WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300190003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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Office of Current nteItgence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
0'/
ARMY review(s) DIA review(s)
completed., compl 1 uP SECRET
7
26 May 1954
Copy No. ,?/
l.cu:neat Ite, -_T-_____,:____ ~Y~FK Y INDOCHINA REPORT
ii. Change In Class.
O Declassified
Class, Changed T.: TS$ C
B/ Ctt1r. H
TOP SECRET
State Dept. review
completed'
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SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Military
Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
Communist Position
Vietnamese Position
French Position
British Position
SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA . . . . . . . . . . Page 27
USSR
East Germany
Communist China
Viet Minh
FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS
France
French North Africa
Great Britain
Australia and New Zealand
Netherlands
Burma
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Japan
South Korea
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SUMMARY
Indochina
The Military Situation: The French have begun to
react to the loss of Dien Bien Phu by bolstering the
Tonkin delta defenses. They are redeploying forces
from Laos and are tentatively planning to send 35,000
more troops from Europe and North Africa.
The Viet Minh redeployment from Dien Bien Phu is
apparently proceeding at a faster rate than the
French had expected. As of 25 May, the bulk of the
304th, 308th, 312th and 351st Divisions was east of
Son La. With the movement of the 316th Division,
only 2,000 of the 35,000 enemy troops formerly in
northwest Tonkin will remain there.
The French report they have no evidence that a
Viet Minh logistical build-up is under way on the
scale necessary for an all-out assault on the
perimeter.
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General Ely accepted in principle General O'Daniel's
plan for having American advisers train the Vietnam
army, but serious difficulties still stand in the way
of putting the plan into operation.
The Political Situation: Security and social
cohesion went from bad o worse.
In Saigon, Bao Dai's turning of police power over
to the gangster Binh Xuyen organization led to the
resignation of hundreds of experienced policemen and
their replacement by Binh Xuyen incompetents. Law
enforcement "dropped to nothing." The American charge
fears antiwhite rioting. The French are by no means
confident of their ability to quell a major disturbance.
In central Vietnam, security is similarly precari-
ous. The local militia are described as entirely un-co-
ordinated and leaderless. A Vietnamese official says
that in the event of an attack, the militia would
probably shoot each other rather than the Viet Minh.
Influential Vietnamese continue to go to Paris and
Geneva on official or semiofficial "missions," changing
large amounts of piasters into francs "for expenses of
the delegation" or, as in the case of one cabinet
member, for the purchase of property in France for
his "retirement."
In talks with American officials at his resort
headquarters near Geneva, Bao Dai loftily dismissed
reports of disintegration in Vietnam and blamed any
political ferment back home on France's failure to
clarify its intentions an
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Geneva Conference
Communist Position: Communist tactics at Geneva
appear to be aimed at stalling the negotiations while
watching developments in Indochina and Paris, at
gaining acceptance of Communist proposals as a basis
for negotiations, and at exalting the contrived
"resistance" regimes in Laos and Cambodia.
The Communist position on the relationship
between a cease-fire and a political settlement in
Indochina is still obscure. After beginning from the
position that the two questions are inseparable, the
Communists began to retreat toward the possibility of
an armistice first. They are now again insisting on
the inseparability of military and political issues.
The Communists seem to think they will succeed in
forestalling Western intervention in Indochina and
will be able to improve the position of the Viet Minh
by a combination of military and political forms of
action.
Observers in Geneva as well as in Washington get
the impression that the Communists believe time is on
their side in Indochina.
Vietnamese Position: The Vietnamese delegate
reminded t He conference on 25 May that Vietnam and
France had recently negotiated two treaties by which
Vietnam had achieved its independence. He agreed
that a cease-fire in Indochina was desirable, but
said his country must defend its independence against
all foreign dangers.
Laotian and Cambodian Position: The Laotian and
Cambodian delegates continued to maintain that,
since their countries are independent, there are no
political problems concerning them for the confer-
ence to discuss.
French Position: Bidault stood fast on the
original French demand that an armistice agreement
with international controls must be concluded prior
to either a cease-fire or a political settlement.
Pressure from the National Assembly limits the
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foreign minister's ability to maneuver. There are
reports of double-dealing within the French delegation
at Geneva.
British Position: Eden told American delegates he
had warned ou n- ai that the Indochina situation
might lead to unpredictable and serious results and
that Peiping must not count on Britain to prevent this
from happening. Eden said he had told Chou that in a
showdown Britain would stand with the United States.
Soviet Bloc Propaganda
East Germany: An East German commentary contributed
the most pointed observation made by Orbit propaganda.
The United States is trying to create a Southeast Asian
"military bloc" directed against China, the commentary
said--and China, "one is well advised to remember, is
closely linked to the USSR by a treaty of friendship
and assistance."
The USSR, Communist China and the Viet Minh soft-
peda e t eir earlier demands that the Communist ghost
governments of Pathet Lao and Khmer be represented at
Geneva. Propagandists continued, however, to stress
the "legitimacy" of these regimes and to treat the
Associated States as a geographic whole, united in a
"struggle for national liberation."
Free World Policies and Opinions
France: The French showed signs of a Hamlet-like
indecis on.
The National Assembly continued to give only
grudging and unstable support to the Laniel cabinet,
and to do so only on the clear understanding that
the government find a way to end the Indochina
conflict.
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General Ely told General O'Daniel, "The sooner you
get into the war, the better we will like it," and most
other French military leaders and some cabinet members
urged American intervention. But most ministers and
most deputies feared such action as a long step toward
a general war.
Meanwhile, the government took only stopgap
measures to strengthen the military position in Indo-
china. It put off action on last week's decision to
send 30,000 troops to Indochina "in the immediate
future" and agreed that for the time being only
5,000--mostly North Africans--would be sent.
French North Africa: The American consul in Rabat
suggested that the recent intensification of terrorist
activity there may be prompted by a nationalist desire
to take advantage of France's troubles in Asia.
Great Britain: Despite a flood of rumors which
followed a special cabinet meeting last week end,
British policy on Indochina seemed to remain the
same. Foreign Secretary Eden appeared to be as
intent as before on giving the Communists every oppor-
tunity to agree to arrangements which the free world
could accept. The Communists, if they spurned all
these opportunities, would be accountable for a
failure at Geneva.
There was widespread editorial nervousness over
the state of the Anglo-American alliance, but the
government's policy had overwhelming popular support.
Australia and New Zealand: Apparent differences
between the United States an Britain caused concern
in Canberra and Wellington.
Netherlands: Catholic and independent newspapers
alike endorsed the American position that early
organization of a collective Southeast Asia defense
system is necessary.
Burma: There was new evidence of growing Burmese
concern over the Communist threat but little reason
to expect Burma to abandon its "neutral" policy soon.
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Indonesia: The Indonesians are beginning to have
doubts about-their original view that Ho Chi Minh was
the leader of a struggle for national independence
essentially like their own against the Dutch. The
press shows an increasing tendency to recognize Ho's
dependence on Peiping. One newspaper warned Ho against
jumping from "the mouth of the lion to the mouth of the
crocodile." Indonesian leaders still prefer to keep
their misgivings about Ho to themselves, however.
Philippines: His leadership challenged by ultra-
nationalists-13 his own party, President Magsaysay
is obliged to move cautiously. He told an American
army officer this week, however, that he was planning
to discuss with political leaders the conditions under
which the Philippines would be prepared to enter into
an Asian or Southeast Asian bloc.
Thailand: The Thai government continued to sup-
port the n ted States, as it has done from the
outset of the Indochina crisis. The director general
of the public relations office said that Thailand
might send troops to Indochina without waiting to
be attacked.
Japan: Japanese diplomacy took no strong, clear
line on Indochina.
The ambassador to Thailand was quoted as telling
the press that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was "merely
an episode in a purely colonial war" and that there
was therefore no reason to attribute particular
importance to it by "forcing it" into the framework
of the fight of the free nations against Communism.
The minister to Switzerland viewed the American
proposal for a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact as
necessary to guarantee any understanding which might
be reached on Indochina.
Foreign Minister Okazaki told the Diet that it
was "problematical" whether the Japanese constitu-
tion--which renounces war--would permit Japan to
join such an alliance.
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Korea: Ambassador Briggs reports that President
Rhee inks the United States cannot get along without
him. Rhee's attitude toward Washington has hardened,
Briggs believes. The president this weeI described
the situation in Indochina as "almost hopeless." At
the same time, he publicly renewed a previous offer
to send troops to Indochina.
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Military
Following the initial reaction of dismay and
consternation over the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the
French have begun to take steps to bolster their mil-
itary position in Indochina.
Vietnam: General Ely told the American charge
in Saigon on 22 May that the French are determined to
hold the Tonkin delta and will bring in all or almost
all of the 13 French Union infantry and two artillery
battalions now in Laos and replace with Vietnamese
troops the Union forces now in static positions in
the delta. One artillery and four infantry battalions
already have been redeployed from other areas of Indo-
china to the delta and at least one of the three
battalions now en route from Europe will be sent there.
As the Viet Minh has gradually increased its
striking power through training, combat experience
and Chinese materiel aid, the scattered French garri-
sons have found it more and more difficult to protect
the Tonkin delta countryside and to prevent posts from
being overrun.
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The American army attache reported on 26 May that
the redeployment of Viet Minh units from Dien Bien Phu
apparently was proceeding at a faster rate than the
French had expected when they recently estimated 20
June as the earliest date this battle corps could
arrive at the delta. The French reported that as of
25 May the bulk of the 304th, 308th, 312th and 351st'
Divisions was east of Son La, with leading elements
of the 351st Division approaching Tuyen Quang, north
of the delta. The 316th Division, the last to re-
deploy, still had two of its three regiments in the
Dien Bien Phu area. With the movement of the 316th,
only 2,000 of the 35,000 enemy troops formerly in
northwest Tonkin will remain there.
According to a senior French official, there is
no indication as yet of a build-up of supplies by the
Viet Minh of the proportions needed for an all-out
assault on the delta. This official believes there
will be no major attack by the Viet Minh before
September, but that the Viet Minh will attempt during
the summer to cut supply lines and strangle Hanoi.
This view is concurred in by the American army attache
in Saigon, who believes that for the near future, the
primary Viet Minh target in the delta will continue
to be the road and railroad between Hanoi and Haiphong.
STAT
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40524
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H
Laos: The threat of another Communist drive on
Luang Prabang during the current rainy season has
receded with the impending movement of most of the
Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu to the delta. It is
possible, however, that minor Viet Minh elements re-
maining in northwest Tonkin and northern Laos will
attempt to recapture several small French outposts
between Luang Prabang and the Tonkin border.
Cambodia: The French have announced the evacua-
tion o em Pang in the north, which was attacked
last month by two invading Viet Minh battalions. The
French stated that the withdrawal was made to permit
the organization of the Siem Pang troops into a mobile
group. There have been no further reports of military
activity by the Viet Minh battalions in Cambodia.
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American training: According to the American
embassy in Saigon, neral Ely has accepted in principle
General ?'Daniel's concept of having the Vietnamese
army trained by American advisers. Although he em-
phasized that there would be no American participation
in operational planning, he agreed that the advisers
should be attached to Vietnamese combat units. American
officials in Saigon say the Vietnamese minister of
defense would like to have the entire training program
administered by the US army.
Dien Bien Phu wounded: French personnel allowed
in Dien Bien PT-u-H-ave seen no Vietnamese prisoners
there, and assume the Viet Minh is moving them else-
where. Viet Minh spokesmen stated that the enlisted
troops have volunteered to join the Viet Minh.
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INDOCHINA
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26 May 1954 Muang Kh Keen Mukdehars
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FRENCH UNION FORCES
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POINTS OE CA MAU .,.
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Base 12516 11-53 105 110
-15 40526
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FRENCH UNION FORCES VIET MINH FORCES
FRENCH
ASSOCIATED
TOTAL
COMBAT
STRENGTH
AREA
REGULARS
REGIONAL
EQUIVALENT
TOTAL
COMBAT
STRENGTH
39 Id Bns
31 Id Bns
70 Inf Bns
86
500
33 Inf Bns
35 Id Bns
68 Id Bits
53,200
12 Arty Bns
2 Arty Bns
14 Arty Bns
,
I Arty Bn
1 Arty Bn
18 Lt Bns
18 Lt Bns
5 Inf Bns
2 Art
Bns
16 Id Bns
0 Arty Bns
21 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
22,500
II
4 Id Bns
0 A
B
t
10 Inf Bns
11 w Bns
s
0 A
B
t
10,100
y
4 Lt Bns
4 Lt Bns
r
ns
y
n
r
y
8 Inf Bns
7 Inf Bns
13 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
2 Arty Bns
14,800
III
4 ArtB Bns
0
3 Inf Bns
77 InftB B
4,800
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bns
6 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
23 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
29 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
35,500
IV
15 Int Ens
1
6 Inf Bns
24 Inf Bns
149900
Arty Bns
0 Arty Ens
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bns
5 Inf Bns
12 Id Bns
17 Inf Bns
V
10 Inf Bns
12 Id Bns
22 Id Bns
15
000
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bits
0 Arty Bns
22,500
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
,
19 Lt Bns
19 Lt Bns
0 Inf Bns
6 Id Bns
8 Inf Bns
?
VI
0 Inf Bns
3 Id Bns
3 Inf Bns
500
2
0 Arty Ens
0 Arty Ens
0At
ty Bns
7,300
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
,
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bna
10 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
1 Inf Bn
0 Arty Bn
11 Id Bns
1 Arty Bn
11,000
V11
4 In! Bits
4 Inf Bits
8 ~ Bits
6000
'
1 Lt Bn
1 Lt Bn
I Arty Bns
1 Arty Bn
8 Inf Bns
5 Inf Bns
13 Id Bns
13,500
V~ii
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4 Ed Ens
7 Id Bns
11 Id Bits
7
500
500
Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Ens
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
,
,
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bns
IX
37 Inf Bns
9 Id Bns
46 Inf Bns
37,800
4 Arty Bns
4 Arty Bns
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Political
Saigon: The deteriorating security situation in
Saigon marked by new indications of professional
incompetence and power-grabbing on the part of the
Binh Xuyen, the gangster organization to which Bao
Dai gave police control some weeks ago. The French
have revised their earlier estimate that Binh Xuyen
control of the police, while disastrous politically,
would not enhance Viet Minh capabilities. According
to a senior French official, the resignation of hundreds
of experienced policemen and their replacement by
Binh Xuyen incompetents is playing into the hands
of the Viet Minh.
The Binh Xuyen's political ambitions have been
greatly excited by its acquisition of the police ar-
senal, and there is a strong possibility of armed
clashes between its forces and those of the Vietnam
National Army. A Reuters correspondent told an embassy
official that the Binh Xuyen had been ordered to take.
the side of local cab drivers in any dispute with a
white passenger. The American charge fears antiwhite
rioting.
The French are by no means confident they have
enough troops in Saigon to quell a major disturbance.
Law enforcement-has reportedly "dropped to nothing,"
thereby giving the Viet Minh and its sympathizers an
unparalleled opportunity to push anti-Western propa-
ganda. In the past week there have been unprecedented
references in the Saigon press to American "imperialism"
and Soviet "benevolence."
Central Vietnam: The security situation in central
Vietnam Is similarly precarious. The local militia
are reported to be entirely un-co-ordinated and leader-
less. A Vietnamese official has said that in the event
of an attack they would probably shoot each other rather
than the Viet. Minh. It is believed that a considerable
number of the many refugees entering Hue from the
provinces are Viet Minh agents.
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The increasing tendency of Vietnamese to take
matters into their own hands, both as individuals
and as groups, is evident in a constructive but prob-
ably belated program launched by the Vietnamese labor
minister which aims at the inauguration of a grass-
roots democratic movement through the formation of a
network of popularly elected local administrative
committeees.
The problems which will be encountered in any
attempt to renovate the government have been aggravated
by the continuing movement of influential Vietnamese
to Paris and Geneva on official or semiofficial
"missions." A recent sharp rise in requests by Viet-
namese for francs in exchange for piasters suggests
growing despair in some circles that Vietnam can be
held. The requests are camouflaged as being for the
expenses of the delegation or, on the part of one
cabinet minister, for the purchase of property in
France for his "retirement."
Laos: An unprecedented popular demonstration was
organize against the Communist powers' build-up of the
so-called "Pathet Lao" regime. Although the demonstra-
tion was undoubtedly organized by the government, it
may promote the development of widespread nationalist,
-anti-Communist feeling.
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Cambodia: Premier Penn Nouth threatened to dis-
sociate Cambodia's currency from the franc unless
certain customs duties collected in Vietnam were re-
mitted to Cambodia in accordance with earlier agree-
ments with France. Whether or not this specific threat
is carried out, it is evident Cambodia is pressing hard
to give maximum reality to its economic as well as
political independence.
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Bao Dai: In talks with American officials at his
resort ea quarters near Geneva, Bao Dai loftily dis-
missed reports of Vietnamese political disintegration
and attributed any political ferment to France's failure
to clarify its int and meet Vietnamese demands
for independence.
Bao Dai gave no indication he would return to
Vietnam or act decisively in any way beyond indicating
through one of his aides that he might remove Premier
Buu Loc and replace him by the overrated Catholic lay
leader, Ngo Dinh Diem. Such a move would be useless
or worse, and would merely postpone the regeneration
of Vietnam which would be possible under either one
of two outstanding men as premiers--Governor Tri of
Tonkin or Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat.
The American charge at Saigon warns that if Bao
Dai returns to Vietnam "his evil genius," Nguyen De,
must be left behind.
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Communist Position
The discussions during the first week of restricted
sessions on Indochina were devoted entirely to proce-
dural matters. The pattern of Communist tactics sug-
gested that the bloc delegates are seeking (1) to stall
serious negotiations while watching the course of mili-
tary and political developments in Indochina and Paris;
(2) to maneuver the conference into accepting the Commu-
nist proposals for an Indochina settlement as a basis
for negotiations; and (3) to gain acceptance of the
principle that all three Indochinese states should be
given simultaneous consideration and equal treatment.
The last step would achieve a measure of international
recognition for the "resistance governments" of Laos
and Cambodia and help to consolidate the "liberated
areas" under the control of the Communist-sponsored
regimes.
17 May: The Communists opened the first restricted
session, n 17 May, with a maneuver aimed at creating
the impression, particularly within the French govern-
ment, that they were willing to negotiate a cease-fire
without prior agreement on terms of a political settle-
ment. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation
attached great importance to both the military and
political aspects of the Indochina question and
believed that they were closely linked, but that, since
the military aspect was covered by both proposals, it
might be taken up first.
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Molotov's next move was aimed at blocking Western
efforts to have Laos and Cambodia dealt with separately
from Vietnam. He suggested that if the conference
accepted his proposal to adopt both the Viet Minh and
French draft proposals as a basis for negotiations, sub-
stantive talks would begin with the question as to
whether Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with
separately.
18 Ma May: The conference accepted Molotov's pro-
posal on 18 May--only to hear the Viet Minh delegate
in the second restricted session flatly reject the
principle of separation. He argued that war and peace
are indivisible in Indochina, that the same military
and political problems obtain throughout Indochina,
and that the only solution would be a simultaneous
cease-fire throughout the peninsula, followed by a
political settlement which would provide unification
in each of the three states. Molotov and Chou En-lai
also rejected the separate approach to Laos and Cambodia.
19 Ma : Molotov concluded the third restricted
session by stating he was not asking for a decision on
the principle of separation and he desired to conduct a
point-by-point discussion of the military aspects of
the French and Viet Minh proposals at the next
restricted meeting.
. 200 May: In separate conversations with Eden,
Molotov and Chou appeared to be interested in breaking
the stalemate. Chou agreed that, military and political
aspects must be dealt with separately, with a priority
for a cease-fire, which should take effect in all three
states on the same date. Molotov also told Eden the
conference could get ahead by examining the French and
Viet Minh proposals for a cease-fire, which would
inevitably apply to all three states. Over and above
the cease-fire question, Molotov said the political
issues could be dealt with separately in each country,
and Chou stated that political settlements might be
different for the three states.
21 May: The conciliatory approach evident in these
private conversations was conspicuously absent from the
Viet Minh delegate's statement in the restricted session
on the following day. He rejected the idea of separate
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treatment of Cambodia and Laos, arguing that the
differences among the three states were of degree but
not of kind.
Molotov introduced additional points regarding
cease-fire negotiations clearly designed to prolong
such talks. He proposed that the Viet Minh and French
proposals be discussed with a view to finding what gen-
eral principles would be applicable to all three states,
to be followed by a discussion of the application of
these principles to each of the states separately.
In addition, Molotov in the 21 May session suggested
four other questions for discussion: (1) establishment
of zones for regrouping forces in each of the three
states; (2) nonintroduction of foreign troops or arms;
(3) supervision of the cease-fire agreement; and (4)
guarantees. He emphasized that these points referred
only to military aspects and that the political prob-
lems could be discussed later.
255M~Ma__y~: The Soviet foreign minister took up his
last ppin t during the fifth restricted session.. He
found "no great difference" between his five points
and the French list of questions to be discussed, but
noted the inseparability of the political and military
solutions and concluded that the conference should pro-
ceed to the discussion of the political problem after
a brief consideration of the military question.
Backed by Chou En-lai and the Viet Minh delegates,
Molotov urged that alternate conference sessions be
held on military and political problems. Molotov and
Chou both recommended direct French-Viet Minh contacts
in the field or at Geneva.
The American delegation at Geneva commented after
the 25 May session that the Communists seemed concerned
at the trend toward discussion of military before
political matters and were attempting to recover lost
ground. The delegation believed that Communist tactics
in this meeting discouraged the hope that the Commu-
nists might, while reserving their position, permit
substantive discussion on military matters to proceed
without simultaneously injecting political issues.
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The delegation concluded that the bloc delegates are
still playing for time on the premise that time is on
their side in Indochina.
Chinese Communist spokesmen at Geneva have continued
to show sensitivity to any suggestion that Peiping auto-
matically follows the Soviet lead, and Soviet sources
have continued to hint that the Chinese Communists are
more aggressive in Indochina policy than is Moscow.
These developments almost certainly represent a
joint Sino-Soviet maneuver. Both Moscow and Peiping
are interested in portraying Communist China as a
fifth great power with an "independent" foreign policy,
and both may feel that the West can be enticed into
asking Moscow to intervene with "those hotheads in
Peiping," thus bringing closer the kind of Indochina
settlement that both Moscow and Peiping want.
Vietnamese Position
The Vietnamese delegate, while agreeing to the
desirability of a cease-fire in Indochina, reminded
the conference on 25 May that Vietnam and France had
recently negotiated two treaties by which Vietnam had
achieved independence. He said his country must defend
this independence against all foreign dangers.
Laotian and Cambodian Position
The Laotian and Cambodian delegates continued to
maintain that there are no political problems to be
discussed once the invading Viet Minh troops have
been withdrawn from their states.
French Position
During the past week, Bidault continued to hold the
line on the original French demands for an armistice
agreement with international controls prior to either
a cease-fire or a political settlement. National Assem-
bly pressure limits his ability to maneuver; however,
he has expressed concern to American officials that
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the French public may take a dim view of his
inflexibility, and even his own party is reported
critical of his stand.
Moreover, there are indications in his seven-point
proposal of 24 May that he may have retreated from his
earlier insistence on the withdrawal of Viet Minh
forces from Laos and Cambodia.
Bidault's job has been further complicated by
reports of double-dealing within the French delegation
at Geneva. According to these reports, Secretary for
the Associated States Jacquet has appointed two repre-
sentatives to deal directly with the Viet Minh and is
spreading the story that Bidault is not doing enough
to reach an agreement. Jacquet has been one of the
strongest proponents of negotiations in the French
cabinet and got into trouble with Laniel over his
premature response to the Ho offer to negotiate on
29 November.
British Position
Britain still has not advanced any proposals of
its own in the Indochina negotiations, and is con-
tinuing to serve as spokesman for the West, both in
the conference sessions and in informal approaches to
the Communists.
In a conversation on 20 May, Eden warned Chou En-
lai that the Indochina situation might lead to unpre-
dictable and serious results, and that Peiping must
not count on Britain to prevent this from happening.
Eden said that in a showdown Britain would stand with
the United States. At a dinner with Molotov the same
day, Eden took the opportunity to emphasize that press
rumors of Anglo-American differences were unfounded.
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SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA
Soviet propaganda has shown sensitivity to reports--
which it declares are false--that Moscow and Peiping
have agreed to consider the settlements for Laos and
Cambodia separately from that for Vietnam. While soft-
pedaling its earlier call for the "resistance govern-
ments" of Pathet Lao and Khmer to be represented at
Geneva, Moscow radio still treats the Associated States
as a geographic whole, united in a "struggle for nation-
al liberation."
The Soviet press and radio have also continued to
denounce the United States for plotting to create a
Southeast Asian "military bloc," and for making charges
of Chinese Communist intervention as a screen for
American intervention and as a means of coercing the
allies in supporting American policy.
East Germany
An East German commentary of 11 May suggested
that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 might apply to the
Indochina conflict--the only such suggestion noted. The
commentary accused the United States of working toward
a Southeast Asian military bloc directed against China--
which, it said, "one is well advised to remember, is
closely linked to the USSR by a treaty of friendship
and assistance."
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Peiping's propaganda has followed Moscow in
emphasizing the "legitimacy" of the contrived regimes
which share the. "liberation" struggle with the Viet
Minh, while ceasing to insist that they be individually
represented at,Geneva.
The Soviet New Times of 15 May reprinted a map
from a Chinese Communist magazine of March 1954 which
shows larger portions of the three Associated States
as being under Viet Minh control than has any map
previously published in the Soviet press.
In apparent response to a statement by the Thai
chief of staff that Thailand would not object to the
free world's establishing military bases there, Peiping
has charged Thailand with co-operating in American
plans to turn that country into a base for intervening
in Indochina.
Viet Minh propaganda has echoed Moscow and Peiping
in portraying the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
as united in a struggle for "liberation." in contrast
to its earlier stress on a cease-fire and negotiations
outside the Geneva conference, this propaganda now
emphasizes the need for a settlement at Geneva.
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FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS
France
Premier Laniel continues to be under unrelenting
pressure from the National Assembly to explore every
possibility for a settlement at Geneva. Meanwhile he
is trying to build up French forces in Indochina to
prevent a military disaster.
The High Council of National Defense, which decided
initially to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina
"in the immediate future," subsequently suspended
action on this plan until it hears from Generals Ely,
Salan and Pelissier, whom it sent to make an on-the-
spot survey of the Indochinese situation. There are
rumors in Indochina that the generals will ask that
at least two more divisions be sent and that General
Navarre be relieved of his command. The American
charge in Saigon, however, reports that Ely will
recommend that only one division be transferred.
Pending the report of the generals, smaller
forces are being sent. According to the American
embassy in Paris, these total 5,000 men and consist
of the following units: three battalions of Tabors
(North Africans similar to Goums), three Algerian
rifle battalions, two artillery units with a total
of 32 cannon, one "flight" of naval aircraft totaling
20 airplanes, and miscellaneous lesser units.
The government is also considering the possibility
of calling up next month the conscripts originally
scheduled for duty in October.
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The government hopes to convince the National
Assembly that military reinforcements are needed to
protect the expeditionary force by strengthening the
defenses of the Tonkin delta. The cabinet is also
anxious to remove the impression that the fall of
Dien Bien Phu broke the back of the French military
effort.
The increased effort now planned is only a stopgap
measure, however, and not an alternative to foreign
intervention or a cessation of hostilities.
General Ely told General O'Daniel in Saigon on 18
May, "The sooner you get into the war, the better we
will like it." While most French military leaders
and some cabinet members continue to urge American
intervention, a majority of the cabinet and of assem-
bly deputies profess to see such a move as the first
step toward general war. The assembly made it clear
in the two votes of confidence it grudgingly accorded
Laniel in the past three weeks that it expects the
government to bring the war to an end through
negotiations at Geneva.
Laniel was unable to forestall a new Indochina
debate following the return of the three generals,
although, thanks to the Ascension Day recess, the
cabinet is safe until 1 June. Laniel will face
severe questioning, however, when he requests the
additional funds now needed for Indochina. In par-
ticular, government efforts to enter into a Southeast
Asia alliance with the United States, but without
Britain, will evoke sharp attack.
Until it is absolutely clear that Geneva has
failed, there is little chance that the assembly
will accept a policy hostile to the climate of
negotiation.
Laniel may hope that reinforcements will serve
to strengthen France's position at Geneva and encour-
age early American participation in the war, but even
if the assembly accepts the program as a means to save
the delta, or to facilitate possible evacuation, it is
unlikely to be diverted from its increasing determina-
tion to rid France of the war burden.
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The American consul in Rabat, French Morocco,
suggests that the recent intensification of terrorist
activity there may be prompted by a nationalist desire
to take advantage of France's troubles in Asia. If
the French position in Indochina deteriorates, the
long-drawn-out conflict between the North African
nationalists and the French is expected to worsen.
The nationalists will probably press harder for
autonomy, while the French, who value North Africa
even more than Indochina, will be more determined than
ever to maintain their hold. The recent change of
resident generals in French Morocco underscores the
seriousness of the problem there and France's realiza-
tion that something must be done now to ameliorate the
situation.
Great Britain
Britain's approach to the Indochina problem has
apparently remained the same this week, despite a
flood of rumors about the special cabinet meeting last
week end. Foreign Secretary Eden reportedly indicated
after this meeting that he expects the next week or two
to be decisive at Geneva. This suggests he will persist
in the policy of offering the Communists every oppor-
tunity to reduce tension until their responsibility
for the failure of Geneva is clearly apparent.
The British government evidently enjoys unanimous
support, cutting across party lines, for its attempt
to serve as an honest broker in East-West negotiations.
Eden especially has won great favor for his intensive
effort to bring Asian nations around to supporting a
collective security plan for Southeast Asia. Should
Eden be forced to report the failure of the Geneva
talks, he could probably count on wide support for a
"stronger government policy" toward Asian questions.
Resentment in the press against American criticism
of Britain's position seems best summarized in a state-
ment of the Washington correspondent of The Times of
London that "Britain has no Indochina policy and is
keeping quiet about it. The United States has no
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Indochina policy and is talking about it at the top of
its voice." This attitude is, nevertheless, frequently
tempered by a widespread editorial nervousness over the
state of the Anglo-American alliance.
Differences between the United States and Britain
on methods of promoting collective security in South-
east Asia have caused considerable concern in both
countries.
New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs Webb
said in Washington he could not conceive of a satis-
factory alliance being formed in Southeast Asia without
the British. He made it clear, however, that New Zea-
land was not reneging on its previous commitments.
The Australian minister of external affairs, Casey,
commented that the question of membership in any area
defense arrangement was hypothetical, since no offi-
cial steps have yet been taken toward its establishment.
He further said it was "quite clear" that Britain, the
United States, Australia and New Zealand are agreed on
the advisability of examining, together with other
governments concerned, the possibility of setting up a
mutual defense arrangement.
The Dutch press reflects concern over Geneva
natural in a country which still retains important
Southeast Asian interests. Both Catholic and inde-
pendent papers, despite a belief that Britain is doing
an effective diplomatic job at Geneva, have approved
the American position that early organization of a
collective defense system in the area is necessary.
The papers reveal some doubt, however, that the United
States is in a position to undertake a decisive policy
in Southeast Asia.
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There have been new indications of growing Burmese
concern over the Communist threat.
Malcolm MacDonald, British commissioner general in
Southeast Asia, told Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon on 19
May he believed the Burmese government during the past
two months had developed a "surprisingly realistic"
appraisal of the Communist danger. He referred to a
conversation he had had with Kyaw Nyein, the Burmese
acting foreign minister, in which the latter expressed
fear of Communist encirclement of Burma and showed deep
concern over the possibility of a Communist takeover in
Indochina.
After his election on 24 May to the chairmanship of
the Asian Socialist Conference, which is now meeting in
Burma, Kyaw Nyein delivered a scathing denunciation of
Russian imperialism. He'stated that Soviet-style
imperialism "is more dangerous than the old 19th
century colonialism,...is more degrading,...is more
ruthless, more systematic."
Despite these indications of increasing realism
among important Burmese leaders, there is little reason
to believe that Burma is on the verge of abandoning
its "neutral" foreign policy.
Burmese defense minister Ba Swe, the outgoing chair-
man of the Asian Socialist Conference, is quoted as
saying that the time appeared ripe for an Asian Locarno
act, which presumably would include Communist China_
k'inaily, the American embassy in
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Rangoon reports there have been some editorial departures
from neutrality, but most of the press and public opinion
solidly supports the government's officially neutral
position.
Indonesia
Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta reports there have
been a number of indications in the past year that the
general Indonesian view that Ho Chi Minh is the leader
of a struggle essentially like their own against the
Dutch has run up against nagging doubts about Ho's inde-
pendence of Communist China. The Indonesian press did
not hail the fall of Dien Bien Phu as a victory in the
fight against colonialism, and has shown an increasing
tendency to recognize Ho's dependence on Peiping. One
paper warned him against going from the "mouth of the
lion to the mouth of the crocodile."
Cumming believes, however, that Indonesian leaders
are not prepared to acknowledge their concern publicly,
fearing that to do so might look like siding with the
West. He also feels that Indonesians believe their
geographical location, coupled with whatever moves the
West may make in Southeast Asia, will provide "an
umbrella which will give them time to formulate their
own position."
Meanwhile, an official of the Foreign Ministry has
denied reports that the government was considering some
sort of regional defense arrangement--possibly including
Communist China--as an alternative to the American plan.
He qualified his statement, however, by stating that
Indonesia favored exploring any possibility of reducing
tensions in Southeast Asia.
Philippines
Scattered press comment condemned the Soviet pro-
posal at Geneva for the creation of a neutral commission,
citing the example set in Korea. Speaking in Chicago,
Carlos Romulo, the personal representative of President
Magsaysay in the United States, said the Philippines
would join a Southeast Asian defense pact only if it
were "for freedom, as well as against Communism."
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In Manila Magsaysay confidentially informed an
American army officer he was planning to discuss with
political leaders the conditions under which the Philip-
pine government would enter into an Asian or Southeast
Asian bloc. With his party split by the ultranational-
istic Senator Recto's bid for leadership, the president
must move carefully.
Premier Nu informed Ambassador Donovan on 23 May
he would immediately authorize Foreign Minister Wan to
submit Thailand's complaint against Communist aggression
in Laos and Cambodia to the Security Council. The day
before, Wan had told Under Secretary Smith in Geneva
he was in agreement with the planned procedure and would
send Thailand's resident representative to the United
Nations back to New York in the "very near future" to
handle the matter.
Other Thai officials also gave strong support to
the Western position on Indochina.
The director general of the Public Relations
Office affirmed a statement by the army deputy chief
of staff that Thailand would permit the establishment
of foreign military bases if they were under the
auspices of the UN. He went on to say that Thailand
might have to send troops to Indochina without waiting
to be attacked.
The Thai ambassador to Washington, who is now in
Bangkok, told the press Thailand favors a cease-fire
in Indochina before negotiating a political settlement,
as well as a Viet Minh withdrawal from Laos and Cam-
bodia. In this connection, Foreign Minister Wan cabled
from Geneva he had told a British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion representative Thailand was prepared to join in
supervising any elections in Indochina that may be
agreed on at the conference.
The American embassy in Bangkok reports that local
press reaction to these developments has been divided.
Government-controlled papers strongly support the
united action policy, while others have expressed
reservations if not outright opposition.
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Japan
Japanese diplomacy took no strong clear line on the
Indochina situation.
Japanese editorial writers were divided this week
in their opinions on the Indochina situation. Some
newspapers criticized the American proposal for a
Southeast Asian pact as indicating a lack of interest
in the Geneva peace talks, while others praised the
action as the "only practical guarantee of peace."
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Editorial comment described French policy since
1945 as "narrow in concept and timid in execution,"
and called it the element principally responsible for
the loss of Dien Bien Phu. One editorial praised the
diplomacy of Britain as superior to America's "ideal-
istic and tactless" diplomacy because it takes the
anticolonial psychology of Asian neutralist nations
into account. Another editorial in the same paper
attacked British diplomacy as "appeasement" of the
Communists which is unlikely to bring about a settle-
ment and only serves to weaken the United States'
position at Geneva.
South Korea
On 20 May President Rhee publicly renewed his
offer to send troops to Indochina. He described the
situation as "almost hopeless," and called for
immediate action on the part of the free world to
supply arms, train native troops and increase air
power there. He also said it is impossible to win
a war without attacking the sources of military
supplies, and that it was senseless to fear that an
attack on Chinese supply routes would bring China into
the war, since China was already taking part.
Ambassador Briggs reports that Rhee's attitude
toward the United States has hardened perceptibly
since the fall of Dien Bien Phu and since Britain's
attitude toward the Southeast Asian pact has become
known. He thinks that Rhee is convinced the United
States now cannot get along without him.
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