LETTER TO RICHARD HELMS FROM RICHARD NIXON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 9, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
State Dept.
review
completed
pages 2-18
May 9, 1973
Dear Dick:
Your comprehensive report on prospects for sta-
bility in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
was an excellent job. I appreciate very much this
survey which can serve for all of us as a base line
for your subsequent observations. This is exactly
the sort of coverage, I had-in mind; and I very much
count on your developing further what you have
begun so well. We continue, of course, to follow
your other reporting as well. I am glad that things
seem to have started off on the right foot for you.
Thhe Honorable
Richard Helms
American Ambassador
Tehran
Iran
Since rely,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
'
_M
-+AI. r Caw y.t4Jui'I L
-MEM( LA M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA3HZNOTON
SECRET (XGDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
April 24, 197
I 1 t
INFORMATION
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGE
SUBJECT: Ambassado s Reports on the
Persian Gu
In response to your wish that Ambassador Helms report to you
periodically on the stability of the Persian Gulf states he has sent
you a preliminary assessment based on recent travels
a brief sketch of each state as follows:
--Kuwait: Despite appearances to the contrary, Kuwait has
better prospects for stability than any other state,., in the area.
This is due to the way in which resources are used on behalf
of the population and Kuwait's flexible foreign policy. The present
ruler is not expected to last long, but succession is assured.
--Bahrain: Bahrain appears to be stable, but in fact many sources
of tension exist. Bahrain is less wealthy than Kuwait and therefore
less able to buy off opposition elements. The royal family is aloof
from the people and follows an ostentatious life style. Bahrain is
religiously divided between followers of Sunni and Shia Islam, with
Iran taking a special interest in the Shia community. It would not
take much for Iran to intervene directly in Bahraini affairs.
--Qatar: The present regime is popular and uses its wealth to
promote stability as in Kuwait. The security forces, with many
Jordanian officers, are capable of dealing with current threats.
--The United Arab Emirates (UAE): The UAE's future depends
heavily on two very different personalities--Shaykh Zayid of
Abu Dhabi, a strong ruler of Bedouin background, and Shaykh
Rashid of Dubai, a clever merchant. Both are aware of the need
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
SECRET (XGDS_j
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W. W V JP
SECRET (XGDS)
for unity. Subversive organizations are able to operate in the
UAE, although some cells have recently been broken up. The
security forces of the individual shaykhdoms show little sign of
cooperating. Thus far a national identity.has not emerged to
offset the forces working for division.
--Oman: The guerrilla war in Dhufar province absorbs over half
of Oman's budget, thus limiting the possibility for using oil revenues
more constructively. The Sultan is not a particularly strong leader
and has done little to bring the various parts of the country together.
Subversive cells have just been broken up, but the threat remains
from rebel activity. The Sultan needs financial and military aid.
The UAE has been remiss in not offering more aid to Oman.
---Saudi Arabia: The prognosis for Saudi Arabia is wealth and
stability within the framework of a conservative monarchy. There
is little opposition to the regime. The army is balanced by the
national guard. Returning students are handsomely rewarded.
Faysal is in good health and his family contains several potential
successors.
On balance, Ambassador Helxns feels that where there is local nationalism
and accomplishment, as in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, one can
anticipate stability. Where there are internal divisions such as in Bahrain,
the UAE and Oman, instability is more likely.
Outside forces that could affect the stability of the area include the
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) and Iran. PDRY is
actively seeking to export revolution and represents a threat to any
state in the immediate area in a one-to-one situation. Iran is another
matter. Arabs feel that Iranians in general and the Shah in particular
are so contemptuous of them and are so arrogant in their dealings with
them that true cooperation probably is not possible. The Arabs genuinely
fear Iranian colonialism in the Gulf.
Ambassador Helms concludes that logically the Arabs and Iran should
work together, but emotions militate against this. One of the key roles
the US may play in the region is to assure that emotions are kept
suppressed and are not permitted to break down the uneasy truce between
the two parties.
Ambassador Helms' observations come at a time when several issues of
concern to us are emerging in the Arabian Peninsula--Persian Gulf region.
Consequently, I feel that a serious review of our policies in this area is
warranted and am working on this_
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
S
OP- MM
DE #2251 0901143 225X1
0 311119Z MAR 73ZYH
FM TEHRAN
25X11
S E C R E T 310906Z.MAR 73
EYES ONLY TEHRAN.060 SECTION 1.OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD, HELMS, TEHRAN
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF,
1. YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU CONVEYED TO ME THE PRESIDENT'S
WISH2 UNDERLINED IN HIS DECEMBER LETTER TO MEs THAT I MAKE A
RUNNING ASSESSMENT OF
n1 IR r N MY TENURE HERE.
YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE ISCU Q ROC E GEO R P L Y
FROM NORTH (KUWAIT) TQ SOUTH (OMAN) WITH SAUDI.ARABIA, THE
LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT STATE, LEFT TO LAST.
3. KUWAIT'
MANY OBSERVERS FEEL THAT KUWAIT PRESENTS, SUPERFICIALLY,
THE LEAST POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY. THE KUWAITI POPULATION
OF 750,000 IS TWO THIRDS FOREIGNERS, HALF OF WHOM ARE
PALESTINIANS. IT ALSO HAS A HIGHLY VOCAL LEFTIST ORIENTED
INTERNAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT REPRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT AND
IN THE PRESS. THE COVETOUS EYES OF IRAQ ARE CAST UPON IT
AND IRAQI TROOP MANEUVERS ALWAYS APPEAR TO BE STRADDLING ITS
BORDER. RADICAL ARAB GROUPS ARE GIVEN FREEDOM OF ACTION
COUTENANCED IN ONLY ONE OTHER ARAB STATE; LEBANON.
9 Y1
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *WHSR COMMENT * * * * *
SENT TO S.C. FOR HAK,KENNEDY'
RECALLED
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IN,FACT, KUWAIT IS VERY MUCH LIKE LEBANON POLITICALLY;.'
AND JUST AS THE RADICAL ARAB STATES TOLERATE BOURGEOIS
LEBANON FOR THE FREEDOM OF ACTION THEY DO NOT HAVE IN OTHER
STATES, SO THEY TOLERATE AND NEED REACTIONARY KUWAIT. KUWAiT,.
HOWEVER, UNLIKE LEBANONs IS NOT JUST A PASSIVE,VIEWER OF
EVENTS--IT CONTROLS. THINGS AND THERIN LIES THE KEY TO
KUWAIT'S STABILITY--A-STABILITY OF GREATER DURABILITY THAN
ANY OTHER GULF STATE, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA. OBSERVERS,ARE
OFTEN BOTHERED BY KUWAITIS APPARENT SUPINE NATURE AND LACK OF
MORAL FIBRE IN PERMITTING RADICAL GROUPS TO OPERATE FROM ITS
TERRITORY. KUWAITIS LOVE TO PROMOTE THIS OUTWARD APPEARANCE
OF "SUPINE-NESS'.' AND ARE LITTLE BOTHERED BY THE MORALITY OF
THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. THE KUWAIT RULING FAMILY AND THE
250,000 OTHER KUWAITIS. ARE ONLY CONCERNED THAT THEY KEEP KUWAIT
FOR THE KUWAITIS. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE. THE FINANCIAL CLOUT,
THE PROGRESSIVE IMAGE AND INTERNAL SECURITY PHILAS,OPHY TO KEEP
KUWAIT FOR THE KUWAITIS. IN THIS VIE; AGREE WITH- THEM, AT LEAST
FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. .THE KUWAITIS CERTAINLY'ARE AWARE OF
THE POTENTIAL TROUBLE THETR POLITICAL PHICOSUPHY MAY BREED AND
THEY HAVE A SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANt;E .WHICH THEY'
WATCH CLOSELY, SHOULD ONE ELEMENT BECOME UNACCEPTABLE, IT IS
PURGED, QUIETLY'. THE REAL PROBLEM, IN THE LONG RUN, IS THAT'
THE REVOLUTION THAT THE KUWAITIS PERMIT TO BE EXPORTED FROM
THEIR SHORE MAY ONE DAY RETURN TO DEVOUR THE BIGs.FATS CON-.
TENTED HEN THAT HATCHED IT, THE KUWAITIS MUST BE MADE MORE
AWARE OF THIS ASPECT OF THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY* -
THE RULER OF KUWAIT IS IN BAD HEALTH AND IS NOT'EXPECTED `
TO LIVE LONG. THE SUCCESSION HAS BEEN WORKED OUT AND, AS
USUAL, THE TWO CLANS OF THE RULING FAMILY, THE SALIMS AND
THE JABIRS, WILL SPLIT THE GOVERNMENT PIE. THE CROWN PRINCE
JABIR AL AHMAO, IS A
RECALLED
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- w
OP MME
DE #2251/2 0901636
O 31 MAR 73 ZYH
FM HELMS/TEHRAN 60 2/5
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T 310906Z MAR 73
EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTIf1N 2 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. DISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN.
OF LOYAL BADU (BEDOUIN) WHO ARE OVER-ARMED AND UNDER-TRAINED.
VARIOUS MEMBERS OF-THE RULING FAMILY HOLD COMMISSIONS IN
THE MILITARY AT MOST LEVELS AND SERVE AS AN EYE ON ACTIVITIES.
AS LONG AS THE OIL MONEY CONTINUES, AND THE RULING FAMILY
USES MORE CARROT THAN STICK, THE POLITICAL SITUATION WILL
REMAIN STABLE.
4. BAHRAIN RPT BAHRAIN
IN CONTRAST TO KUWAIT, BAHRAIN GIVES THE OURWARD..
APPEARANCE OF TRANQUILITY AND STABILITY. THE BAHRAINIS..
HAVE THE OLDEST AND BEST EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE GULF.
AS TH. FIRST OIL PRODUCER IN THAT AREA' AN ARTISAN AND:
MIDDLE CLASS HAVE EVOLVED AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
CLASSES ARE NOT SO GREAT. BUT BECAUSE THE BRITISH STAYED
ON LONGER IN BAHRAIN THAN KUWAIT ANF SUPPRESSED THE SOPHIS-
TICATED NATIONALIST MOVEMENT'FOR ALMOST TWENTY'YEARS OF
ITS EXISTENCE, THERE IS MORE BITTERNESSs.MORE URGENCY AND
A BETTER CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.
ALTHOUGH FAR BETTER PREPARED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY
THAN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN DID NOT HAVE ITS FIRST FREE ELECTION
UNTIL DECEMBER 1972 (VS. 1964 IN KUWAIT). IN ADDITION,,.
THERE ARE OTHER NEGATIVE FACTORS IN BAHRAIN NOT PRESENT IN
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN IS NOT,A WEALTHY OIL STATE AND CANNOT
AFFORD TO BUY OFF WOULD-BE AGITATORS. THE ROYAL FAMILY IS
ALOOF FROM AND A BURDEN ON THE PEOPLE. IT MAINTAINS ITS
OSTENTATIOUSNESS IN SPITE OF ITS SMALL INCOME. THE MERCHANT
CLASS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE GRANTING OF CONCESSIONS BY THE,,
ROYAL FAMILY FOR ITS INCOMEs BUT RATHER ON ITS OWN MERCANTILE
SKILLS. THE SUNNI ROYAL FAMILY DOES NOT TRUST THE SHIIA
BAHRAINIS OR EVEN THE NON-SAUDI-DERIVED SUNNIS. THE FAMILY
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IS. ALIEN TO THE ISLAND AND LOOKS TO RECRUITED TRIBESMEN
FROM SAUDIA.FOR ITS, PERSONAL GUARDS.
THE SPLIT`BETWEEN THE IRANIAN DERIVED FAMILIES (SHI'A
AND SUNNI) AND ARAB FAMILIES IS GREATS AND THE SUNNI-SHI'A
SPLIT EVEN GREATER. THE SHI'AS PROBABLY OUTNUMBER THE
SUNNIS, BUT THE SUNNIS CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAND.
IT IS AMONG THE SHI'A -THAT THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND COMMUNIST
ACTIVITY IS MOST STRONG. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY OF THE GREAT
MERCHANT FAMILIES ARE SHI'A ANO THEY LOOK Tp IRAN FOR PROTEC-
TION.IRAN HAS RESPONDED WITH AN ACTIVE, HIGH POWERED DIPLq_;
MATIC MISSION WHICH SEEKS TO PROMOTE THE IRAN-NESS OF BAHRAIN.
THE ARAB BAHRAINIS HAVE FORMED THE NATIONALIST PARTIES
IN BAHRAIN AND HAVES AT LEAST ON THE EXTREME LEFT OF THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM, ON OCCASION FORMED FRONTS WITH THE
ANTI-REGIME SHI'AS.. THE KEY ANTI-REGIME RADICAL ACTIVIST
PARTIES ARE, HOWEVER, ARAB AND DRAW THEIR PHILOSOPHIES FROM
THE ANM, THE BATH AND ARAB SOCIALIST PARTIES. A SOPHISTI-?
CATED SPECIAL BRANCH, OFFICERED BY BRITISH EXPATRIATES, HAS'
BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THESE PARTIES UNDER CONTROL,-BUT IN SO
DOING, THEY HAVE FORCED THE PARTIES TO IMPROVE THEMSELVES
ROGANIZATIONALLY TO A VERY HIGH DEGREE. CELL STRUCTURE AND
COMMUNICATIONS:SYSTEMS ARE PROBABLY SURPASSED ONLY BY THE
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THEIR SOPHISTICATION. SHOULD THE EXPATRI-
ATES BE FORCED OUT, THESE GROUPS WOULD PRESENT A REAL THREAT
AS THE ONLY GROUPS WITH A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF ROGANIZATION
TO ASSUME IMMEDIATE ACTION, AS LONG AS THE EXPATRIATES SUR
VIVE, HOWEVER, THE UNPOPULAR REGIME WILL EXIST.
ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE IRANIAN. IT IS VERY APPARENT
THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE SET THEMSELVES UP AS THE PROTECTORS
OF THE SHI'AS ON BAHRAIN. IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH OF
AN EXCUSE FOR THE IRANIANS TO LAND A FORCE TO PROTECT THE
SHI+AS AGAINST THE "ARABS". THE BAHRAIN DEFENSE FORCE (BOF)
IS NOT LARGE, EFFICIENT OR LOYAL AND ONCE THE IRANIANS
LANDED, THE ARABS COULD NOT DO MUCH ABOUT IT.
5. QATAR RPT QATAR
THE COUP WHICH BROUGHT SHAYKH KHALIFAH BIN HAMAD TO THE
THRONE IN FEBRUARY 1972 WAS GREETED WITH A SIGH OF RELIEF BY
THE QATARIS ANDY ONE YEAR LATER, THE PEOPLE STILL ARE
EXPERIENCING THE SAME EUPHORIA. PRIOR TO THE BLOODLESS COUP,
THE LARGE RULING FAMILY (AL-THANI) WAS A GREAT'BURDEN ON THE
PEOPLE. IN SPITE OF THE LARGE OIL INCOME (200 MILLION
DOLLARS/80,000 POPULATION) QATARI DEVELOPMENT WAS SLOW
BECAUSE OF THE DEMANDS OF THE AL-THANIS. SHAYKH KHALIFAH
HAS NOW CUT THE AL-THANI SUBSIDY AND ENCOURAGED THE FAMILY
MEMBERS TO ENGAGE IN PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES. WITH FASTI"R
DEVELOPMENT AND MORE MONEY IN CIRCULATIONS THE PEOPLE ARE
APPROACHING THE KUWAITI VIEW TOWARD THE RULING FAMILY.
THE EX-RULERS AHMAD, AND PARTICULARLY HIS SON ABD-AL-AZIZ,
HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF A COUNTER-COUP, BUT TO DATE THEY
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..--.._ . ..w...._W,
HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GATHERING TOGETHER A FORCE.
ALSO, THE SAUDIS ARE'WATCHING EVENTS IN QATAR CLOSELY AND
MUCH PREFER A STABLES KHALIFAH-LED QATAR TO A POTENTIAL
LEFTIST REGIME THAT MIGHT EVOLVE SHOULD AHMAD HAVE TO BE
OUSTED AGAIN.
QATARIS EXPATRIATE (MOSTLY JORDANIAN),OFFICERED SECURITY
FORCE IS QUITE CAPABLE-OF MEETING ANY OF THE CURRENT THREATS.
THERE ARE LARGE PALESTINIAN AND PERSIAN COMMUNITIEE IN QATAR.
THE PALESTINIANS ARE PERMITTED TO HAVE ORGANIZATIONS AND
HOLD RALLIES, BUT ARE HELD IN CHECK BY THREAT OF EXPULSION.
THE PERSIANS,.MOSTLY MERCHANTS' ENJOY COMPLETE FREEDOM AND
EQUALITY IN KEEPING WITH KHALIFAH'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN.
THE QATARIS THEMSELVES ARE FAIRLY UNSOPHISTICATED
POLITICALLY. THE STUDENTS.THEY SEND ABROAD ALL HAVE USEFUL
POSITIONS, NOW FILLED BY EXPATRIATES' WAITING FOR THEM WHEN,
THEY RETURN SO THERE IS A LACK OF DISCONTENT FROM THAT-SIDE.
ALSO, THE SMALL' INBRED LOCAL POPULATION IS CONSERVATIVE AND)
THE USUAL POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE GULF (ANMs P"FOAGs ETC.)
HAVE NOT FOUND QATAR A FERTILE PLACE FOR THEIR_.PHIL:OSOPHIES.
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OP , MMED
DE #2251/3 0901557
0 311555Z MAR 73 ZYH
FM HELMS/TEHRAN 60 3/5
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T 310906Z MAR 73'
EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 3 OF 5
TO: OR. HENRY A. KISSING-ER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN
AS LONG AS SHAYKH KHALIFAH RULES AND THE WEALTH IS DIS
TRIBUTED EQUITABLY, THERE WILL BE NO TROUBLE IN QATAR.
6. THE UAE.RPT UAE
THE UAE'S FUTURE DEPENDS TO A GREAT DEGREE... ON THE PERSON-.
ALITIES OF ITS TWO LEADING SHAYKHS AND THEIR' ABILr'TY TO GET'
ALONG WITH EACH OTHER. SHAYKH ZAYID OF ABU DHABI AND SHAYKH
RASHID OF DUBAI ARE THE KEY PLAYERS, AND TWO M.EN COULD NOT
BE MORE DIFFERENT. ZAYIDs RULER OF ABU DHABI AND PRESIDENT
OF THE UAE, IS A BEDU WITH ALL THE GUI-LEI. CHARM AND PRIDE
THAT IS CHARACTrRIST'IC OF BEDUIN. SHAYKH RASHID, RULER OF
DUBAI AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UAE: IS A TOWNSMAN, A MER-
CHANT WHO LIVES. BY HIS WITS, BY HIS ABILITY TO MAKE A DEAL AND BY
HIS BASIC DISTRUST OF THOSE WHO HAVEN'T HAD TO EARN THEIR
MONEY BY THEIR OWN DEVICES. SEVERAL FACTORS, HOWEVER,'
MILITATE AGAINST A SPLIT. FIRST, THE PEOPLE OF THE UAE
GENUINELY WANT THE UNION, PARTICULARLY THE CITIZENS OF THE
SMALLER, HAVE-NOT SHAYKHDOMS (AJMAN, RAS AL-KHAYMAHs FUJAYRAH
AND UMM AL-QAYWAYN). SECONDLY, ALTHOUGH DUBAI: ABU DHABI,
AND SHORTLY SHARJAH COULD GO IT ALONE, THE OTHER STATES
WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR OUTS19E AID AND IRAQ IS ALL TOO WILL-
ING TO BE THE PROVIDER: ZAYID AND RASHID DON'T WANT REVOLU-?
TION ON THEIR DOORSTEPS. LASTLY: THE OLD DICTUM "UNITED WE
STANDS DIVIDED WE FALL" IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR MINDS. THERE
ARE TOO MANY BIG NEIGHBORS (IRAN, IRAQ AN9 SAUDIA) WAITING
IN THE WINGS TO PICK OFF A WEAK PLAYERS OR SO THEY FEEL.
ONE OF THE GREAT PROBLEMS FACING THE UAE IS THAT IT IS
TRYING TO BE TOO PROGRESSIVE TOO SOON. THE UAE IS FAIRLY
TOLERANT TOWARD POLITICAL ACTIVITY AN9 DISSENT-BUT IS NOT
SOPHISITICATED ENOUGH TO HANDLE IT. THUS, IDEOLOGIES FIND
FERTILE GROUND IN THE UAE, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE EDUCATED,
WHILE THERE IS NO COUNTER EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE
RECENT WRAP-UP OF PFLOAG CELLS IN THE UAE SHOWED THE EXTENT
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TO WHICH SUCH AN ORGANIZATION HAD INFILTRATTED THE STATE.
(THE POPULAR FRONT FDR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN AND THE ARAB
GULF IS A RADICAL MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION FORMED BY_
CADRE WITH ANM TIES AND IS ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW CONSER-,
VATIVE REGIMES.BY SUBVERSIONS TERRORISM AND. GUERRILLA WAR--
FARE.) THE PFLOAG GROUP IN THE UAE WAS WELL ORGANIZED WITH
HIGH LEVEL PENETRATIONS OF THE UNION DEFENSE FORCE (UDF).
THE LUCKY BREAK THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE WRAP-UP OF THE PFLOAG
ORGANIZATION HAS PROBABLY SET PFLOAG'S PLANS FOR OPERA-
TIONS IN THE UAE BACK AT LEAST A YEAR. BECAUSE EACH SHAYKH
DDM MAINTAINS. ITS OWN SPECIAL BRANCH,. AND THERE IS LITTLE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM, THERE IS SMALL DOUBT THAT.PFFAG
WILL REORGANIZE RAPIDLY IN THE FAIRLY PERMISSIVE POLITICAL
ATMOSPHERE OF THE UAE. SHOULD BE EXPATRIATES BE FORCES
OUT OF THE E SPECIAL BRANCHES OR SHOULD THE UAE BREAK UP,
PFLOAGIS PROGRAM COULD MOVE FASTER
PALESTINIAN FC A IF EN OR6kNI:ZATIONSs SUCH AS FATAH/BSOs
ARE ALSO GIVEN A FAIRLY FREE HAND IN THE UAE. AT THE CURRENT
TIMES THE UAE DOES NOT-PERCEIVE THESE ORGANIZATI.ONS.AS A.
THREAT AND THEY 00 NOT REALIZE THE DEGREE. TO WHICH THESE
ORGANIZATIONS. ARE COOPERATING WITH PFLOAG. PALESTINIANS. ARE
REQUIRED TO FILL MANY SLOTS IN"THE UAE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE EXTRA CURRICULAR.
ACTIVITIES OF THESE MEN AND WOMEN IS A WEAKNESS. THAT MUST BE CORRECTED RAPIDLY.
THE UAE GOVERNMNT IS FACED WITH NUMEROUS PROBLEMS, WHICH
MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS;
THE GOVERNMENT MUST BEGIN TO UTILIZE QUALIFIED YOUTH,
SPREAD MORE OF THE WEALTH TO THE MIDDLE CLASS, STEP UP SOCIAL
REFORM AND DEVELOP A NATIONAL APPROACH (ONE BUDGET, ONE ARMY,
ONE PASSPORT), OR THE RADICAL ELEMENTS, SUCH AS PFLOAGS WILL
CONTINUE TO FIND FERTILE GROUND FOR THEIR IDEOLOGIES. THE
RECENT PFLOAG WRAP-UP PROBABLY AWAKENED THE RULERS'TO THE
PROBLEMS THEY FACE AND THE NEED FOR COOPERATION, BUT THE
DIVISIONS, JEALOUSIES AND SUSPICIONS RUN DEEP. IF A MEANING-
FUL UNION CAN EVOLVE QUICKLY' AND THE CHANCES FOR THIS
HAPPENING WERE NEVER BETTER (FEAR IS STRONGER THAN JEALOUSY','
THE UAE CAN LOOK AHEAD TO A STABLE EXISTENCE. ALSO, THE UAE
MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS--IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, SUCH AS BURAIMIs THE GULF ISLANDS,
ETC. MUST BE SOLVED AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED. THE
UAE MUST BE A NATION IN FACTS NOT JUST IN NAME. IT MUST .,
ESTABLISH ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY ON SOMETHING MORE THAN OIL
ROYALTIES OR IT WILL FALL PREY TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION OR
EXTERNAL TAKEOVER RESULTING FROM REACTION TO THAT SUBVER-
SION. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THE UAE' AND THE AMBASSADORS WHEN
HE VISITS FROM KUWAIT, SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN THEIR CONTACTS
WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS' TO POINT OUT THESE PROBLEMS AND THE
NECESSITY FOR THE RAPID SOLUTION OF THEM.
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7. OMAN RPT OMAN
'WHEN YOUNG SULTAN QABUS TOOK OVER OMAN BY OUSTING HIS
FATHER IN JULY'-1970Y HE PROMISED THE PEOPLE THAT HE WOULD
UTILIZE THE OIL REVENUES (NOW ABOUT $120 MILLION PER YEAR)
TO BRING ABOUT SOCIAL REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRY.
THE WAR IN DHUFAR PROVINCE, WHICH ABSORBS 50-60 PERCENT
OF THE BUDGET, HAS PUT.'A DAMPER ON QABUS' PLANS AND THE PEOPLE ARE
BEGINNING TO GET IMPATIENT. ALTHOUGH THE SUCCESSFUL CON-
CLUSION OF THE GUERRILLA WAR IN DHUFAR IS IMPORTANT TO THE
SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, THE OMANIS 00 NOT SEE THIS AND QABUS
HAS NOT TRIED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. TO THE OMANISi DHUFAR HAS
ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED A FIEF OF THE AL BU SAID DYNASTY,
REMOTE, A PLACE FOR MERCENARIES. THE SULTAN HAS NOT TRIED-TO
CHANGE THIS CONCEPT. THE SULTAN IS NOT A POLITICIAN OR AN
INSTINCTIVE LEADERS IN SPITE OF HIS GREAT PERSONAL CHARM.
HE HAS NOT GOTTEN OUT AMONG THE-PEOPLE, DRIVING AROUND AND
PRESSING FLESH. HE ISs 'TO MOST, A NOt4-PERS` N-A PICTURE IN
THE PAPER, A VOICE ON THE RADIO, YET HIS MOST' IMPORTANT
TASK IS TO BRING THE DISPARATE" PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TOGETHER
1000
PSN:021917 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR;090/18:14Z OTG:311555Z
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
#2251/4 0901757-
0 311754Z MAR 73 ZYH
FM HELMS/TEHRAN 60 4/5
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T 310906Z MAR 73
EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 4 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN
IN A SENSE OF NATIONHOOD UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. FOR FIFTY-
YEARS OMAN HAS BEEN DIVIDED AND THUS. IT HAS BEEN EASY PREY
FOR SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS. ALSO, THE SULTAN IS NOT BRAVE,
A CHARACTERISTIC MUCH ADMIRED BY THE ARABS--HE TRAVELS THE
ROAD FROM HIS PALACE IN SIB TO HIS PALACE IN MUSCAT-AT'
60 MPH UNDER HEAVY GUARD. OUT OF HIS CAR HE IS SURROUNDED
BY TROOPS. THE SULTAN HAS GREATER NEED FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERT
NOW THAN FOR MILITARY EXPERTS. GETTING THE PEOPLE BEHIND HIM
IS IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE, YET HE IS SINGULARLY UNIMAGINA-
TIVE AND SURROUNDS HIMSELF WITH SYCOPHANTS. WHAT LITTLE
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO
THE SULTAN BUT TO THE FOREIGN EXPERTS WHO WORKIN THE FIELD.
THE WRAP-UP OF PFLOAG CELLS IN THE MUSCAT-MATRAH REGION
IN JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973 IS AN INDICATION OF THE SUBVERSIVE
POTENTIAL IN THE COUNTRY. THESE CELLS, REMNANTS OF NAFLOAG
CELLS, WHICH WERE BROKEN UP IN 1970-71 AND WHICH WERE WELL
ESTABLISHED IN MUSANDUM, JABA AL-AKHDAR AND MUSCATS PLANNED
A CAMPAIGN OF URBAN TERRORISM To BE UNDERTAKEN IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AN OFFENSIVE BY THE REBELS IN DHUFAR. IT WAS A HIGHLY
SOPHISTICATED OPERATION ANDS HAD NOT THE URBAN OPERATION
BEEN THWARTED, COULD HAVE CAUSED SERIOUS DISRUPTION IN THE
COUNTRY. AS IT WAS, THE OFFENSIVE BY THE REBELS IN DHUFAR
WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL. THEY WERE ABLE TO PIN DOWN AN OMANI
BRIGADES WHICH ULTIMATELY HAD TO BE RELIEVED BY IRANIAN
HELICOPTERS. THE REBELS. HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO THEIR
SANCTUARY, BUT HAD THE URBAN TERRORISTS BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT
THEIR CAMPAIGNS THE OMANI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN
SEVERE STRAITS. EXPATRIATE ADVISORS TO THE OMANI FORCES
NOW ESTIMATE THE REBEL STRENGTH AT 1200 (FROM A PREVIOUS.
ESTIMATE OF 600) AND HAVE A MUCH GREATER APPRECIATION OF
REBEL ABILITY'. THE CAMPAIGN IN DHUFAR IS DRAGGING ON WITH-
OUT ANY END IN SIGHT. THE REBELS STILL CAN RETIRE TO PDRY
PSN:021979 PAGE 01 TOR:090118:272 DTG:31Z754Z
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
w
WHEN THINGS GET TOUGH AND THEY STILL CONTROL THE QA':RA MTS,
NORTH OF SALALAH, WHERE THEY CAN COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF
LOCAL "MILITIA"' AND FROM WHERE THEY CAN ROCKET THE TOWN AND
MINE THE KNH ROADS. ON THE OTHER HAND THE REBELS HAVE NOT
BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED ATTACKS NOR DO THEY HAVE THE WIDE POPULAR
SUPPORT THEY REQUIRE. THE SULTAN IS TRYING TO IMPROVE THE
LOT OF THE DHUFAR.IS AND HAS SUCCEEDED IN WINNING THEM OVER
TO A GREAT EXTENT. THE COST OF THISI.AND THE MILITARY CAM-
PAIGN HAS, HOWEVER, DRAWN ON DEVELOPMENT FUNDS.FROM THE
REST OF OMAN.
THE SULTAN BADLY NEEDS FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID, FAST.
ALSO, HE NEEDS TO IMPROVE HIS IMAGE. OTHER STATES IN THE
REGION HAVE A GREAT STAKE IN HIS SUCCESS AND MUST BE CON-
VINCED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THE UAE, FOR ONES HAS BEEN < _-
PARTICULARLY REMISS IN THIS. IT IS HOPED THAT THE SULTAN'S
VISIT TO THE UAEs PLANNEp
FUNDS FROM SHAYKH ZAYI 25X1
25X1
SAUDI ARABIA RPT SAUDI ARABIA
IN THREE YEARS, KING FAYSAL WILL BE 70 YEARS OLD."
HIS COUNTRY WILL HAVE AN ACCUMULATION OF TEN BILLION DOLLARS
IT CAN'T POSSIBLY SPEND INTERNALLY, AND IT w L L_HAVE TWO SEPARATE
ARMED FORCES AND SEVERAL THOUSAND MORE STUDENTS AND OFFICERS
WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME IT WILL
STILL BE RULED BY AN ABSOLUTE, CONSERVATIVE, TRADITIONALIST
MONARCH AND IT WILL BE THE LEAST DROGRESSIVE ARAB COUNTRY -~
SOCIALLY. IT WILL HAVE NO RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST BLOC.
ANACHRONISTIC AS SAUDIA IS AND, BASICALLY, WILL REMAIN, THE
PROGNOSIS FOR, THE FUTURE IS ONE OF STAG ITY. THE REASONS cOR
THIS ARE MANY. FIRST, THE OPPOSITION WHICH DOES EXIST, IS
FRAGMENTED BY TRIBALISM AND REGIONALISM. SECONDLY, THE TRAM-,
TIONAL SPRINGBOARD FOR COUPS IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE ARMY, IS
CONTENT AND BALANCED BY THE NARIONAL GUARD. THE STUDENT
RETURNING TO SAUDIA FINDS THAT'HIS TALENTS ARE REWARDED, IF
NOT UTILIZED. LASTLY, THE ROYAL FAMILY IS AWARE OF THE
ADHESIVE NATURE OF ITS ROLE AND CAN USUALLY BE COUNTED ON To
PUT ASIDE. PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES TO WORK TOGETHER IN TIMES
OF CRISIS.
KING FAYSAL IS IN GOOD HEALTH, ALTHOUGH AT HIS AGE ANY
NUMBER OF THINGS CAN HAPPEN Tn CAt1SF HIS 1NrAPi i.iv f1R fl ?
A~ 7WIN S NOW STAND.
THERE ARF CLAIMS THAT FAYSAL
IS BECOMING SENILE.- BUT IT MAY BE THAT HE IS ONLY BECOMING
PSN:021979 PAGE 02 TOR:090/18i27Z DTG:311754Z
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
I w w
MORE CANTANKEROUS AND INFLEXIBLE. IN ANY EVENTS FAYSAL MAY
WELL OUTLIVE CROWN-PRINCE KHALID, WHO IS ONLY A FEW YEARS
YOUNGER AND HAS A HISTORY OF HEART TROUBLE. AS SUCCESSION
NOW STANDS, KHALID WOULD SUCCEED FAYSAL AND STRONGMAN PRINCE
FAHD WOULD MOVE UP A NOTCH TO CROWN PRINCE AND ALSO TAKE OVER
AS PRIME MINISTER, A ROLE USUALLY RESERVED FOR THE MONARCH,
ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CIJULD ARISE FROM THE LATTER IS THAT
KHALID JUST MIGHT NOT ACCEPT THE ,REIGN BUT NOT RULE" ROLE
AND THIS COULD CAUSE A FAMILY CRISIS. ALSO, FARO AND HIS
SIX FULL BROTHERS (KNOWN AS THE SUDAYRI SEVEN) MAY NOT BE
AS CLOSE AS PEOPLE THINK. THEIR MOTHER, WHO MADE SURE THEY
STOOD TOGETHER, IS NOW DEAD AND SULTANS FAHO'S NEXT BROTHER
AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE, IS VERY AMBITIOUS AND MIGHT MAKE A
MOVE ON FAHD IF FAHD REVERTS TO HIS OLD DISSOLUTE WAYS. IF
A CRISIS OCCURS IN SAUDIAs IT WILL DOUBTLESS OCCUR WITHIN
THE RANKS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, ALTHOUGH FOR REASONS SET OUT
BELOW, THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY.
THE MILITARY IS WELL-TREATED. THEY GET:GOOD ARMS,
TRAINING ABROAD, GOOD SALARIES AND PROMOTIONS, AND ARE
GIVEN OTHER INCENTIVES, SUCH AS PIECES OF PRIME LAND., TO
1000
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 w
H#2251/5 0901223
0 310906Z MAR 7~ ZYH
FM HELMS/TEHRAN 60 5/5
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T 310906Z MAR 73
EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 5 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN
BIND THEM MORE CLOSELY TO THE REGIME. ALSO, BRIGHT, LIBERAL
MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ENTER
THE MILITARY AS JUNIOR OFFICERS AND THEY ARE QUITE POPULAR
WITH THE OTHER OFFICERS. THEY ARE ALSO RESPECTED FOR THEIR
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS--SOME OF THE BEST PILOTS ARE PRINCES.
IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE MILITARY, THE TRIBALLY
CONSTITUTED NATIONAL GUARD IS ON HAND. THIS GROUP, ABOUT
EQUAL IN SIZE TO THE ARMY, IS A HIGHLY MOBILE FORCE ORIGIN-
ALLY FORMED TO QUELL INTERNAL DISORDERS. HOWEVER, ITS
AMBITIOUS COMMANDER, PRINCE ABDALLAH, HAS BUILT THIS FORCE
INTO MORE OF A COUNTER-ARMY, WITH THE BLESSING OF THE ROYAL
',AMILY.
AS FOR THE YOUTH OF THE KINGDOM, ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT
THEIR CAPACITY FOR TOLERATION OF THE ANACHRONISTIC SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT'WOULD BE PRETTY LOW. CERTAINLY, SAUDI STUDENTS:
IN THE U.S. TALK FREELY AGAINST THE REGIME. THE TALK IS
USUALLY BROUGHT ON BY CONTACT WITH "PROGRESSIVE" AR-,BS THEY
MEET AND THE NEW LIFE THEY ARE EXPOSED TO. WHEN THE STUDENT
RETURNS TO SAUDI ARABIA, HOWEVER, HE FINDS WAITING FOR HIM A JOB
WITH A NICE SALARY, A GOVERNMENT HOUSE, FREE EDUCATION AND
HEALTH CARE FOR HIS. KIDS, RADIO, TELEVISION AND AT LEAST
THE 'TRAPPINGS OF PROGRESS. AROUND HIM, THE OTHER ARAB
STATES ARE IN CHAOS. IF HE WANTS TO LET OFF STEAM HE CAN
GO TO BEIRUT, IN ADDITION, THE ROLE THE SAUDIS HAVE PLAYED
IN THE OIL NEGOTIATIONS HAS GIVEN THE YOUNG MAN A SENSE OF
PRIDE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE MINISTER OF PETROLEUM,
AHMAD ZAKI YAMANI, IS. HIS HERO,
AND YAMANI IS PART OF THE ESTABLISHMENT. SAUDIS ARE NOW
SOMETHING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, NOT BE LAUGHED AT. WHO
PAYS A SUBSIDY TO WHOM--THE EQYPTIANS OR THE SAUDIS? THIS
IS IMPORTANT IN UNDERSTANDING THE SAUDIS' ACCEPTANCE OF
THEIR LOT. THOSE EDUCATED IN THE WEST ARE NOT RED HOT
PSN:021980 PAGE 01
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
TOR:090/18:38Z DTG:310906Z
******* S E C R E T *******S COPY
25X1;1
2.25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
RADICALS, THEY SEE THAT THEY CAN WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM,
AND THAT THE SYSTEM WORKS, LIKE THE YOUNG KUWAITI, WHAT
REGIME WOULD A YOUNG SAUDI EMULATE?
DISCUSSING THE STABILITY OF SAUDIA, OR ANY OF THE GULF
STATES, IS A COMPLEX MATTER. THE WESTERN OBSERVER IS TOO
READY TO WRITE OFF FAMILY, TRIBES LOCAL NATIONALISM AND
PRIDE. WHERE THERE IS- THIS SENSE OF LOCAL NATIONALISM AND
ACCOMPLISHMENT--"IN SAUDIA, KUWAIT AND QATAR--STABILITY CAN
BE PREDICTED.' WHERE 'THERE ARE INTERNAL DIVISIONS SUCH AS
BAHRAIN (SHI'A-SUNNI), THE UAE (DUBAI-ABU DHABI) AND OMAN
(TRIBAL VS. SETTLED AND DHUFARI VS. OMANI) INSTABILITY CAN
BE EXPECTED.
A NOTE OF CAUTION MUST BE ADDED TO THE ABOVE ASSESS-.-
MENTS. FIRST, THE STABILITY OF THESE STATES, IN THE SHORT
RUN, IS DEPENDENT ON ONE OR TWO KEY PERSONALITIES. THE
SUDDEN DEMISE--NATURAL OR PLANNED--OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEADERS
COULD CAUSE TURMOIL IN THE REGION, SECOND, THE MOST VULNER-"
ABLE STATES ALL HAVE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES OFFICERED
BY EXPATRIATES, USUALLY BRITISH. SHOULD THESE.. MEN BE FORCEn
TO RESIGN, THROUGH NATIONALIST PRESSURES OR ELIMINATED BY
ASSASSINATION OR THREAT OF ASSASSINATIONs OPPOSITION FORCES
WILL HAVE A FAIRLY FREE HAND TO OPERATE. LASTLY' IN SPITE
OF OUR OPTIMISTIC NOTE ON THE YOUTH OF THE AREA, I.E. THEY
GENERALLY APPEAR PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, WE
SHOULD RAIIZE THAT THE DESIRE FOR SOCIAL REFORM AND THE
EVOLUTION OF NEW SETS OF VALUES WILL CAUSE PRESSURE ON THE
REGIMES. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE REGIMES ARE PREPARED TO
ACCOMMODATE NEW IDEAS WILL DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE YOUTH WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
FINAL FACTORS ARE PORY AND IRAN. PDRY IS.THE ONLY ARAB
STATE IN WHICH A RADICAL MARXIST-LENINIST REGIME HAS ATTAINED
AND RETAINED POWER. IN ADDITION, THIS REGIME IS. ACTIVELY
SEEKING TO EXPORT ITS REVOLUTION, DIRECTLY IN OHUFAR AND THE
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, AND INDIRECTLY BY COOPERATING WITH ANM
ORIGINATED FRONTS SUCH AS PFLOAG. THE ABILITY OF THE STATES
OF THE PENINSULA TO WORK TOGETHER TO MEET THIS THREAT--TO
ISOLATE IT, OR DESTROY IT--WILL BE A DETERMINING FACTOR IN
THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE AREA. ALTHOUGH PDRY IS SMALL,
IT WAS A WELL-TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED POLITICAL CADRE,
IT HAS INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITY, AND REPRESENTS A
THREAT TO ANY STATE IN THE AREA IN A ONE-ON-ONE SITUATION,
REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES
IN THE GULF IS A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. POLICY. THE ARABS FEEL
THAT THE IRANIANS IN GENERAL AND THE SHAH IT PARTIIULAR ARE
SO CONTEMPTUOUS OF THEM AND ARE Sri ARROGANT IN THEIR DEALINGS)
WITH THEM THAT TRUE COOPERATION PROBABLY IS NOT POSSIBLE,
19 THE U.S. CAN GUIDE THE TWO PARTIES AWAY FROM POSSIBLE
AREAS OF CONFLICT, WE WILL BE DOING AS MUCH AS WE CAN TRULY
HOPE TO DO. NOT ONLY DO THE ARABS SENSE AND RESENT IRANIAN
PSN 021980 PAGE 02 TOR:090/18:38Z OTG:310906Z
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
CON=(EMPTs THEY ALSO FEAR IRANIAN COLONIALISM IN THE GULF.
THERE IS NOT ONE ARAB STATE IN THE REGION THAT IS NOT FULLY
AWARE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE CAPABLE OF TAKING OVER ANY OR
ALL OF THEM ANY TIME THEY CHOOSE. THE ARABSs THEREFORE,
APPROACH THE QUESTION OF COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY MILITARY
COOPERATION, WITH UNDERSTANDABLE RELUCTANCE. EACH TIME
IRAN SAYS TO A COUNTRY-LIKE KUWAIT--"DON'T FEAR IRAQ, WE'LL
PROTECT YOU't--OR RESPONDS RAPIDLY TO A REQUEST FOR AID--SUCH
AS FROM OMAN--THIS ONLY RUBS THE ARAB NOSES. IN THEIR OWN
INADEQUACIES AND INCREASES SUSPICION AND RESENTMENT.
LOGICALLY, THE ARABS AND IRANIANS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER, BUT
EMOTIONS MILITATE AGAINST THIS. ONE OF THE KEY ROLES THE
U.S. MUST PLAY IN THE REGION IS TO ASSURE THAT EMOTIONS ARE-
KEPT SUPPRESSED AND ARE NOT PERMITTED TO BREAK DOWN THE
UNEASY TRUCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.
1000
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/15: LOC-HAK-297-2-18-1
? w
rT?t" ! M.
1