COMMUNIST POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-26-4-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGT011
?SG?/ SPOKE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger j.
SUBJECT: Communist Political Offen ye in South Vietnam
INFOR TION
Octob r 13, 1970
Following Madame Binh's eight point proposal in Paris last month,
a good deal of evidence has been uncovered which indicates that the
Communists are embarking on new political offensive in South
Vietnam designed to topple the Thieu-Ky leadership. Intercepted
messages, captured documents, and clandestine sources have
revealed that a high level directive was distributed throughout the
Communist apparatus in South Vietnam well before Madame Binh's
presentation. are directive emphasized the following:
The Communist rank and file must be made to understand
the importance of the coming political and diplomatic phase.
Madame Binh's speech must be distributed to all Vietnamese
groups and individuals of consequence.
? The rank and file must be mobilized in support of a political
offensive. They are to win over uncommitted Vietnamese by
convincing them that only the ouster of the present regime in
Saigon and a U.S. troop withdrawal stand in the way of peace.
-- Illusions of peace should not be entertained; military
attacks must continue on all fronts, especially against U.S.
forces.
Tactical Arguments. This directive learly suggests that the Commu-
nists hope to use the eight points to help mount an extensive political
campaign against the South Vietnamese Government. They will
probably make the following arguments:
-5-EeftElT/SPOKE
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SECRET! POKE
e only barrier to peace is the existence of Thieu-Ky-Khiem.
Those three men should be disposed of soon, or at least must
ot be re-elected in 1971.
-- South Vietnamese political groups opposing Thieu-Ky-K.hiem
an make common cause with the Communists.
P blems for the Communists. However, the very fact that the Commu-
are using these political tactics reveals and may increase some of
problems.
-- They probably would not attempt to engage in such maneuvers
unless they felt too weak militarily to follow any other course.
-- Hints of collaboration with other South Vietnamese political
groups may cause real problems for the experienced Communist
cadre, who do not like the idea of sharing power or collaborating
with other groups. This will pose a difficult problem for Hanoi.
-- Moreover, most South Vietnamese political leaders distrust
the Communists even more than they dislike Thieu.
Possible Problem for us. On the other hand, the new Communist line
Npay pose a difficult problem for us, particularly as the 1971 elections
proach. It is possible, particularly if the Communist campaign
succeeds in deluding many South Vietnamese politicians, that a number
of strong South Vietnamese groups will oppose Thieu's candidacy.
Thieu may then use a number of questionable devices to rig the elections,
raising questions about the validity of South Vietnam's claim to be a
true democracy.
Your new proposal should help us meet this problem, since it can put
Thieu on the right side of the peace issue in South Vietnam if he uses
it properly.
V.
SECRET! SPOKE
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??22787
.wpg,71.trOltsrANDUM ISE PRESIDENT HAS SELa
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
October 22, 19
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger(
SUBJECT: Hanoi's Short Term Intentions
The CIA has produced a memorandum on Hanoi's intentions over the
next six months or so (Tab A). The major points follow.
Hanoi's fundamental view of the struggle has not changed. The
Communists still believe that they have more staying power than
their opponents, and they are gearing their efforts to a long,
drawn-out contest. It seems clear that they are determined to make
the sacrifices required by the wider war in Indochina; there is some
evidence that Hanoi has stepped up its recruitment efforts, and the
southward flow of troops from North Vietnam began earlier than
usual this year.
Before the U.S. elections. The Communists could take several
different courses of action in an attempt to influence the U.S.
Congressional elections.
?
-- They could step up military pressure in the northern-
most provinces of South Vietnam, attempt to inflict a
severe defeat on the Cambodian task force northeast of
Phnom Penh, or maneuver diplomatically to arouse peace
sentiments in the U.S.
-- We have no evidence as to what they are planning.
The next six months. The range of practical alternatives open to
Hanoi is not very broad.
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? With the loss of Sihanoukville and the disruptions
caused by the allied operations in Cambodia, much of
the Communist effort will be devoted to expanding and
reinforcing their logistics system in southern Laos,
and attempting to re-establish a credible military threat
in or near southern South Vietnam.
-- It is unlikely that the Communists will attempt an all-
out offensive anywhere in Indochina during the next six
months. Some short and sharp offensive action cannot
be ruled out, but the Communists primarily will play for
time by conducting a low cost, low level struggle.
-- The Communists will continue to hammer away at the
Government of South Vietnam by insisting that the Thieu-
kty leadership stands in the way of a settlement.
? They will probably engage in some wary exploration of
the allied position in Paris. But they do not expect much
change in the allied position, and they are not willing to
pay a price that would seriously jeopardize their chances
for success in South Vietnam.
Comment. The CIA clearly interprets the evidence, including recent
infiltration activity, as part of a long term Communist effort. It
largely discounts any significant increase in military action during
the next six months, either before or after the U.S. Congressional
elections. We agree that much of Hanoi's efforts during this period
will necessarily be directed toward rebuilding diminishe4
but it is also quite possible that Hanoi may try some spectaculars
during this period, such as rocket attacks on U.S. bases.
Hanoi's growing manpower commitments bear watching. The Commu-
nists have injected about 20,000 troops into the Laotian panhandle
since June. The destinations of all these troops is not yet clear; some
could be bound for South Vietnam or Cambodia, though most of them
will probably be used to expand and reinforce the trail network in
southern Laos. In addition, about 3, 800 troops have begun to move
toward southern South Vietnam (COSVN) so far this month. The
numerical sequence of the groups in which they are moving suggest
that many more are scheduled to follow. Last year, infiltration into
the Laotian panhandle itself was negligible, while groups destined for
southern South Vietnam did not start to move until early November.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
;.7 October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
.11,311oi1e,..ShOrt-Tetra Intentions
' Introduction
Viewed from either Hanoi or Washington, the
? current situation in Indochina appears unusually
complex, and the complexity in turn raises the pos-
sibility that the Communists may go off on a new
tack in the war. We believe, however, that Hanoi's
fundamental view of the struggle has not changed
? and that the Communists are as committed as ever
to the notion that, although their struggle will
he long, painful, and often unspectacular, they
? have more staying power than their opponents. They
? also apparentlyl continue to believe that South Viet-
nam is the main target. Although their attention
may be shifted to Laos and Cambodia at any, given
time, whatever they do elsewhere is ultimately
geared to the war in South Vietnam.
? Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
? It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelli-
? gence and coordinated with the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of National Estimates, and
the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
No Foreign Dissem
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Options for October
l. It is this outlook that will govern what
the Communists do during the current election cam-
paign in the US. Hanoi has no doubt examined the
range of actions it might take in the next month
with a view to embarrassing the Nixon administration,
but this consideration would almost certainly be
no more than peripheral. As always, Communist ac-
tions over the next month will be governed mainly
by their view of the current tactical and strategic
situation in the war as a whole.
2. Within this framework, we do see three areas
where the Communists may take actions that might have
some impact in the US. (Various other moves--in
southern Laos, for instance--could also be undertaken
at any time, but their political effect would be
much less impressive.) First, they could make life
difficult for the Cambodian column now bottled up
on the road to Kompong Thom; they might even send
in more troops and mount a full-scale assault against
it.
3. Second, Hanoi might send some of the units
now in the infiltration pipeline to northern South
Vietnam for further tests of ARVN's mettle. This
would accord with the use the Communists tradition-
ally make of regular North Vietnamese divisions like
the 308th and the 320th,
It wOula also mean wlrn tne eteday
rate of military activity that the region near the
DMZ has been seeing lately. Actions against ARVN
near the DMZ might be supplemented by local "high
points" elsewhere in South Vietnam and by more ex-
tensive military activity in Cambodia.
1416Forei
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11. 1.1.1-1,1.?.11A..LJ .1. 11,
No Fore mssem
4. Third, the Communists might dole out an-
other installment of their political and diplomatic
"offensive" before the US elections, perhaps by play-
ing a variation of the cease-fire or the POW theme.
This would be a public move, aimed more at peace
sentiments in the US and South Vietnam than at the
, governments in Washington and Saigon. Although the
Communists would make use of any political assets
? they have in South Vietnam to whip up support for
such an initiative, they would nevertheless have
? to tread carefully. It would be all too? easy for
Washington to turn a Communist move on the peace
front to its own advantage in the election campaign
byl citing it as evidence that Hanoi was beginning
to feel the strain. Moreover, the US has the floor
in Paris at the moment, and the Communists might
? have trouble getting an initiative of their own
launched before 3 November.
5. Any of these moves is possible; further
? action against the Cambodian column may in fact
? have already begun. We would emphasize, however,
that it is long-range considerations, and not just
? a desire to weigh in during the US elections, that
will determine what the Communists do.
The Longer' View
6. How, then, is Hanoi ordering its longer-
term priorities? The levidence, as always, is spotty:
numerous reflections of troop movements, a flood
of propaganda, scores of captured documents and
prisoner debriefings,
and second-hand diplomatic gleanings. In general,
it seems clear that the Communists remain
de r-
'mined to make the sacrifices demanded by the wider
war in Indochina that erupted last spring. There has
been a hint or two, particularly in a few press
articles this fall urging expansion of the North
Vietnamese militia, that the sacrifices might in-
deed be extensive. This year's southward troop
flow which has begun earlier than usual apparently
will be quite substantial.
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NoFore.40
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7. There are one or two possibilities that
? can be discounted with a degree of confidence.
Hanoi almost certainly is not planning an all-out,
? Tet-type offensive anywhere in Indochina in the next
? six months; not only does it have too few resources
in place, but such a course would be out of keeping
with the whole thrust of Hanoi's war policy during
the past two years. Nor does it appear that there
will be much heavy fighting in the southern half
of South Vietnam, where Communist forces are in no
position to mount a major challenge against the
? allies. In North Laos, the apparent withdrawal
of some North Vietnamese units suggests that the
Communists may be less active than last year, al-
though we still anticipate a move in some strength
against yang Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng.
8. Maintaining and expanding the logistics
system in the Lao panhandle and in eastern Cambodia
almost certainly is one of Hanoi's priorityl concerns.
The lower end of this system has been disrupted, ?and,
even more 'important, Sihanoukville is no longer
available. Thus the Communists have become more
dependent on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the trail is
coming under increasing attack. They must simulta-
neously expand the system's carrying capacity and
improve its defenses; to do this, they are developing
new routes, dispersing their storage areas, and aug-
menting the combat forces along the trails. Although
land routes almost certainly will be the most impor-
tant way of moving men and materiel south, Hanoi may
also step up its efforts at seaborne infiltration,
especially in the Mekong Delta.
9. Just as important in Communist eyeg. -and
vastly more difficult--is the maintenance of a credible
military threat of some sort in and near southern
South Vietnam. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regu-
lars, without whom the effectiveness of Hanoi's other
assets is seriously reduced, were badly off in this
area even before Sihanouk's ouster. Since then, they
have received few replacements from the north; more-
over, some troops already there have been diverted to
the war in Cambodia, and the rest have suffered from
supply shortages and loss of their sanctuaries. This
situation, we believe, demands that Hanoi quickly
send substantial numbers of troops southward and de-
velop new channels for supplying them.
.ftRwignDissem
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IF .1 W.11-1 No Foreigil Dissem
10. It is impossible to Make a meaningful esti-
mate of the manpower commitment involved in these
two tasks, but without a doubt it is substantial.
Between November 1969 and May 1970, the Communists
sent about 60,000 troops through the infiltration
system, almost half of them to South Vietnam's two
southern military regions. This total probably did
not even replace the losses incurred during the
same period; moreover, almost no new troops have
arrived in southern South Vietnam since August. The
Communists could send very considerable numbers of
troops south and still not regain the ground they
lost in the last year. They must also move large
numbers of men into the Lao panhandle and Cambodia to
operate and defend their expanded logistics network,
while at the same time maintaining at least minimal
levels of military activity in all three parts of
Indochina.
11. Although the main Communist military ef-
fort in the next six months may be devoted to re-
furbishing and defending their logistics system and
their military structure in southern South Vietnam,
this does not rule out the possibility of some strong
offensive actions. In southern Laos the Communists
may mount a fairly extensive operation along their
western flank, in an effort to gain additional in-
filtration routes and enhance the security of the
routes and bases they now have. The Communists will
also keep up the pressure in Cambodia. There they
will probably continue to concentrate on the country-
side, building an indigenous "liberation movement,"
keeping the Cambodian Army tied down, and peraps
occasionally trying to bring parts of that army to
bay. Doing even this job may require more men than
Hanoi has committed so far. We see little evidence
that the Communists plan to move forcefully in the
next few months to bring down Lon Nol, and they are
unlikely to try anything--a move on Phnom Penh, for
instance--where the costs and risks would be high
and the benefits considered questionable.
12. Northern South Vietnam is also likely to
see some increase in military activity, but there are
no signs that the Communists are ready to try to take
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AroForetnDissem lop
? on the South Vietnamese there in a big way. In north
? Laos the Communists will probably husband their re-
? sources carefully, even though some offensive action
is almost certain. In southern South Vietnam, they
are almost certain to maintain a very low' military
posture.
The 'Chance for a Respite
13. This is a full order for Hanoi, and the
? question arises whether the Communists perceive a
need to lighten their military burdens by being more
forthcoming at the Paris talks. Most of the evidence
indicates they do not. Still, there may be something
? of substance in recent statements from people who talk
? to the North Vietnamese, and who have taken the line
? that the Viet Gong's new eight point proposal is a
"flexible" document subject to bargaining even on the
key issues.
14. If the Communists do want to act positively
in Paris, we would not anticipate a specific initia-
? tive. Rather, they might take advantage of any pri-
vate talks to angle for a new way to attack their old
problems. They probably expect to be talking with
? the United States before long in any case, and their
line will be tailored to what the US has to offer.
If the US is prepared to discuss the issues they con-
sider fundamental--particularly the matter of po-
litical power in South Vietnam?they are likely to
come up with some concessions of their own.
15. The Communists would probably seek to back
up any political talks ?in Paris by trying to mobilize
their political resources in South Vietnam. With a
presidential election less than a year away, they
would try to get as much steam as possible behind
? the notion that changes at the top in Saigon could
bring about a settlement, and they would push as hard
as 'they could to get grass-roots sentiment moving
? their way. It is hard to see that such tactics would
? have much success at the national level in today's
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South Vietnam, but the Communists might hope to im-
prove their position in some localities.
Conclusions
16. The range of practical alternatives open
to Hanoi in the next six months is not very broad.
The course that the Communists ?are most likely to
follow is a continuation of the tactics of protracted
warfare they have relied on for so long. Essentially
they will be playing for time and not for immediate
results. Southern Laos and Cambodia are the most
probable places for strong offensive action, but
within this time frame we do not expect the North
Vietnamese to try for really decisive actions in
either area.
17. The Communists are committed to the concept
of a long, drawn-out contest in Indochina, and they
show every sign of being ready to carry on the struggle
for power in South Vietnam for years. The question
today is whether they might be interested in trying
to alter the shape of the struggle in order to cut
their costs, protect their assets, and perhaps im-
prove their capabilities for the long-haul effort
they anticipate.
18. We think they are interested in exploring
the route toward a cease-fire and a situation that
might improve their operating milieu in South Viet-
nam. Their watchword in the political and diplomatic
field, however, will be wariness. They almost cer-
tainly do not expect much give in the US position
in Paris, and they are not willing to pay a price
that would seriously prejudice their chances of suc-
cess in the struggle for power in South Vietnam.
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inv
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Logistics Impact of Interdiction
Operations in South Laos ,
1. The attached memorandum is in response to
John Holdridge's request that you wish to be informed
of the amount of supplies destroyed or captured as a
result of the interdiction operations in South Laos
during the 1970 wet season.
2. . In view of your interest in what was going
on with the enemy's logistics system during the
period of these operations, I am also attaching a
recent publication by this Agency which discusses
logistical developments in South Laos and Cambodia
during the 1970 wet season.
THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
Deputy Director for Plans
Attachments; (2)
1. Intelligence Memorandum, "Logistics
Impact of Interdiction Operations
in South Laos During the 1970 Wet
Season," 15 Oct 70
2. ER IM 70-147, "Communist Logistical
Developments in Southern Laos and a .1- et.#1"- " '2
Cambodia Dflrinff fhP 1970 Wet Season,"
Oct 70 (Copy No. 170)
Copy No. /
Z /421-4-4- 40 Ale .110 Res, jo et7 /? ,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
15 October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Logistics Impact of Interdiction
Operations in youth Laos
During the 1970 Wet Season
Background
1. Allied interdiction operations against the NVA
logistics system in South Laos during the 1970 wet season
consisted principally of the 7AF Commando Hunt IV program
and limited ground interdiction efforts by friendly
guerrilla forces in Operation Gauntlet and MACSOG units
carrying out Prairie Fire operations.
2. The impact of the 1970 wet season interdiction
operations, in terms of supplies destroyed, was small.
This result was to be expected both because of the reduced
level of logistical activity during the wet season and
the environmental restraints imposed on our inter-
diction operations. The effect of the wet season inter-
diction programs is, in fact, more properly measured by
assessing the extent to which they complicated the enemy's
attempts to keep the system in a state of readiness for
the resumption of dry season operations; increased the
cost and difficulties of moving even small amounts of
supplies; forced the diversion of large numbers of personnel
to maintain and defend the system in South Laos; and
obstructed plans for the westward expansion of the system.
3. A primary reason for not anticipating a large
pay-off in terms of the destruction of supplies is the
meager nature of the target system, particularly during
the wet season. During the 1969 wet season, for example,
the 559th Transportation Group pulled out of South Laos
and the actual movement of supplies was restricted to the
movement of small amounts in the area around the DMZ and
.shuttling activities in the central Panhandle. During the
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1970 wet season the 559th remained in South Laos. But the
amounts of supplies moved through the system were small,
apparently adequate to maintain the forces in the Panhandle
but not enough to provide a significant volume for through-
put to Cambodia or South Vietnam.r 25X1
LB17 September concern? about moving supplies
became minimal and the operations of the 559th concentrated
almost exclusively on the Completion of final preparations
for the opening of the 1970-71 dry season.
4. Other factors that limited the pay-off from
interdiction operations were the sharp reductions in Air
Force sorties, the influence of weather on both ground and
air operations, the launching of ground operations during
the period when traffic flows were at their lowest point
of the year, and, finally, the hostile environment which
caused many ground operations to be short-lived.
Alt Interdiction
b. 7AF interdiction operations -- Commando Hunt IV --
Cleke-reduced-significantly during the 1970 wet season.
1:Only. 14;400 tactical attack sorties were flown in southern
Labs this summer (June-Septembek) compared with 29,500
'Sorties- for the same four months last year. The decrease
ih="ta-dtical attack sorties Was paitly offset, however, ?by
the greater number of B-52 strikes which more than doubled,
--thcreasing from 1,100 last year to 2,400 this year.
- :6...The results of these air operations are difficult
to assess in a quantitative sense. This is because the
data on bombing results, principally pilot reports, and
the: condition under which they must be reported make them
almost inevitably subject to wide margins of error. In
addition, the methodologies currently used to convert
BDA results" to supply losses involve a number of ques-
_tionable, though necessarily arbitrary, assumptions
yielding results which are at odds with other intelligence.
Despite these limitations which preclude any precise -
weighing of supplies lost because of air interdiction,
k-nutaber of related factors support a judgment. that the
amounts lost during this wet season were undoubtedly small.
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Nuir wit... 1 w
7. The data reported by 7AF, for example, indicate
that truck destruction during this wet season increased
by about 25 percent compared to the 1969 wet season when
truck traffic was inordinately low. At the same time,
the data show that secondary explosions and fires, the
category which traditionally accounts for the bulk of
estimated losses, decreased by 25 percent.
8. A better appreciation of the magnitude of supply
losses due to air interdiction can be had by comparing BDA
data for this wet season with similar data for the previous
dry season. Thus, effective truck losses averaged 4 a day
during this wet season, compared with losses of 24 trucks
a day during the previous dry season. Similarly, the
average of 47 secondary fires and explosions for this wet
season compares with an average of 200 a day reported
during the past dry season.
Ground Interdiction
9. During the past wet season, two programs
Operation Gauntlet and Prairie Fire -- involved the use
of friendly ground forces in interdiction operations in
South Laos. Neither of these programs resulted in the
destruction of large amounts of supplies.
Prairie Fire
10. The commitment of Prairie Fire resources to
ground interdiction operations during the 1970 wet
season was minimal. During the period June-September,
an average of 30-35 Prairie Fire operations were con-
ducted monthly in South Laos. About 90% of these
operations were oriented primarily toward reconnaissance
activities. A number of operational handicaps, par-
ticularly the vigorous reactions of enemy forces, meant
that these FGU missions were usually short-lived. Only
a handful of these operations yielded any significant
information on enemy logistics or gained access to
enemy installations that were not long abandoned. In
the few cases where the probes were relatively lucrative,
the amounts of enemy supplies captured or destroyed
were quite small.. A typical example is represented by an
operation in late September south of the western corner
of the DMZ. This operation unearthed an ammunition cache
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in a bomb-damaged bunker. The cache contained 3,800
rounds of'.30 cal., . 500 rounds Of 50 cal., And nine rounds
of 57 tM-recalless rifle ammunition -- a total of
some 350 pounds of ammunition.
The most lucrative of the Prairie Fire interdiction
operations during the 1970 wet season was Operation
Tailwind, -a three-day long reconnaissance-in-force opera-
tion carried out some 15 miles west of Chavane. Operation
Tailwind was launched on 11 September when three platoons,
totaling 136 troops were inserted by helicopter into an
area near enemy Route 165/966 close to the Binh Tram 36
area of operations. Although met with almost continuous
enemy hatassment, the heavy application of close air
support7sustained the operation's momentum and allowed
the-force? to-enter several enemy installations (presumably
on the outer periphery of BT 36) before being exfiltrated
on 14_E_OPtember. Early into the mission, friendly troops
captured and subsequently destroyed an ammunition cache
containing an estimated 30 tons of supplies.* In addition,
some-850 .pageS of enemy documents were seized and re-
turned to MACV for analysis.** Allied losses sustained
during the 80-hour duration of Operation Tailwind were
relatively moderate. Three troops were killed, and
fifty were wounded (but only five required hospitaliza-
tion)Estimates of enemy killed by air strikes numbered
over 400. The operation was costly, however, in terms
of he1ic4terd; -Two helicopters were shot down during
extraction attempts. Another dozen helicopters were so
heavily damaged by enemy fire as to be unserviceable.
Operation Gauntlet
_
12.: Operation Gauntlet, the major ground interdiction
program undertaken during this wet season, was launched
*_Founa In the cache were: 500 140mm. rockets, 300 82mm.
rocket", -2,000 23mm. rounds, 12,500 rounds of small arms
ammunition, and 40 bicycles.
** According to MACV reporting, these documents contain
highly significantinformation on the 559th Transportation
Group. As of 25 September, 400 pages of the documents had
been classified Category A -- the highest rating for
intelligence value.
Keireir
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%PLAN iL 1
on 29 August 1970 and concluded on 30 September. The
-Operation,, including approximately 5,000 irregular
:troops, had as its primary mission the interdiction
:and. harassment of enemy lines of communication (LOC s)
Tin Southern Laos, and the displacing of enemy units
deployed along the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau
overlooking the Se Kong River and Route 16. Given this
mi_ssion, the interdiction operations of Operation Gauntlet
-Can-not be evaluated primarily in terms of the amounts of
jupplies destroyed and captured.
-13. -Another factor which drastically limited any
potential pay-off, from Operation Gauntlet in terms of
es_upplies destroyed was the fact that it took place at
.he height of the wet season when supply movements
phiough the Panhandle were at the lowest level of the
_
14. -The quantity of supplies captured or destroyed
by bperation Gauntlet forces was small -- some 23 short
t...00:frice and little More than 1 ton of weapons and
ammunition.* The loss of these supplies willbe of little
9-Onequen-ce to the enemy. Three Communist LOC's were
also temporarily interdicted during the Operation, Route 23
a*-P*1 Toumlan, the Se Bang Hieng River well west of
'*toilte 23,--andoRoutes,96-165 in the Chavane area. These
interdictions probably had a marginal effect on supply
Etovement.since,as stated above, the level of logistic
ge4vity,in theselareas:and throughout the Panhandle
was_at_an extremely low level.
15. Gauntlet forceshave also had some additional
success in destroying enemy supplies by calling in air
strikes against enemy facilities. One of the more
dramatic examples of this activity 'was an air strike
which resulted in 20 large secondary explosions and 200
_ _
smaller secondary explosions. It is probable that the
ground-air cooperative ventures of this type result in
much greater-destruction of supplies than does ground
t.ction.alone.
-
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16. Although the effects of Operation Gauntlet have.
been Slight in terms of the capture or destruction of
An itemized listing is contained in the Appendix.
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LUU
enemy supplies, the program has had -a measure of sticcess
in other respects. -It was a contributing factor to the
developments which forced the North Vietnamese to make a
number of troop deployments to improve their tactical
position in South Laos.
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The Successful retaking of Phou .Non g Tao and
R5-26 by Gauntlet forces also has had a significant
ikpact on :the 'enemy's -logistic capabilities. The
liolding of these positions has denied the enemy free
access to Route 16 and the Se Kong- -river, Critical
areas .which he must control before the westward expansion
df his logistical system- can be corripleted. Extensive
0c6:4i7n gL -dlorfg RbuteS .ai -arid 16 Will also
crOpfpli-cate the enemy's Use of these routes.
?.=!- - - F'
10. - Operation Gauntlet has also met with some
success in its harassment of enemy forces. Gauntlet
forces. reportedly killed some 600. enemy troops- and..
wounded an-other 500.- Inflicting these Casualties was
ri7k_7t -without its own high costs because- Gauntlet forces
suffered_ 147_ killed-in-action and 677 wounded-in-action.
More importantly, Gauntlet casualties account for a
significantly higher share of manpower resources than do
61ImY casualties.
c -
_
19. Phase II of the South Laos interdiction program
-- which is to be launched on October 20th offers some
prospects of significantly greater- success in terms of
the destruction of enemy supplies. Phase II will place
forces along those north-south routes in
Sp-uth Laos which are major channels for the movement
of -supplies. It will also be taking place during the
- 6 -
SECRL? ..?"
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/30: LOC-HAK-559-26-4-9
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w CLUI11.3
period when the enemy will have started his dry season
iogistic campaign and supply movements should -be at
hi .h levels. It should be noted, however; that the
forces will be operating in ireas?dritical
:to e enemy. Consequently, they will be -vigorously
:defended and the casualties sustained bY
1:forces will undoubtedly be much greater than they were
Eduring Operation Gauntlet.
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APPENDIX
Weapons and Ammunition Captured in
0 eration Gauntlet
Weapons
60 mm mortar
RPG-2
RPD machine gun
AK-47
Recoilless gun
SKS
M1
Bren gun
Pistol
Unit
3
14
4
36
2
2
1
1
1
Ammunition Units
57 mm recoilless 45 rounds
30 caliber 4 cases
60 mm mortar 54 rounds
82 mm mortar 9 rounds
B-40 rocket 51 rounds
RPD ammunition 1,500 rounds
Hand grenades 17
AK-47 ammunition 4,130 rounds
SFP.
No Objection to Declassification in art 2013/12/30: LOC-HAK-559-26-4-9
LpFT F
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