CIA REPORT, "THE WORLD SITUATION IN 1970"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-289-3-9-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 18, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/15: LOC-HAK-289-3-9-9
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March 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HAL SONNENFELIYr
FROM: Al Haig /Y
SUBJECT: CIA Report, "The World Situation in 1970""
The President has read the March 11 memorandum to him from
HAIL (attached) that you prepared and has made some comments
that require follow-up action.
The President tbovot our present policy (as noted in the second
paragraph on page 3) to the gradual and asked HA.K to develop a
more aggressive approach with a few bold, unexpected moves.
thin program for tbo President.
A New Loolt at Radio Free Euro (page 3)
The President agreed that we should review RYE in connection with
the Fiscal 1972 budget, but cold that he favors continuing it
and not cutting it,
Attachment
Actions Recommendation to HAK on bow we go about
AMH:WL:ms:3/ 18/70
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MORI/CDF C05106193 page 1
C05106195 pages 2-7
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
INFORMATION
March 11, 1970
SUBJECT: CIA Report: "The World Situation in 1970"
You raised certain questions in connection with this CIA report; this
memorandum comments on these questions.
1. Weakness of Soviet Military Forces in the Western USSR
This CIA paper suggests that the Soviet build-up of military forces along
the Sino-Soviet border has absorbed resources which would otherwise have
gone to Soviet forces in Western Russia and that these latter forces are
consequently inadequately supplied.
I think this conclusion is probably somewhat overdrawn. It is true that
some 30 Soviet divisions have over the last several years been diverted
to the Chinese border regions. Twelve of these are at the highest state
of readiness and much of the equipment is of the most up-to-date type.
Divisions in the Far East have unusually strong artillery support and some
of the equipment has not even appeared in Soviet units in East Germany,
which are among the best and most ready the Soviets maintain. One reason
why Soviet forces adjacent to China are so well stocked is that they are
deployed at the end of long lines of communication and in an emergency
could not be rapidly brought up to highest readiness status.
CIA's assumption is that if it were not for the China problem, Soviet
forces on the "western front" would be getting all or most of the resources
now going east. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about Soviet resource
decisions or arguments within their leadership to be able to accept this
assumption with complete assurance. The Soviets have other demands
on their resources, including from their strategic forces, and it is there-
fore at least conceivable that some resources now going to the east would
not necessarily have been allocated to the western forces. Unless the
Soviets were deliberately planning to attack Europe (or expected an imminent
NATO attack) and therefore wanted to build up their western forces to
complete readiness, they would have no great compulsion to keep all their
divisions in the western USSR at a high pitch of readiness.
MORI/CDF
C05106195 pages
2-7
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At present, they maintain 31 combat ready divisions in Eastern Europe.
Some 12 additional ones at or near combat readiness are further back, in
the Western USSR. Numerous additional divisions in the Western USSR
would require a great deal of build-up over periods ranging from weeks
to months before they were combat ready. If it were not for China, there
would probably be fewer of these low-readiness units and all Soviet forces
might have somewhat better and newer equipment. But it is doubtful that
the Soviets would maintain in constant readiness, at top manning and equip-
ment levels, the 80-90 divisions generally thought to be needed for an
attack westward.
China has undoubtedly served to complicate any Soviet planning for attack
against the West; but it has not prevented the Soviets from maintaining large
forces in the west, useful both to suppress dissidents, as in Czechoslovakia,
and to remind Western Europe of the close proximity of Soviet power. Of
course, even more relevant in the latter respect is the large Soviet MR/IRBM
forces pointed at Europe. The demands placed on Soviet resources by the
Chinese front may have had some effect in slowing the modernization of the
MR/IRBMs.,
West European detente-mindedness is not so much a function of the precise
military posture the Soviets maintain, as of the expectations people have
of Soviet intentions. In this regard, many Europeans now feel that the
.Soviets are so pre-occupied with China that they want quiet in the West.
Some Europeans also question our readiness to resort to nuclear weapons
in defense of Europe and therefore want, through detente, to lessen the
likelihood of Soviet attack, or of crises that might lead to war, The Soviets
have of course encouraged this mood by their proposals on "European
security" and by intensified contacts of all kinds with West European
countries.
It is unlikely that even if Soviet forces were somewhat better off than they
are today, these West European attitudes would be much different under
present circumstances.
2. Can We Do More in Eastern Europe to Take Advanta
Situation?
By your Romanian trip and the policy associated with it, you have signaled
your readiness for improved relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.
Your Foreign Policy Statement points out that the pace for such improvement
should depend on what the East Europeans themselves think the traffic will
bear.' This is an important qualification because we have no interest in
arousing the Russians to clamp down. Some minor gradual improvements
in relations with Hungary and Poland are possible but realistically we
cannot expect any of the East European countries to go as far as Romania at
present. But we have taken a major step in indicating that if and when they are
ready for bona fide and reciprocal improvements, we will be receptive.
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A sober attitude on our part toward the Soviet Union will also help us
in Eastern Europe, because, like others, the people there would find
a grand US-Soviet love-match discomforting. For them it would mean
that we had written them off and underwritten the Soviet sphere of
influence. It is characteristic of the Soviets that in the past they have
used both the extremes of an alleged threat from the US and of alleged
prospects for a grandiose US-Soviet deal to try to frighten the East
Europeans into submission. We have to operate in the middle ground
between the two.
n sum, I think our general policy approach as now enunciated and
implemented is best calculated to promote the gradual growth of greater
/ autonomy in Eastern Europe. Later, we might consider selective
A1 relaxation in our economic policies
and more intensive contacts
,
,
including at high levels of government. We must also make a constant,
though tactful, effort through NATO to keep the Western allies generally
on the same policy lines toward Eastern Europe. In time, the new
Committee on Challenges of Modern Society might be one means of
eveloping relations with those Eastern countries that are ready to
participate.
It is my understanding that evaluation of RFE in 1969 indicated that it
continues to enjoy a sizeable audience in Eastern Europe. Many people
regard it as the most reliable and comprehensive source of information.
The regimes are of course unhappy with it, as are the Soviets. Funding
for Fiscal 1971 will remain at about 30 million dollars and will not allow
some of the modernization that RFE and CIA felt desirable to maintain
the quality of service. It might be appropriate to consider a small
itional sum of money if it turns out that the service is running down.
I believe that in connection with the Fiscal 1972 .budget a complete and
independent review of RFE's activities and effectiveness should be u25X1
taken. This could well begin by mid-spring.
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4. Increased Exchange Programs.
There is no question that as regards the East European countries
increased exchanges of various types can over time help to reinforce
trends favorable to us. We must however be careful not to press pre-
maturely because the regimes are suspicious and fear Soviet reactions.
They also are skillful in obstructing contact with their population and
otherwise constraining the activities of our people. However, many
private US institutions and individuals maintain contacts, exchange visits,
and engage in various projects, and the Administration should encourage
this kind of activity. It will be to our advantage to demonstrate that
Romania is benefitting most (apart from Yugoslavia) from contact with
us because this will show-the practical advantages of good relations with
us.
As.regards the Soviets, we still face an extremely restrictive approach
on the part of the Soviet leadership. The Soviets are eager to send
people here to earn dollars or learn from our technology; our biannual
exchange agreements (the latest one was just negotiated) guarantee us
some degree of reciprocal access by our people to the Soviet scene.
Without such agreements the Soviets would never grant us this and
exchanges would be largely a one-way street. At best, exchanges with
the USSR will grow slowly because of the attitude of the Soviet rulers,
but we should keep up the pressure for steady expansion. Opinions in
the West differ, but there may well be at least a marginal impact in
breaking down Soviet prejudices even from the limited programs we
are able to conduct.
In your recent conversation with Ambassador Beam you agreed to
arrangements for reciprocal visits of government officials. Over time,
it cannot harm us and may help if the new generation of Soviet leaders
sees some of our accomplishments (and, for that matter, some of our
problems and the way we tackle them).
We must, however, not oversell the exchange program. Its effect will
at best be extremely gradual; and any boasting about its impact on
Soviet attitudes may provide the most rigid among the Kremlin leaders
a pretext for scuttling the program.
This is also an area where some coordination and exchange of experience
with the Allies and Japan could be helpful.
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5. Increased Trade with the Communist Countries
Four general premises should be borne in mind in considering the
effect increased trade might have on our relations with the Communist
countries, or any other countries:
Increased trade has greater effects over time than in any
given year (such as 1970).
The increased interdependence of the world economy, coupled
with the continued independence of national policies, has,
however, raised the sensitivity of all countries -- including
Communist countries -- to trade to its highest point in
history.
-- Trade policies, as contrasted with trade itself, can have
significant effects in any given year.
As with other countries, we could use trade policy more actively to
promote our foreign policy objectives with the Communist countries.
At a minimum, we must be careful that it does not seriously impede
achievement of those objectives.
Trade per se will always be marginal in our dealings with the Soviet
Union, though it could be'-relatively more important with other countries
including China. Our trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is
now about $200 million in each direction, about twice the volume of 1962.
This amounts to well under one percent of our total trade. Even if we
relaxed our export controls and the grain shipping requirements, and
granted most favored nation treatment, it is unlikely that the actual
volume of trade would in the next two or three years more than double
to $400 million in each direction.
The prospects for trade with China are even smaller. A recent pri-
vate study for the National Committee on U. S. - China relations arr: ved
at the conclusion that the high estimate for our trade with China was
about $250 million in each direction. Thus, even with these fairly
optimistic assumptions, our trade with the Communist world would be
only about two percent of our total trade.
However, it. is clear that virtually all the Communist countries badly
want increased trade with the United States. We could thus use trade as
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part of a general political improvement of relations. (The resulting trade
would be of much less importance than a U. S. decision to foster its
development.) Conversely, a tightening of our present controls would
clearly display disapproval of their policies. Differential treatment of
different Communist countries is of course an important variant on either
the positive or negative themes.
n response to your comment the Secretary of Agriculture in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate agencies, has been
directed to initiate a study designed to determine what world-wide population
could be supported if world food production could be raised to the level
currently achieved through U. S. agricultural methods. The results are
due on April 6, 1970.
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6. Raising Food Production
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