Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2.pdf108.44 KB
Approved For Release 2007/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2 TH : NEW YU tK Tit?Ii S 4 July 1977 'We Really Don't To the Editor: Mm. Stansfield Turner, the Direc- tor of C.I.A. as well as the Director of Central Intelligence, has proposed to President Carter that the intelligence community have a single chief umafili- ated with any of the component agen- cies, such as C.I.A. In considering this proposal, one should not forget that Admiral Turner already wears the- hat of Director of Central Intelligence, 'the President's key man on all, intelligence matters. The question is nvt ti-at the Director of Central Intelligence is also the Di- rector of C.I.A., where there have been a number of capable Deputy Directors who can and have run the C.I.A. for .prolonged periods in the absence of the Director or when no Director had been appointed, but that the Director of Central- Intelligence has not acted hhe the Director of - Central Intelli- g ence. lost of this inaction on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence is due to the fact that the Presidents of the United States, from Truman on, have been satisfied with inaction. They leave been satisfied, as former Senator Rlansfield told the Murphy Commission, with a "swollen, expensive and in- efficient intelligence community." Part of the inactivity was because the Di- rector of Central Intelligence would cnly involve himself in battles that geed . an Intelligence Czar' . would dissipate his energies and de- tract from the necessary intelli;erce- collection activities of the intelligence community if he tried to act without Presidential backing and authority. What could be done without creating an "intelligence czar"? . (1) Responsibility and final author- ity for the intelligence community's STAT budget could be placed in the handai of the Director of Central Intelligence. (2) Personnel cut` could be made in .the agencies of the intelligence com- munity. Senator Mansfield recom- mended a reduction in the number of personnel in the National. Security Agency, in view of the fact that each - of the armed forces maintains its own cryptological capability. The Defense Intelligence Agency could safely-be cut .from 5,000 to 500,.with a correspond- ing cut in.budget, making the D.I.A. something like the Bureau of Intelli-! pence and Research in the Department of State.. Published figures ind;catell; that there are about 38,500 in Army' intelligence, 10,000 in Navy intelli- gence and 60,000 in Air Force intelli Bence. There is justification for having' a cadre of trained personnel available for wartime purposes and even for peacetime purpose;, but no one having knowledge of peacetime intelligence production of these services and the :act that there is little correlation be- tween peacetime intelligence training and combat intelligence work can- jus-tify such numbers. (3) With real supervision by the Di- rector of Central intelligence, backed by the President, and after consulta-I tion and tough decisions on what the vital interests of the United States are, hundreds of messages could go out around the world to cut back on pe- .ripheral intelligence ;,collection. The problem is that no one has been wiill- ing to make a decision on what to cut and then cut. There have been efforts to heat The New York Times on everything. President Nixon. joking- ly told Mr. Colby on his being sworn in as Director of C.I.A. and Central Intelligence not. to--allow him to 'be surprised by something he read in the newspaper. We really- don't need an intelli- gence czar, with the-incumbent risks of hearing only one voice. What we do 1 need is Presidential initiative and de- termination to rationalize and support the Director of Central intelligence and intelligence community concepts RENZEL:HOE-t{SE,6MA 1 Professor of Political Science Hope College New York, June 25, 1977 f Approved For Release 2007/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100056-2 i