COMMAND AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

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CIA-RDP91-00901R000600330003-6
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August 1, 1960
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~JNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE August, isso Command and the Intelligence Process Approved For Release 200,5/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 By Ca~itain RUP'US L. TAYLOR, USN "Hostile armies may face each other for years striaing for a victory that is decided in a single day. 7hi.s being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height,of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no help to his sovereign, na master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."-SuN Tsu- Circa 500 B. C. "Since Intelligence constitutes a anal element in the Commander's estimate of the situation leading to a decision, it is a basic function of Command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information." -DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER-1946 he essence of military genius has been, and will continue to be, foreknowledge. The process for obtaining it is called "Posi- tive Intelligence" (as opposed to "Counter- Intelligence") and constitutes one of the es- sential functions of leadership, whether mili- tary or political. This seems so obvious as to hardly require discussion. Yet it does. In fact it has even required legislation. Does anyone remember, for instance, the Pearl Harbor investigation and its results? Here, indeed, it appears we forgot the obvious and Congress found it necessary to remind us alI, as Fred- erick the Great put it, "It is pardonable to be defeated but never to be taken by sur- prise." Without rehashing the Pearl Harbor hear- ings, sufT-Ice it to say that there is room for doubt that command at any level fully re- alized its relationship to the intelligence func- tion. Congress seemed to feel that unifica- tion of command would correct the fault, and we have moved far along that road since. But are we still missing the obvious? Perhaps a look at what constitutes the positive intelli- gence process, with some historical examples of its application and its place in the com- mand structure today, will help answer the question. The Five Requirements First of all there is The Command Require- ment. How does a commander initiate and co-ordinate the search for the necessary in- formation upon. which to base his decision? In addition to drawing on his own knowledge 27 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 ~~proved For Release 2~1b5~'a 1~1(Tt~tP~~l~&0000600330003-~AucusT GRADUATED FAOM the U. S. Nava] Academy in the Class of 1933, Captain Taylor served in Naval Forces Philippines, 1941-42; Staff, Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific, 1942- 43; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1943-44; -and Staff, C mmander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1944-46~ince World War II he has held a number of assignments in intelli- gence and is currently Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. and experience, he assembles a staff to ex- ploit the resources available and to gather, collate, organize, and present to him the de- tails necessary to keep him fully advised. 'The creation of such a staff in its turn creates in- telligence requirements, for each member of the staff must search for necessary information to complete his part in the staff function of keeping his commander advised. This second element can be termed the Staff Intelligence Requirement. The commander has not finished his task when he has assembled his staff, gathered, col- lated, evaluated, and interpreted his informa- tion on varied subjects into a coherent whole and made his decision. The decision requires execution. For this, the commander also needs a staff to transmit his-will to his sub- ordinate elements. But the subordinates can- not themselves operate simply on the basis of their commander's decision. They themselves require support in the form of "necessary in- " formation" in order to interpret and lay plans to carry out intelligently the will of their commander. This process generates a third element in the intelligence process, the Fleet Sup~iort Requirement. As the complexity of operations increases, the need arises for the commander, his staff, -and his subordinate elements to co-ordinate their activities with other agencies, arms, and services. Agencies, arms, and services them- selves have intelligence requirements. This imposes a need to exchange necessary infor- mation amongst all elements involved in an operation or endeavor that has a common purpose. The inter-play brought on by this situation requires that necessary information be passed laterally, passed up and passed down, so that all concerned are aware of what the ether knows and are able to benefit or act accordingly. This fourth element of the intelligence process might be called the Joint Intelligence Requirement. A fifth intelligence requirement is that im- posed by combinations with allies. This is quite similar to the joint requirement de- scribed above, but more complex and one which requires more delicate control. It is the Combined Intelligence Requirement. Thus, we can say that there are essentially five requirements to be met in any positive intelligence effort: First, the Command Re- quirement; second, the Staff Requirement; third, the Support Requirement; fourth, the Joint Requirement; and fifth, the Combined Requirement. In organizing an effort to meet the above requirements, the positive intelli- gence process is broken into what amounts to three fundamental divisions: Basic Intelligence, Current Intelligence, and Estimative Intelligence. The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage defines basic intelligence as "gen- eral reference material for use in planning, concerning enemies or potential enemies, which pertains to capabilities, resources, or potential theaters of operations." While this definition leaves something to be desired, it seems to convey the idea that basic intelli- gence is relatively static while at the same time quite comprehensive. Current intelligence, on the other hand, is likely to be more volatile and of narrower scope, being confined to the elements of necessary information required to cope with the specific problem at hand. Nev- ertheless, current intelligence -has to be viewed in the light of the ever present basic intelligence without which current informa- tion may lose its meaning or even take an erroneous meaning leading to incorrect de- duction and decision. The dictionary men- tioned above does not specifically define current intelligence, possibly because of its variable nature. Third among our funda- mental divisions of the intelligence process is what we have called estimative intelligence. This is defined in the dictionary of U. S. Mili- tary Terms for Joint Usage (under the head- ing of "Intelligence Estimate of the Situa- tion") as "an appraisal of the elements of in- telligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy and, when appropriate, the sequence in which they may Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 THE CONSEQUENCE OF A FAILURE IN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE PROCESS , USS California settles into the mud of Pearl Harbor following the Japanese surprise attack on 7 December 1941. To reduce the likelihood of a fantastically more devastating surprise attack in this day of nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain adequate intelligence agencies, which arc appreciated and under- stood on the proper military and political levels, as part of a sound intelligence organization. 26 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 196U] Approved For F~r~~/ahl~~'8tel~3~Cttl~q~0901 R00060033000~6 be adopted." 'This definition may be a little Thus, responsiveness to co~-mand may not be restrictive, but nevertheless it conveys tor- satisfied if the commander has to rely upon redly the idea that estimative intelligence is a people or resources not under leis control to deductive and interpretative process by which meet his essential requirements. Such a lack one derives useful meaning and portent from would amount to a derogation of command the basic and current intelligence available. control and would amount to an imposition It is in this aspect of the intelligence function of responsibility without commensurate au- that the commander's personal appraisal bc- thority. The same is true of the estimate proc- comes essential to a sound estimate. And it is ess. Since, however, the basic, current, and at this point in the intelligence process that estimative divisions of the intelligence func- thecommander must be appraised of all of the lion are confluent parts and if indeed intelli- csscntial elements of basic and current in- Bence "constitutes a vital element of a com- formation that might affect his conclusion as mander's estimate of a situation leading to a to the significance of the intelligence he has decision," no commander would be justified caused to be gathered and presented to him. in permitting any essential element of the in- telligence function to escape from his direct Seven Essential Steps control and thus from immediate responsive- Seven steps must be taken to provide for Hess to his demands. These elements are in- thc details necessary to meet the five require- eluded in the seven processes mentioned above meats. These are: collection, collation, evalu- of which perhaps the first, collection, is the lion, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, and most misunderstood. Without control over dissemination. Opinions may differ as to the collection, a commander attempting to direct order in which these seven steps should be his intelligence effort would be hamstrung stated, but there is general agreement that from the start. they arc the essential steps in the fulfillment Having mentioned collection as one of the of the intelligence process. If any of them are essential processes of intelligence over which slighted, the product may be affected ad- the commander must exercise at least general verscly. They apply equally to any division control and supervision, brief mention of the of the intelligence effort. There would seem other six processes and what they are would to be little need for detailed discussion of each seem to be in order so as to provide back- of these steps. Yet, if one is to determine ground for the discussion which will follow whether or not he is engaged in a duplica- thereafter. live or unnecessary effort, an examination of -The collation process, which amounts to how he is performing these steps and what relating the known and unknown, follows requirements they are fulfilling is about the close on the heels of, and is often concurrent only way in which he can tell whether or not with, collection. It leads to the evaluation he is wasting his time. process which is simply a sorting out of the Taking collection first and referring to Gen- likely from the unlikely as a result of the evi- eral Eisenhower's premise that "it is a basic dente derived from collation. At this point function of command to initiate and co-ordi- analysis begins in the form of development of Hate the search for the necessary informa- . a logical meaning of the data culled by the lion," we recognize that the initiation and evaluation step. The analysis step, as the co-ordination of the collection effort is a vital word implies, then provides a means of con- element of the command function. Thus, if sidering the separate parts of the data in rela- the commander is to have control over his lion to the whole problem on which the data destiny, he must exert a sufficient measure bears. Thus, analysis leads to a synthesis of of control over the collection processes that all that is known into a meaningful whole. fulfill his vital needs to insure the responsive- This requires highly knowledgeable as well ' Hess of that process to those needs. Where as skilled inductive and deductive reasoning that process supplies data for a basic intelli- and is the very guts of intelligence production.. Bence effort, time may not be of high im- These two steps are usually performed con- , portance. However, where current intelligence currently by the same individuals. Yet they is involved, time is usually of the very essence. must be taken as separate steps and must be Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 #l. S. Naval Institute Proceedings [AUGUST susceptible of critical examination by others, particularly the commander concerned. All four of these steps, collation, evaluation, anal- ysis, and synthesis are essentially staff func- tions performed vn behalf of the commander by his staff to relieve him of a task which can- not be pcrformcd by him alone. Nevertheless, the commander must satisfy himself that these four processes arc logically, intelligently, and. thoroughly pcrformcd and that his own famil- iarity with the way in which they arc per- formed is sufficient to enable him to discrim- inate between a sound and an unsound effort, and good and bad advice. We then come to the interpretative process which is the distilled essence of all of the previ- ous steps and should include the personal ex- pcricnce, knowledge, instinct, and judgment of the commander's broad experience and peculiar miliCary genius as well as that of his staff. The cycle of the intelligence process is then finished by dissemination of the inter- preted product to subordinate and lateral echelons for use in their own further plans and decisions. Some Historic Examples Commanders arc not likely to be able to devote much personal time to the routine activity that produces the intelligence they need. This is particularly true in the produc- tion of basic intelligence, but they must as- sure themselves that such routine activity is taking place and that it is following the guide lines prescribed. They can do this only if the people performing these duties are under their direct control. If commanders are either unable or unwilling to give guidance and direction to all phases of intelligence process, there's no telling what the result may be. And when a commander does have to apply himself personally to the interpreta- tive and estimative phase, he may well find that he lacks basic information essential to his own deductive processes. Consider for a moment the effect of this sort of situation on McGlellan's conduct of the Peninsula Cam- paign in the Civil War. Although the people concerned were under his control, he ap= parently considered that the business of col- lecting, collating, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting information was entirely a matter for his G-2 and all he need concern himself with was the end-product. Here is how John G. Burr in his book, Tke Frameruor'k of Battle, describes the result: "Prom the time he [General McClellan] took command of the Army of the Potomac until he was removed after the battle of Antietam, he never failed to overestimate the strength of the Confederates facing him. When the famous Pinkerton, acting as In- telligence Officer, said Lee's Army consisted of 200,000 men, Little Mac never verified or questioned the estimate though other officers knew it was absurd; in actuality Lee's forces never exceeded 80,000 and, before Jackson joined, were fewer than 65,000." Glearly, McClellan gave inadequate atten- tion to his intelligence activities, and it cost his country dearly. Even the victorious Grant had his troubles with intelligence. His failure to see to it that sufficient knowledge was ob- tained of terrain ruined his plan at Chatta- nooga. Such a basic omission could hardly be less than an indication of careless intelligence planning for which the commander can no more escape the responsibility than he can its consequences. Let's turn a few snore of Burr's pages and consider the case of the Russians and Ger- mans in the East Prussian Campaign of 1914. "In 1914, the Russians and Germans faced each other in East Prussia and Poland. The Czarina was a German and the Russian Court was infested with German spies and sympathizers. Even in the Russian armies there were enemy agents in high position. As if that were not enough, at the start of the ,campaign the Russian High Command issued many. orders and sent much information over its radio-in the clear. "Naturally, information as to the size, .composition and location of Rennenkatnpf's and Samsonov"s armies poured into German headquarters. To be sure, von Prittwitz was leery of the stuff coming over the air from Russian headquarters, fearing it was a clever ruse; but the Hindenburg-Ludendorff-Hoff man team, knowing Russian carelessness, greeted it joyfully and used every bit of it." In contrast to this consider the Russo-Ger- man situation in 1939: "When the Germans made their pact with Russia in 1939 they expected once again to place their spies throughout Russia. But Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 1960] Command and the Intelligence Process 31 Stalin had not forgotten 1914. Ever since he had become head of Russia, the Soviet leader had been busy rooting out foreign agents from his government and army. He had no intention of undoing that work, and the Ger- man visitors were carefully kept where they could learn and sec nothing. I do not mean to say that the Nazis did not obtain a great deal of information on the front-line Soviet Armies. Undoubtedly they did. But they did not learn enough about the potential Russian strength back of those armies, and it was that potential strength which eventually frus- trated them. "Von Brauchitsch was able to smash the Polish communications so efficiently because he knew exactly where all the nerve centers were at all times. In France and Norway the Allied forces and movements were known in the greatest detail. "Nothing escaped that net of [Nazi] spies and informers spread over all the countries of the world-except Russia. Stalin knew that the more completely he -could blind his en- emy the better chance he would have on the battlefield." Aside from the excellence of Russian coun- ter-intelligence, several points of interest stand out here. First of all is the fact that the intelligence policy of the Germans apparently made full provision for the gathering of in- formation from all sources. Next the icigh commanding generals themselaes took the trouble to evaluate and interpret. And last, but by no means least, they acted upon what they considered the best informa- tion available. Operations and intelligence were closely allied. The policy directing one guided the other as well. But let's have a look at what Burr says of another front of the 1914 war. " ...Von Moltke was surprised by the ap- pearance of the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] in Belgium. There was a physical as well as a psychological reason for that sur- prise. Shortly before World War I, British Intelligence picked up the threads of the G~r- man spy system in Great Britain. Very cau- tiously Scotland Yard and the War Office un- raveled the skein,- even locating the great ma- jority of the Boche agents. But they didn't dis- turb them or give them any reason to be suspicious-ixntil war was declared. Then the authorities pounced on the whole lot at the same time. German GHQ was blind for many months after that, so blind that no word of the movement of the B.E.F. to France ever reached von Moltke. He didn't know they were across the Channel until his IX and III Corps ran into them at Mons." Here is a beautiful example of British understanding of the importance of integra- tion in intelligence matters. It is a practical demonstration of the close relation between intelligence and counter-intelligence, as well as of the many exacting complexities of in- telligence operations that require the most careful integration and guidance at the high- est command levels in order to achieve maxi- mum effectiveness. Here also is another dem- onstration of what lack of intelligence does. ' This has its application in a peace as well as in a war period-a fact so often overlooked in American efforts. Alexander the Great dared tlic seemingly impossible invasion of the sprawling Persian empire because his agents had told hiin how rotten inside it was; Elizabeth's England challenged haughty Spain because Sir Frances Walsingham's intelligence service (England's first national effort) was able to obtain con- clusive evidence of the low state of readiness of the Armada; and George III lost the Amer- ican colonies through underestimating the ?? temper of the colonists. Genghis Khan's was the predecessor of the Nazi method of war. The Mongol chieftain never attacked a nation until he had sent hundreds of agents as merchants, travelers, refugees to collect all available information and to spread morale-destroying rumors. One would have thought that by World War I the modern captains of war would have learned the intelligence lesson. Some did, but many more did not, and it is to be regretted that an embarrassingly large num- ber of the latter wore the uniform of the United States of America. Benjamin Cain makes this passing com- meet with regard to World War I in a Lecture of Intelligence Experiences During World War Id delivered on 10 December 1946 before a group of the top Allied leaders of World War II: "By 1916 American employment of intelli- gence had been reduced to almost a negative Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 32 Approved For Relea~$,2QO,~i/a~~$~F~~~~01R0006003300usT factor. About this time I had become a big shot, being newly promoted to Lance Cor- poral, Iwas appointed `information soldier' for a machine gun unit. Such work was be- neath the dignity of the offiicers and higher non-toms, so I got it!!" But we were not the only ones to let our- selves fall into such a complacent, if not stupid, attitude. Shipley Thomas in S-2 in Action relates the following: "From time immemorial until 1914 there were but two sources of intelligence of the enemy. These were `Combat Intelligence' and `Spies Within the Enemy's Lines.' Beginning with 1914, three additional sources became effective: "1. Deep airplane reconnaissance. 2. Electrical and radio listening appa- ratus. 3. Artillery observation. "The failure to secure and interpret com- bat intelligence was nowhere more strikingly apparent than in the entire German 1914 campaign. The seemingly disregard of what might have been learned of British and French movements in early September, 1914, and the failure to interpret these correctly, led to disastrous results. "Von Moltke (nephew of the great von Moltke) and the whole German Army of 1914 suffered from the same basic failure to appre- ciate and use combat intelligence. In their long years of peace, combat intelligence had become a dead letter. Theory, dogma and schoolroom logic had become, as it .usually does, the substitute for combat intelligence:" Of course, contact with the enemy usually brings better opportunities for the completion of the order of battle picture. In that connec- tion Burr relates the following: "On the stabilized Western Front in 1914- 1918both sides built up systems which located every unit of their opponents by number. In each headquarters was a map showing the location of each of the enemy divisions, which was so thorough that its efficiency was some- times fantastic. At one time a U. S. Division was sent into the lines at night, as usual and with all precautions for secrecy, only to be greeted by a large sign over the German trenches: `Welcome-Division !' At another part of the front in the early days of November 1918, an observation balloon with its basket loaded with high explosive and artistically arranged dummies was sent aloft to give the Boche airmen, who had been shooting down many of our gas bags a surprise. Not a Ger- man plane would go near it and finally an- other sign appeared over their trenches: `Take that damn thing down.' "Yet, even under those conditions, where Intelligence had every chance to obtain in- formation, both sides succeeded in surprising the other by thorough camouflage and swift concentrations during the hours of darkness." World War II Experience One would have thought with the experi- ence of previous wars and peaces behind us -our concept of the role of intelligence be- tween wars and in war would have improved by World War II. But it didn't. Never in its short and turbulent history has the United States been faced with such a sud- den and dismaying disaster as it beheld on the morning of 7 December 1941. And never with less excuse. All the lessons of history had been of no avail. . The Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, including the additional views of Mr. Keefe and the minority views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster concluded by the 79th Congress in July 1946, gives complete testimony of what happened and why. While this investigation had no great fault to find with the amount and quality of the informa- tion supplied (except as to reconnaissance) and stressed the need for unity of command, it did find that those in high authority failed to properly appreciate the intelligence at hand and failed to centralize authority as well as to make aclear-cut allocation of responsi- bility in intelligence matters. In other words, the high command failed to establish a sound intelligence policy. Why? Because it did not have a sound understanding of intelligence. Although both Army and Navy schools of high and low degree had long taught history as well as the fact that intelligence is a func- tion of command, no effort had been made to insure that intelligence assumed its proper place in the staff divisions of command. Many commanding officers took an attitude similar to McClellan's in appointing an in- telligence officer and then leaving the matter Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 1.960]~?~pproved For Rel~~~~'~i1~~~ ~~~~~.~.Q~.01 8000600330003-633 THE SUPER-BATTLESHIP YAMATO ON HER DEATH RIDE OFF KYUSHU Naval Intelligence in the Pacific during World War II from the Battle of Midway to the surrender of Japan was rarely perfect, to be sure, but can be rated "outstandingly good" and must be credited with saving thou- sands of lives and greatly speeding America's victory. completely up to him from that point on. In the Navy Department, at the time of Pearl Harbor, a minor feud between the Qffice of Naval Intelligence and the War Plans Division was being waged unchecked by higher authority. War Plans felt that it should collate and evaluate information and leave only the matter of gathering it to In- telligence. But Intelligence regarded such matters as properly its function. Meanwhile much time and effort that could have been better spent otherwise was wasted on this inter-office strife. In fact the argument wasn't settled until June of 1943, when the Combat Intelligence Division was established! During this time, the then Commander-in- Chief, U. S. Fleet, was reliably reported to have stated that all he wanted of his intelli- gence organization was an estimate of what the enemy might be up to two weeks hence ! Even with the war well joined and before we could see our way clear to victory, another im- portant officer, the senior Army Air Com- mander in a certain theater, is said to have remarked to the effect that he had "never heard two intelligence officers agree on any- thing so he just disregarded them altogether!" Undoubtedly we got better as we went along in World War II. The defeat of the Japanese at Midway was due as much to the Commander-in-Chief's personal understand- ing of the intelligence process and the applica- tion of his own judgment, intuition, and ex- perience to it as it was to the intelligence available, which was pretty sketchy, notwith- standing many published accounts to the con- trary. Samuel Eliot Morison in Volume IV of his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II states: "As early as 20 May Admiral Nimitz issued an estimate of the enemy force that was ac- curate as far as it went-and even alarming. What he did not know was that Admiral Yamamato himself, in the super-battleship Yamato was to command the main body of the Combined Fleet, comprising three new and four old battleships, three light cruisers, a destroyer. squadron and a light carrier, to operate between Midway and the Aleutians and cover both. Although the picture was not complete the composition, approximate routes and timetable of the enemy forces that imme- diatelythreatened Midway were so accurately Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CfA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 34Approved For Release~0,g5/~/,~~ ~'r1~~4z~~~c~~~'Ar~1 R00060033000~~rcusT deduced that on 23 May Rear Admiral Bel- linger, the naval air commander at Pearl, was able to predict the Japanese plan of attack on the Atoll. But for this early and abundant in- formation and (what was equally important) the prompt and intelligent use of it, the Pa- cific Fleet would have had only a slim chance of winning." In the early morning hours of 4 June 1942 contact was made and the battle was joined. As Morison puts it in the final paragraph of his chapter on "Midway Preliminaries": "The battle was on. `The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on the de- velopments of the next two or three days,' re- corded the CinCPac analyst on receipt of this news. It did. The action about to be .joined was one of the most decisive of the war." Another fine example of command's under- standing of the intelligence process is available in the Report of Operations of the U. S. First .Army in Europe. The First Army estimate of German capabilities and intentions prior to the Battle of the Bulge is an excellent example of intelligence at its best and reflects credit on General Bradley's understanding in spite of the disregard shown by higher command in this case. The point is, however, that no mat- ter how many successes are achieved, failures are both expensive and unnecessary. Why does one leader establish sound intelligence policies while another in the same Armed Forces does not? We cannot afford the luxury of leaders who do not understand the business of getting information of the enemy. We must be sure that our educational system for high command does not permit an ofricer to reach such command without having demonstrated a thorough understanding of intelligence. Confusion in these matters, such as illustrated by the following extract from Captain-now Rear Admiral (Ret.)-Ellis M. Zacharias's book, Secret Missions, must not be permitted to reign where the relationship of intelligence and command is clearly understood. This extract is from a quoted letter dated 3 Feb- ruary, 1942, from Colonel John W. Thomas- son, Jr., USMC (then. in ONI) to Captain Ellis M. Zacharias; USN: "I would say ...that our department re- sembles more than anything the outside edge of a cyclonic or whirling storm. Everything is being tossed about. ping is superimposed on Stark having absorbed most oC ilic tatter's functions... . "Wilkinson has ONI, the third Chief in a year and a half.... ~1'e arc swollen enor- mously. Never was there such a haven for the ignorant and well-connected. As a matter of fact, ONI isn't bad so far as collecting in- formation goes. But what good is information if it isn't used? Here the museum idea seems to prevail." That this confusion was felt all along the line and that a lack of any intelligence policy was undermining the efforts of the information gathered is evidenced by this quotation from the same book: "The intelligence organizations afloat and in the field failed to recognize the future planning value of intelligence picked up in their operations, and after culling the immedi- ately usable tactical data from the material to which they obtained access in combat, they discarded the rest." As Admiral King had said, all they wanted to know was what the enemy might do a short time hence. Another amazing feature of the behavior of some military leaders is their disregard of the most elementary security considerations. An example of this is to be found in publica- tions by the United States of the famous Zim- merman notes of 1 March 1917. Why the Germans did not immediately realize that their diplomatic codes were being read is not known. Certainly the British must have felt a good deal of apprehension for a valuable source and no doubt took steps to see to it that what they might give us would be ready for publication. However, it is a dangerous precedent. More to the point was the disclo- sure of the Yainamato ambush in the recent war, not to mention the Pearl Harbor hear- ings. Through it all, however, progress is be- ginning to show and ranks of the ignorant are, thinning. But still not quite enough. George S. Pettee in The Future of American Secret Intelli- gence says: "Unfortunately, we were far more con- sistent in recognizing the modern character of enemy intelligence than we were in ap- preciating the same facts for the management of our own intelligence work. The history of our own wartime intelligence methods is the Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 196~]Approved For Re~~~1~/f,~BTn~e~~g~~c~~o~~018000600330003-635 story of how this revolution was half way car- ried out, but was hampered at all times by the lack of comprehension of the necessities imposed by new conditions.... Under Sec- retary of State Dean Acheson told the House Appropriations Committee on November 26, 1945, that up to the beginning of the war, the State Department's technique of gathering information differed only by reason of the typewriter and telegraph from the technique which John Quincy Adams was using in St. Petersburg and Benjamin Franklin was using in Paris ! I is a poor excuse, however, to say that we arc behind because we started late, unless we also try to catch up." Pcttcc says elsewhere that what we must do is to " ...recruit, discipline and arrange in functional order a number of human minds to the effect that the result of their combined work will approximate the result which would have been obtained, by a single rational mind had the task been within the scope of a single rational mind." That's all very well, but again it isn't enough. We must educate our military lead- ers to such a thorough understanding of intel- ligence and its relationship to command that they will establish sound intelligence policies as readily and easily as they establish disci- plinary regulations for their men. Today's Need and Cost Where do we stand today in the era of `'peace" since 1946? We have certainly learned a lot, it is true, but have we learned enough? The situation we face today is quite different from any that we have faced in the past. In fact, it is unique. To quote a 4 De- cember 1959 Interim Staff Memorandum of the Sub-Committee on National Policy Ma- chinery of the Senate Committee on Govcrn- inent Operations: "In the fourteen years since the end of World War II the traditional distinction be- tween peace and war has been obliterated by a contest which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on world com- munism by expediency. The competition is total-it is military, economic, scientific, dip- lomatic, cultural and moral." This aptly describes that twilight zone some call "The Cold War." But call it what you will, it is not peace, and we may not apply to it the measures of peace and survive. Back of it lurks the not unlikely possibility of limited wars as a means the Communists may pursue (and have pursued) to gain advantage in this competition. And back of that lurks the ever present, deadly danger of an unlimkted war which none may hope to survive. In this milieu, accurate, timely information of what our potential enemies may be up to is vital. Indeed, because of our situation in the world, it is also essential to know what our friends and uncommitted nations can or may do to either strengthen or weaken our security in each of the three general situations we have, or may have, to face, namely, once again the present armed truce ("Cold War"), "Limited War," or "Unlimited War." This is no time "to begrudge the outlay of an hundred ounces of silver" for information. Nor have we, yet. The legislation that estab- lished the CIA, the Department of Defense, and its reorganization of 1958 are evidence of this. But these very. institutions bring on a new danger to the intelligence process. That is the critical scrutiny of budgeteers of how much these consolidations and monoliths save in eliminating duplication in the intelligence process. They don't, and shouldn't, save any- thing. They should only increase its scope and accuracy, But because they all add people and requirements to the structure, they should, and do, cost more. Careful consideration of the intelligence process described above must reveal the crea- tion of a commensurate expansion in re- quirements with an expansion of the com- mand structure. Why? Because each execu- tive, whether military or civilian, responsible for advice, decision, or execution of military plans and policies must have sufFicient control over the intelligence by which his advice, decision, or executive act stands or falls to in- sure to the best of his ability the soundness of his acts. You may argue, for example, that since the reorganization of -1958 in the Department of Defense places operational control of the armed forces in the hands of the Secretary of Defense the military departments no longer need operational intelligence components. This is an appealing argument, but not a. conclusive one. At the very least it pre- Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 36 ' Approved Fri; ~e~-~~?/~~/2~~~~~DP91-00901 ROO~U6$1~3~6003-6 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN 1948 Tlie several organizational changes in the Armed Forces since World War II do not affect the basic require- ments of the intelligence process nor alter. the intelligence needs of command at each operational level. supposes that the function of current intelli- gence ii-~ust then be performed by the JCS. This wouid require that the Joint Staff acquire at least some of the resources now in the hands of the military departments for that purpose. Is this economical? No, and here's why. The SecDef through the JCS ex- ercises operational control through unified commanders. They in turn exercise their op- erational control through component com- manders who in their turn depend upon their parent military departments for support in intelligence matters. Thus, you might say that so long as Admiral Felt, CinCPac, needs Admiral Hopwood, CinCPacFlt, Admiral Hopwood needs the intelligence resources necessary to carry out effectively Admiral Felt's will. Admiral Hopwood can't turn over to Admiral Felt CinCPacFlt's intelli- gence resources and still expect them to be re- sponsive to him. But Admiral Felt can, and does, expect Admiral Hopwood and his intelli- gence resources to be responsive to CinCPac because of his superior position of authority. And so on up and down the chain. So if you lengthen the chain, you expand the require- ments at all levels. Some consolidation of the basic intelligence process can and has been achieved. More can be done. But such con- solidationcan't go beyond the point where the responsible commander can no longer judge the reliability of that process and obtain im- mediate, effective response from it. It has been, and no doubt, will continue to be argued that "agreed intelligence" would eliminate the expanding requirement men- tioned above and that this can be achieved through the CIA for the government as a whole and through the JCS mechanism for the Defense :Establishment. In the writer's opinion "agreed intelligence" is not worth a plugged nickel unless such agreement is spontaneous and unanimous. Any other method of agree- ment in the intelligence business emasculates the interpretive step to a dangerous degree. Duplication here is a guarantee against con- centration of stupidities and is to be encour- aged. It is the commander who makes the decision, bears the responsibility for it. He should have all the facts. -Only in this way will we achieve the strokes of genius necessary to save us from disaster. We should not be- grudge the price. The cost of defeat today is irretrievable. Thus, in examining our intelligence re- quirements today, we should ask this question: Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 1 X760] Approved Fd~'o~tea~ez~fl0~1ig1?szbE1-~d~~s1-00901 R0006003300~i-6 Is the information needed as a basis for ad- vice, decision or execution of decision for which adviser, decider, or executor bears full responsibility? If so, that person must have the means of getting the information he needs when he needs it and of determining its validity. Be- fore circumscribing his authority to do this, he, together with those who have assigned him his responsibilities, must examine the follow- ing questions with regard to his intelligence effort. What part of it is: a. Indispensable and non-duplicative? b. Indispensable but duplicative? c. Highly desirable and non-duplicative? d. Highly desirable but duplicative? After this examination and before with- drawing any resources, the authority who leas assigned responsibilities should re-examine those once more to determine whether with- drawal of resources necessary to perform a duplicative task does not, in fact, circum-~ scribe a necessary authority and therefore calls for a coinmCrisurate reduction in re- sponsibility. It may be hard to find a superior willing to do that, but that he must do. Means and Method How is all this worked out today? To answer that, let's consider briefly the means by which responsibility is fixed. The duties of the Presi- dent stem from the Constitution which, among other things, assigns to him the respon- sibility for over-all command of our armed forces. This responsibility is an appropriate portion of his over-all responsibilities as Chief Executive in which capacity he administers the laws passed by Congress. These laws en- tail an assignment of responsibilities some- times directly from Congress to departments and agencies of the Executive Department as in the case of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, and the Department of Defense Re- organization Act of 1958. Within this general framework of law and precedent, the Armed forces are managed, with the buck for ulti- mate decision stopping at the President's desk. Meanwhile, all up and down the line there exists an interlocking complex of responsibili- ties for advice, decision, and execution. The Director of Central Intelligence, for example, is the principal intelligence advisor to the National Security Council which advises the President. -But the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are his principal mili- tary advisors, while the Secretary of State is his principal advisor on foreign affairs. Can we say that the DCI should stay out of mili- tary intelligence matters and the Secretary of Defense. out of foreign political matters? If we consider again the above description of our present situation by the Senate Committee on Government Operations together with the responsibilities of the above officials, it be- comes readily apparent that none of them can stay out of any field of intelligence with- out achange in their responsibilities. So the question becomes one of the degree to which any of these agencies can permit their intelli- gence needs to be met with resources outside their control. This same line of reasoning ex- tends down through the chain of command. Because the various departments and agen- cies engaged in intelligence activities pass to one another copies of their intelligence utter- ances and because these publications often report on identical items, wasteful duplica- tion is said to be manifest. This just isn't so. Where the reporting is identical, you have agreed intelligence without a forced compro- mise in Committee. Where it differs, you have a better basis for interpretation. It is not simply a matter of the intelligence people taking in one another's washing. It is a mat- ter of providing responsible officials with a means of interpreting the total available "take." In fact, it is one of the more desir- able features of Joint Intelligence. The whole complex is somewhat like basic scientific re- search. The more you do of it and the greater the independence of thought that goes into it, the more likely you are to get the best product. This does not mean we should have anarchy in the intelligence field. On the contrary, we should have disciplined control of the direc- tion and degree of effort. This, unification can and does provide. Unification should not, however, attempt to force agreement or limit effort without altering responsibilities for ad- vice, decision, and execution. Thus, the need for engaging in all five categories of intelli- gence at all levels should be viewed in the Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 38 Approved For R~~e,~~/~~~feC~~~~~.-00901 R000600~?~~~s,~ light of the responsibilities vested at those levels. We cannot argue, for example, that the Air Force should provide the Navy with all air intelligence. The Navy has responsi- bilities which require that it know thoroughly what air threat exists to interfere with its ability to carry out its mission. It must have the means at its awn disposal to know this or, like McClellan, it may find itself without the means of applying its own experience and know-how in naval matters to the processing r.[ the information on which it must, perforce, act. 'The same is true of the Air Force, the Array, and so on. Thus, it appears, everybody has to do at Icast a little bit of everything. No attempt has been made to show why the Navy, for ex- ample, needs political, scientific, and eco- nomic intelligence as well as intelligence on foreign navies. It is assumed that the reader will realize many of the factors which enter into the Navy's need to plan and run an estab- lishment whose mission it is to insure U. S. freedom of the seas throughout the world. The factors that enter into sea power and its influ- ence on history are not limited to a knowledge of opposing hardware. Nor can advice in naval matters be so limited. The same is true in varying degrees of the other branches of our Armed Forces. So, again, it becomes a ques- tion of degree. Unification has brought about a means of determining degree and direction of intelli- gence effort in the Defense Establishment but not a means of reducing it. The SecDef or the JCS as over-all com- mand organs can remove responsibilities in military echelons below themselves, if those rc- sponsibilites are not otherwise stipulated by Congress. They can thus alter intelligence re- quirements of subordinate commanders. But when they do so, they may not be able to alter the requirement, per se. They can exer- cise command and control over the efforts of their subordinates, who in their ,turn can do likewise, and thus concentrate intelligence efforts. The subordinate can depend on the superior, and he can compel the subordinate, but neither has control of lateral efforts. Therefore the SecDef or JCS can concen- trate or diversify the intelligence effort in the Defense Establishment as they see fit, so long as they do not circumscribe statutory respon- sibilitics assigned to the military departments. TI-ese statutory provisions require almost as much in the way of intelligence production as do Joint Intelligence requirements. Thcrc- fore, the military departments must neces- sarily engage in estimative intelligence pro- duction adequate to meet responsibilities imposed by Congress. This includes at least a Staff and a Support Intelligence Require- ments which must be met. It follows then that the additional requirements subject to change by the SecDef are in the field of Command, Joint, and Combined Intelligence Require- ments. These interlock so closely with the Staff and Support Requirement that much of the basic, current, and estimative process necessary to fulfill one also fulfills the other, and little or nothing would be saved by the shift of responsibilities necessary to reduce the Command, Joint, and Combined Require- ment at the military department level and below. In effect then, one must conclude that the intelligence firocesc is essentially the same for all levels of command and control. The real point of difference is the use to which the intelligence is to be put. This is what generates the divergencies we have termed the basic, current, and estimative divisions. Any of these can metamorphose into the other and often do. Time is one of the key factors in that metamorphosis and is the ingredient that usually changes basic intelligence into cur- rent intelligence. Although the basic and current processes usually differ materially from the estimative process there are types of information of such high validity and broad .scope as to become estimates almost at the point of collection. Common-user systems are dangerous be- cause they lack the element of responsive- ness gained through authoritative control. They seldom are able to meet all demands at once and hence are more suitable to service functions (like cafeterias) where time and authoritative control may not be so impor- tant. We have agreed that intelligence is a command function. Time and authoritative control may be of the essence in performing that function. Like reading the neighbor's newspaper-it's all right, if you don't need it first, It is impossible to excise or circumscribe ' one portion of the intelligence process with- Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-009018000600330003-6 1 ' ~ `1,j~,0) Approved FoIE'Rti~~l ~i~l6,F~~#'-00901 R0006003300a~-6 uut a(fcctin,r,? another at some, perhaps criti- cal, time. Unification can do little to improve this situation and by trying can only compli- cate and obfuscate an already complex and di(Iicult problem. In Conclusion To sum up, the following propositions are postulated: a. In order to plan a military establish- ment capable of acting as an effective instrument of national policy, it is neces- sary to know the capabilities and inten- tions of foreign nations, enemy, or friendly, to threaten or strengthen the security of our country in peace, cold war; limited war, or general war. b. The availability of timely and accurate information in response to the above stated requirement is a sine qua non for good advice, sound decision, and effec- tive execution in the management of military forces. c. Such dependence on intelligence is a vital aspect of responsibility in the em- ployment of armed forces whether in active warfare, achieving a satisfactory state of readiness for warfare, or in using armed forces as strategic instruments of policy in any of the conditions men- tioned in "a." above. d. Information from widely varied sources and on widely varied topics may be rele- vant. ~. Responsibility must be accompanied by a commensurate degree of authority and resources. f. :Each branch and arm of the Armed Services has special responsibilities and technical considerations peculiar to it alone and these impose an additional and separate requirement for intelli- gence. From the above we can conclude that adequate intelligence and positive control over the resources that provide it are essential elements of effective management of the military departments at all levels. This being so, it is vital that we know as much as possible of the capabilities and inten- lions of any potential enemy throughout the years of peace. We cannot afford the luxury of being surprised in the next war. We must know whether, when, and where a blow is coming, or else our chances of being able to roll with the punch are nil and the likeli- hood of being able to retaliate at all recedes in prospect. The question,' of "whether" is a most important one from `the economic view- point and is usually deducible from a study of , basic capabilities. These circumstances set for us a difTicult obstacle but not an insurmountable one. If we establish and nourish adequate intelligence organizations with a sound policy and real backing to support them, there is no reason why we may not expect to know within rea- sonable limits of accuracy from whence danger may come, where, and when it is most likely to strike, and the expected power of the blow. We are already on the road to such an or- ganization. We must not falter now (as we often .have in the past). We must listen to that old Chinaman and begrudge nothing in the way of "honors and emoluments" to insure the .nation against surprise. ' ? We can achieve success i.n this program , only if our leaders, political as well as mili- tary, steadfastly continue to maintain a sound intelligence policy behind vigorous intelli- gence organizations. " .. we may accept it as a principle, that our navy will be strong enough, when it is stronger lhan tht. enimy, and no! before." Commander ?Bxnnii,Y A. Fta~c~, irsrt--1905 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 :CIA-RDP91-00901.8000600330003-6