'WE REALLY DON'T NEED AN INTELLIGENCE CZAR'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 56
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2
TH : NEW YU tK Tit?Ii S
4 July 1977
'We Really Don't
To the Editor:
Mm. Stansfield Turner, the Direc-
tor of C.I.A. as well as the Director
of Central Intelligence, has proposed to
President Carter that the intelligence
community have a single chief umafili-
ated with any of the component agen-
cies, such as C.I.A.
In considering this proposal, one
should not forget that Admiral Turner
already wears the- hat of Director of
Central Intelligence, 'the President's
key man on all, intelligence matters.
The question is nvt ti-at the Director
of Central Intelligence is also the Di-
rector of C.I.A., where there have been
a number of capable Deputy Directors
who can and have run the C.I.A. for
.prolonged periods in the absence of
the Director or when no Director had
been appointed, but that the Director
of Central- Intelligence has not acted
hhe the Director of - Central Intelli-
g ence.
lost of this inaction on the part
of the Director of Central Intelligence
is due to the fact that the Presidents
of the United States, from Truman on,
have been satisfied with inaction. They
leave been satisfied, as former Senator
Rlansfield told the Murphy Commission,
with a "swollen, expensive and in-
efficient intelligence community." Part
of the inactivity was because the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence would
cnly involve himself in battles that
geed . an Intelligence Czar' .
would dissipate his energies and de-
tract from the necessary intelli;erce-
collection activities of the intelligence
community if he tried to act without
Presidential backing and authority.
What could be done without creating
an "intelligence czar"? .
(1) Responsibility and final author-
ity for the intelligence community's
STAT
budget could be placed in the handai
of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) Personnel cut` could be made in
.the agencies of the intelligence com-
munity. Senator Mansfield recom-
mended a reduction in the number of
personnel in the National. Security
Agency, in view of the fact that each -
of the armed forces maintains its own
cryptological capability. The Defense
Intelligence Agency could safely-be cut
.from 5,000 to 500,.with a correspond-
ing cut in.budget, making the D.I.A.
something like the Bureau of Intelli-!
pence and Research in the Department
of State.. Published figures ind;catell;
that there are about 38,500 in Army'
intelligence, 10,000 in Navy intelli-
gence and 60,000 in Air Force intelli
Bence. There is justification for having'
a cadre of trained personnel available
for wartime purposes and even for
peacetime purpose;, but no one having
knowledge of peacetime intelligence
production of these services and the
:act that there is little correlation be-
tween peacetime intelligence training
and combat intelligence work can-
jus-tify such numbers.
(3) With real supervision by the Di-
rector of Central intelligence, backed
by the President, and after consulta-I
tion and tough decisions on what the
vital interests of the United States are,
hundreds of messages could go out
around the world to cut back on pe-
.ripheral intelligence ;,collection. The
problem is that no one has been wiill-
ing to make a decision on what to
cut and then cut. There have been
efforts to heat The New York Times
on everything. President Nixon. joking-
ly told Mr. Colby on his being sworn
in as Director of C.I.A. and Central
Intelligence not. to--allow him to 'be
surprised by something he read in the
newspaper.
We really- don't need an intelli-
gence czar, with the-incumbent risks
of hearing only one voice. What we do 1
need is Presidential initiative and de-
termination to rationalize and support
the Director of Central intelligence
and intelligence community concepts
RENZEL:HOE-t{SE,6MA 1
Professor of Political Science
Hope College
New York, June 25, 1977
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Approved For Release 2007/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2
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