THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (AS OF 1500 EST)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-15-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 7, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of intelli.genco
7 April 1972
I. Communist activity has in d
Military 'Region (MR) 4. The Communistselaunchedy in
a
widespread. coordinated series of ground probes and
shelling attacks on government positions in five delta
provinces on 7 April. These actions were coupled, with
. p r.atta=v on -ev ratr.k; y "highway bridges.
Late re'portd indicate that the 'Communists have overrun
Kien Thien district town in Chuong Thien Province,
and that several outposts were under heavy enemy attack
further north in the Vinh Long - Sa Dec area.
2.- -us vi-lots have sighted a regimental-size
Communist force about 20 miles northwest of - Tho,
in the same area that had
reported substantial a op movement. To the
west, another regimental size Communist force reportedly
has crossed into Chan Doc Province from Cambodia.
These may ho elements from either the 52nd or 101D
Regiments, which are subordinate to the enemy Phuoc
Long Front 'and which were detected in this general area
some days ago. The Com ; e 191-7 iment has not
been locate: in several
days and cou in sou Vietnam east of Chau
nri her ttr%...
3. The enemy is also maintaining heavy pressure on
.South Vietnamese positions in MR-.3. Press reports indi-
cate that Communist gunners are continuing heavy shelling
attacks against An Loc, the provincial capital of Binh
Long Province, and are also hitting a nearby South
Vietnamese artillery base. Enemy sappers reportedly
have knocked out several bridges along Route 13, the
key road link- between An Loc and Saigon, and othor late
reports claim that Route 1 has boon cut just west of
Saigon. These attacks are probably the work of commando
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elements from the Communist 429th Supper Command,
which recently infiltrated Tay Ninh Province and
are now in good position to work against major
lines of communications as well as South Vietnamese
artillery support-bases north-6f Saigon.
4. The US Embassy. reports that some 8-10,000
refugees fled the initial 5-6 April enemy attack in
Binh Long Province, a number that undoubtedly has
risen sharply with the loss of Loo Ninh District.
Press reports indicate that some civilians have been
evacuated from An Loc, but there is no sign that the
number of refugees has swelled to anywhere near that
recorded for the northernmost provinces. Emergency
aid is now being flown into various hastily erected
reception centers around the country, but government
resources may soon be overburdened, if the increased
communist activity in the delta' provinces drives more
refugees toward the major cities.
emen s rom these units probalaly are also responsible
for recent increased enemy-activity in nearby Phuoc
Long Province.
6/
outposts as well as-for street fighting.
captured document revealod that more forces would be
pl?ovided for both ground attacks on South 7i etnam ar; -
Captured
documents o suggest., however,
.that the 7th Divi.;ion elements now concentrated in
eastern Cambodia may soon be headed for increased
tactical activity in Tay Ninh Province. One recently
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th Division forces
would provide tactical support for a mid-April
attack against Tay Ninh city by elements of the
enemy's 9th Division,
Military Rogion 1
25X1 7. Military activity remained light in the
northern provinces, but there are indications that
Hue may soon be the tax t attacks.
a combined
rocner-intantry assault is being planned for Huong
Tra District, the 'urisd c ncon,nassing
25X1 Ilue. he Viet Cong
attem es ?roy bridges both north and south of
Hue on the nights of 5 and G Anrf 1 -N,fi e.rrara
25X1 enginber u" Its have been ordered to complete work on
access routes toward Hue to enable Communist armor,
artillery and infantry to launch the "final batt-In
to resolve the war."
8. Since the fighting subsided two days ago,
some Communist AAA and SAM units in 'the `areas
immediately north and south of the DMZ have been relo-
cating to new positions to reduce their vulnerability
to air attack. For this reason, t1lere is likely to 4
be a temporary dimunition in the intensity.of ground-
4 wry n~ 4t. __~_ ._-
.. 9. The US Embassy in Saigon estimates that
100,000 refugees---one-third of the provincial population--
have been generated so far by the fighting in Quang Tri.
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n
of all i.nterm"I., i,steritll C
n
11enxt,y...four~ iugea c ni.e~..a dt ,t the :usp1 as
it.. ixd-` fi~; ~7A f~g
-~ havC Uoeti established
between Quaff. Tri c Y: ` t
im~ee heAded,, by t.1in,istex
.
Of state ~c.nan puang . a
no
'consisted ml r ly -of -rocket an .
Pleiku Airfield received
13th Vi.c:twn~~~se posi.i:ions.
-five, 122?mmt':.-bckets during the evening of 6 April-
4 nee r^as attacked early on
10. Ert.,,~r. ini.ti.atc
r~ar attacks against
A fi.rel)Ase Kontum rov
can ARVN soldier killed and.12
' ?at?i,i, e up ill :. antes soon.
,Vietnd mesa 120th 'at Dai t .
North'
As element Q ..tlx
been ordesc . O .destroy an AfVN position' at ac Mut
` with marta 'r.e., and an-,.enemy ` 1o9istics unit "frnm the
A ;3 Front, which usually stAys, wel .. out
Communist's
of Combat +. ,:.has mewed 12 miles , to the east, '
t- tlxe enemy is. moving its' swp_p1y.,,1- Line"
suggesting p~ c
closer to a; fi.cipated areas of fighting. New road
cons tructia ttsz also been reported.
side
Viet Cong Coun'tr
11. w1 : the Communists currently are concen-
trating th 0 l.k of their efforts on the big-unit
contest in y'th Vietnam, Viet Cong military. and
political us also are being encouraged .to increase
pressure ag?'.st the, south Vietnamese : in the villages. bout
A number of e._~:ports
the country ;:tpdicate Za ie ie otzg oca apparatus
is busy tryi to take advantage of the impact on the
rural papux;;'on of the initial successes enjoyed by
the Communi A( plai n?-forces. .
12. Cot i; nist agents around Da Nang reportedly
are txying~-. propagandize the increasing number of
refugees tO i :~ ave government camps and return to
their formef. Plomer. Undercover agents are contacting
the refugee'..; pnd advising them that they should come
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cavex to tle winni n s i.#c ? e .
r ;nt!y
rice .c' ..SO' a a
e h r tart ouanrf 96m P rd
;axe:. working ' hard to, sjjruce up -tour arc p? ~
organizations in outlying hamlets and village.
ng
is is actin . laced on olqganizing support, amo
be having doubts about the ability of government
security forces tc -protect them.
13. Farther south in MR-3, enemy cadre in a
Communist command northwest of Saigon reportedly have
k ?s p. i taruct zj t st epgthen ?1oca1 , Viet
,-students and individuals with fami.l~t members in the
these plop
`1:11 ~ 1111, are now ely to a moms vulnerable to Communist
v rtUre ..for support. while South- Vietname$e scats
11 are under attack and suffering heavy losses.
14. In the delta, enemy cadre reportedly are
forming "special action teams" to help penetrate and
overrun more government outposts. An enemy provincial
directive authorizing the formation of 'the new teams
stated. that the capture of government outposts was
an important part in disrupting the government's
pacification program. The destruction of the program'
the document claimed would provide the necessary
"springboard for a genera). offensive.." in Kien Phong
Province, Viet Cong cadre reportedly have been instructed
to step up their efforts to organize subversive organ-
izations in government areas to help launch a general
uprising campaign at some future unspecified date.
1.5.. Much of the current Viet Cong activity being
reported does not suggest much of a change from
.standard Communist procedures at the local level. The
..current emphasis, however, indicates that Viet Cong
officials clearly hope to capitalize on the adverse
psychological effects government setbacks are having
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ot the local population as a result of the successes
of their main force attacks farther north.
Popular Reactions
16.? Communist agitation plans notwithstanding,
much of the civilian population in Saigon and 'in
other parts of the country well away from the fighting
is still going about its ordinary business with very
few outward signs of serious alarm. As the action
spreads from one front to another, however,'apprehension
among civilians is growing.
17. One bit of evidence reflecting the absence
of panic at least in Saigon is the fact that over the
past several days the black'market rate for the US
dollars and the price of gold have actually dropped
slightly. Pro-administration politicians remain
publicly optimistic, Lower House Speaker Can was quoted
in the semi-official press yesterday asserting that the
South Vietnamese army is holding the line in Quang Tri
and that only US air support was needed to-defeat the
enemy.
18. At the same time, many leading figures in the
capital are voicing increasing concern. Leading
Buddhist Senator Mau, whose strongest support is probably
centered in the northern provinces, expressed'fear that
Quang Tri City is "doorned" and Hue might prove impossible
to hold. Another politician who has long been a caustic,
critic of the Thieu regime, senator Chuc,'charged that
the military situation was not as disturbing as the lack
of political leadership being provided by the government.'
in Quang Ngai Province, in southern Military Region 1,
local Buddhist notables are "extremely concerned" about
enemy attacks further north. The monks reportedly are
supporting the expansion of an organization among local
high school students aimed at preventing Viet Cong
infiltration of student bodies or of Quang Ngai City.
Any relevant information will be turned over immediately
to province security authorities for action. '
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19. So far, however, most Vietnamese are still
tQ ail)g. ,the. situat onn carefully and there :do a not
appear to be any popular groundswell of sentiment
either for or -against the government as a result of
t:avervMali level
.11iovea through the Ban Phone area in March. The cargo
.,~cL-.~i:tt an.s vf- rice, 1,000 tons of
ordnance, and 1,100 tons 6f gasoline. T ho ordi ance
deliveries, in March 'increase the amount of arms and
ar nuniti n moved to that area since 1 February to at
,.:r.east 3,800 tons, most:of,which is probably for support
.of major offensive campaigns in the B-3 rront and
21. The extremely large volume of gasoline-shipped
.is'sufficient to maintain a m~;jor transport effort in
the southern Panhandle and northern Cambodia well into
the wet season.
20. During. March the flow of supplies through the
GQmmunist logistic network in the southern Laotian
22.
the 14
rth V
i,etna
]nese w co i
arge quan sties of supp '
at least through A
ril
p
.
the he third
day
of April
' which it called `
the
mo
nth of
the
,
"Gen
tatipn
Offe e,
z s
use of
the
term
may indicate
that the No
rth Vie
tnames
e pla
n to move more supplies
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during Apri
l than
in any
of t
.
he three previous months
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III North Vie
tnam
23. The North Vietnamese 325th Division is apparently
moving south from the Hanoi area to supplement Communist
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