INDUSTRIAL SECURITY LETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000800270002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 28, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE?DEF INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE* DIRECTORATE F DUSTRIAL SECURITY
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
LETTER
Industrial Security Letters will be issued periodically to inform Industry, User Agencies and DoD Activities of developments relating
to industrial security. The contents of these Letters are for information and clarification of existing policy and requirements. Information
contained herein does not represent a change of policy or requirements until and unless officially incorporated in the Industrial
Security Manual. Local reproduction of these Letters in their original form for the internal use of addressees is authorized. Suggestions
and articles for inclusion in the Letter will be appreciated. Articles or ideas contributed will become the property of Dl S. Contractor
requests for copies of the Letter and inquiries concerninq specific information should be addressed to the cognizant security office, for
referral to the Directorate for Industrial Security, HO DIS, as appropriate.
NO. 80L-4 28 November 1980
In this issues, the following items appear:
1. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
TO THE DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.
2. VISITS BY COMMUNIST COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES OR NATIONALS.
3. EXPORT OF TECHNICAL DATA/VISITS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES.
4. VERIFYING SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING ABILITY PRIOR TO
RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
5. VERIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS ON UPGRADES, CONVERSIONS
AND TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
6. KEEPING EMPLOYEES INFORMED WHEN SECURITY DEFICIENCIES ARE NOTED.
7. NOTED SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND HOW TO AVOID THEM.
8. TAKING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME - A HAZARDOUS UNDERTAKING.
9. REPORTS PERTAINING TO TRANSMITTAL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.
10. SHIPMENTS BY COMMERCIAL CARRIERS.
11. CONTROL BOXES LOCATED WITHIN CLOSED AREAS.
12. CLASSIFYING PREVIOUSLY UNMARKED MATERIAL.
13. WARNING NOTICES & OTHER NOTATIONS REQUIRED ON CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.
14. WITNESS TO DESTRUCTION.
15. PSQ & FPC DEFICIENCIES WASTE TIME AND MONEY.
16. DISCONTINUANCE OF ADVANCE TELEGRAPHIC LETTERS OF CONSENT.
17. OVERSEAS REFRESHER BRIEFINGS FOR INDUSTRY UNDFR PARAGRAPH 97dp ISM.
18. ERRATA ON ISL 80L-3.
19. COGSWELL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AWARDS FOR 1980.
20. PERSONNEL CHANGES.
21. A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.
NOTE: All paragraph references to the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding
Classified Information (ISM) are based on the April 1980 edition which all
users should now have.
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1. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION TO THE
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
In ISLs Nos. 80L-1 and 80L-3 we reported on the decision to reassign
administration of Industrial Security from the Defense Logistics Agency to
the Defense Investigative Service. The effective date for the transfer was
1 October 1980. Each facility assigned for security cognizance will be
informed if there is a change in cognizant security office contact points.
We also plan to publish a new address list updating that furnished with
ISL 80L-3 as offices are activated. For example, the areas handled by DCASMA,
San Francisco and DCASMA, Baltimore have been redesignated as Regions with
Headquarters in San Francisco and Washington, respectively. Cognizance in
these two areas will switch from the Los Angeles and Philadelphia cognizant
offices. Likewise, the facilities formerly assigned to DCASR, Chicago will
continue to be inspected by people from that area; however, Chicago will no
longer be a Region Headquarters and cognizance will be transferred to the
cognizant security headquarters now located in Cleveland. We still emphasize
that the basic procedure and philosophy for Industrial Security administra-
tion will not be changed and only a very limited number of changes will
occur in the contact points established between industry and cognizant security
offices.
2. VISITS BY COMMUNIST COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES OR NATIONALS
A revised DoD Industrial Security Manual (Apr 1980) was recently distrib-
uted. A new requirement (paragraph 6a(19)) requires contractors to notify
the cognizant security office of any plans to host unclassified visits by
representatives of Communist countries. Although this new paragraph was not
highlighted as a change, nor was it addressed in the "Summary of Changes" in
the front of the publication, its existence is being brought to your attention
in view of its impact. The change is designed to insure that contractors
establish an internal system for identifying such visits in order for appro-
priate employees to be given a Defensive Security Briefing and a Counter-
intelligence Awareness Briefing as provided for in Appendix VII, ISM, para-
graphs A and B, respectively. This new requirement is also designed to alert
contractor personnel to the provisions of paragraph 5.o. ISM, as well as the
provisions of the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act,
the latter being administered through the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations. ISL 77L-1, dated 15 April 1977, contains more specific informa-
tion on the subject of marketing with Communist countries.
3. EXPORT OF TECHNICAL DATA/VISITS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
Export of certain goods and technology is prohibited under specific
statutes. Failure to observe these restrictions can result in substantial
penalties. A central point of contact in the U.S. Government has been
established to inform companies of the restrictions on the export of certain
goods and technology which is prohibited or restricted under the Export
Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Atomic Energy Act and
other statutes. Companies and individuals should be particularly aware that
unpublished technical data released orally, visually or in written form in
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the U.S. to visitors from, and representatives of, foreign countries may be
considered exports. To obtain information or clarification on what goods or
technology may be embargoed or require a validated export license, companies
should direct inquiries to:
Director
Exporters' Service Staff
Office of Export Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230
Tel: [phone]
4. VERIFYING SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING ABILITY PRIOR TO RELEASE
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Verification of another facility's security clearance and storage
capability is a critical element when transmitting classified material to
another contractor. Since many cleared contractors serve as major distrib-
utors of classified information, it is essential that all personnel responsible
for such activity be thoroughly familiar with the procedures in the ISM which
must be followed before classified information can be transmitted outside the
facility. Facility Security Supervisors are urged to review the ISM require-
ments (as a minimum, paragraphs 3e, 5c, f and 17), as well as the facility
Standard Practice Procedures, to ensure the SPPs are adequate and their
personnel are knowledgeable in this area. Any questions which arise should
be referred to the cognizant security office for resolution.
5. VERIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS ON UPGRADES, CONVERSIONS AND
TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES
Verification of U.S. citizenship is now required by paragraph 5ae, ISM,
for new clearance requests at all levels, including contractor granted
CONFIDENTIAL clearances. It is not applicable for those employees having
security clearances converted, transferred or upgraded.
6. KEEPING EMPLOYEES INFORMED WHEN SECURITY DEFICIENCIES ARE NOTED
An important part of a contractor's security program consists in keeping
employees informed of security procedures and, as indicated in paragraph 5f,
ISM, advising them of any security deficiencies resulting from recurring
security inspections conducted by the cognizant security office. The require-
ment for the self-inspection program set forth in paragraph 5ac, ISM, does not
provide specific guidance regarding deficiencies noted during these inspections;
however, contractors should inform their employees of any security deficiencies
noted during their self-inspections in the same manner as they are provided the
information following security inspections conducted by the Government. This
notification will contribute to a more viable security program and encourage
participation by employees in the facility's security program.
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7. NOTED SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND HOW TO AVOID THEM
A contractor furnished the following illustrations of deficiencies found
during inspections by the Government and from his own self-inspection program.
You'll note that he first shows the deficiency and then what should be done.
This way the employee is kept informed within the intent of paragraph 5f, ISM:
o During a DoD inspection, an employee was asked to produce several SECRET
documents for audit. He agreed to retrieve them from his classified container
and removed the combination from his wallet in order to unlock the contai
_ _ner.
***(Combinations to classified containers must be memorized!)
o A cleared employee from another location agreed to work overtime on a
classified job but did not have access to a container to lock up the material.
Another employee gave him the combination to his safe--but just to be sure he
didn't forget it, also wrote it on the chalkboard in the office. This was
detected by a location protection officer. ***(Combinations must be memorized
and are not to be provided outsiders...What else was in the container for
which the visiting employee had no need-to-know?)
o Loss of several SECRET items was reported to the Government, investigated
and then authorized to be stricken from accountability records. Two years later
these items turned up at another location inside reusable file hangers.
***(Thoroughly check each file folder or hanger, especially when removing them
from a classified container and look behind and under container drawers.)
o Inspectors discovered that several cleared employees were assigned to
U.S. activities overseas for an extended period. Special briefings had not
been given nor were reports made to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office (DISCO). ***(The ISM requires a report to DISCO when cleared employees
are assigned outside the U.S. for a period in excess of 90 consecutive days
during any 12-month period.)
8. TAKING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME - A HAZARDOUS UNDERTAKING
Paragraph 14e, ISM, states: "Removal of classified materials to such
dwellings for 'after hours' work as a convenience to such persons is not
authorized." There are those who still disregard this prohibition and pay
a substantial personal penalty in addition to damaging the National Security.
Consider the following case:
A mathematician employed by a cleared facility chose to take classified
material home to work on after hours. His cousin, who was visiting,
became aware of this and photographed the information, ostensibly without the
knowledge of the mathematician. However, reports suggested that he later
became aware of his cousin's actions on receiving money for his "assistance,"
and then failed to report the facts to appropriate authorities. The classified
information, relating to NATO and U.S. Security, was allegedly passed by the
cousin to the Soviet Union.
The cousin was arrested in New York, convicted as a spy, and sentenced to 22
years in prison. The mathematician was also tried; not for having furnished
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information to his cousin, but for failure to report a potential compromise
(18 USC 793(f)(2)). His conviction resulted in a sentence of three years
imprisonment and the court denied his appeal. (See U.S. vs. Dedeyan 584 F.28
36(1978).)
The message is loud and clear; the risks are just too great if you remove
classified material from an authorized work area and take it to your residence
to work on. Car accidents, burglaries and thefts, not to mention uncleared
family members, all portend compromise. The subsequent threat to a career
through administrative or disciplinary action is ever present. It's just not
worth it!
9. REPORTS PERTAINING TO TRANSMITTAL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
The term "shipment" as used in the ISM has occasionally been interpreted
to pertain only to the movement of classified material by an authorized
commercial carrier. This erroneous interpretation could lead to a failure
to submit reports required by paragraphs 6a(ll) (Evidence of Tampering) and
6a(12) (Improper Shipment). Reports required by these paragraphs should be
submitted to the cognizant security office whenever any classified material
is improperly transmitted (shipped) to them.
10. SHIPMENTS BY COMMERCIAL CARRIERS
Recently, classified material transmitted via an authorized Commercial
Carrier on a commercial bill of lading, was lost in transit. Investigation
of the incident determined that the bill of lading issued by the shipping
contractor was not marked with the annotation "Signature Security Service
Required" as required by paragraph 17d(3)(b), ISM. As a result, it was
impossible to trace the shipment to determine the point of loss.
Contractors should review the procedures they use in the shipment of
classified material via commercial carriers to ensure full compliance with
the provisions of paragraph 17a(2), 17c(5) and 17d(3), ISM. Prior to the
use of a commercial carrier for the shipment of classified material, the
designation or qualification of a qualified carrier must be obtained from
the contracting officer or his designated representative.
11. CONTROL BOXES LOCATED WITHIN CLOSED AREAS
A recently approved change to paragraphs 36a(l)(d) and (2)(b), ISM, will
modify the current requirements to lock control panels with three-position
dial-type, changeable combination padlocks. Essentially, the change means
that, when the mechanical mechanism for setting the combination to a locking
device for entry control is located in a control box within the Closed Area,
it will no longer be-necessary to secure the control box by a combination lock.
The new wording states that, "if the control box is located within a closed
area it shall require only a minimal degree of physical security protection
designed to preclude unauthorized access to the mechanism. The cognizant
security office may be requested to approve the security measures afforded
the control box."
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12. CLASSIFYING PREVIOUSLY UNMARKED MATERIAL
A contractor-generated document which may inadvertently contain classified
information might be distributed outside the facility without any markings to
identify the document as classified. Although such a situation is not covered
specifically by the ISM a common sense approach to reestablish control of the
information should be taken by the contractor. Efforts should be made to
determine that all holders of the document are authorized access to it and
that control of the information has not been lost by the unclassified communica-
tion. If both these conditions are determined to exist, then promptly notify
all holders of the document of its proper classification and applicable
associated markings. The contractor's written notice should, as a minimum, be
classified Confidential and can be marked with a declassification instruction
such as "Unclassified when Upgrading Action is Completed." The "Classified by"
line on the notice should cite the applicable DD Form 254. If, however, it is
found that control of the document has been lost through, for example, secondary
distribution by the Defense Technical Information Center, or that uncleared
personnel have had access to it, a report of the compromise to the cognizant
security office under the provisions of paragraph 7d, ISM, is required.
13. WARNING NOTICES AND OTHER NOTATIONS REQUIRED ON CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
Paragraph llc of the ISM may be interpreted to mean that "warning notices"
include the "Notations Concerning Downgrading and Declassification" specified
by paragraph llc(5). Such markings are not "warning notices" in the sane
sense as the markings in paragraphs llc(l) through llc(4). Further, the
present construction of paragraph llc requires that the markings, specified
by all of its subparagraphs, are to be placed on the cover of a classified
document if there is one. It is not essential that the "Classified by" and
the "Declassify on" or "Review for Declassification on" markings appear on
the cover of a document. Paragraph llc(5) states that procedures governing
marking for downgrading and declassification are to be found in Appendix II.
Paragraph C of that Appendix stipulates that such markings shall be on the
"face" of the classified document. The use of the word "face" in this
context is intended to mean either the cover, first, or title pages or in a
similarly prominent position. Certain "warning notices" should, of course,
be placed on the cover of a document if there is one, but the markings
specified in Appendix II do not have to be so placed. An appropriate revision
to paragraph 11 is being made.
14. WITNESS TO DESTRUCTION
Concern has been expressed relative to the utilization of a subcontract
guard as a witness for the destruction of classified material. Paragraph 19d,
ISM, addresses the optional use of a "subcontract employee" for witnessing
destruction. We would consider a subcontract guard as a type of subcontract
employee.
15. PSQ AND FPC DEFICIENCIES WASTE TINE AND MONEY
The Personnel Security Questionnaire (PSQ) and Fingerprint Card (FPC) reject
rate continues to be of great concern to the Defense Industrial Security
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Clearance Office (DISCO). This problem costs cleared contractors thousands
of dollars yearly because, in most instances, the processing of the security
clearance request is delayed until the information missing from the PSQ or
FPC is obtained from the contractor or the applicant. In other words, the
case just sits in DISCO until the missing information is obtained. This
means that the request for investigation is delayed, the case processing
time is increased, and the amount of time a contractor cannot use an employee
on a classified contract is increased. It is a well-known fact that these
delays are costly to contractors, and this situation is especially disturbing
when it is apparent that the problem could be solved through careful comple-
tion of the PSQ and FPC. Since the privacy portion of the PSQ is not
reviewed by the contractor, it is important to stress to the employee the
need for care in completing that portion.
Due to the severity of the reject problem, a reject study was conducted
by DISCO in November 1979. Review was made of 1,072 rejected cases. The
arrest block of the PSQ presented the most serious reject problem in that
incomplete arrest data was at least one of the reject reasons in 261 of the
surveyed cases. Other serious reject problems which were surfaced during
the survey include the absence of the applicant's current employment starting
date, the failure of the security supervisor to sign the PSQ, and the absence
of dates or places of treatment for mental disorders, drug addiction and
alcoholism. In regard to FPC rejects, 23 cases were rejected because the
applicant did not sign the card; 70 were rejected because identifying data,
such as the applicant's physical description, was not listed, and there
were 49 cases rejected because no FPCs were submitted at all. It is
imperative that all of the requested information be placed on the FPC. The
FPC must always be signed by the applicant and the prints must be clear and
classifiable.
Paragraph 26b, ISM, also requires in the case of immigrant aliens that
the applicant for clearance produce for the contractor's review, the Alien
...Registration Receipt Card (Form No. 1-151 or 1-551) which has been issued
to the individual. DISCO systematically processes DD Forms 49 (PSQs) whereon
the employer or designated representative attests that the applicant presented
his/her card; however, extensive, costly investigation often discloses that
the applicant is a nonimmigrant alien; therefore, not eligible for a security
clearance. DISCO suggests that the space immediately to the right of the
"Yes" and "No" blocks in Part II of the DD Form 49 be used to record the date
the applicant was afforded permanent residence in the U.S. by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. In addition to providing very pertinent informa-
tion, this could preclude a perfunctory check in the "Yes" block.
During 1981, DISCO intends to establish a computer system that will show
which contractors have the most serious reject problem. This sytem will
enable Industrial Security Representatives to discuss the reject situation
with individual contractors during industrial security inspections.
Just a reminder! The DISCO after-hours telephone number is Area Code 614,
236-2058. Status information can be obtained by calling Area Code 614, 236-2265.
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16. DISCONTINUANCE OF ADVANCE TELEGRAPHIC LETTERS OF CONSENT
DISCO has discontinued sending telegraphic notification of clearance to
DISP contractors. The experience of a representative segment of industry
reveals that the telegraphic notification was not of sufficient benefit to
industry to justify the cost to the Government. Letters of Consent will
continue to be mailed from DISCO in the most expeditious manner.
17. OVERSEAS REFRESHER BRIEFINGS FOR INDUSTRY UNDER PARAGRAPH 97d, ISM
The Office of Industrial Security, International, has noted that requests
have increased for them to conduct the annual refresher briefings of cleared
contractor personnel assigned to duty stations outside the U.S. OISI is_not
staffed to routinely administer these briefings and solicits the cooperation
of contractors to reduce these requests to those unusual cases where it is
impractical for the contractor to accomplish them as required by paragraph
97d, ISM.
18. ERRATA ON ISL 80L-3
a. Since publication of ISL 80L-3, a few changes have been noted and
are included here to enable recipients to make pen and ink changes to the
telephone numbers listed on page 7:
Area Telephone
City and State Address Code Number
Atlanta, GA (no change) 404 429-6340
Los Angeles, CA (no change) 213 643-0203
San Francisco, CA (no change) 213 it it (interim)
Area Telephone AUTOVON Number
Cognizant Security Ofc Code Number (For Govt. Agencies Use)
NOTE: It should be noted that the last sentence of ISL 80L-3 cautions that,
"Pending formal notification, contractors should continue to maintain contact
with the offices now providing security services." Appendix VIII, ISM, will
contain the updated information and additional corrections when published.
b. On page 3 of ISL 80L-3, the following counties (parishes) were left
off under ATLANTA in the State of Louisiana: Saint Charles, Saint Helena,
Saint James, Saint John the Baptist, Saint Martin, Saint Mary (and part of
Saint Martin), Saint Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington,
West Baton Rouge, West Feliciana. Additionally, Sherville should be changed
to read Iberville.
c. Also on page 3, under BOSTON, add Chautaugua and correct Cheenectady
to read Schenectady.
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d. Also on page 3, under WASHINGTON, add "and the city of Alexandria, VA."
e. On page 4, under CLEVELAND and the counties in Illinois, correct
Sanganion to read Sangamon.
f. On page 6, under SAN FRANCISCO and the counties in California,
correct Greenn to read Glenn.
19. COGSWELL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AWARDS FOR 1980
Seventeen firms were selected by the Defense Logistics Agency for
demonstrating superior performance in carrying out security obligations
on classified defense contracts.
Recipients of the James S. Cogswell Awards, named for the Agency's first
Chief of its Office of Industrial Security, were selected from over 11,000
industrial firms having Department of Defense facility security clearances
to perform on classified contracts. Winners were chosen on the basis of
criteria that included the degree of security consciousness and cooperation
by management; effectiveness of employee security education and motivation
programs; security practices and procedures; and ability to sustain
progressive security systems.
Plaques for outstanding performance have been or soon will be presented to:
Facility
Facility Security
Supervisor
Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
Avondale, Louisiana
Base Ten Systems, Inc.
Trenton, New Jersey
Bulova Systems and Instruments Corp.
Valley Stream, New York
Dynamics Research Corporation
Wilmington, Massachusetts
Environmental Research Institute
of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Ford Aerospace and Communications
Corp., Aeronutronic Division
Newport Beach, California
General Instrument Corporation
Government Systems Division
Hicksville, New York
George L. Carcabasis
Oleh Pavlovsky
Arlene Christodoulou
Mary E. Brindamour
Sarah G. Ward
Robert K. Murray
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Facility
Facility Security
Supervisor
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc. Francis D. Lindhorst
Missile Systems Division
Cape Canaveral, Florida
Martin Marietta Corporation Thomas H. Farrow
Bethesda, Maryland
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Svcs.,Inc. Warren C. Scheife
Vance AFB, Oklahoma
Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. Robert D. Donovan
Santa Rosa, California
Radiation Research Associates, Inc. Norman Schaeffer
Ft. Worth, Texas
Sentinel Electronics, Inc. Michael W. Kott
Bristol, Pennsylvania
TRW Defense and Space Systems Group Henry D. Newson
Cape Canaveral Field office
Cape Canaveral, Florida
United Technologies Corporation
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group
East Hartford, Connecticut
United Technologies Corporation
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group
Rocky River, Ohio
Joseph C. Chew
United Technologies Corporation Andrew J. Stanchick
Sikorsky Aircraft Division
Stratford, Connecticut
It is planned that the Defense Investigative Service will continue recognizing
those industrial facilities which demonstrate superior performance in carrying
out security obligations by continuation of the James S. Cogswell Awards.
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20. PERSONNEL CHANGES
a. Regional Cognizant Security Offices: The Director, Defense Investigative
Service, Mr. Bernard J. O'Donnell, has recently named the following as Directors
of Industrial Security in the listed cognizant security offices:
Boston - Mr. Wayne A. Ambrose (former Chief, Management Support Division,
DCASR, Boston); Cleveland - Mr. Donald L. McAlister (former Director of Industrial
Security, DCASR, Chicago); Los Angeles - Mr. Joseph (Leo) Poirier (former Chief,
Management Support Office, DCASR, Los Angeles); Philadelphia - (to be
announced at a later date); San Francisco - Mr. Alfred (Bill) Hazen
(former Chief, Industrial Security Division, DCASMA, San Francisco); Washington, DC
Mr. Richard F. Williams (former Industrial Security Staff Specialist, Executive
Directorate, Industrial Security, DLA).
b. Director for Industrial Security, Defense Investigative Service: Due to
the retirement of Captain R. A. Mauldin, USN, who was the last Executive Director,
Industrial Security, under the Defense Logistics Agency, Mr. Frank Larsen, his
Deputy, was named as Acting Director for Industrial Security, effective 1 October
1980. Mr. Larsen was successor to the late Colonel James S. Cogswell in July 1966
and served as the Chief, Office of Industrial Security, in the then Defense Supply
Agency until August 1967. Subsequently, he retired as a Captain from the U.S.
Navy and spent six years with industry in security, program management and
engineering support. From 1973 until he returned in October 1979 to the Executive
Directorate, Industrial Security, Defense Logistics Agency, he was employed by
the Department of the Navy where he served primarily in security of classified
information at the policy level.
c. Three of our key staff personnel technically retired effective 31 August
1980; however, they have agreed to extend their services for a number of months
until the many details involved in the functional transfer from Defense Logistics
Agency to the Defense Investigative Service are worked out. Our gratitude goes to:
Mr.
Robert
E.
Green, Chief, Industrial Security Program Division
Mr.
Jervie
P.
Fox, Chief, Industrial Facility Program Division
Mr.
James
A.
Reeder, Chief, Industrial Security Education & Training
21. A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
As this year draws to a close, I feel most appreciative for the confidence
and cooperation exhibited by contractors and our Government colleagues in
helping us do our job. I am also confident that 1981 will provide challenges
and opportunities for all of us. With continued display of teamwork and
unrestrained communications, the future outlook for our industrial security
programs has never been better.
FRANK LARSEN
Acting Director for
Industrial Security
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DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DIRECTORATE FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
1900 HALF STREET, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20324
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE.$300
ATTN: SECURITY SUPERVISOR
THIRD CLASS MAIL
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
PERMIT No. G-131
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