HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY 1960 AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601290001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles
The attached transcripts are the released
testimony by Secretary Herter, Secretary
Gates, and Dr. Dryden.
The classified transcripts were loaned to us by
State, Defense, and NASA without the
knowledge of the Congressional Committees.
These transcripts have been returned to the
Committee.
WE
13 Sept 1960
(DATE)
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I vx 1 a 4a-Lrn,,-y.a.A. .a.A.,a, 1
1 ?_,-.F111" MEAN 1111.1.? I I o rA,n n 1
CENTRAL
OFFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
ei ? n
...a."-A0444.)
/714E44.vuomij
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
I/DISPATCH
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
:.,
.,
-,, -
FOLD HERE
TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS
AND PHONE NO.
DATE
(2210 e
1
1 U CLASSIFIED I
I CONFIDENTIAL I
SECRET_
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TRANSMITTAL
SLIP
DATE
28 MAY 1960
TO:
The Director
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS.
Attached
of Secretary
the Senate
at the afternoon
Poted by
is a copy of the transcript
Herter's testimony before
Foreign Relations Committee
session yesterday.
ST/
Assistant Legislative Count
1
,
6 0
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
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(47)
el
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I UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
DCI 221 Admin
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Attached
of Secretary
Senate Foreign
day as censored
is a copy of the transcript
Gates' testimony before the
Relations Committee yester-
and released.
STA1
Assistant Legislative Counsel
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Assistant Legislative Counsel
3 June 60
ClCe`13 L?ft,
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I UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
DCI 221 Admin
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: Attached is a copy of the transcript of
Dr. Dryden's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee yesterday as censored and
released. Mr. Helms has indicated that by Com-
mittee agreement a substantial portion of Dryden's
testimony involving NASA's knowledge of the U-2
program prior to the incident was deleted. In
addition the Committee decided to censor the last
part of the transcript in view of a considerable
amount of personal disagreement among several
of the Committee memberzer)
STA1
STA1
Aisistant Legislative Coun
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Assistant Legislative Counsel, 221 East
2 June 6(
Cr?d'EPUT
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TESTIMONY BY
SECRETARY HERTER, SECRETARY GATES, AND DR. DRYDEN
ILLEGIB
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,
Vol.*-:
jJI Uttitrh ftttro fitair
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Committee on Foreign Relations
3/ 0\-;?-'0 6
HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OF MAY, 1960
and Incidents Relating Thereto
MAY 27 1969
Washington, D. C.
WARD & PAUL INC.
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
)8-4267
NATIONAL 8-4268
8-4269
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tad HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY, 1960
AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO
Friday, May 27, 1960
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met at 10:07 a.m., pursuant to notice,
Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman of the full Committee)
presiding.
Present: Senators F.:JhriEht (presiding) D Mansfield,
Gore, Lauche, Wiley, nokerlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and
ailliams.
Also present: SenatoraJavits, and Young (Ohio).
Also present: Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary
of State; Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs; William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, C.I.A.; Charles A.
Bohlen, Special Adviser to the Secretary;Gerald Smith, Statej,
Captain L. P; CL,ay, III, USN Military Assistant to
Chairman, JCS; Julian P0 White, State. Department
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rirs
akel
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your
willingnees to come here today to discuss with the Committee
the events of recent days and weeks which are related
to the collapse of the long planned Summit Conference.
Chairman Khrushchev, who for months has,promoted a
Summit Conference and invited people throughout the world
to believe that an easing of tensions between the free world
and the Communist world might be possible, has now dashed
those hopes. In a few short hours he destroyed the atmosphere,
of negotiation which had been built up over long months.
Mr. Secretary: you and the President have been frequent
In your warnings in the past that our hopes must not rise
too high lest they be dashed to pieces, as they have been,by
a swing of the Soviet pendulum.
Despite the fact that there are few in the free world
who doubt that the principal onus for the destruction of
summit hopes must be born by Chairman Khrushchev, there are
many who believe that our conduct has not been without fault.
They believe there are things we might have done, which were
not done. They believe there were things which we did, which
might better havebeen left undone -- or delayed.
I have long believed that one of the basic strengths
of our democracy is found in our capacity of self-appraisal
our ability to, be critical, without destroying our unity.
At this particular Juncture of history, this Committee is
C60 4
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confronted with a most difficult task. Without furthering
the objectives of the Soviet Union, we must subject our ?
on activities to careful scrutiny to ascertain whether we have
conducted ourselves in a way best calculated to promote
the interests of this nation and to preserve the peace of the
worldJ
am sure there are some who will feel that any such
scrutiny of our own activities can serve no good purpose
As for myself, however I believe that failure now to review
and assess our conduct would be to neglect our responsibility
and to lose an opportunity to improve the procedures and
the execution of our foreign policy?
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42 Y take this occazion, Mr? Secretary, to assur you
once again that 3 m certain there ia no tetiori on
the part of any metrbaer o! this Cctmiitthe to deal with
this sub ,ctr, on a partisan bae We are me
hero not
aa Republicans or ranee ate( but aa mambo reo tne 8,enas
who ill taking their oaths ot o'fitco awsr:e, a. did you,
to uphold the same Constitution.
We are cancer
as you are, that nothing that takes
place hers in any way damage the conduct of eur ?Zoxeign
Ateve all, we shoulf, strfO,Fo to avoid biter riartisan
debate which might pro:2udica the reazonable ac cactivs
conduct of our 12oreign the :bauurce, The mntf.r:7ca
of participants in events oE recantweeks sa:e Tz,T, iseu.
At the same timo we a ek, as I am sure to conduct
this review in such way ? we may learn Iacz the events
oZ the past waks ,Ailt we can dotO Allf 2ere:;.sn
policies and our governmental ?:.1zoceduro,l, fox
formulation and eltocutton
Ikinc,:w that thz: jectwhich we will ?1,, diacossin-3
are most
en :civ ta Inde ye shoud
iega t there i one vast area of 22,-Dctitiva fira:azh
activity which le not Tpi.a.act to the
type 02
Congressional contxol, the chan%c pvb1,7,?c opinion--
ia, the fayer:it'-1 of t11,o Ca t:raL InteIlii,gettoe Agency.
It?;.s operationa siMiIar aotivities oZ al' crtaat natieniLl,
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are divorcee! ano separate from th, ,normal dtandands. and
the usulai restraints that are characteristic of other
covornmental operations.
There is no point ir our pretending that the black arts
of intelligence operations de new now, and have not threughut
reccxded history, involved ,eations of every Ccmmandment-
They do. Lying, cheating, murder, stealing, seductiono
and suicide are part of the unp -,asant business in which
aIl great nations participaN:e - not because they want to,
ncA because they lieve these acts are mcraLL but be;:.latse
they beleve such activities are essential o their cwn
sal-17,,reservation This i ono oe the 42q1, Z3cts of life
this world.
At ef espionage are against the of this naticn
ss of all othea: nations Zut these acts nevertho'Less take
placeo and it does not proracte a cleaa: uzaic of
inturnational eelatons pre-end they dc not,
Every member anpeuciates these facts, We hcpo that
the procedures we have Got ufey: the conduc::? of these
hemings will make it rossible for 2epresontatives of the
B:anch to be candid and ccmplete because unless
the is synh cando' rtV EnCefg; difficult fo-4' the Senate
to i1k11rgG its responsibilitiesin the fi,.d of foreign
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As you knotl, the Committee has agz,,ad that thes:.i.,
sessions are to be el:ecutfi.ve? However, in order to make the
maximum amount of infoiiat.on available to the public, which
n.iust in the final analysis understand our policies if they
are to be supporta:. by the peop1e e have arranged for a high
ranking official of the Executive PTanch to delete from the
executive transcript any statements or information which might
Li any way
opardize the national security. Should any
cue stion arise as to whether such deletions go beyond those
necessary to protect the national security I will appoint
a bipartisan subcommittee to consider such questions.
I have urged membere to limit their questions to those
directly relevant to the recent Sumit Conference and incidents
related thereto. Although the Committee has not considered
fully all witnesses it may wish to hear, I have expressed the
personal opinion that there is no occasion for private wit-
nesses to be heard on the matter before the Committee.
Finally, as you know.. the Committee has decided that
members should for the first timo aroynd, at least limit
their period of questioning to not to exceed ten minutes
each,
It is my hope Mr.. Secretary, that our study can be
focused on four princir' areas; first the events and decisions
resulting from the U-2 incident; second, the effect of these
events and decisions upon the summit; third, the policy of
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7
t-2 our government regarding the Summit meeting; and fourths the
policy of the United States in the future and possible improve-
ment in the execution thereof.
Therefore, Mr. Secretary, we have some guests from the
Senate who have requested to come as observers. I wish to
admonish them that this is Executives and that they are not
te disclose on their own responsibility anything that takes
place in these hearings and I might also call the attention
of the Committee that it was noted in the press that Mess
the official governmental news agency of Soviet flussa was
the first applicant to purchase a copy of the transcript
which will be later released, so we might keep this in mind..
I suggests Mr. Secretary that you proceed with your
statement for the information of the Committee.
The Secretary has a statement prepared which will be
the presentation of his point of view.
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(Cantor)
STATEMENT 0.7 THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
SECTARY OF STATE
OGSI
4:) Secretary Herter, Mr, Chairman and members of the
Committee: I appreciate very much your willingness to allow
me to make this etatement,
This statement is guided very much as indicated by the
Chairman in the remarks that he has just made in the next to
the last paragraph with regard to divisions; namely, the-
genesis of the Summit; the U-2 incident, the events in Paris
and the future.
A. The Throat to Berlin.
In order to understand what happened in Paris, we need te
look back over the preceding eighteen months,.
In November 1958, the USSR began a new strategy areete'
toward alterting the situation in Berlin. and East Germeny ie
its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give un thi!
present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a eo-called
'free city," the Soviet Union etated ite intention to prooce6
unilaterally at the end of six months: turning over full
sovereignty to the so-called GDR. and thereby confronting the
Allies with the alternative of capitulation er resort to force
which would be met by Communist force.
Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more
flexible than its original statement, it is still the official
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.1F
the USSR, Its iorcc lies in the Se7iet abilit;7
threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed but physically
exposed.
The Western Powers, of course , promo 7 rejected the
Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their detenation to
by Berlin,
In the months that followed, while the USSR elaborated and
pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plan
to meet it. They sought to engage the USSR in negotiations
-elnlv clarifying its intentions and either attaining
solutions acceptable to the West or, as a minimum, convincini;
it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound..
13 Engaging the USSR in Negotiation..
It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the USSR
would negotiate on an acceptable basis In January, 1959 the
USSR proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the
two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany.
The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace
treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a united
Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be
settled. first,
They also maintained that the only proper solution for
Berlin lay in Its becoming the capital of a unified Germany,
and therefore, they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an
isolated issue, But the USSR had held for some time that
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T-2 reunification was solely the business of the Germans and
therefore refused to discuss it.
The West persisted during February and March in its
? efforts to get the Russians talking somehow, :t proposed a
meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible
Summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The USSR
had repeatedly indicated a desire for that Summit meeting since
1956. Finally, a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice
the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a
Foreign Ministers meeting and a date was set in May, shortly
before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for
meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.
C. Foreign Ministers' Deadlock,
During the intensive preparations for the meeting
the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic
position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as
the Western Peace Plan. It consisted in approaching the uni-
fication of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering
the USSR a chance to adjut its position gradually to the
eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections
would presumably bring.
OThe Plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed
to world opinion; but its rejection by the USSR was none the
less flat.
The USSR stuck admantly to its previously announced
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end T2
proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus,
the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.
Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western
Powers and the USSR explored the possibility of an interim
agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic
solution of Berlin as a separate issues would do something
to mitigate difficulties wh1.h the USSR professed to find
there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the
USSR insisted on language which would have implied the
eventual erosion of the Western Position in Berlin.
Accordingly, despite the labor of three months with only
one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended
in deadlock.
D. High level trips.
The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not
result in a war crisis, however, because 'a parallel train of
events had meanwhile brought hope in a different direction.
We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet
Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchange of
views between the Soviet leader and top US officials.
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nantortake 3
unstad
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12
This was followed in June and July by further visits
and exchanges of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President
to the USSR. The fact that these visits took place without
public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic
communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed
to offer a possibility "- only a possibility, of course
that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet
-
Western relations into somewhat less dangerous shape might
be found by developing these informal contacts.
411. 4112
Secretary Herter. Accordingly the President decided to
go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long
had in mind when the time seemed right. He Invited Chairman
Khrushchev to visit this country: and the visit was announced
before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting.
During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected,
on resolving outstanding problems: but a somewhat greater
degree of mutual understanding was seemingly attained,
particularly on the need to settle international nuestions
by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a
suspension, later publicly acknowledged, of whatever was
left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.
E. Preparation for the Summit:
After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and
desirable by the Western Powers to move toward renewed
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discussions this time at the Summit. Some flicker of hope
for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas
Geneva had ended in deadlock. During his American visit'
Khrushchev had also evinced an Interest in the equally vital
field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks
were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt
that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves if any
for the Summit.
Accordingly after due consultations among the Western
Heads of Government an invitation to a Summit was sent to
Khrushchev and accepted by him, aid after some difficulty
over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This
move found broad support in Western public op:Ilnion,
Secretary Herter. There ensued an intensive and protracted
series of preparations on the 0estern sides involving re-peate
meetings not only of thaForeign Ministers and of NATO but
even of the Heads of Government. Without our own Government
we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making
progress not only on Berlin anaGermany but most particularly
in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet
Western relations.
At the December meeting of Western Heads of Government
a consensus emerged that the May Summit might well be only
one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely
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exploratory. Some modest progress vas hoped for, but no i?,;;La,
solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made
the series of talks, possibly in a gradually improving
C.) atmosphere over the years might do substantially more.
F. Summit Prospects Dimmed .
In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit
there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people
began talking j partly in hope, partly in some confusion,
about "detente", There were comparatively conciliatory
speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks
at Geneva; a new Soviet-US cultural agreement was signed
November 21, and on December 1 the US, the USSR and other
powers signed the Antarctic treaty.
But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest
signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against
West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin.
Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was
harder in tone, boasted again. of Soviet missile prowess, and
began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal
Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central
feature of Soviet pre-Summit tactics, The reason for this
attack is still a matter for speculation, Perhaps they th1.'.t.
it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helpinE
to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of
course, but naturally rallied us to speak out indefense of oar
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German ally
Khrushchev as early as December I also began repeating
his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany. He repeated these thrests in his speech to the
Supremo Soviet. on January 14 and in his remarks during his
visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On
February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal
bloc-wide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty,
Thus Khrushcheve threatening Baku speech of April 251
though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only
a harsher version of what he had been sayng for months
before., I shall make full documentation on his speeches
available to the Committee.
Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting
crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep
the record straight -- notably in the speeches of April 4
and 20, which Khrushchev atteked for starting arguments that
he in fact had began.
The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile
preuuably signalledto the USSR that prospects for eroding
the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin
rmained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were
quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO
Council In Istanbul May 24 also reaffirmed the Western
position on German
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reunification and ze7rettedSit.,regusallto discuss
speciic practical measures of disarmament. Thus as the
Summit drew near the prospects fox important agreement
seemed siendex,o ong as the USSR remained cemmitted
to dxiving the weetern rowe e opt of Derlin and to
cussing disarmament in terms of general principles rathen
than concrete steps.
The Western outiool: consistently remained, hewever,
that the Summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an
cpportunitv ior an exchange of views which wouiZA clarify
each side's position7 it might contribute to some2-edtctien
of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences
4:1) on disarmament. It could be at least a small first
step ln a long process of improving Soviet-Western 'tele,-
tions.
X:E. THE U-2 INCIDENT
On May el occurred the unfortunate failure el an
intelligence mission. The USSR at once seized on it to
complicate the approach t?he Summit. With regard
to the role of the US Cevernment in this matter o / cannot
hore to improve cn the lucid and straightforward account
which the President gave to the nation Wednesday night,
X will, thereftx:e0 not attempt to go into ?detail, although
am of course *eeady to answer questicns concerning my
responsibilities.
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aoxoX tt1d nnly like to re-cm-rthasti
peints whik.h stand out in the President'7. pcon:art
1, The U-2 prcgxam was un important and cz::U;cient
xat iligence effort. We Knew that failn=e cl amy misf_on
rneler this pzegram wor:i.d have rLerlous cunsequences Lut we
recnsideKel that the great benefit :ivS j stified the
risk:1 involved.
2. The decision net to suspend this ,r gzam
as the 0=it meeting poach e& a eoun
Conaitons at a
or would have P:Kented
very important information. The.7e is never a good time"
for a allure of an Intel ence mission We believe it
unwise to lower our vigilance because vf these pnatical
negot4,ations.
3. initial statements by 'he US G vernmant popor'
cght first f all to protect the pilot, his intolligm!,:,,
and eveY;yh, connected with that mi?tiU
be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and,
pilot were in Seviet hands we t;ylieved the congs and
the Amexican peop4re should be given the facto. Thus mp
to May 7 US state;ants followed the general 1!.rA r Um
col? stery,, and thereafter were adjusted to the zituNtlon
as At dp&
4, Since the U-2 system had been com remIse&it
W as discentinued as any othe intelligence miseen ueuld 11,e
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?
?
18
in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was
withheld until the President could convey the fact personally
in Paris.
Based ofl. these four points, I believe most Americans
will agree that the main course of cur action so given what we
knew at any particular troo. was sound. In particular,
I have doubts that any alteration in the languag9 of
statements would have made any difference inthe arbitrary
Soviet demands which followed.
II/. TRU EVENTS IN PARIS
A. Narrative
I should like to give you an account of the major
developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible,
since the details have been widely publicized. But I
would like to tell you of those events Which in my opinion
had a determinant effect there, and particularly those
which influenced the decisions of the President.
On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was
already considerable speculation at the news that MI.
Khrushchev was arriving. in Paris on Saturday rather than
on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan
were due to arrive.
Mx. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Only Airport
gave no indication of his subsequent position. It was mild
in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he
would proceed with the Summit Conference despite the U-2
incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately
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?
4 designed to conceal his real purpose,
On Sunday at 11 a.m, at his request, Mx. Khrushchev,
accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal
Malinovsky -- which is in itself an unusual procedure
which I shall revert to later -- called on President de
Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.
During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a
memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to
be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be
prepared to attend a Summit Conference. The French Delegation
provided a copy of this memorandum to the American Delegation
early that afternoon, The memorandum wassubsequently presented
by Mr. Khrushchev without change, as the opening part of his
statement to the Four Power meeting on Monday morning, May
16,
After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning,
Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.a.
on the same day and read the same statement of position to
him.
The copy of the statement received from the French
Delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate
consultation with the President and with members of the
American Delegation a to its significance and meaning.
It was our general conclusion, stlbsequently borne out
by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable
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demands set forth in this document had been drawn 'op in
Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's depanture. In this sense
it represented a fixed
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21
t4-2 the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great
country.
In connection with this decision, the President resolved
(:) to announce to the Conference his previously taken decision to
suspend further flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.
Although the original intention had been to restrict the
first meeting of the Conference at the SummLit to the Chiefs of
State and Heads of Government and to their interpreters, the
President, on learning Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked
Secretary Gates and myself to accompany him to this meeting.
I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond
saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with Interpre-
tation, took fully an hour. He read this entire statement from
a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was
the memorandum which he had left with President deGaullei plus
certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the
United States and which referred to Soviet willingness to hold
a Summit Conference within six to eight months. The major
addition was the cancellation of the invitation to the President
to visit the Soviet Union.
Apart from his statement a which was made public, the
(:) President only once joined in the ensuing discubton -- in
order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that
the suspension of the U-2 flights was not merely for the
duration of the Conference, but for as long as he was in office.
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22
T-4 Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev
would not have the authority to depart while in Paris.
I might digress here to observe that it had been our
experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least
since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no
matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collect-
ive decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his de-
parture from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions
apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could
be undertaken.
I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus
unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it
bore directly upon the position which the President took at
the meeting on Monday morning.
It was out of the question, of course, that there should
be any acceptance by the President of the humiliating and
arrogant conditions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in
mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was
Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else, who was placing this Summit
Conference in peril.
The President, therefore decided before the Monday
meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the
great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the
issues not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to
demonstrate the restrain and dignity which was incumbent upon
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2'3
The balc..ace of the cascussion at this z:zeting,; which I
shou point .r.lt was the only one during the :,::nitire period in
2aric at .i7hiCo. the Sovietz were present was largely devoted
to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Nacmilln
ghx,-;:z3hcLev from the irrevocable step of publich.-
ing his abusve statement whose unacceptable conditions woul0
::!mder imposible any Con2erence at the Summit, and to
2.;:::.:rflohevva adamant insistence that he would riublish this
etatement an-do so at a time of hi a own choosing? The meetin
oroLe un on ;he basis of a suTzestion by President de Gaulle
that the eonVorees ztould reflect on this matter for twenty-four
horo and thon examine the situation.
This ranting completely confirmed our conclusion of the
night before that Mr? Khrushehev was operating within the fi:ed
limits ot a policy set before his departure from Moscow? It
is significant in this connection that the statement he issued
later tkn).t day? Monday Kay 16 which was identf;.eal with the
one he had made at the Conference took no cognisance whatacever
of the discussion at the Conference and in particularly of the
ProJient s statemnt concemint6 the sulmension of U-2 over
Secretary Herter? The rest of the proceedings in Paris
were anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the Western
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-.Lepresentatives that there was no possibility of a Sulmit
Conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's
part. On Monday, Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khrushchev in
a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible
demands.
On that same day President deGaulle decided; with the
agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan to call
a session of the Summit Conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesdays May
17 which was, after the twenty-four hour recess which he had
proposed on Monday, He sent invitations in writing to the
three other participants.
The President, in accepting made clear his view that
acceptance by the Soviet representative would mean that the
Soviets had abandoned the demands Which the President had
previously found completely unacceptable.
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or
Mr. Khrushchev did not show, up at the appointed time
fox the Tuesday meeting. After a ,great deal of telephoning
between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it
fi
iTheet
4:, became clear that he was refusing to attend Sumeit
Conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary
meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a
Summit Conference. By this reference to ''conditions he
obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all
of the conditions he had set forth previcusly, and indeed
he so stated in a written communication to Pxesident de Gaulle
later that same day.
In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend
the Smit Conference, except on terms which all three
Western representatives deemed unacceptable, the three
Western Reads of Government mat briefly at 9230
on May 17 to approve the final tripartite commuaque,
copy of which I should like to insert in the record, at
this point.
The Chairman. Yes, it may be done.
The document referred to fo1lows0
I?.M1DIATE RELEASE May 17 1960
James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President
THE WHITE HOUSE
(Paris, Frence)
COMMUNIQUE
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The President of the United States, the President of
the French Republic and thP Prime Minieter of the United
Kingdom take note of the fact that because of the
attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union it has not been possible to begin, at the
Summit Conference: the examination of the problems which it
had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs
of State or Government.
They regret that these discussions, so important for
world peace, could not take place. For their part, they
remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding
international questions should be settled not by the use or
threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation.
They themselves remain ready to take part in such
negotiations at any suitable time in the future.
Secretary Herter. Thus the Summit Conference was ended
by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing
the great international issues with which it was supposed
to deal.
The following day, Wednesday, May 180 was marked by
tripartite meetings of the Western Heads of Government
and their Foreign Ministers to consider the situation. In
these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the
Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the
measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.
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This day was also marked by Mx. Khrushchev's press
conference, which was fully reported by press, television
and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance
of vituperation, abuse, and less of temper. It should be
noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled
nature of his remakrs and actions at this press conference,
Mx. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to
any specific course of action in the international
field?
B. Analysis.
We have naturally given a great deal of thought to
the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets
in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the
sole purpose of sabotaging the Conference,
I should like to say right off that there are many
cbscure aspects of this Scviet behavior and that we do not
knew all considerations and factors which went into its
determination We probably never shall. I hardly need to
emphasize here to the members of this Committee the complete
secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet
Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party,
which is the effective ruler of that ccuntry, It is only
possible to try to deduce frcm Soviet actions, after
they are taken, the considerations which brought them about.
What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative
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estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an
estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further
information and future events.
There is one thing, however. that can be regarded as
certain: This is that the decisionto wreck the Conference
was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At
no point during his stay in Paris -- neither when he dis-
closed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 1100 a.m.
on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently -- did Khrushchev deviate
one inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounce
the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union? (3)
punish these flights. Neither the statement made by
the President at theo=e meeting head on Monday nor the
serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and
Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr.Khrushchev
before and after the Presidents announcement of suspension of
flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable
demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his
behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify
his positbn to any significant degree.
The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and
literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gremyko and
Marshal Malincvsky is an interesting sidelight on this
point. There is much speculation as to this change from
his previous attitude during his visits both to the United
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States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings
alone with the President and with President de Gaulle:
with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the
significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the
brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it
was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence
of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal
Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would
be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had
stuck strictly to the agreed position.
It also seems certain that the decision to
cancel the invitation to the President was made before
Khrushchev left Moscow.
As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in
regard to the Summit meeting which had previously appeared
so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm
of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we
can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is
to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have
entered into this decision0 I shall try to list them
briefly.
1. There was considerable indication, particularly
during April that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there
was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly
in regard to Berlin, at the Summit. Evidence of Western
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cantor-take 5
unttad
determination and unity on this point in speeches and
statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him
to this conclusion. Thus In his Baku speech on April 25, he
not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position
on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate
peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began
for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success
of the Summit. By this of course he meant success on Soviet
terms.
2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there
area number of indications that Mr. Khrushchevts conduct
of Soviet fore igl policy, particularly his over-personalization
and in Communist eyes over-commitment through personal visits
to the US and France, was arousing at least serious questioning
if not opposition to the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem
a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his
conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the
Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some
of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.
3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident
occurred.
A combination of these three factors in our judgment
is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to
disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of
these factors should be weighed is for the moment beyond
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2
our reach.
The U-2 Incident was most certainly seized upon and
magnified beyond Its true propertiomas a justification for
this decision. It Is debatable whether it would have been
possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for
so radical and violent a position.
It might well be that a lack of success at the Summit
would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult
choice, for his point of view, than no conference at all.
He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to
avoid facing the eonsequences of failure of negotiation by
the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference..
It may seem Incredible to you that reeponalble leaders
of a great power ohouldhave come all the way to Paris merely
for the purpose of wrecking the Conference, thereby
Incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and
enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the
Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and free nations eveltwhere.
I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation
in Mr. Khrushchevts and the Sovietrs thinking.
Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped -- and this explains
his early arrival in Paris -- to divide the Allies and isolate
the United States. He anticipated that the United States would
refuse the demands he had set forth and that the Conference
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3 would then collapse, with the United States bearing
responsTbility for the rupture before world opinion.
Secretary Herter. His plans miscarried because our
two Allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States
and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchevvs scheme. The
result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which
Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete
isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States
and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of
the Conference squarely where it belongs -- on his own
shoulders.
This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchevls behavior
5s strongly supported by the attack which he made at his
press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister
Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity,
lack of will and subservience to the allied relationships
in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with
the United States, their loyalty to our common purposes and
their refuslil to play the Soviet game.
IV. The Future
What conclusions should we draw for the future?
I believe the signs are that there has been as yet
no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect
the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off
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4 the United States from its Allies. This conclusion is supported
by Mr. Khrushchevts Paris statements, including those
at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more
specifically anddeinitely, by the statements which he made
in Berlin on his way home.
We must remember, however, that, given the nature of
the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet In secret
at any time and change existing policy without public debate
or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason
that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be
regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain
valid in the future.
Thus, though the worldts hopes have been keenly
disappointed by the fact that the Summit Conference was not
held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities
c? the world situation have not been gm,atly changed. Whether
this continues to be so depends, as .I have indicated, on actions
cf the leading communist countries.
Provisionally, however, I conclude that the _im2lication
for US policy is that the main lines of our policy remain
sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that
we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort.
Proponents within the CommunIat Bloc of anaggressive course
must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part.
Proponents of a peaceful course should he encouraged by our
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5 readiness to get on with outstanding international business
end unstad in a sober and rational manner.
.swetMand fls
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T-5 We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures,
page 13
of the not only in Berlin but also elsewhere I trust that our evident
stmt
readiness will deter such pressures.
al()
Helen
Secretary Herter. Among the lessons of Paris, the most
important for the free world, including ourselves, it seems to
me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent
need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our
Allies 1 programs for strengthening the free world. We came
back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have
Allies, and I am sure that our Alliances will take new life
from this experience.
At the same time I would stress equally the need to
expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the
newly developing countries.
On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted
support to our Mutual Security programs as authorized by this
Committee, which are now more important than ever.
We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in
a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems
with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing
negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open
communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not
cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to
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T5 find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet
the nuclear menance that hangs over mankind.
0
Secretary Herter. I believe in this period it is in-
cumbent upon us all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on
the world scene and to avoid actions, statements and attitudes
which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension.
If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault
of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing
pretext for action by them which would have this effect.
We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or
policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect
our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even
more to plunge us inevitably tnto fruitless and damaging domestic
recrimination. We must now as in the future, maintain a
vigilant, calm and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in
our power to do so 13!: accurate in our estimates and effective
In our actions.
I would close in expressing the hope that we will not
become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as
to lose sight of our own constructive purposes -. which are
larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to
external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward
which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs
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t-5
$3
for helping to bring that future about -- for holding high
the light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with
emerging nations, for trying to create an international
community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of
force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies
should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.
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still take 5;
unstad fig
wetland
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The ?Chairman. Thank you: Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Reporter: I have the documentation mentioned by
the Secretary on page 4, which will be inserted in the
record at this point. They are the various. documents and
speeches.
(The documents referred to ,ake,jas follow:)
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8TAT21FW inratragamyNCB visrr-To
t.
The followiree Is a colleotion of public statements made by
10ariehebev from the tfoie of his departure from the US until Nay Sp 1960
which are Offensive oe threetening i =team vie.eteeris the Wet*
-particUlarly the 'OeSoThe tatmatiata are arievaged ratder the following
heading52 2erlire-Oermaer7; 2) US end Western Pollen 3) ?he &wait;
It) ?miswrite 4T.%.WctPaeizig Asian our They have beer extracted from
the folloiethg a*,atelesente and epeecheez
SpoceN ,v.toeseeret most return .from US* September 280 1959
2petteb em Vla(liveatokt Cctober8,1959
tf.? Sepreme &meet* October 31* 1959
,..4)eeckt te:6 *etriet journalietat Neersaber lit* 1959
fpeech et Neugarien Party Congress* December 19 1959
t?IveeN,Ix to Supreme Soviet, January lit* 1960
Letter to abantetiler Adeemart Jtorhar7 .28, 1960
Fteewtz to Indian Parliament* February 110 1960
t Reception t Februaty 120 1960
*sea et Bbiltett February 150 1960
epeeeil at Calcutta Dinner,* February 15, 1960
at.Jogjakartat Februaiy 21* 1960
F2peech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960
Prers Conference at Jakarta, February 29* 1960
Press Conference at Jakarta* Marebt lt 1960
epesca ay press luncheose* March 254) 1960
Speech in Rheimat March 290 1960
Press Canference at Rambouillett April 20 1960
Speech in. Mosmrs I; on return froze France, April 1, 1960
Speech in *tku* April 251 1960
It should be noted that this collettion does not include private
atatssente and criticisms of West Germany* On .00C46.14310 Drashcieev has
be expeciAlly offensive end threatening in private talks. The Federal
ftepeblic* and abincellor jammer personally were the chief targets of
offensive public statements on ilbrushcbevos pert daring this period*
Beginning with his November lit speech to Soviet journalists, rbrumbeierr
lennstted a vigorous aapaigx of slander against the FRO and Ademaner
designed to diecredit them and diclate the FE0 from the West* At times
these public etatments were truely ecurrilous? :Likening the Chancellor
Nazie? to Ritler ceILing im aenile etoo
It is also important tonote that in ))13 December 1 speech. in
Budapest, after a lapse of 3i mantas', neetab.cherir renewed his threat of
a eeparate peace treaty witit,mxti ear provecation on the pert of the West.
- - )
41.
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Awarently Khrushnhzv thm 000anded that the West mead cs, ahead mith a
exmmit oonferenee and. that it uAe therefore timely to begin exerting
press= on *1,2 1.7;gtiitht key laTne-of Berlizo 47.1oSovArp Ehrmehdhelrle
threat a a. sapan4W treaty?, in 'Orme of thiti nomnswenaes for the Allied ?
pcsition. inBer-i'lgi, wlamm mwe expliet, and rimaoing *6.th oath smoeedm
ng maym it tho DwAvriber Iezb, Lvii. in hie April
25 .13tic ?Pocat threutt that th i 4116.54 thAreby Mt onlybe devriveci
st? 1%941 1:31- mixthdrIrig Torilkt TelAve to
ta.th. tnapo in Berlin,:i
rt.
f.tre.d.:,,A77TSTFTnTGf
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frit)
Berlin-417,17w
SA54,15.,4+4,5444555?5,54,5
7ta3 only war go settle the B,Prlisa. pmblea, 2,t; r.-.ro sign a pepze U.'s/Ay
wits Germanys And We -MVO p7:CpY:150. t',6) thatffer4t, Thar* rt.::
evading a pear.:e treaty' eftycl-te;,
ti e other coun4-tuea on whom tht?15,
:Aping, of a paar?R tmaty depends stand tor pace and coexititencev.Th
,rostips of World Vex iust Ion.g. Laut 1-?)e i,a0.4)?Tra7.1,, t&isze t.???,,acy. ctt
a aourcm the bard,f1}-?Am the loctigrat4mf third world war'o f.179!
V.trzti.raci s 30,11?Uo.P. fa)* Fseal,:a p.0-1t o.f t,sz?ei 7.1;2(1A.
44644.:4.. `e20 dea.d:Limo,, itt1ig)14 bat, 4,t, -0o ??VICiltti Tffa
rMta
eiie rortorts t4 cone t?,,o terms with om4
? If we till' tal maw aril they do rmt lead Ut thz3 da3;.trea rogkatcis.
shall have rao other way cut tozept elegliatc petio,9 troa.;-y- with ?tht.thever
cf the tm esta-tes vents&t nd ti tuz;?17 caefL-t. a!tteil. bear no
g'eSpOriailbialtirThr rafwl to Kt.. Vra...4,;c',F, It 'gill be borne
try.thot Tftiff.) 'had an tInrewiagable apprach ?to thz? solve?ton of this problems
dA41-4, tete.th2rae.d eas5?ng teratcil1.l'elations between states
c?Ln the ir.iat-.1.ft=h .gastetd. to PreOefet% the.? dangerous sOliree threatening
the. outbreak .dir atbfad world *Faro .4 e,
We. are doing kyur t..tpzet to leake the Soviet' 'proposals acceptable. We
do riot t>4emibr?Kish to reach agreement through regotiations2
tthi r4. uo hays ?#-Ift77: !.t1...gbt to sign a peacS treatrwith the G1 if the
GoTaMikeilt. tale FF$2.1eZ113. Reputtl.io Of Germany does not wish to sign a
eaoe treaty.
??
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We have befare our eyes the example of the United States of America,
which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However., it cannot
be held that one slid% can unilaterally sign. traatiez vetie 24 other cannet$
thou& a pet,ce treaty wIth Japan was aigued aar' er ix, Its 0izerit??
Tb* lividtAtioa a the 00017:gation. regirreii Wet
`1,r,"- be itonelnolvt. ttis teLlwoving relaticoe, We vish afttaCh
dgrestoisot. 'With mr form= 6.1-ieveTh i. tcr we do not Dix sar`..Y tizne
Wa vtarL tba noiution of is crilation to improve, not woraaus oux
iationee.? The Vertet Qtvuorszontie.eadyto tizr out w4:77. corwolltable peace.
mane *0aolle & reasonstae sciatica of the Gerwho probleis9 to Pr Ci mate
the improvementif- ts- international atzepepheres and to create condition?,
fox' diza?"segtent. and . the een o pearte CAS earth for the
oaks of maate..altt Nargivissel
Bat if. we 'do nov meet tbth--latierstantLytto if the fortes b.aeicing
Char.-7;0114r MoLlatex.obtinateiy insist en VA ?positions of strength ? policys
we shall. hEtieno otber ahoice. "Izdt but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.
The Soviet Union ciiies tvt ixend to 0)31:mive vdth those who are for the
continuatton of the .?ReJeiticas of strangthll .polic:jr, We and our /Cates
would reaftly sip. a treaty with West Gerakalyy but if 'we do not Succeed in
thivx we shall In compelled -to stg? a Ilrilateral teeaty with the ME.
(Speech at Eturigarlan ?arty Congreasj December 3,.$ 19590.. rarushchev's-
first public tkreeat toaigta a separate peace treaty with the GIS aftor
hie US r.sit)
fl ?
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The Soviet crerierteonsid.er that a peaceful settlement with
atimany is an urgeht internatiwaal question
qirtaiSt
on of the very fore.
most importance, Ma sha4.1 make every effort, to have thim que6t1on solved
et last. We sincerely strive to find a solution for the Gergian question
together with to_trafl.tes .14 the struggle git Hitler Germanct, We con-
ider that along with this tha question of Vest terlin too will be settled
on an agrecd basis, If, however, al, our efforts to conclude peacs
treaty with'the,two aerman states fail to be crowned with sucf, 5s atter
the Soviet UnIcdana ether vial:Log atatee,vi1tigh a peace treaty
the OUR with all the eussequenose prooetd14 from .i.?cldis
Khraahcher Supreft Soviet spetat?sauary 1I, 1960e)
it ..that Uvie otY mit meet
live feraver wttttout a peace tree
abnormal eituAtion ihitast
Of coures9 we oanhc,. re.7orttIe
acd forevv2
orx$
sth e
ov:t TA!,
Soviet Union does not at u4dereten,licg3i. 11
but to $ peace tre 4 witki ti a 911 it all the anzzrt.rg
inoladlog those 1.0r Vest Bsr/i/.4 That 4maiw. leffAid
qusvtlona of- Germany with the Palab 17,415pif R6;Jutli.c
Republic, With.tbe sigytvg of a pette 4maty AI bq,-; clear tv hil that
to strive 44,!: alter Gho itAlxct..LF OftAt4i r.f:tAl4g. t to bring
matters Le a war, Va shall hot abet vvestive tirgeawbh cherish the
(Imam of puehthiCiermen frantierz to the bast, If acme states refUse to
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sie; Ex)c, trett4.7,7 it WI S1 So bi? !.
peal-;e ?Jr wx,? 'Cot En*laxx.tloci z1
n fr4"j1.7 fo:12.
cold lax? (Letter to Adenz,xleYLi, Januar..y.
AP Corresw,ndantt, that
Weiztc.?.174.11.,hd.ragal Wt....st Berlin regaT:f.%Pir.s."of
rafxk,,:f Etilssia"e t-.11 Tac.
a-zntit rerit'ac..,:r.,115.. or Italy
n?irustiche?TgThe qitic ? .tr.a wt, t,-)0
1,-,cneti: are aIlegeal7i
t:itL ora4.-,,41.eguertZtr4 peana;, Itile we are. to rialto
West wIth Evia.-17,--)to Ber.line This is
quest%i.-. ."7 .9 h of which ragaires seps.rate
*T.II.y tha Soviet Unir:irt thett
intexesviA :dft.stIrrits,ment,? in sategu4
42.1 the
-?
3,err
intereeted in ,saf.t.gua'rdingpa a t',."i24 IS why L titiaryto ~csr
-
diaz.rukament. questlon W74.4 o2 .i ff>r
few all the peepla, rn- the eaune of pa::,,
The seu.,vetio.rA of West Berlin i3 eritirely dirfere., 11-ds is a Tie t.71:)n
whose solvition bee been dragged ovi. fc . yearn ssino?, -the ,=?ni-1 of the wax,
!ow ib ongir ai w wit'' A surigi4tx: c.onterancezL shorty to
strengthen peaca; tat the leftowrs of' ci:7?Ei E;i5t n mt bean done
way with Yet? This. situation .::ontredie 4 ;:,0174,(30P. ee This is why Vit
shall strive to wipe out thE tialwirt war. shali try to COZArinCe Cur
allies of the last war to sign a pe3c% tronty vith the, two ex:toting German
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.3fq
states. If they 1 tand thie need or if tiley re4li.;A, it hut
reAts,.s1 tc agrtJe, Nr;Evi we shall sign a peace c.4,th thCM,
When s pef;.tv, treaty with tho GDR iE slu.adz. all tha a
againfit Germany xial 'lease 5XttSt L're t.er!:-11.44-y- - uaa
e.nd 'with rceard VO t9t BaTlin as wel% Berlin r,he terr7,"
(Diiikarte p.vs3s Feoruv7 19600?
4cit'att3:, MANCZ-3M mrrespcndent M.11 Gordet:! Y(;tJ are xf:.1.rdoe.i.
411, of peet.::of$11 coe2intt!ixe and. to,v;ltcA??1 betve
74.A.id'01zit.,, if thiv. re lly.s ec, why do you (lution tho statt. cily?
1;1 where the Nilitary wsttions of the Wstwn powrt wea
,.,If ail. our possibIlitiea zre elhaustad and au.v a'zpiitALs not
vn.dzrodr? w61 Yi naIl unilaterally eLcr. a peace treaty with tht GDR, This
settl the protlem connected vitt the 11o14.6i,vn c,f the remnants of
in the tarritory of the OM which will Ov; the peace treaty idth
tho pToble of lif_iuidating the ccoA:pattuL rezamo in Wet Zterlin idu
alno bs settl?. (DipLfigatio ?re $6 Agisoolttion luncheon in Pariss, March 25,
We arr.,' doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve under.
terd Alg For our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany-. I repeatr, we hall do our utmost to this end. If the
Western pcivers dr, not understand our peace-loving povition:,. Tie shall have
411) to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, (Rheima lunCheon, March 29, 19600
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6
Fontaine of Le Mond M Chtlirmen, you morc: thari once Intimated
that the Sov-iet Union votad el.gna fiparate treaty with the GDR iftin
summit meeting dnot 'lead to the concluErle,n4ol..!.; German peace treaty's
Could you way mom precisely t4 What- iMterit, such treaty wm..1