NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S PROPOSED NSDD ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000600020021-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 20, 1983
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP96BO1172R000600020021-2 ,,-
V
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
E.CTE'D
OFH AL USE
NSA review
completed
REF: OIPR 2366/ca
June 20., 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RICHARD G. STILLWELL
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Re: National Security Agency's Proposed NSDD
on Cryptographic Security
You requested our comments concerning a National Security
Decision Directive proposed by NSA and discussed at the last
IG/CM meet}}ng After reviewing. the_,prpppsa and accompany
memorandum_.fwe-'recommend that NSA consider reinstituting a
cryptographic `security lprogram under its .own authority rather "
wT --''--
Security Council, it should supplement its accompan~ing,memo-
I ntell ge, nc, e Community may w sh. to ci nAs1-der, establishing:
parameters `for.aht subms'on pf NSDDs b Cbmmunit, ,_ embers.
According to its memorandum, NSA operated a cryptographic
security program'until 1973 which included an indoctrination
program, records, signed access statements and aperiodic
polygraphy. We have been informed by NSA that authority.for they
program derived from a National Communications Security
Directive issued by the National Security Council. The program
was discontinued in 1973 due to the burden created by its
administration during the Vietnam War when large numbers of
military and other personnel had access to cryptographic
information.
These statements raise factual questions that should be
addressed by NSA before it subm-i.-ts.tea s proposal to._the. National
Secuur.it Council First, how can a cryptographic security
rograIn be sufficiently, ru'cx.al to .the national security . t-
warrant ,issuance of a separate NSDD if ;NSA discontinued "the
program ten years due to administrative burdenat a, timwhen the need .for cryptograpic securvi.ty, would have. n.
,acut:y-NS'A"`t'ates in retrospect that terminating
~Varticula'rly
he"pr-ogram was a mistake and that it has experienced a twenty
procedures. NSA's`,argumerit :for reinstituting a cryptographic
curl, "
'"p ogram would =beg strengthened by. the add-tion of
nformation.addressinci'the change:. in_c.ircumstances since the.s
. iiMwM~~st 5 DOJ Review .
Completed. . Lam
Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000600020021-2
 Approved For Release 2007/11/01 CIA-RDP96B01172R000600020021-2
? 0FFlC1AL t ?
'problems and duplication could result from a prolif
er o of
olra h_re u ment recommend 't 'a a "NSA review
NSA's memorandum further states that the a eI eme t ire
ecurity programs ap r odic: polygra h 31
Because morale
t
wish to reinstitute a cryptographic security rogramTtha
}existing. po.iygr.apn, requirements- to cetermine, wnetner an
additional re uirement is warranted for_this?_purpos A'may
_ _ ~... 7.-..c.w,....-`. w. i-r......v+. v?? --C.~w7a..r.?a.,-_..a..=-1F,. a~ai a.a?~. v~u~r AL
elementsof its former :proaram~except__ op lYgraphy, }and monitor
that--program to determine its effectiveness. j If,~., after the
pro
g,ram_ has beenoperati.ng foxx_a-__t.ime NSA le term nes that' ! _._~,,,
~polygraphy would increase_^_the p ogra ''m_s a _fectiveness,~ it .could
be added~fl This r e uiremenf woula"be-ba~'sea on NSA_,s author:i.tae
to protect cr
DD.
YP tog~ ra
P ~ is rater t a an NS-~~
than establishing broad policy direction would necessarily
graphic securit pro ram is-questionable. Routine promulgation
of"`NSD s t at address partzcu ar 'segments of, a program rather
In general_terms,:t a advrsabili 'y ,f ingan ~NS D
mplement.a-specific,c,-limited policy goal, such as a crvto-
instrumets. Proliferation of these proposals may-resur
future. reluctance to approve NSDDs"p oposedr
by Intelligence"
,,,
;
Community componen,..s Tadd t. on s NSDD could' confuse t
..
objectives'-and authori.ti`es of NSDD 84 The Inte 'igence
Community may therefore wish to consider general parameters for
credibility.of the Intelligence Community in this regard.
the submission of proposed NSDDs to the NSC in order to preserve
the effectiveness of NSDDs as policy tools and maintain the.
In conclion ae recomr~-end t is the NSA" reinsti?ute-
cryptographic security_Jprogram
under ids own authority If~the
.. .: ? aT
aboSi je also recommend t, at the Intelligence community agree-
nn, Ali,t~Pl iiiac fnr .~ha f>~tirc cii
hrniC6-'k r%f' 1~T{CnT~cw~~- ??? ---
v MARY C/ LAWTON
Counsel for Intelligence Policy
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
LIMITED
?FFlClA! t KF
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