ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI, TO THE AMHERST, SMITH, VASSAR, WILLIAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. ALUMNI CLUBS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Addr? cc kkv A,4-;-,l :+-, .. .. .Ct_l, r
Di rec Approved For Release 2~007e/09//17 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
to the Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Washington, D.C. Alumni Clubs
17 September 1980
t IJ 7'0 2 i c.c vv~,
,CIA-
Good
evening. Welcome to the CIA, Amherst men, Williams men, Vassar
and Smith ladies. I guess maybe it hasn't gotten into the extracurricular
side on the alumni yet has it? I don't know whether we've got ladies from
Amherst here yet or-not, but if you are, welcome.
I guess I'm with you tonight for a couple of reasons. One is an enduring
gratitude for having had the privilege of an education, at least part of an
education-?-I left at the end of two and a half years in a small, New England
liberal arts college; one of the great institutions in our country, I believe,
is private, small colleges dedicated to the liberal arts. And I'm always
pleased to be with others who have shared that kind of an opportunity, but
I also know that you, as leaders of this community, this country, help shape
the public opinion in our country and I'm anxious to share with you our vie,,-.,s
on the Central Intelligence Agency, on the intelligence function of our country
tonight because I know it's important for you and the country to understand
that. We're. in the midst of some important changes, some important swinging
of the pendulum in this country with respect to intelligence and I would li'.
to give you a few of my views on why I believe intelligence is important,
perhaps of growing importance to our nation and that it takes to have a. good
intelligence capability in this country.
Let me start by saying that I sincerely believe that the decade of the
1980's is going to more precarious for our country than the decade of the
70's or the 60's. Several reasons I would say that. One, this will he the
decade in which we face the first leadership in the Soviet Union that does
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
not feel militarily inferior to the United States. Now that's important.
It is important to how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. We
cannot-bully them. We cannot feel superior to them in this regard. And
first we must decide what we want to do about this with respect to our
military posture ourselves, but regardless of what we do there, I would
say to you that throughout most of the decade of the 1980's, there is no way
we can change this perception of near parity in military forces between our
two countries. Therefore we must and will have to adapt our diplomacy under
these circumstances. It doesn't mean we're going to lose, it doesn't mean
we are too weak to handle it, but it means we have to be more astute. We
have to be more foresighted. We have to have good information.
A second reason the 80's will be precarious is that the developed
countries of the free world cannot expect the same continued high rates of
economic. growth in this decade that we have experienced in the last several.
Why? We estimate in the Central Intelligence Agency that the total amount of
energy available to the developed nations of the world in this decade will
increase by only a percent or two per year. And that's our optimistic side.
One or two percent growth of energy available will not sustain 5 or 6% rate
of growth of gross national product of our countries. And therefore we have
a different economic outlook and.that affects our relationships all around the
world. And so, too, will the fact in the energy field that in 1980 the OPEC
countries will siphon off of world trade about $110 billion;.that is, that
will be their net return after they have bought everything they are going to
buy from us and after they have sold everything they are going to sell to us.
None of us know what billions of dollars are, but last year it was $63 billion
they took off; 2 years ago it was $2 billion. Now the difference between $2
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
billion and $110 billion is enough to change the world economic prospect.
Why? Why is it so different? Because in 1974 they increased the price of
.oil by 42 times. By 1978, their benefit from doing that had decreased to
$2 billion; first, because they were buying much more from.us, the West,
but secondly, because we had eaten up their profits by. inflation. You don't
have to lecture to anybody in America today to say that the OPEC is not going
to let us eat their profits up by inflation in the next four years as we did
in the first four years of their price rises. They are now indexing;'they
are going to raise the price of oil as- rapidly as we inflate. So we have a
different problem in front of'us. One hundred ten billion dollars over a few
years gets to earn enough interest to where you are almost making $110 billion
in interest every year. It's a bi'g and a different problem for us.
And thirdly, the decade of the 80's will be different and more precarious
because the traditional mechanisms for handling these military, political and
economic problems that we face are not going to work the same way in the 1980's
as they had before. Our NATO allies, economically prosperous, politically stable,
they want, they demand a stronger voice in the councils of the Alliance. The
underdeveloped countries of the world, as you read every day in the papers, are
more and more independent, aggressively independent, particularly. those that
produce raw materials. And in the 80'.s they are going to produce the quantity,
the type of raw materials that suits their economic needs., not ours. Sometimes
those are coincident but they need not necessarily be. Now I'm not predicting
that our alliance is going to be weaker; I'm not suggesting that we are going
to-be in a total head-on'clash with the lesser developed countries throughout
the decade; I'm simply suggesting to you-that the traditional mechanisms, the
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
traditional ways of working in these organizations will not necessarily be
effective in the 1980's as they have been in the past. We must adapt. We
must be more subtle, I believe. We must be more understanding of other
people and their cultures, their economic problems, their pblitical issues
and so.on.
And again, I come back to saying that I believe this means for us in the-
intelligence world, that we must do a better job of keeping our' policymakers
in this country well informed. Can we do that? What does it take? It is
going to he more difficult in the years ahead than it has in those behind.
It is more easy. It's easier to find ways to counter intelligence activities
today; people are more soph.isti'cated; people are more alert; there are more
countries we need to gather intelligence on. It is a more difficult task.
To be effective in the 80's- we are going to have to change our ways of doing
business and we are going to have'to have some legislative support. Let me
touch those two things quickly.
One reason we have to change our ways is that the means of collecting
intelligence today are quite different than they were a decade or a. decade
and a.half ago. Thanks to the wonders-of American technology. Our technical
systems for cal l ecti.ng intelligence ' information * have just burgeoned; we get
much more information'today than we ever expected we'would from our means of
listening. to signals, from'our means of taking photographs of.what is going
on on the surface of'the earth.. Now that does not denigrate or. make unusable
the traditional intelligence human spying activities. But it changes the
character of it. You do not go out and risk the life of a spy to get information
you can obtain from a sensor. So we must, today, have a very sophisticated,.
complex .
/way of integrating all of our means of collecting-intelligence, moreso than
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
has ever, perhaps, been-necessary in the past.
For instance, if by a photograph we find that country x
has a new factory out here in the countryside. We wonder what it is all about.'
We then turn to the signals intelligence people and we say, "Why don't you find
out if the network of communications from that factory to the capital goes to
the Ministry of Nuclear Materials, or to the Foreign Ministry." And if it
goes to the Ministry.of Nuclear Materials, we will then go and. find a human
agent and well say, now what we want to know-is not what is-in that factory,
but some specific element of the nuclear relationship which we-will define
for him and put him to work in a very targeted, specific way. It can be much
more effective, but it takes much*-more teamwork. And it's a fascinating
challenge for'us.
The second side of intelligence'ts taking all this information that you
have gathered and doing something with it. Turning it into analyses that, are
useful to our policymakers in the Executive Branch; to our legislators on the
Hill, and to some extent, when we can do it in an unclassified form, to the.
American public. The challenge; the change that we'have to face today on the
.analytic side of our house is equally great because today the number of countries
we are concerned with is just so much'greater than it was- twenty or'thirty years
.ago. There is: hardly a country in the world not impacted by the major decisions,
of this country and there is hardly a country in the world that does something
inportant on its own that isn't of interest and concern to us.- We have to know
what is going on. And the areas of'academic- expertise.that we'have to be able
to,work in are growing also,'a great challenge to us. We are not'only
interested in the technology of miss-iles'and tanks and ships,~we are interested
to the health and psychology of foreign leader ;?we'are interested in Soviet
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
grain harvest this year and next; we are interested in the flow of narcotics
on the international market; we are interested in international terrorism;
we are interested in the gross national product and the types of products
and the profusion of technology across the world in many, many countries.
And it goes on and on.. There is hardly an academic discipline in any of our
colleges or even the universities of this country which we do not employ here
in the Central Intelligence Agency. We have to change. We have to be able
to spread ourselves into many more areas than in the past.
Still another reason for change is the disinstituti'onthe Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Intelligence Community in general, has become, a much
more public institution in our country today than it ever has been before.
Or that any intelligence service has ever been in history. This came about
as a result of the accusations, the charges, the investigations of the Intelli-
gence Community in the '75-'77 time frame. It is a fact of life; we cannot turn
the clock back; we have now established new sets of'controls in the Executive
Branch, on Capitol Hill, in the Legislative Branch. We are working well under
those controls. I believe we can handle i:t. I believe that these changes are
acceptable. But partly as a side effect of these changes of becoming a .more
public institution; but partly also is a. side effect.of Vietnam, of the Pentagon
Papers, Watergate, we have lost something that we cannot afford to lose in the
intelligence business--that is the capability to keep our necessary secrets.
We cannot be a secret intelligence service*if everything we learn is spewed out
into the public domain. We are today then, asking the Congress for legislative
help in this area. Now sometimes you read in the press that what we are asking
for apd what. we need is to be unleashed, to be put under less control. That is
inaccurate; that is facile misunderstanding of'what in-.fact-we need; what, in
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8 ;
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
fact, we hope the Congress will give us. What we want is protection for our
ability to keep our secrets.
Several pieces of legislation we have in mind. The first concerns
something called covert action. Covert action isn't strictly intelligence.
Covert action is the attempt to influence the events in'a foreign country
without the source of that influencing being known. It has always been
assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by Presidents as the place where
it will be carried out. It used to be just three years ago that it was almost
unconscionable to talk about undertaking covert action. It was very unpopular.
Today even in the media, as well as in conversations with Americans, I find
people saying is there not. something we can do between just talking with other
countries and sending in the Marines? And yes, there is. Covert action does
have a place in our diplomatic portfolio. In 1974 the Congress passed the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires that, if we are to undertake a covert
action, on direction of the President, we must notify up to eight committees
of the Congress. Now that is something in the neighborhood of 200, people.
I can assure you I find it very difficult to go out and recruit others to go
risk their lives on behalf of doing a covert action for us if I have to confess
to them that maybe only 200 people on Capitol Hill will know about it.
Now, I don't want to be critical because I think in 1974 the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment may have been necessary. It may have been a_ good idea. It was the
beginning of establishing controls over.the intelligence'.mechanisms. through
the Congress--controls which had existed but withered and now'were being
reinstit.ted. But, today, we do not'need that same control because we have
a very e;=fectiive set of intelligence committees in each'chamber of the Congress
and they z'o and are only to do oversight of'the intelligence community; and
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
they do a very effective job of it and we want and are asking the Congress,
andI think you will find that tomorrow we are going to make some progress
on this I hope...to pass a law that will limit this information on the
covert actions to these two oversight committees. -Please note that on those
two committees, there are at least two representatives from each of the other
committees that we are not going to inform. So, in effect, we are not cutting
the numbers of.committees that will know this any, we are cutting the number
of people. So if the Foreign Affairs Committee, which under our hope, will
not have this information in the future, needs to have it; there will be two
members on It who do have that information' and raise their hand in a Foreign
Affairs Committee debate and say there is something in the intelligence field
that is germane to our debate. Let's stop and'get the intelligence people in
here and we, of course, would come and inform them.
A second area where we need help is in what we cal'] identities legislation.
I am in the difficult spot today of asking Americans to go overseas, serve
their country as Central rntelli:gence Agency off cers, under cover;'that is,
not acknowledging that they work?for'us, into countries where terrorism is
quite popular, into countries where their security cannot be assured by the
host country very well. And I have to do that while confessing to these people
that this country has not yet been willing to do anything against those PLmerican
citizens who callously and, in my opinion, traitorously, deliberately go out
and try to disclose the identities of'these men and women. You'all know that
in.1975, after Mr. Agee did this with respect to our people. in Greece, our
Chief of Station there was murdered. You'may all remember that in July of this
year-'after Mr. Agee's cohort, Philip Wolf, went to Jamaica ' and went on television
and said here are the pictures`of'15 members of'the'United States Embassy who
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
work for the CIA, here are their addresses, here are the telephone numbers,
here are their license plate numbers, the house of one of those 15 men was
his
shot up two nights later. Had/daughter had been there and in her bed we might
not have her with us today.
We have a bill-before the Congress and it, too, tomorrow and the next day,
is going to make progress. And it makes it a crime and in a repeated pattern
of activity and with deliberate intent to destroy the intelligence activities
of our country, disclose the names of our undercover people or'our foreign
.agents overseas. There is a great deal of controversy in the press who claim
that this is unconstitutional, who fear this is going to bring them into court.
Let me assure you that we have painstakingly crafted this legislation with the
Congress to avoid that. The Attorney General, former Solicitor General, Robert
Bork, have said that this legislation is constitutional. And they are a better
source of opinion in my mind than the Washington Post or the New York Times on
that subject. And only if people carry out these activities over a pattern and
over a period of time and only if they do so with a demonstrated intent to destroy
our intelligence capability, can people be prosecuted. We believe it is most
essential to our peoples' welfare, our peoples' morale, that we have some
protection and this bill is very carefully designed to give them that without
intruding on the constitutional rights of`our;ci'tizens.
Finally, we have a bill with respect'to what is known as the Freedom of
Information Act. This problem i:s really one of'pe'rception'rather than fact.
Perception'in this sense. If I' am going to somebody overseas and -saying will
you risk your life for our country,' and he 1ooks'me in the eye and says', but
do you' have to under the Freedom'of'Information Act'release my name of they
call for'it.? I will tell him no.' 'But true answer, if he'presses me, is that
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
I have never been required to do so yet; I have been challenged in the courts
repeatedly and we have always won. But are you going to stick your neck on
the line on the hope that we will win the next one when your name is the issue
at stake. Not very likely. So we want to exempt from the Freedom of Information
Act, the information in our files about our sources of information; not about
information that could be in our files about American citizens or others--we
really don't keep that, but we wantth.e public to be assured that the Freedom
of Information Act will still apply to their legitimate interests in what
may be in our files. We hope that this will pass this session of Congress also
because it will be.a. great boon to changing this perception, this overall
perception that this country cannot keep-its secrets, therefore its intelligence
services cannot be trusted by those with whom'we must work overseas.
In sum, you, I, this country faces a dilemma with respect to intelligence.
We want our country to be as open, as- free as- it can be and we want our govern-
mental institutions to exemplify that openness. At the same time, I think we
all recognize that a secret intelligence service is necessary for our country
so that we are not caught unawares, so that other people cannot take advantage
.of us in the international arena. The issue, the problem that we have is can
we have both? Can we have the ideal of openness; can we have th.e necessity
of some level of secrecy. 1-believe we can; I believe we can do both, and
we must. I believe we can have controls on'.the intelligence apparatus of our
country that still allow us to be effective. On the one hand, those controls
today are in the Executive Branch.through_the President and his Executive Orders
that govern us. On the other hand, they are in the Legislative Branch through
the Committees of the Congress- and I bel ieye these two sets of ' controls give, the
public of this country reason to be confident that the intelligence activities
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
are being conducted in accordance with national policy and under the supervision
of the elected representatives of the people.
On the other hand,'I am very grateful that over the last two years or so,
I can just feel the swing of this pendulum in terms of American public support
for a good intelligence service. It is coming back and we are very,.very
grateful to have, it. And with some help from the Legislature such as I have
been describing to you tonight, I believe we can, with the support of the
people, with some good legislation, continue to be as effective as this Agency
has been over its 32-year history.
Final ly,?.th.en, let me just say I believe these trends are all moving in
the right direction'and that we are shaping a new kind of intelligence for our
country. We are not yet there; we continue to need your support and I don't
mean just your support for these legislative initiatives that I have mentioned
to you tonight, your support for the fact'that this country must in the decade
of the 1980's, a decade I believe will be a precarious one, most have a capa-
bi:l i.ty to look overseas and learn what is happening to foretell events, so that
we can keep our policymakers as well informed as possible and they can make
the best decisions possible for you, for our country and, in effect, for the
entire Free World. Thank you:
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
Q&A's
Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Alumni Clubs of Washington, D.C.
17 September 1980
Q: Could you just outline for us the way the Central Intelligence Agency
(I believe there is a Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency---I don't know whether there are still intelligence branches of
the various Armed Forces, and the information-gathering functions of
the State Department and the Department of Commerce and God knows how
many others there are) how these all fit together?
A: How big is this octopus called the Intelligence Community? I have two
jobs. I am the Director of Central Intelligence, established by law in
1947, to coordinate all of the intelligence activities, what we call the
national intelligence activities, of our country. The law also provided
that the Director of Central Intelligence would always be the head of
the Central Intelligence Agency.-- one:of the components of the Community.
There are two kinds of components in the community--there are those who
collect information and there are those who use it and analyze it. The
CIA does both, but primarily collects our human intelligence. The National
Security Agency collects signals intelligence. There are other components
that collect photographic intelligence spread around the community. The
State Department and a number-of other organizations like the Federal
Broadcast Information Service, collect open intelligence, unclassfied
intelligence, and so on. One of my key jobs, and one that President Carter
has strengthened in his term of office, is to coordinate all that collection
as I indicated to you was important to do so. It is also important to you
and me for our pocketbook. There is a lot of money in these expensive
technical systems, and we don't want too many, we don't want them over-
lapping, we don't want them underlapping--failing to get what needs to be
collected. So I have had strengthened authority ovyer.those agencies; I
control what we call their "tasking"--what they go out and collect. it's
my responsibility. I control'their budgets. Now the other side of t!*:e
house is analyzing intelligence. There is a Defense Intelligence AgL:cy,
a large organization here called the National Foreign Assessment Center
which is part of the CIA, there is the State Department Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, there are small intelligence organizations in Energy,
Commerce, and so on. We all work together and I am nominally their boss
but I say nominal l ,pause we want--competitive, differing analyses to
come forward. We/ R}1t one individual to be able to tell anybody, suppress
that view. That is a crazy idea you've got here. We let it all bubble
up. I then do have to make decisions what is my advice as senior intelli-
gence advisor to the President, but if there is a strong dissenting view
like from DIA, I will feel it incumbent upon me to present that as an
alternative, if you see what I mean.. So we try on the one hand to have a
DCI who does ride strong on the collecting agencies who organizes and
brings together the analytic agencies, but not with a strong control over
them- The money is not'very big here, comparatively speaking, and the
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
importance of having different centers of thinking, different centers of
interpretation is very keen to our overall objective.
Q: Do you think it is possible for the Director of the CIA to properly
balance for intelligence and analysts (inaudible).
A: Can a Director of Central Intelligence combine the roles of being
intelligence interpreter and a policy advisor, particularly a strong-
willed one and he graciously named somebody else. I don't have a very
strong will just as long as we do things my way around here. Seriously,
the usual question, and I'll answer it first, and maybe it's part of
yours or not, is can I be the head of CIA and run all the other intelli-
gence activities fairly Because in some sense there is competition there
particularly in the budget area. And it is difficult to not have two
masters, but to be two bosses I guess, but I believe it can be done
and in point of fact, particularly to my case, because I have such a
superb deputy, Ambassador Frank Carlucci, I am really able to turn the
running of the CIA over to my deputy and I make major policy decisions
risk -taking decisions, and try to be as much DCI as I can rather than
CIA. But can I be intelligence chief and a policy advisor--let me make
it clear that one of'the ethics of intelligence is to stay out of the
policy business; because if I start advocating that we ought to have a
SALT treaty, SALT II treaty, will the Congress or you believe me when I
testify on how well I can verify the SALT II Treaty? So, we don't pick
policy positions. Now, we have to stay.very close to the policymakers
because if we're not producing intelligence on what they are making policy
on, we are here for naught. So I'm very well abreast of what policy
decisions the President and others are trying to make. But I am very
scrupulous in not letting intelligence advocate one position or another.
Now clearly, some of the things we come up with scotch or support a policy
preference or at least have a major impact on it, but because we want
those to be appreciated-as being non=biased, we very carefully try to
stay out of the policy process. 'For'a strong-willed person it's a hard
thing to sit there in the National Security-Council and hear everybody
advocating something you'know is- just wrong. And not speak up, but
I do try. And do.
Q: Admiral Turner, we've heard a good deal this evening about some of the
activities of the CIA--intelligence=gathering, covert-action activity
'by that I understand now'you to mean an attempt to influence affairs
in another country without that country being aware of'where the'
influence comes from. I wonder if you would comment for us,-compare
for us the very effective role of'the.CIA in Chile, both in its intelli-
gence gathering and in its covert activities which resulted in the murder
of Allende, and that of.the CIA's role in Iran, which seems'to have a great
deal of difficulty attached to it, both in terms of its ability to cQnvey
information to the American Congress and the President as to what was
about to happen and it seems, obviously in terms its current covert activity
which I understand or would assume is going on'at this very minute:
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
A: Would I compare our intelligence success in Chile with our intelligence
failures in Iran? I am not asked the question in quite those terms, but
it's a good one. We in both Chile and Iran, undertook covert actions.
In Iran way back in 1953 and in Chile in 1970. Let me emphasize
that in some sense the one in Iran was successful in 1953 and it achieved
what the country asked us to do. The country did not ask us to murder
Allende and we did not do that in Chile, but generally speaking, I do not
think we were successful in achieving what the country Wanted in Chile.
But, I would only emphasize to you in both cases -the covert action activi-
ties of this Agency in those countries were authorized by the President of
this country, checked by the National Security Council and we were conforming
with the national policy in those regards. Now, as to the so-called failure
in Iran in 1978, when the Shah, actually fell in early 1979 but he began
to lose power in 1978; we have been accused of an intelligence failure
here, and we would like to have done better there. Let me just say this
in our self-defense without trying to be too defensive, but the most
difficult part of intelligence is the political side, particularly the
side of predicting coups, revolutions, changes like this that come about
suddenly. Now in this instance, throughout 1978, beginning in January,
we were reporting to the President that there were a lot of problems in
Iran. There was a lot of undercurrent of unrest. We saw'it from people
who were dissatisfied with their economic status, dissatisfied because they
did not have a role in the political process, dissatisfied because their
Islamic traditions or practices were being profaned and dissatisfied because
there was graft and corruption, and so on. What we did not forecast was..
that these various centers- of dissatisfaction would coalesce around a 78-year
old cleric who had been an expatriate for 17 years and would become a force
of greater strength than the Shah could handle and right up to October'I
personally, while seeing this building, felt that because the Shah had such
strong police and military forces, that he was going to step in at a critical
moment and take control and suppress- this. He did not do so for reasons that
I'm sure we will probably never understand, indicative in part that not even
the Shh understood the strength and the- welling up of these forces and
their ::alescence. What happened in Iran is what we term a "societal change"
not a revolution. It Is a lot easier in many ways to predict a revolution,
an organized activity, something where you can infiltrate it with a spy
and find out what they are going to do. This was, in fact, a true revolu-
tion, a change ine society brought-about by these many centers of
dissatisfaction that managed to bring themselves together and topple the
Shah on a program that was strictly anti-Shah. A lot of the chaos we have
seen and which is frankly getting worse in that country today-is that that
kind of a cement between a group of different does not hold very well.
Once the Shah is gone they haven't been able to find that same motivating
factor. They. are working it around their religion, but there are great
differences within the country over that today. And we have a situation
in Iran where there are so many different power centers in the country today
that it is tending towards chaos-.
Q: Right now, sir, what is the parity of'our intelligence effort vis-a-vis
-'Russia and Western Europe? .
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8 ,
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
A: What's the parity compairson of our intelligence effort capabilities
with Europeans and the Russians. An interesting question. Because
today there are only two countries in the world that have a full intel-'
ligence capability--ourselves and the Soviets. You see, technical
systems have become so expensive that there is no other country that
has the full range of them that we and the Soviets do. Now that does
mean the Europeans are not good in intelligence. I'm just saying that
they have limitations that we do not because of our greater breadth
of intelligence capabilities. As farr the Soviets are concerned, we
are definitely ahead of them in the/tab Phical collection that I described
to you because of superior American technology. On human intelligence
they are much bigger than we; it's very hard to measure, but I'm not
dissatisfied, I think that we're more clever and do just as capable a
job with a smaller number of people. But that, of course, is a disputable
issue. It's'ery hard to tell. Finally, the other half of intelligence is
analysis and I believe we have a great advantage over the Soviets here.
because I do not think you could do as good analysis when you're in a
very structured, authoritarian society where you may lost your job and your
head if you come up with th.e-wrong conclusions. I can go to the President
and say I think you're wrong, boss and I'm not sure my counterpart, Mr.
Andropov, can get away with that. I think that inhibits good analysis.
I think we have a-great advantage on them there.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: We've got a couple of big issues here. I hope you're prepared to stay
a while. Does covert action contravene the principles and ethics of
our country in essence is part of the question. And don't we need both
public and Congressional oversight to ensure that covert action doesn't
go off and do things as unsuccessful as what we did in Chile. First of
all, if it's a covert action, by definition, you can't have public over-
sight. Now you can have Congressional oversight on.a classified basis
and what I'm saying to you and asking the Congress is not to reduce or
eliminate Congressional over:;-.ht, I'm trying to reduce the number of
people on Capitol Hill who have to know this and thereby reducing the
probability of leaks. Let me emphasize to you, please, I do not mistrust
the Congress for leaks anymore than I mistrust anybody else in the intelli-
gence world, but the danger of a leak is geometrically proportional to the
number of people who know-it, in a broad sense. We want oversight; we want
oversight.o1 the covert action process but two committees, on which. are
represented' the other 6 committees, I believe is adequate for public
assurance that the covert action is being undertaken in an'authorized and
a proper way. And we don't even go up and start a covert action unless
it has been signed off 'in writing by the President of the United States.
So, I think. it's under very tight control. Is it against our ethic, is it
against our country's morays to undertake covert action? Let me give you
an example of a covert action. We want to influence another country to
take a certain position in the United Nations on-the Camp David Accords.
;Now- our foreign minister, our Secretary of State-can go to their foreign
minister and say, Joe we really think you ought to do so'and so on this
position in the United Nations. Now what's Joe going to think? The first
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
thing he is going to say is, is Mr. Muskie telling me that because i.t's.
good for the United States or it's good for my country? So, if we want
to be effective with that Foreign Minister, we may find that it's better
to have someone else suggest to him that the best thing for him to do is
to take a certain position in the United Nations about the Camp David
Accords. And I believe there is quite a role for that kind of thing.
Now you're much more concerned with assassinations, paramilitary, over-
throws of governments and so on. To begin with, we have an Executive
Order that forbids anyone in our government considering assassination,
any assassination effort. So we.have drawn a very clear and unequivocal
line there; on military support, overthrowing governments, I can only say
to you that if that is ever undertaken, it is undertaken. with the approval
of the National Security Council, the President of the United States and
at least two, and today 8, committees of the Congress. So it has to,.in
some sense, reflect the will of the people. Rather than pass a law and
say you won't do any covert action, I think it is better to trust these
organs of the country which are constituted under the Constitution to
reflect. the will of the people in these regards.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Top Secret? No, I'd rather not discuss that because the President simply
has to be able to get advice from his advisors without it all coming out
that Joe said this and Bill said that and Pete said this; because if it
really does all fall out in the press as it does so often, people get wary
about this and pretty soon the President is deprived of this kind of advice.
Q: Looking at both Iran and Nicaragua, we've come up with the Ayatollah and
the Sandanista guerrillas (inaudible). Is there any guidance within the
USG at this point not only binding on your Agency, but also on the State
Department and others that when vie some dictator, some in control about
to go down, that we do something to'promote getting someone in position
to take over power who is friendly to our interests?
A: That's a very difficult question to answer. It's one that transcends
intelligence, and gets into broad policy. It is one on which if I could
share the innermost thought that I'have wouldn't entirely satisfy you-
because we do things pretty much on an ad hoc basis country-by-country:.
Let me come back to this other question which relates to it. One of the
ways to do just exactly what you are suggesting, and it is a good suggestion,
and I would like to answer you yes, we always do it, but I can't in all
honesty; is to undertake_a covert action years in advance of that crisis.
That is, to covert subsidize'and work with people who stand for moderation
for freedom, for democracy, so that when the country collapses around a
dictator, we are able to help bring to the fore the kind of people who
stand for the kinds of things we stand for. That is one of the things
that it is covert action. You see, covert action is not, when anything
I do that isn't collecting intelligence, collecting information and
analyzing it, is defined as covert action. if I'm out supporting the
democratic elements in a country of'the right or the left, I'm doing a:
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
covert action and I need to have that freedom to do just what you
suggest.
(Inaudible.)
not
A: Why did it/work in South Korea? Either we hadn't tried a covert action
or we didn't do it well. I'm sorry to be somewhat facetious. We , it's
a very difficult thing to do. I'm suggesting we should try, but I
certainly guarantee you 100% success.if I'm asked to do this. You have
to have some moderate elements from which to buil.d to begin with and.
I can tell you, we have declined in recent times. We have declined to
undertake a covert action for that very reason, that we did-not think
there was an adequate moderate base upon which to build in a particular
country, and we felt we would be deluding our decisionmakers if we under-
took'what they were suggesting we might want to do. See what 'I mean?'
There was such a low:probabi'lity of our being able to build a base of
support: that we*said, really, you're just kidding yourselves if you
think you're going to accomplish something through us in this particular
country.
Q: What portion of your efforts are describable as military intelligence
as opposed to political or'ci'vil or did Brezhnev sleep well last night?
A: It's very hard to put numbers on it, but I would say to you that
intelligence on the Soviet Union is probably 70% of our effort, the
whole Soviet Communist Bloc; that within that, better than half is
military-related; and those are very broad numbers because you just
can't do it by a timeclock; that isn't the only factor here, but yes,
we still have a very- high percentage of our effort on military affairs,
particularly Soviet military affairs. And it's one of my big problems..
First of all, it's hard to change any institution of this size and
change its direction. Secondly, you asked me what military intelligence
would 1 cut out in order to do more economics--it's a very difficult
decision because we are under a very definite military threat today.
We pare a little here and hope to get some more from the Congress and
we add a little there. But it's not easy.
Q: As DCI at the time you started working for the CIA, there was a document
you had to sign, to say if after your employment at the CIA if you were
ever to'make comment on international affairs you had to submit them to
a CIA Board of Review. Now-you have a predecessor by the name of George
Bush who is presently running for'Vice President, who apparently signed
the same document, except has not fallen under this requirement. Why?
A: ..If I can get through the next 40 days.wi,thout too many more questions
like this I'll be in great shape. Mr. Bush signed a secrecy agreement
with us; he has indicated to us that he will live up to it, including
his activities during.the'campaign. The agreement does not say everything
we write, publish or'comment on after we'leave the CIA must be submitted
for review. It says that which deals with the intelligence process, that
which deals with what we learned about or in the intelligence business.
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8
here must. be clear, it's not censored; it's cleared for security reasons
only. Mr. Hetu is the Chairman of the Publications Review Board that
does that. The point being that every someone as knowledgeable as Mr.
Bush may not know three or four years after the fact whether something
is still or be inimical to the.-Interest of the country if it were disclosed.
Q: (Inaudible.)
A: That is a very perceptive question and I glossed over that. I do become
an advocate of policy to some extent whenI suggest a covert action
solution. Let me say this.in mitigation. We only originate covert actions
suggestions here as a supplement to existing policies. Only is a strong
word, but I don't know of a case when it hasn't been that way. That is,
I don't think we would come along and say there's country over here and
we think we ought to start a whole new thrust in there. What we say to
ourselves is, in our base in the National Security Council, I hear them
saying they would like to try to get country x to stop doing this. I'll
come back to my staff here and I'll say, this is-the direction the country
wants to go. The Secretary of State wants to go. The President wants to
go.and has endorsed it. Can we help? If so, we develop a proposal and
send it down for the review-of the National Security Council. But it
is getting us into the policy business in that one sphere. For that reason,
some people suggested-get covert action out of here. Not unreasonable,
Let me suggest one reason you may not want to do that. Right now, covert
action is part of the CIA and we have people who go into the covert action
department and they spend 2, 3, 4, 5 years there and they work and they
come back and they go into other parts of the CIA and they move around.
If you take and you create a whole new-Agency for covert action, what are
going to get. You'get a lot of pressure for covert action. You've got a
bureaucracy dependent upon the flourishing of covert action. So they are
going to generate it. If my covert action people today don't get any business
for the next two years and they didn't for a number of years practically
around here, they're not really worried about their job anymore, anyway,
because they are going to go bac': into other departments of the Agency.
In short., it is not a full-time profession for people in this organization
and, therefore, it does not generate a constituency. Lastly, let me say
that it would be very expensive to duplicate because many of the same
individuals carry out our intelligence collection to do the covert action.
See what I mean. You have an agent overseas. Today he's giving you
information about what that foreign minister is thinking, tomorrow he's
talking to-the foreign minister saying, hey, why don't you vote in the
United Nations? Lastly; the two relate together very much--intelligence
collection and covert action, because again, if you support a democratic
politician in a foreign country before he comes into power, he's your friend
.afterwards. One time you're working covert action with him, the next time
you're working intelligence.
Approved For Release 2007/09/17: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140019-8