NIC ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

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NIC Organization and The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is comprised of the National
Mission Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their assistants, and the Analytic Group. The
National Intelligence Officers serve as personal staff officers and senior
advisers to the DCI in their respective areas of functional or regional
responsibilities. They are responsible for producing National Intelligence
Estimates and other interagency assessments. In this function, the NIC is
the successor to the Board and Office of National Estimates, established in
1950, as the DCI organization to produce intelligence estimates for the
President.
The National Intelligence Officers are selected from senior officers in the
Intelligence Community, the Foreign Service, the military services, acade-
mia, and the private sector. They are responsible to the DCI and serve him
largely in his role of leader of the Intelligence Community. Collectively,
the NIOs sit as the National Intelligence Council. The Council has a
chairman and two vice chairmen.
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The Products There are four types of coordinated Intelligence Community papers. The
most formal and authoritative of the four is the National Intelligence
Estimate-the NIE. A recent example is an NIE published in September
1986 called Colombia: Prospects for the New Government, which exam-
ined the prospects of President Barco and his projected ability to deal with
a growing insurgency and a thriving narcotics industry. Such country
specific NIEs are becoming less typical, as we seek to broaden our
estimates regionally and functionally. Special National Intelligence Esti-
mates-or SNIEs-are similar to NIEs but deal with more time-urgent
issues. SNIEs are often specially requested by a policymaker and written in
a matter of weeks or days.
The two other forms of
estimates are: Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM) and Interagency
Intelligence Assessments (IIA). Both are issued by the Chairman of the
NIC, rather than the DCI. IIMs address topics in more detail, and IIAs
have a quick turnaround but are usually of less immediate concern to
senior policymakers than SNIEs. Finally, Memoranda to Holders may be
issued for any of these four types of estimates, to update or amplify its
judgments.
The total number of estimates produced between 1979 and 1986 steadily in-
creased to an almost even balance of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs and IIAs. In mid-
1986 the annual production plan was restructured to implement the DCI's
decision to undertake more estimates that cut across traditional analytic
disciplines and to reduce the number of conventional-style country-oriented
NIEs, particularly on areas of marginal policy relevance. This year the
plan includes about 100 formal estimative products, a list that, to assure
relevance, is flexible and subject to revision. The list does not include the
stream of less formal products constantly in production by the NIOs, their
assistants, and members of the Analytic Group to advise the DCI or
stimulate thought throughout the Community.
The following charts indicate for 1986 the percentage of formal products
by type, the genesis of the requests, and the agencies providing the drafters,
the latter two indicate the degree of Community involvement in tasking
and execution that is typical of NIC production.
NIOs frequently attempt to challenge the Community to reexamine the
conventional wisdom, and in the process often include alternative scenarios
as well as indicators that will alert policymakers to a possible change in
trends. An estimate on the Philippine succession written in 1985 discussed a
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broad range of less likely succession possibilities which could be used in de-
veloping policy options. Estimates before 1983 usually had focused only on
what the Intelligence Community believed to be the most likely scenario.
When agencies differ on important issues, these differences are highlighted
either through parallel text or footnotes. For example, a recent estimate
entitled Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System, stated that Soviet
domestic problems are likely to push Gorbachev to seek a restoration of de-
tente. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Air Force took a different
tack, arguing that Soviet internal problems are not a significant variable
concerning Moscow's foreign policies.
The estimative product is reviewed at every stage and at the end, feedback
is sought from policymakers through formal and informal channels. It is
enormously helpful when a senior official takes the time to write a note or
call to give views on an estimate-positive or negative.
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Confidential
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Types of National Estimates Produced,
1986
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Requesters of National Estimates,
1986
Policy Community
10%
NFIB
Agencies 23%
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DCI/NIO
67%
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Principal Drafters -o# National Estimates,
1986
DOE
1%
INR
5%
DIA
5%
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The Process In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with topics that
are relevant and timely; they must reach the right officials before key
decisions are made. The most critical step in the estimate process is the se-
lection of topics to be considered. A policymaker or the Director may ask
that the Community take a thorough look at an issue. Alternatively, an
NIO or the Chairman of the NIC may initiate an estimate in order to an-
ticipate policymakers' needs-i.e., what he needs to hear, not necessarily
what he wants to hear. Thus, successful NIOs must be constantly in touch
with their key consumers as well as specialists in their field.
The NIC involves all of the components of the Intelligence Community in
the rigorous process of developing and coordinating an annual production
plan that is constantly updated throughout the year. Three DCI panels also
participate in this process by advising on the analytic soundness and policy
relevance of the plan and on key estimates in their fields. (The Military Ad-
visory Panel is composed of eight retired flag officers, former ambassadors,
systems analysts, and a university professor. The Science and Technology
Advisory Panel is made up of nine leaders of industry; and the in-house
five-member Senior Review Panel includes former ambassadors, retired
flag officers, and a distinguished scientist.)
The estimative process has five stages, which involve all components of the
Intelligence Community:
? Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP addresses the
estimate's origin and purpose and asks key questions to be answered; the
TORs outline in greater detail the central issues to be addressed in the
estimate. The development of the CP/TOR is closely supervised by the
NIOs, as it sets the stage for all that follows. The CP/TOR are reviewed
and approved by the DCI for coordination and distributed to the
representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) Principals
who meet to discuss and amend them.
? Writing the Estimates. The NIO supervising the preparation of the
estimate selects a drafter from the Intelligence Community. When the
draft is completed, it is reviewed by the NIO, the Chairman of the NIC,
and by the DCI's Senior Review Panel. When possible, estimates are also
reviewed by specialists outside the Community and other DCI panels.
Estimates accommodating these comments as appropriate are sent to the
DCI with a recommendation that they be sent to NFIB Agencies for
formal coordination.
? Coordination. Formal coordination meetings among NFIB representa-
tives are held and differences are either resolved or highlighted, with
emphasis on the latter when they are significant. Dissenting views are
clearly stated in the estimates as alternative language or footnotes.
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? NFIB Approval. The DCI reviews the estimate after coordination and
then submits it to NFIB Principals for final coordination. NFIB reviews
the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds additional
alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the DCI approve
or remand it.
? Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is
sought from the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis.
Further, retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared for
treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have
changed and why.
Assuring Quality/Relevance
A good estimate digs deep, probes for factual bases of disagreement,
highlights the critical uncertainties, and raises questions that need more
attention. Top quality estimates do not necessarily simplify a policymaker's
job; rather an excellent estimate widens the policyniaker's agenda and
pushes the individual toward more extensive reflection. Getting a high
quality, highly relevant product out of a process involving several agencies
is not an easy task. We have taken several approaches:
? NIOs attempt to integrate traditional areas of analysis (such as political,
economic, social and military) in many broad estimates. For instance, an
estimate in production on Islamic fundamentalism will look at this as a
regional phenomenon. This study will examine the influence this religious
revival is having on the social patterns, economic practices, and political
behavior of key Arab states as well as discuss the implications for the
United States.
? Where appropriate, estimates cut across regional and functional analytic
lines. For example, the NIC has produced an estimate on the prospects
for counterterrorist cooperation among developed countries, and is
preparing an estimate on the outlook for US foreign basing and access
rights worldwide.
? Another will take a regional look at ASEAN rather than the usual
country or event-specific approach. Still another will give policymakers a
better understanding of the rapid shift in economic power to the newly in-
dustrialized countries in East Asia.
? Occasionally we will attempt a totally new type of estimate. One such
planned estimate will look at about 10 international high impact, low
probability events. Individually, the probability of these events occurring
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is low; however, their occurrence would have a dramatic impact on the
international system. The Estimate will provide warning indicators of
their potential emergence.
Estimates and the Intelligence/Policy Connection
Occasionally charges are made that judgments in some estimates were
written to justify a particular pre-existing policy preference. The Tower
Commission expressed this concern. There have been other instances in
recent years of accusations of policy corruption of objective NIC judg-
ments as well. This is particularly marked on issues concerning Iran,
Central America, the USSR in the Third World, and overall Soviet
policies. The NIC must tell it like it is, and let the chips fall where they
may, and that is just what we attempt to do. We always have been, and will
continue to be, careful to maintain the independence of the intelligence
process. While we seek policy relevance, we seek to avoid policy prescrip-
tion. Our analyses have not always been congenial to the policy communi-
ty. Examples of estimates that reexamined the conventional wisdom, in
some cases contradicting the assumptions underlying an administration
? policy, are listed below. These examples, moreover, were picked from a
much longer list:
? One recent estimate concluded that for the next few years constraints on
Soviet hard currency would not be serious enough to spur a major shift in
their foreign policy nor require Moscow to make fundamental economic
reforms. The White House and some advisers at the NSC disagreed.
? In three estimates on Libya spanning five years, the Community was far
more cautious and pessimistic about the impact of US political, econom-
ic, and covert sanctions on Qadhafi than some administration policy
officials.
? Major estimates on Soviet strategic programs have often dealt with
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Estimate Process
I IdeaTOR --~.MM. Review
Feedback Draft
Publication Review
.to/
Community
Community
NFIB
Approval
Review
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Coordination
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Strengths and Weak- Strengths
nesses of the NIC
The strength of the NIOs derives from their freedom from the demands of
current intelligence production and requirements, their focus on the longer
term intelligence and trends, and their access to the DCI. Careful selection
of senior people, with experience and stature in their fields, from a variety
of professional and institutional backgrounds, provides objective advice and
avoids institutional biases. The independence of the individual NIOs and
their allegiance only to the DCI is intended to avoid conflict with policy or
budget interests that tend to influence, or at least give the impression of in-
fluencing, the judgments of the intelligence services of the individual
agencies.
The limited ability of the Community to devote resources to a broad range
of in-depth research limits the longer term estimative work of the NIC.
The problem will persist to the extent that Community intelligence
analysts tend to act more as all-source reports officers than in-depth
researchers.
In addition, many of the the major questions require highly judgmental
answers, which by nature go beyond any specific body of evidence. The
questions call for political judgments of a high order with no certainty of
being correct. Analysts tend to shrink from many judgments sought by the
policymaker because the evidentiary base is too thin; yet these judgments
can and must be made, even if qualified by explicit statements that they
are based upon limited data.
We try to identify the major variables that could affect our best judgment
and to determine how those variables might affect the outcome. In sum, we
try as much to describe the environment within which future events will
take place as we do to provide a judgment on what is most likely to happen.
Another problem is the difficulty in arriving at crisp judgments through
the Community coordination process. The search for consensus often
reduces the punch of those judgments, except where significant disagree-
ments lead to alternative text or footnotes. We frequently use uncoordinat-
ed typescripts to reexamine and challenge the accepted wisdom and to get
those analyses before policymakers.
The NIC's estimates production schedule routinely falls prey to staff
shortages, NIO personnel changes, delays in receiving sensitive source
materials, competition for the services of qualified drafters, the necessary
Intelligence Community review and coordination process, and the need to
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spend valuable time in recasting less than acceptable drafts. As a result,
there is a "bow wave" of estimates in queue awaiting production.
One of the strengths of the NIO system is its ability to bring the NIOs into
contact with policymakers, providing the NIOs a firsthand opportunity to
see the latter's information needs. This is a two-edged sword. A close
working relationship is vital to our ability to provide intelligence relevant to
policy decisions. Too close a relationship can lead to perceptions that the
independent intelligence process can be compromised for policy-or politi-
cal-purposes. We strive to maintain a proper separation between policy
and intelligence in order to maintain our objectivity.
There is a constant need for NIO knowledge of "blue team" activities, that
is, what our own policymakers are doing that affect foreign developments.
We always need better information on the day-to-day intentions, planning,
and operations of State, DOD, and CIA's Directorate of Operations in
selected covert activities in order to have a full picture of the forces at play
in foreign developments and to warn of unsuspected pitfalls.
There are the problems associated with finding, acquiring, and retaining
the best possible personnel for the NIC. A major hurdle is the stringent
hiring process-particularly the rigorous polygraph examination and the
length of the interview and -testing procedures-for anyone wishing to work
in this building. We need to seek a representative sample of personnel from
agencies and institutions inside and outside of government in the interest of
a broad intellectual base. Too often, outstanding candidates simply are
either intimidated and decline our offer, or exhaust their patience and
accept another job offer.
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Formal Estimative Projects Chaired by NlOs*, 1986
Africa 8
At Large-Non Proliferation 2
Counterterrorism 7
East Asia 11
Economics 4
Europe 3
General Purpose Forces 4
Latin America 8
Narcotics 1
Near East South Asia 14
Science and Technology 3.5
Strategic Programs 4.5
USSR 2
Chairman NIC 3
Total 75
* Does not Include other NIO products such as memos
to the DCI, think pieces for the Intelligence community, etc.
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SWOOIIWACS STAFF to
10
15
20 25
Percent
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NIO/Africa I. Key Issues
? Libya's Defeat in Chad. Qadhafi's army has been literally decimated,
although President Habre's forces probably will need several more
months to expel the remaining Libyans in the north. So rapid was the
Chadian success that US policymakers have not fully formulated a
follow-on US policy. They need assessments of Qadhafi's likely moves
(including new Chad military ventures, new terrorism in Africa, and
renewed subversion in neighboring Sudan and Niger), French intentions,
and Habre's military intentions and capabilities.
? Instability and Economic Stagnation in Southern Africa. US decision-
makers are rethinking policy toward southern Africa. They seek new
ways to use our preferred diplomatic and economic tools to reduce
regional and civil violence, promote economic development and political
liberalization, and curb Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe.
H. Agenda
With nearly 50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the wide variety of
problems that arise there, the NIO/AF must prioritize and be highly
selective in choosing topics for Intelligence Community studies. Top
priority currently goes to the myriad issues in southern Africa (including
the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars, South Africa's domestic situation
and regional relations, and Soviet military aid and influence in the region)
along with Libyan activities in the Sahel belt (especially the war in Chad
and Libyan activities in Sudan and West Africa). Second-order priorities
include new problems in US relations with old friends Zaire, Kenya, and
Sudan-problems aggravated recently by unavoidable reductions in levels
of US foreign aid. Long-term and persistent issues are led by Africa's
continuing economic decline and accompanying political instability, and
also include major natural disasters such as famine, drought, and the
growing AIDS pandemic.
III. Estimative Program
A total of eight estimative products were completed in 1986 and 10 are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/East Asia I. Key Issues
? Challenges in the Philippines. The situation in the Philippines is more
difficult than many US policymakers have been willing to admit.
President Aquino faces serious challenges from a stalled economy, a
Communist insurgency, and even her own military.
? Potential for Political Instability in South Korea. An unpopular Chun
Doo Hwan claims he will step down from the Presidency in 1988.
However, it is likely that he will try to retain political power from behind
the scenes. An increasingly confrontational opposition is pushing for
direct presidential elections, while the ruling party wants a parliamentary
cabinet system that will ensure its continued rule. The uncertain
domestic political situation is increasing the likelihood of political
instability and the potential for a military move by North Korea. L
? Uncertainty in China. The removal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang
and the slowing of reforms raise prospects of further instability as
prospective successors to aging Deng Xiaoping jockey for position.
Retrenchment on domestic and foreign policies would set back China's
opening to the US and the West.
II. Agenda
The sheer number of Asian nations and the multitude of problems needing
attention require the NIO/EA to structure his agenda with priorities much
in mind. Top priorities of the moment include the Korean Peninsula, the
Philippines, and China. Right behind these hot issues come a number of
second-order problems that could move to the front burner rather quickly,
including developments on Taiwan and Indochina. A number of other
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issues, presently more of a potential problem, need watching so that they do
not catch us by surprise. The situation in Cambodia and developments in
Indonesia fall into this category.
M. Estimative Program
A total of 11 estimative products were completed in 1986 and 11 are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Europe I. Key Issues
? Threats to NATO's Security Consensus. The Iceland summit and
Gorbachev's latest INF proposal have stimulated reevaluation of security
policies in Europe. The European left is embracing nonaggressive defense
strategies that would weaken NATO, and there is movement toward
greater European cooperation that excludes the US. Other potential
threats to NATO cohesion include differences over counterterrorist
policies, protectionism, and out-of-area disputes.
? NATO's Southern Flank. With early elections probable in Italy and
Portugal, possible clashes in US-Spanish base negotiations, and height-
ened tensions between Greece and Turkey, new problems-and potential
crises-could erupt. Soviet probing is probable in connection with
Gorbachev's planned visits to Italy and Greece.
? Western Opportunities in Eastern Europe. Imminent succession strug-
gles and continued economic decline are key issues in Eastern Europe.
Moreover, there are signs of increased friction in the Warsaw Pact as a
result of Gorbachev's aggressive new policies and stiffer Soviet trade
demands.
H. Agenda
The NIO/Europe accords top priority currently to issues relating to the
transatlantic alliance, including
growing threats to the NATO consensus. Secondary concern goes to
programs designed to strengthen early warning capabilities in areas of high
crisis potential, such as Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. A third
priority includes efforts to upgrade analytic and collection resources
focused on Eastern Europe at a time of high uncertainty, and potentially of
profound changes.
III. Estimative Program
A total of three estimative products were completed in 1986 and four are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
orlyl
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NIO/Latin America I. Key Issues
? The Sandinista Threat to Central America. The insurgency faces an
uphill struggle, the Sandinistas are consolidating power, and Soviet
support to Nicaragua is increasing.
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? Latin American Debt. Mounting foreign debt afflicts the entire Third
World, but only in Latin America could default have traumatic impact
on the world financial system and economy. The region owes the rest of
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? Narcotics. The narcotics flow from the Andean, countries through
Mexico and the Caribbean to the US is increasing. We are losing the war
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? Insurgency in the Andean Countries. Marxist-Leninist groups are ex-
panding in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. They are mostly Cuban
or Soviet-supported, with some Sandinista involvement.
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? Mexican Instability. Mexico's continued economic problems are result-
ing in a number of negative trends, including loss of popular support to
the regime, rising drug trafficking, and continued illegal immigration to
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H. Agenda
Responsible for yet another area encompassing numerous countries and
diverse issues, the NIO/LA must prioritize Community efforts on Latin
America. Most pressing issues involve the Nicaraguan insurgency and the
Soviet/Cuban foothold in Central America. Of secondary but high impor-
tance are the issues of Latin American debt, narcotics, and instability in
Mexico. Continuing concerns revolve around chronic instability in Latin
American countries and in their relations with the United States, Soviet
Bloc, and Cuba.
M. Estimative Program
A total of eight estimative products were completed in 1986 and eight are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Near East and I. Key Issues
South Asia
? Iran-Iraq War. Iraq appears brittle, and a tactical loss could become an
Iraqi rout. Newly introduced weapons are increasing the threat to
shipping in the Gulf, and succession in Iran could have profound
implications.
? State-Supported Terrorism. The US and its allies differ over how to deal
with the terrorist threat. Other than Lebanon, however, state-supported
terrorism seems to be diminishing since the US bombing raid in Libya
and UK sanctions against Syria. Nonetheless, the problem remains
serious.
? Arab-Israeli Dispute. The US administration wants to reinvigorate the
peace process and shore up Egyptian stability, but policy discussion is
impeded by sensitivity and bias toward issues relating to Israel.
II. Agenda
A disproportionate share of the NIO/NESA's work is driven by ad hoc,
priority requests for quick, focused intelligence assessments. Recent papers
generated by these requests have focused on such issues as Egyptian
military construction in the Sinai, Egypt's deteriorating prospects, and
India's response to US efforts to improve bilateral relations. A second
category of production in the NESA area concerns chronic policy problems
that require frequent revisiting, such as the Iran-Iraq War, Libya, and the
Arab-Israeli military balance. The third element of our NESA production
involves long-term issues that affect US policy in the Middle East-such as
the implications for the US of the Islamic revival, perceptions among the
Arab states of the superpowers, and trends in Israeli social and political
dynamics.
III. Estimative Program
A total of 14 estimative products were completed in 1986 and 10 are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/USSR I. Key Issues
? Gorbachev's Position and Agenda. General Secretary Gorbachev is
staking out a bold agenda for political, economic, and social change in
the USSR, but support for his program in the leadership and ruling elite
remains precarious.
? US-Soviet Relations and Arms Control. Gorbachev also is shaking up
the Soviet foreign policy apparatus and altering long-held negotiation
positions in an effort to get an agreement that will restrict SDI and ease
? The Soviets in Afghanistan. The Soviets are trying new military tactics
and a more sophisticated political strategy, but they remain committed to
the maintenance of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
II. Agenda
The NIO/USSR will devote primary substantive attention to four subjects:
Gorbachev's domestic position and agenda; US-Soviet relations, especially
its arms control dimension; Soviet policy in Afghanistan; and Sino-Soviet
relations. All of these are issues with considerable potential for develop-
ments that could have significant impact on US interests and policy.
III. Estimative Program
A total of two estimative products were completed in 1986 and six are cur-
rently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/At Large and The National Intelligence Officer at Large manages the Analytic Group,
Director, Analytic an office of eight senior estimate drafters and two research assistants. They
Group review, comment on, and guide the production of interagency papers. In
1987 approximately 15 to 20 estimates, interagency memorandums, or
research papers will be drafted by officers within the Analytic Group.
The NIO also oversees the drafting and coordination of estimates on a
variety of global issues, particularly those dealing with Third World
instability and low-intensity conflict. The highest priority will assess the
prospects for US basing and access rights abroad b examining a broad
spectrum of potential regional developments The second
highest priority will be to respond to the DDCI's concerns that the current
mix of interagency estimates leaves unaddressed a number of potential
future developments that, though currently judged unlikely, would have a
substantial impact on US interests if they nevertheless took place, for
example, significant movement toward German reunification or the eco-
nomic and political collapse of Israel
Estimative Program
Five estimative products are currently planned for completion in 1987 to
address this agenda.
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NIO/At Large I. Agenda
(Nuclear Proliferation/
Chemical and Biologi- One of the highest priorities is the Pakistani and Indian nuclear issues.
cal Weapons) Monitoring nuclear weapons developments in key countries, and keeping
(NP/CBW) Congress up to date on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program are also top
priority.
Also important is:
? Assessing current intelligence on the areas of concern with respect to
nuclear and chemical proliferation
? Assessing Soviet and Near Eastern chemical and biological weapons
programs.
? Terrorist use of chemical and biological materials.
II. Estimative Program
A total of three estimative products were completed in 1986 and six are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Counterterrorism I. Key Issues
? State Sponsored Terrorism. The motivations, methods, and targets of
Syria, Libya, Iran and possibly Iraq.
? Radical Shia Threat. Including the Lebanon hostage problem and
growth of nacent Shia cells in US, Europe, and elsewhere.
? Radical Palestinian Threat. Including Palestinian mainstream and
factions, Western targets, and potential domestic threat.
? Central and South American Violence. Increasing use of terrorist tactics
by insurgent groups, particularly in Andean nations, and the ability of
governments to deal with the problem; threat to US interests in the
region.
? Cooperative Counterterrorist Measures. Measures available to Western
nations to increase cooperation and prospects for success.
II. Agenda
The top priority of the NIO for Counterterrorism is to continue to provide
intelligence analysis on the containment of Middle Eastern terrorism and
the prevention of its spread to Western Europe and elsewhere. The
production of timely intelligence to assist European policymakers in
dealing with their own problems of terrorism is an important part of this ef-
fort. Another key priority is to provide intelligence and analysis on securing
the release of US hostages.
M. Estimative Program:
A total of seven estimative products were completed in 1986 and seven are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Economics I. Key Issues
? Agricultural Policies. The US, as well as Japan and Western Europe,
are under strong financial pressure to reduce government subsidies to
agriculture. The US cannot act unilaterally without hurting US farmers,
and US negotiators need to know what agricultural subsidies other
governments provide, why they do so, and what flexibility they have to
bring about reductions.
? Petroleum and Near East Stability. The global oversupply of petroleum
is straining OPEC's ability to cooperate and to stabilize prices. It is
increasing friction between those producers with relatively large reserves
and those with smaller reserves; the latter are pushing for high prices in
H. Agenda
Of highest priority is the issue of economic reform in the USSR. Equally
important is: Third World debt with the goal of providing advance warning
of problems and tactical support for negotiations.
Other problems include: global energy problems from the perspective of the
tradeoff between lower energy prices and future energy security; economic
differences among the major countries that result in politically sensitive
trade imbalances; changing economic patterns, and prospects in Asia, and
the impact of these shifts on our relations with this dynamic region.
III. Estimate Program
A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and eight are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Foreign Denial The work of the NIO for FDIA falls in a special category of support for the
and Intelligence DCI:
Activities
? An estimate on Soviet Intelligence Capabilities will be published in 1987.
? The Office of the NIO/FDIA provides the Chairman of the DCI's
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (DDAC). The Com-
mittee, among other things, is responsible for coordinating the Communi-
ty's national-level, all-source analysis of the purpose, means, and effec-
tiveness of Soviet and other foreign intelligence denial and deception
measures. The Committee also oversees assessments of the substantive
intelligence damage suffered or anticipated from compromises of classi-
fied US and allied information involving or impacting on intelligence
sources and methods. At this time, the DDAC is now doing for the DCI
(at the request of the White House and with the approval of the
Department of Justice) damage assessments for the Walker/Whitworth,
Pollard, Pelton, and Chin cases.
? Since its inception in 1984, the Office of the NIO/FDIA has focused on
areas of potential US vulnerability to hostile-particularly Soviet-
intelligence-related activities. Matters such as counterintelligence and
security issues, denial and deception, and active measures (covert propa-
ganda and covert action) all come under its purview. Historically these
problems had tended to be viewed departmentally. The NIO/FDIA
Staff, comprised of officers from CIA, DIA, FBI, and NSA, has been a
catalyst in broadening perspectives of individual agencies and compo-
nents in appraisal of these threats, and in promoting coordinated
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NIO/General Purpose I. Key Issues
Forces
? Warsaw Pact Military Threat to NATO. The size and capabilities of the
Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO represent a changed threat to NATO.
New force organization, weapons, and training all contribute to changes
in capabilities, which is ever present in the background of Soviet /West
European relations.
? Support to MBFR Effort. Continuous effort is expended to provide the
data upon which judgments about MBFR options are made
? Soviet Projection of Military Power Beyond Europe. The presence of
Soviet military forces in distant areas is often seen as evidence of their
potency in international affairs but not as the real military capability
that it signficantly represents.
? NATO Military Forces.
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II. Agenda
Assessing the complicated and formidable threat facing NATO will be the
highest priority task again in 1987. Several estimates will assess the
capabilities of selected components of the force, other estimates will
address the threat theater by theater. Support of the MBFR and related
force stabilization efforts will continue. We will also complete the military
modernization program series on selected NATO countries in the context
of the likely Warsaw Pact Threat. Attention will also be paid to Soviet
threats and power projection outside of NATO to include maritime,
foreign military sales and assistance, and activities in the Far East.
III. Estimative Program
A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and 21 are cur-
rently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda. We are
looking at scaling this schedule back to a more realistic agenda for the
year.
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NIO/Narcotics
1. Key Issues
conducting a joint study of the field in an effort to define the topic more
? Narco-Terrorism. The nexus between narcotics organizations and terror-
ist organizations is an area requiring additional intelligence and analysis.
Currently,-the NIO for Counterterrorism and the NIO for Narcotics are
exactly and diagnose its intelligence needs more precisely.
? Spillover Countries. US intelligence coverage is generally effective in the
major cocaine-producing countries. More intelligence emphasis and
efforts are needed on drug-related issues in countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
? R&D Effort in Support of US Narcotics Control Objectives. A study by
the Intelligence Research and Development Council is currently under
way. It needs careful monitoring to ensure that a fully coordinated
Community product is developed.
II. Agenda
Primary attention to three areas beyond the production of interagency
papers currently listed on production schedule: supporting the DCI in his
role on the National Drug Policy Board; working with major law enforce-
ment agencies to build new policies and procedures to protect intelligence
sources and methods in courtroom scenarios; and working in interagency
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forums to advise on tactical and strategic intelligence needs of law
enforcement, including resolution of the question of whether a strategic
(all-source) intelligence center is needed.
III. Estimative Program
One estimative product was completed in 1986 and four are currently
planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Science and I. Key Issues
Technology
? Technological surprise.
? Soviet science and technology as a base for future military capability.
? Chinese efforts to narrow the huge technology gap with the West.
? Threats to US competitiveness by technological advances in other
Western Countries. Potential role of the Allies in SDI.
II. Agenda
The highest priority of NIO/ST is to review recent estimates on Soviet
military technology, especially in the areas related to future low observable
strategic defense, and antisubmarine warfare systems.
Of lower priority but still of importance is the effort to assess Chinese and
non-Communist world technological advances and prospects.
New efforts include technology available to terrorists and narcotic traffick-
ers in the late 1990s, and what problems this would pose to the US.
III. Estimative Program
A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and nine are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Strategic I. Key Issues
Programs
? Soviet Strategic Offensive and Defensive Force Capabilities and Pros-
pects. Assessment of these force capabilities is crucial to the US national
security process. The sum capabilities are constantly reexamined. Our
estimates are essential to US strategic military programs and are used in
detail by the Pentagon and Strategic Air Command. The President,
Executive Branch, and Congress receive extensive briefings on the work.
We are currently focused especially on ICBM force modernization,
mobile missiles, ABM developments, directed energy weapons develop-
ment, military space programs, and deep underground leadership protec-
tion program.
? Support of US Strategic Arms Control Negotiations. Our assessments of
Soviet attitudes toward compliance and verification and US capabilities
to monitor agreements are critical to the US arms control process
H. Agenda
The NIO/SP expends the majority of effort on the annual NIE 11-3/8,
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the
Late 1990's, which is a year-long multi-volume enterprise. Other estimates
and ad hoc memoranda will specifically address more narrowly focused
questions raised by the arms limitation process or by prospective develop-
ments in US forces or weapons. We will bt intensifying our support to the
Strategic Defense Initiative organization and will continue our deep
involvement in the arms control process. We have underway a definitive
NIE on our monitoring capabilities. Estimates will be produced coverin
all of the key issues noted above.
III. Estimative Program
A total of five estimative products were completed in 1986 and 16 are
currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.
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NIO/Warning Pursuant to the Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/1, the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning is responsible for advising the
DCI in all matters pertaining to warning and recommends when the
issuance of warning is appropriate. He also reviews the collection and
analysis of intelligence from all sources for warning implications in
assessing intelligence judgments within the Intelligence Community and
promotes research and training in methodologies and procedures for
warning and for developing warning consciousness and discipline through-
out the Intelligence Community. The NIO for Warning substantively
duplicates in his area of coverage all the areas of the regional NIOs while
specifically seeking out the issues for which warning is warrented.
Estimative Program
Two estimative products are currently planned for completion in 1987 to
address this agenda, in addition to a monthly warning report for the DCI.
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Confidential
Chairman, National Received his commission and a B.S. degree from the US Military
Intelligence Council Academy in 1962. Earned a M.A. in public administration in 1966 and a
Major General Frank Ph.D. in political science in foreign and defense policy in 1969, both from
B. Horton III, USAF Harvard University. Completed Squadron Officer School in 1970, Air
Command and Staff College in 1974, Air War College in 1966, and the
National War College in 1978. Taught international politics and defense
policy at USAF Academy 1968-73, except for a year in Vietnam 1970-71.
From 1973 to 1977 was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Plans and Operations, US Air Force in Washington, D.C. Served in
various positions at the wing level throughout the Strategic Air Command
over the next several years, including commander of the Minuteman III
wing at Grand Forks, N.D., 1982-84. From September 1984 to June 1985,
served as Director of Command Control, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Operations, Headquarters, SAC. Became Deputy Director for the
National Strategic Target List, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in
June 1985. Assumed his present duties as Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council in September 1986.
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Vice Chairman/NIC Received a M.A. in Russian Regional Studies from Harvard University in
Graham E. Fuller 1961. In 1962, studied Chinese language and Far Eastern History at
London School of Oriental and African Studies.
In 1983, became NIO for
Near East and South Asia before becoming the Vice Chairman on 1
January 1986.
Vice Chairman/NIC Received a B.A. in Political Science from West Virginia Universi
ty and a
Hugh Frederick M.A. in Public Law and Government from Columbia University.
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Appointed the NIO for Warning in 1981 and served concurrently as e
Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council through 1982. Was on
special assignment with the DCI for two years and then assumed duties as
NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities in 1985. Named Vice
Chairman of the NIC on 16 March 1987.
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NIO for Africa Received a B.A. cum laude in Political Science from the University of
Frederick L. Wettering Illinois in 1961 and received a M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Illinois in 1962.
he assumed duties as NIO for Africa on 19
NIO at Large/Director Received B.A. in History and Economics from Mount Holyoke College in
of Analytic Group 1973 and a M.A. in International Affairs from George Washington
NIO at Large/NIO for
Nuclear Proliferation/
CBW
Major General David
W. Einsel, Jr., USA
(Ret.)
NIO for Counter-
terrorism
Charles E. Allen
NIO for East Asia
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
University. Has completed most of course work for a Ph.D
became NIO at Large and Director of the Analytic Group in
Received both a B.A., cum laude, with distinction in Chemistry and a
M.A. in Physical Chemistry in 1950 from Ohio State University. In
September 1950, as a Distinguished Military Graduate, entered active
duty and has served in many responsible positions with the Department of
the Army working on planning, policy, and operational matters on nuclear,
chemical, and biological affairs. In 1956, received a MS in Physics from
the University of Virginia. Retired from the military in June 1985 and
became NIO at Large in September 1985.
Received a B.A. from the University of North Carolina in 1957. Is a
distinguished graduate (1972) of the Air War College and did graduate
studies in International Relations at Auburn University, 1971-72.F
Became NIO for Counterter-
rorism in January 1985. Also served from January 1985 to February 1986
as the NIO for Narcotics.
Received B.A. in Asian Studies in 1968 and a M.A. in East Asian Studies
in 1969 from Florida State University. Was a Ph.D. candidate from 1972-
75 in International Relations at American University.
I the National
Security Affairs Adviser to Senator John Glenn. Became NIO for East
Asia in February 1985.
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NIO for Economics Received B.A. in Business from Babson College in 1966 and a M.A. in
Deane Hoffmann Economics from the University of Maine in 1978. From 1968-71 taught in
the Business Department at Worchester Polytechnic Institute and attended
Clark University.
Became NIO for Economics on 15
Acting NIO for Received B.S. from the United States Naval Academy in 1969, M.A. in
Europe Government from the College of William and Mary in 1975, and a Ph.D.
Robert L. Hutchings in Government from the University of Virginia in 1979. Formerly served as
Deputy Director of Radio Free Europe in Munich, West Germany, and as
Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of
Virginia, where he taught Soviet and East European politics. Currently a
Professorial Lecturer in East European Politics at the School of Advanced
International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. Has written Soviet-
East European Relations: Consolidation and Conltict, 1968-1980 (Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1984), Foreign and Security Policy Coordination
in the Warsaw Pact (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche and
internationale Studien, 1985), and several articles on East European
politics and Warsaw Pact affairs. Appointed Acting NIO for Europe
effective 16 March 1987.
Received B.M.E. (Mechanical Engineering) from Cornell University in
1953, M.B.A. from Columbia University in 1959, and Ph.D. in economics
from Columbia University in 1962.
Served in a broad spectrum of positions culminating as senior projects
manager in the DI for which he was awarded the National Intelligence
Medal of Achievement in 1985. Assumed current position as Assistant
NIO/FDIA and Chairman, DCI's Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis
Committee in April 1984. Appointed acting NIO/FDIA effective 16
March 1987.
NIO for General Pur- Received B.S. from the US Military Academy in June 1952 and holds a
pose Forces M.A. in Public Administration from George Washington University.
Major General Stephen Commands in combat in Korea and Vietnam; Deputy Commanding
E. Nichols, USA General V Corps; Commanding General Readiness Region V; and Staff
tours at SACEUR and US Mission NATO. Is a serving officer with an ex-
tensive background as a consumer of both strategic and tactical intelli-
gence. Became NIO for General Purpose Forces in September 1984.
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NIO for Latin America Received B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University School
Robert D. Vickers, Jr of Foreign Service in 1965 and a M.S. in the same discipline from the Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science in 1968.
Became NIO for Latin America in July 1984.
NIO for Narcotics Received an A.B. and an M.A. in social science and inwholoiry from the
William R. Kotapish University of Michigan.
NIO for Narcotics on 1 February 1986.
NIO for Near East and Received a B.A. in International Relations from American University and
South Asia has completed additional studies in International Relations and Business
Daniel K. Webster Administration from American University and the University of Massa-
chusetts.
Became NIO for Near East and South Asia on 5 May 1986.
NIO for Science & Received B.S. with distinction in physics and mathematics from South-
Technology western College, M.S. in physics and electronics from MIT, and Ph.D. in
Julian C. Nall physics from Vanderbilt University. Is a graduate of the National War
College.
ogy on 12 September 1983.
Became NIO for Science and Technol-
NIO for Strategic Received B.S. in physics from the California Institute of Technology in
Programs 1963 and a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in 1969. Is
Lawrence K. Gershwin former officer of RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense
Analysis. Served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense between 1979-
81. Became NIO for Strategic Programs in October 1981. Recipient of
Distinguished Officer Award, 1984 and Meritorious Officer Award, 1987.
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NIO for USSR Received A.B. in political science from University of Georgia in 1964,
Robert E. Blackwell, M.A. in 1965, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of
Jr. Michigan in 1971 with concentration in Soviet politics. From 1969-75, was
P --I- ] __, e..:- at Emory I Tniversity. F
~,,, L3111L 11Vlvaava v. ~.------- - Became NIO for USSR on 5 January
198 (,7.
NIO for Warning Received Bachelor's degree from Seattle University and a M.A. in
John J. Bird economics from the University of Washington. Served in both the US
Marine Co Reserve and the US Arm
Became NIO for Warring in October 1984.
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