What part of it is:
a. Indispensable and non-duplicative?
b. Indispensable but duplicative?
c. Highly desirable and non-duplicative?
d. Highly desirable but duplicative?
After this examination and before with-
drawing any resources, the authority who leas
assigned responsibilities should re-examine
those once more to determine whether with-
drawal of resources necessary to perform a
duplicative task does not, in fact, circum-~
scribe a necessary authority and therefore
calls for a coinmCrisurate reduction in re-
sponsibility. It may be hard to find a superior
willing to do that, but that he must do.
Means and Method
How is all this worked out today? To answer
that, let's consider briefly the means by which
responsibility is fixed. The duties of the Presi-
dent stem from the Constitution which,
among other things, assigns to him the respon-
sibility for over-all command of our armed
forces. This responsibility is an appropriate
portion of his over-all responsibilities as Chief
Executive in which capacity he administers
the laws passed by Congress. These laws en-
tail an assignment of responsibilities some-
times directly from Congress to departments
and agencies of the Executive Department as
in the case of the National Security Act of
1947, the National Security Act Amendments
of 1949, and the Department of Defense Re-
organization Act of 1958. Within this general
framework of law and precedent, the Armed
forces are managed, with the buck for ulti-
mate decision stopping at the President's
desk.
Meanwhile, all up and down the line there
exists an interlocking complex of responsibili-
ties for advice, decision, and execution. The
Director of Central Intelligence, for example,
is the principal intelligence advisor to the
National Security Council which advises the
President. -But the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are his principal mili-
tary advisors, while the Secretary of State is
his principal advisor on foreign affairs. Can
we say that the DCI should stay out of mili-
tary intelligence matters and the Secretary of
Defense. out of foreign political matters? If we
consider again the above description of our
present situation by the Senate Committee on
Government Operations together with the
responsibilities of the above officials, it be-
comes readily apparent that none of them
can stay out of any field of intelligence with-
out achange in their responsibilities. So the
question becomes one of the degree to which
any of these agencies can permit their intelli-
gence needs to be met with resources outside
their control. This same line of reasoning ex-
tends down through the chain of command.
Because the various departments and agen-
cies engaged in intelligence activities pass to
one another copies of their intelligence utter-
ances and because these publications often
report on identical items, wasteful duplica-
tion is said to be manifest. This just isn't so.
Where the reporting is identical, you have
agreed intelligence without a forced compro-
mise in Committee. Where it differs, you have
a better basis for interpretation. It is not
simply a matter of the intelligence people
taking in one another's washing. It is a mat-
ter of providing responsible officials with a
means of interpreting the total available
"take." In fact, it is one of the more desir-
able features of Joint Intelligence. The whole
complex is somewhat like basic scientific re-
search. The more you do of it and the greater
the independence of thought that goes into it,
the more likely you are to get the best product.
This does not mean we should have anarchy
in the intelligence field. On the contrary, we
should have disciplined control of the direc-
tion and degree of effort. This, unification can
and does provide. Unification should not,
however, attempt to force agreement or limit
effort without altering responsibilities for ad-
vice, decision, and execution. Thus, the need
for engaging in all five categories of intelli-
gence at all levels should be viewed in the
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light of the responsibilities vested at those
levels. We cannot argue, for example, that
the Air Force should provide the Navy with
all air intelligence. The Navy has responsi-
bilities which require that it know thoroughly
what air threat exists to interfere with its
ability to carry out its mission. It must have
the means at its awn disposal to know this or,
like McClellan, it may find itself without the
means of applying its own experience and
know-how in naval matters to the processing
r.[ the information on which it must, perforce,
act. 'The same is true of the Air Force, the
Array, and so on.
Thus, it appears, everybody has to do at
Icast a little bit of everything. No attempt has
been made to show why the Navy, for ex-
ample, needs political, scientific, and eco-
nomic intelligence as well as intelligence on
foreign navies. It is assumed that the reader
will realize many of the factors which enter
into the Navy's need to plan and run an estab-
lishment whose mission it is to insure U. S.
freedom of the seas throughout the world. The
factors that enter into sea power and its influ-
ence on history are not limited to a knowledge
of opposing hardware. Nor can advice in
naval matters be so limited. The same is true
in varying degrees of the other branches of our
Armed Forces. So, again, it becomes a ques-
tion of degree.
Unification has brought about a means of
determining degree and direction of intelli-
gence effort in the Defense Establishment but
not a means of reducing it.
The SecDef or the JCS as over-all com-
mand organs can remove responsibilities in
military echelons below themselves, if those rc-
sponsibilites are not otherwise stipulated by
Congress. They can thus alter intelligence re-
quirements of subordinate commanders. But
when they do so, they may not be able to
alter the requirement, per se. They can exer-
cise command and control over the efforts
of their subordinates, who in their ,turn can
do likewise, and thus concentrate intelligence
efforts. The subordinate can depend on the
superior, and he can compel the subordinate,
but neither has control of lateral efforts.
Therefore the SecDef or JCS can concen-
trate or diversify the intelligence effort in the
Defense Establishment as they see fit, so long
as they do not circumscribe statutory respon-
sibilitics assigned to the military departments.
TI-ese statutory provisions require almost as
much in the way of intelligence production as
do Joint Intelligence requirements. Thcrc-
fore, the military departments must neces-
sarily engage in estimative intelligence pro-
duction adequate to meet responsibilities
imposed by Congress. This includes at least
a Staff and a Support Intelligence Require-
ments which must be met. It follows then that
the additional requirements subject to change
by the SecDef are in the field of Command,
Joint, and Combined Intelligence Require-
ments. These interlock so closely with the
Staff and Support Requirement that much of
the basic, current, and estimative process
necessary to fulfill one also fulfills the other,
and little or nothing would be saved by the
shift of responsibilities necessary to reduce the
Command, Joint, and Combined Require-
ment at the military department level and
below. In effect then, one must conclude that
the intelligence firocesc is essentially the same
for all levels of command and control. The
real point of difference is the use to which the
intelligence is to be put. This is what generates
the divergencies we have termed the basic,
current, and estimative divisions. Any of
these can metamorphose into the other and
often do. Time is one of the key factors in
that metamorphosis and is the ingredient that
usually changes basic intelligence into cur-
rent intelligence. Although the basic and
current processes usually differ materially
from the estimative process there are types of
information of such high validity and broad
.scope as to become estimates almost at the
point of collection.
Common-user systems are dangerous be-
cause they lack the element of responsive-
ness gained through authoritative control.
They seldom are able to meet all demands at
once and hence are more suitable to service
functions (like cafeterias) where time and
authoritative control may not be so impor-
tant. We have agreed that intelligence is a
command function. Time and authoritative
control may be of the essence in performing
that function. Like reading the neighbor's
newspaper-it's all right, if you don't need it
first,
It is impossible to excise or circumscribe '
one portion of the intelligence process with-
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uut a(fcctin,r,? another at some, perhaps criti-
cal, time. Unification can do little to improve
this situation and by trying can only compli-
cate and obfuscate an already complex and
di(Iicult problem.
In Conclusion
To sum up, the following propositions are
postulated:
a. In order to plan a military establish-
ment capable of acting as an effective
instrument of national policy, it is neces-
sary to know the capabilities and inten-
tions of foreign nations, enemy, or
friendly, to threaten or strengthen the
security of our country in peace, cold
war; limited war, or general war.
b. The availability of timely and accurate
information in response to the above
stated requirement is a sine qua non for
good advice, sound decision, and effec-
tive execution in the management of
military forces.
c. Such dependence on intelligence is a
vital aspect of responsibility in the em-
ployment of armed forces whether in
active warfare, achieving a satisfactory
state of readiness for warfare, or in using
armed forces as strategic instruments of
policy in any of the conditions men-
tioned in "a." above.
d. Information from widely varied sources
and on widely varied topics may be rele-
vant.
~. Responsibility must be accompanied by
a commensurate degree of authority
and resources.
f. :Each branch and arm of the Armed
Services has special responsibilities and
technical considerations peculiar to it
alone and these impose an additional
and separate requirement for intelli-
gence.
From the above we can conclude that
adequate intelligence and positive control
over the resources that provide it are essential
elements of effective management of the
military departments at all levels.
This being so, it is vital that we know as
much as possible of the capabilities and inten-
lions of any potential enemy throughout the
years of peace. We cannot afford the luxury
of being surprised in the next war. We must
know whether, when, and where a blow is
coming, or else our chances of being able to
roll with the punch are nil and the likeli-
hood of being able to retaliate at all recedes
in prospect. The question,' of "whether" is a
most important one from `the economic view-
point and is usually deducible from a study of ,
basic capabilities.
These circumstances set for us a difTicult
obstacle but not an insurmountable one. If
we establish and nourish adequate intelligence
organizations with a sound policy and real
backing to support them, there is no reason
why we may not expect to know within rea-
sonable limits of accuracy from whence
danger may come, where, and when it is most
likely to strike, and the expected power of the
blow.
We are already on the road to such an or-
ganization. We must not falter now (as we often
.have in the past). We must listen to that old
Chinaman and begrudge nothing in the way
of "honors and emoluments" to insure the
.nation against surprise.
' ? We can achieve success i.n this program ,
only if our leaders, political as well as mili-
tary, steadfastly continue to maintain a sound
intelligence policy behind vigorous intelli-
gence organizations.
" .. we may accept it as a principle, that our navy will be strong enough, when it is stronger lhan tht.
enimy, and no! before."
Commander ?Bxnnii,Y A. Fta~c~, irsrt--1905
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