WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300070016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #03099-87/1
27 July 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: yarning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)
A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on
21 July 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting
participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their
views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional
concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment:
NIC #03099-87
This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from Attachment.
SE C&tT
Walter L. Barrows
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
nginvrn FROM Multiple
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NIC #03099-87
21 July 1987
WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics
at the monthly warning meeting on 21 July.
2. Brief Items:
(1) Angola - Government Offensive. Although Angola was not on the agenda,
the NIO asked if the apparent start of the long-awaited government offensive
warranted another warning DIA agreed that Luanda's
forces appear to be making limited advances, but argued that it is unclear if a
major offensive has begun. All agreed that the campaign is likely to proceed
slowly, in part because UNITA is well prepared and the Angolans/Cubans will be
cautious.
(2) Chad - Coming Attack on Aozou. DIA led the discussion of prospects for
a Chadian attack on the remaining Libyans in the Aozou Strip. There was
consensus that:
An attack is likely in August, after the OAU Summit ends. The exact
timing probably depends upon the return from Paris of Habre's
commanders, time needed to reconnoiter a new Libyan minefield around
Aozou Airbase, and Chadian progress in solving logistic and command and
control problems. Habre's tactical plans are unknown; his options
include overrunning the southern outposts before attacking Aozou
Airbase, bypassing the outposts to hit the airbase first, or softening
up Libyan defenses with airstrikes and raids before mounting a ground
assault. He probably will select the best tactics available, even if
his troops must traverse Libyan territory to reach a vulnerable point
in the defenses.
Habre probably will win, but the Libyans are likely to put up a better
defense at Aozou than they did at Ouadi Doum or Faya Largeau. The
Libyans have had ample warning and time to improve their defenses.
Their troops at Aozou are somewhat better than the ones routed earlier;
they probably will make better use of air power; and they may have
organized a counterattack force. Habre must provide adequate logistic
support and properly analyze how to deal with the Libyan minefields and
covering weapons; his casualties are likely to be high.
If Habre seizes the airbase, he probably will garrison it with a small
force. It is too distant and isolated to convert into a major base.
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Warning Note: Although we expect Habre to win, his margin for error will
be narrow and he could suffer a major defeat at Aozou. He probably cannot
achieve tactical surprise, and the Libyans are likely to make effective use of
their superior airpower and heavy weapons. A major Chadian defeat might
restore the Libyans' confidence and lead to renewed aggression in Chad. Even
if successful, Habre's losses will be high.
(3) Sudan - How Lon 9 will Sadiq Last? DIA began the discussion of
political instability in Sudan, which produced consensus that:
The Sudanese armed forces remain unlikely to topple Sadiq and accept
responsibility for the country's intractable military, economic, and
political problems unless they suffer new major defeats in the south or
there are widespread disturbances in Khartoum. Particularly vulnerable
are the government bases at Akobo and Nasir; if they do not fall,
however, the government probably will regain the tactical initiative in
a few months when the dry season begins. Although agreements on
student issues ended some recent protests in Khartoum, other issues
surfaced and the demonstrations have resumed.
Sadiq continues to suffer sagging political support. His recent visits
to the Gulf states apparently did not gain any new military assistance
for Sudan, although Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly agreed to
provide some petroleum to ease the severe fuel shortage. Sadiq's
ruling Umma party could suffer a damaging split, and the rival National
Islamic Front (NIF) may gain some support.
Although analysts agree that senior army officers in Khartoum remain
reluctant to move against Sadiq, CIA noted that junior officers who are
carrying the burden of the fighting in the south could attempt to take
power if they suffer more major defeats there and continue to see
Sadiq's support of the military effort as inadequate.
All agreed that a warning notice is not needed at present, but CIA
suggested several indicators that would signal increased potential for
a coup: (1) if civil servants and the NIF join the continuing student
riots in Khartoum; (2) if shortages of essential food, water,
electricity, and petroleum worsen (IMF mandated austerity measures
would likely aggravate these shortages); or (3) if recent small ethnic
clashes in Khartoum grow into large confrontations.
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(4) Uganda - Can Museveni Cope? CIA led the discussion of Uganda's
deteriorating security situation, economy, and relations with Kenya. There was
consensus that:
Insurgent activity in the north and east probably will increase in the
coming months but not affect the capital. Eighty percent of the
government forces are committed in the north, but they have been
relatively inactive. The army may become more aggressive now that
Uganda is receiving new MI-17 helicopters from the USSR and more SF-260
aircraft and armored personnel carriers from Libya. In Kampala, there
is no significant military or terrorist threat other than indiscipline
among the government forces. Museveni is seeking to replace the army
troops in the capital with police.
Any new economic reforms are likely to be too little and too late, and
corrupt officials will attempt to circumvent them. Incentives to
smuggling remain, and the recent currency devaluation was too small.
Museveni's advisers either do not want to implement more reforms or
cannot agree on what steps to take.
Museveni's dealings with Libya and several Soviet Bloc states will
continue to irritate Kenyan President Moi. No Soviet personnel are
scheduled to remain with Uganda's new helicopters, but Ethiopia may
send a training team. (Moreover, several Ugandan pilots have returned
from MI-17 training in Libya, according to a report received subsequent
to the warning meeting.)
Warning Note. Kenya may get tougher with Uganda and begin to provide
military assistance to the insurgents. Museveni's latest economic reforms and
the new foreign funding promised in June 1987 probably will provide the Ugandan
economy a short-term stimulus, but they are unlikely to result in long-term
improvement.
(5) Liberia - Backsliding on the OPEX? INR led the discussion of prospects
for US-backed economic reforms in Liberia. There was consensus that:
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Monrovia and Washington may be at an impasse, with the Liberians
insisting on changes to the operational experts (OPEX) agreement that
would emasculate the program. Doe's diplomatic note said that the US
experts should not have co-signature authority or legal immunity, and
the US said these changes were unacceptable. Some dishonest Liberian
policymakers are opposed to the agreement because it would curb their
graft, and most of the Cabinet resent the infringements on Liberian
sovereignty. (Information received since the warning meeting suggests
a compromise may be possible, although the OPEX issue will continue to
strain the US-Liberian "special relationship.")
Liberia's financial situation and bilateral relations will continue to
worsen. Monrovia was expected to miss a Brooke deadline on 21 July,
which would block other disbursements to Liberia. Doe's Foreign
Minister is again demanding that the US pay more rent for the use of
facilities in Liberia. Finance Minister Bestman is insisting that US
aid go through a Liberian bank--not a US one. Ambassador Bishop has
been denied access to Doe, and AID Administrator McPherson's telephone
call to Doe's office was cut off.
Doe apparently believes that he can increase government revenues and
avoid accepting the bitter OPEX medicine, but he has poor prospects for
alternative financing.
Warning Note: Liberia is trying to sabotage the OPEX agreement, and
prospects are poor that it will go through. Demands for increased rent for
facilities no doubt intensify, and Doe will seek new sources of assistance,
perhaps even from the Soviet Union in an attempt to extract concessions from
the United States. Depending upon how combative Doe becomes, US citizens in
Liberia may even become targets of an anti-American campaign.
4. Main Item: Soviet Inroads in Southeastern Africa. CIA led the
discussion of Soviet activity in the region, which produced consensus that:
The Soviets have recently become more entrepreneurial, opportunistic,
and risk-taking in southeastern Africa. Analysts do not believe that
the Soviet behavior is intended as a major new challenge to the United
States, although it is designed to exploit US weaknesses and take
advantage of low-cost opportunities to "cause Washington pain." Moscow
is capitalizing on new opportunities to sell arms to the Africans and
gain influence with them; in particular, it wants monetary payment for
arms and political support on issues such as Afghanistan.
The USSR and Tanzania signed a $200 million arms deal last November,
and the Soviet ambassador has tried recently to drive a wedge between
Tanzania and the US by expressing Moscow's concern about alleged US
military activity in neighboring Kenya. The ambassador's action
probably was not aimed at Kenya, with which Moscow probably would like
to improve ties.
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Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe sounded very upbeat during his visit
to Moscow. He seems committed to concluding an arms deal with the
USSR--not the UK. The deal may not be concluded or cancelled for
several more months, however. Some analysts continue to doubt that
Moscow will provide MIG-29s to Zimbabwe; they think that Zimbabwe may
settle for MIG-23s that can be provided earlier and at lower cost.
Other analysts believe that
it Limbabwe
presses Moscow to provide the better airplane, the Soviets may agree.
Zimbabwe is probably the only state in the region that Moscow would
consider providing with sophisticated new arms.
In Mozambique, the Soviets continue to support African multilateral
initiatives without sharply increasing Soviet and Cuban costs.
President Chissano is scheduled to visit Moscow in August 1987; he
probably will be criticized for his overtures to the West, but should
stick to his argument that Mozambique must accept help wherever it is
offered. Reporting on Chissano's Moscow visit may provide clues of
what to expect if he comes to Washington in October--although Chissano
probably will say favorable things about his hosts in both capitals.
DIA noted that this pattern of Soviet activity is based on a long-term
strategy. Moscow probably aims to build up its position in southern
Africa gradually, to ensure that it plays a major role in a future
settlement in South Africa.
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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa
warning meeting:
EXTERNAL:
DIA/DIO
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8D
DIA/DB-5
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
State/INR
NSA
INTERNAL:
DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/OIR
DDI/OGI
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
DDI/SOVA
NPIC
FBIS
DDO AF
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