WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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No. 0015/76
April 9, 1976
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CONTENTS (April 9, 1976)
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current lntellgence, reports and analyzes signifi-
vently includes material coordnrted with or re ared
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strate
ic
g
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
25X1
1 Middle East - Africa
3 Europe
6 East Asia - Pacific
1 Western Hemisphere
8 International
9 Lebanon: The Left's Ascendancy
12 Israel: West Bank Arabs Restive
15 Czechoslovakia: Party Congress
16 The Polisario Front
18 China: Teng's Removal
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor eekly
Summary,
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LEBANON
Lebanese leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt
finally gave in to Syrian pressure on April
2 and agreed to a ten-day truce. Within
the time limit-a condition demanded by
the leftists-the Lebanese parliament is
supposed to amend the constitution, elect
a new president, and thus make way for
President Franjiyah's resignation.
Muslim leftist forces remain poised to
resume the fighting should these con-
ditions not be met.
The parliament is scheduled to convene
April 10 to amend the constitution. If this
session is successful, election of a new
president presumably will follow within a
matter of days. Franjiyah, according to
his Christian colleagues, has agreed to
step down after the election of his
successor.
Syria has increased its military
presence in Lebanon during the past week
in an effort to keep up the pressure on
Jumblatt.
These forces, along with Syrian-con-
trolled Palestinian troops, have taken
control of major ports, border-crossing
points, and key supply and com-
munications facilities throughout the
country in what appears to be an effective
blockade of arms and supplies to Jum-
blatt's forces and their allies. Damas-
cus has kept most of its regular forces
in the north near Tripoli instead of
in central and southern Lebanon to
minimize the chance of an Israeli counter-
move.
The Israelis, as of midweek, did not
appear concerned that conditions in
Lebanon might lead to a new Arab-Israeli
war, although defense officials announced
publicly for the first time that significant
numbers of Syrian regulars have, in fact,
entered Lebanon.
Damascus is gambling that Tel Aviv
will continue to act with restraint and that
the show of Syrian force will intimidate
Lebanese leftists and their Palestinian
supporters into going along with the plan
to replace Franjiyah and extend the
cease-fire. The danger is that Syria might
fail to intimidate Jumblatt and misjudge
the limits of Israeli tolerance. (An
analysis of the growing military and
political strength of Lebanon's Muslim
leftists appears on page 9.)F
* AMASCUS
(UNDOF
-f ZONE
'(3otanj
USSR-LEBA ON
/U,11 aq6-
The USSR is giving strop support to
Syria's effort to achieve a truce in
Lebanon.
On Thursday, a Pravda article signed
"Observer" to denote the Kremlin's en-
dorsement, backed Syrian mediation and
called for the preservation of a united and
independent Lebanese state. It was the
most authoritative Soviet statement to
date on the Lebanese situation.
Soviet diplomatic intercession in Beirut
may have been prompted by a meeting
between Vinogradov and Syrian President
Asad on March 29. At about that time,
Damascus was soliciting Western reaction
to more open and extensive Syrian in-
tervention in Lebanon, and Asad may
have convinced the Soviets of the gravity
of the situation.
Moscow wants to avoid an expanded
conflict in the area, but it has other
reasons for supporting the Syrian
proposal. It does not want Asad's prestige
to suffer, particularly at a time when
Soviet problems with Egyptian President
Sadat have intensified. Moscow may also
fear that Syrian failure in Lebanon could
lead to political instability in Damascus.
US naval movements have led the
Soviets to talk publicly about possible US
intervention in Lebanon, and they have
formally asked Washington for an ex-
planation of US intentions. The Soviet ac-
tions appear designed to show the Arabs
that Moscow is protecting their interests.
USSR-EGYPT
A.J. f -}oUcce
Moscow is taking a tough public line on
President Sadat's abrogation of the
Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty.
Privately, it has indicated it is not plan-
ning any dramatic retaliation against
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Cairo.
A Soviet government statement issued
last week put Moscow's formal denuncia-
tion of Sadat's action on the record. The
statement did not berate President Sadat
by name, but it did reject some of his ac-
cusations against Moscow on the ar-
maments and debt questions and made
clear that it was Sadat's reorientation of
Egypt's foreign policy that has caused the
rift.
The statement, as well as a torrent of
Soviet comment that followed, rejected
assertions by Egyptian officials that the
abrogation will not cause any changes in
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Moscow
said Sadat will have to face up to the
Egyptian people for the consequences of
his policy-a statement designed to sow
doubts in Egypt about the wisdom of
Sadat's action.
Soviet officials have privately indicated
that the USSR does not intend to take
any dramatic action against Sadat.
In justifying their decision to sit tight,
the Soviets are asserting that Sadat's
isolation in the Arab world and Egypt's
economic difficulties will eventually lead
to his removal. They probably want to
avoid any action that might lend sub-
stance to Sadat's charges that they are
seeking to undermine him. Some Soviet
officials are worried that Sadat may expel
the many Soviet citizens still in Egypt and
act against the Soviet cultural centers,
which give Moscow entry to the Egyptian
left.
The Soviet public statements have
stirred an outpouring of charges from the
Egyptian press and public figures of
Soviet meddling. The Egyptians are try-
ing to show widespread support for Presi-
dent Sadat to counter the Soviet cam-
paign, but their failure to publicize some
of the specifics of the Soviet rebuttal
suggests concern that the attacks might
RED
Vfi'A
FRENCH Tf Iktf{tty"l
Aker AN
155A5 18OUTI
FRENCH TERRITORY OF
THE AFARS AND ISSAS
Paris has met a quick rebuff to its ef-
forts to begin the peaceful decolonization
of the French Territory of the Afars and
Issas.
Somali President Siad last week re-
fused to give Paris a formal guarantee
that Somalia will respect the sovereignty
of the territory after it becomes in-
dependent. Siad, who wants to annex it,
told a special French emissary that he
would only give verbal assurance.
The Front for the Liberation of the
Somali Coast-a Somali puppet
organization-and the African People's
Independence League-the legal opposi-
tion party in the FTAI-last week re-
jected French proposals for a meeting that
would include them, the pro-French
governing party led by Ali Aref Bourhan,
and the Ethiopian-backed Djibouti
Liberation Movement.
The Front and the League called on
France to negotiate only with them, ex-
cluding Ali Aref and the Djibouti Libera-
tion Movement. The Front accused
France of trying to conceal its true
aim-the transfer of power to Ali Aref
after a sham ."referendum.
The special French'emissary had visited
Addis Ababa before he went to
Mogadiscio. The Ethiopians reiterated
their determination to prevent Somalia
from dominating the FTAI. They ex-
pressed concern about the weak domestic
position of Ali Aref, whom they favor to
lead an independent government.
The Ethiopians said they oppose
"foreign bases" in the territory after it
becomes independent, but made no ex-
plicit objection to French troops remain-
ing there to protect its sovereignty. Ethio-
pian officials said they would prefer
guarantees b the Organization of
African Unity.
RHODESIA
N2_
The four southern African presidents
who support the black Rhodesian
nationalists are pressing ahead with ef-
forts to increase military pressure on Ian
Smith's white minority regime.
Tanzanian President Nyerere, Mozam-
bican President Machel, Zambian Presi-
dent Kaunda, and Botswanan President
Khama reportedly agreed, at their recent
meeting in Lusaka, that the insurgents
should be permitted to launch guerrilla at-
tacks into northwestern Rhodesia from
Zambia. No such attacks have occurred
yet, but the Zambians have reportedly
been making plans to support such
operations.
The African leaders were unable to per-
suade the leaders of the two principal
nationalist factions-Joshua Nkomo and
Bishop Muzorewa--to bury their
differences.
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Nyerere and Machel are trying to
tighten their control over outside aid to
the nationalist guerrilla forces because
they are concerned that direct aid by the
Soviets, Cubans, and Chinese to the fac-
tions each favors could widen existing
divisions and weaken the guerrilla effort.
The Tanzanians informed communist
countries last week that all outside aid is
to be sent through Tanzania and Mozam-
bique.
The four presidents want to avoid a
repetition of what happened in Angola.
They have agreed that no Cuban or other
foreign combat troops will be allowed to
join the fighting in Rhodesia. The
pressure to allow communist participation
will increase, however, if the fighting
drags on, as is likely.
A recent British initiative aimed at
restarting settlement talks shows little
sign of bearing fruit. British Minister of
State Ennals was given a sympathetic
hearing in Tanzania and Mozambique
last week, but Nyerere and Machel both
expressed their belief that further fighting
would be necessary before there could be
any meaningful negotiations. Kaunda,
who had been the prime backer of the
settlement talks, reportedly has come to
the same conclusion.
ALGERIA-MOROCCO
Algeria last week renewed its efforts to
keep the UN involved in its dispute with
Morocco over Western Sahara. A senior
Algerian Foreign Ministry official told
the US ambassador on April 1 that the
return to the area in late March of UN
Secretary General Waldheim's special en-
voy shows that the international com-
munity is still involved. The official urged
the US to encourage UN efforts to
resolve the dispute. He did not suggest
any softening in Algeria's position.
The envoy's mission was abruptly
suspended this week. Neither Morocco
nor Mauritania would receive him
because he had met representatives of the
Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas and
inspected Saharan refugee camps during
his visit to Algeria.
The Moroccan
poised to launch
army reportedly is
a massive sweep to
clear remaining pockets of Polisario re-
sistance in Western Sahara. Moroccan of-
ficials are counting on this offensive to
halt-at least through the hot summer
months-Polisario raids on Moroccan
forces in southern Moroccan and Western
Saharan towns.
continues to strengthen its tor6es and
defensive positions in the tri-border area.
major elements
of three armor battalions and up to four
motorized infantry battalions, plus sup-
porting artillery, deployed in defensive
strongpoints west of Tindouf.
Algiers is also increasing its air strength
in the area. Six MIG-21 fighters were on a
highway strip northeast of Tindouf. This
is the first time such aircraft have been
seen in the southern border area. Sixteen
new aircraft revetments were observed
nearby, suggesting that the Algerians in-
tend to build at least an auxiliary landing
strip there. Seventeen MIG-15s or
MIG-17s were at Tindouf airfield, about
double the number previously located 25X1
there. (A discussion of the background
and the character of the Polisario Front
appears on page 16.)
ITALY 6 / Z D
The Socialist Party is maneuvering to
bring down Prime Minister Moro's two-
month-old Christian Democratic minority
government. The Socialists, whose
abstention in parliamentary votes is
crucial to Moro's survival, seem to want
an early national election but hope to
avoid sole responsibility for the political
and economic uncertainty that would
follow the fall of Moro's government.
The maneuvering by the Socialists is
part of the political fallout from a clash in
parliament last week over legalized abor-
tion. The Socialists were infuriated by the
Christian Democrats' willingness to rely
on the support of the neo-fascists to
thwart a Socialist attempt to make abor- 25X1
tions readily available. The neo-fascists
have Italy's fourth largest party, but they
are treated as political pariahs by the six
other parties.
Parliamentary debate on abortion has
been suspended until next week. The
Christian Democrats, who failed to agree
on a party strategy at their recent con-
gress, are trying to patch things up. The
Socialists, however, are in no mood to
compromise and appear determined to
force decisions on basic political issues.
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A meeting of the Socialist directorate
this week showed strong sentiment in
favor either of an early parliamentary
election or an emergency government in
which the Communist Party would have a
limited but openly acknowledged role.
The directorate gave Socialist chief De
Martino a mandate to solicit the views of
major political and labor leaders on a
broad range of Italian problems. the
Socialists are hoping to persuade others to
agree that Moro's minority government is
too weak to act effectively.
De Martino is clearly trying to bring
the government down by consensus in
order to avoid the kind of criticism his
party faced when it toppled Moro's
previous government early this year.
UNITED KINGDOM 2I "2 5
James Callaghan became prime
minister and leader of the Labor Party on
April 5 after a third-ballot victory over
left-winger Michael Foot.
The policy direction of the Labor
government probably will not change
significantly. Callaghan will put his per-
sonal stamp on the government, but there
will be little change even in the style of
leadership. Callaghan, like Wilson, has a
knack for avoiding controversy and for
seeking out the middle ground on poten-
tially divisive issues. His sense of tactics,
however, at times leaves Callaghan open
to charges that he lacks conviction and
originality.
In his first television address as prime
minister, Callaghan warned that Britain
continues to live beyond its means and
that more sacrifices will be necessary. He
reaffirmed that the government must con-
trol inflation before turning full attention
to reducing unemployment. This order of
priorities was confirmed by Chancellor of
the Exchequer Healey in his budget
message the following day.
Most key ministers have remained in
Callaghan's new cabinet if not always in
the same job. Most importantly,
Healey-the symbol of the government's
economic recovery program-stays on as
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Anthony
Crosland succeeded Callaghan as foreign
secretary. Crosland, while not an avid
"European," will probably follow
Callaghan's pragmatic approach to EC
affairs. British foreign policy will continue
to reflect Callaghan's pro-American out-
look.
Foot's impressive and dignified perfor-
mance in the leadership race may gain
him the deputy party leadership, a
stronger say in setting policy, and a key
role in maintaining party unity. He has
already been named Leader of the House
of Commons, the government's business
manager in Parliament.
Many Labor politicians, probably in-
cluding Callaghan, hope to put off an
election until next year in the expectation
that inflation and unemployment levels
will be lower. Callaghan might still be
tempted to call a snap election, however,
if the opinion polls and local election
results later this spring show that Labor
has a good chance of winning.
Budget Announced
Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis
Healey announced this week a mildly
reflationary budget that reaffirms the
government's commitment to reducing in-
flation through cooperation with the labor
unions.
The budget, which entails a $22-billion
deficit in the fiscal year running through
March 1977, calls for selective tax cuts if
the trade unions accept tougher wage con-
trols.
Included in Healey's tax package are
certain unconditional tax relief measures
as well as a few minor investment aids.
Higher excise taxes are planned for
alcohol, cigarettes, and gasoline. Personal
income growth from an expanding
economy is supposed to provide a higher
base to tax, increasing the overall revenue
take.
The largest part of the tax relief,
however, is contingent on labor's accep-
tance of an annual limit on wage increases
of about 3 percent. Healey is likely to
have a hard time selling this to the unions.
He may have to accept a higher pay limit
coupled with less tax relief. Under current
guidelines, wage increases have averaged
10 percent.
Healey has scheduled a 13-percent in-
crease in government spending in the
fiscal year ending next March. This is
down sharply from the 29-percent rise
registered last year; in real terms, it
amounts to almost no change.
Healey emphasized that economic
recovery must be based on the expansion
of exports and import substitution rather
than massive government spending. He
ruled out the prolonged use of import con-
trols, but indicated the government might
use selective controls.
Len Murray, general secretary of the
Trades Union Congress, objected to a
3-percent pay limit on the grounds that it
is inflexible and does not take pay
differentials into account. Margaret
Thatcher, head of the Conservative Party,
objected to the conditional nature of the
tax cuts and to the large role that the un- 25X1
ions play in deciding on tax cuts that
affect other citizens as well.
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31-5 ~
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EC summit in Luxembourg last
week failed to agree on solutions for the
pressing economic and institutional
problems facing the Community. The
political fallout will probably be most
damaging for French President Giscard.
His ideas on monetary cooperation and
his proposal to resolve the deadlock on
direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment were blocked.
The most immediate problem facing
the heads of government at Luxembourg
was the disparity in economic conditions
25X1 that had led France again to withdraw
from the joint float-an action that
emphasized West Germany's relative
strength within the EC. Chancellor
Schmidt made no bones about Germany's
unwillingness to underwrite further EC
programs to benefit the weaker members
unless they accept binding pledges to
follow more stringent economic policies.
The French and British, in particular,
found this condition politically unaccep-
table. The leaders fell back on charging
the finance ministers with examining later
this month EC Commission proposals for
policy cooperation.
Prime Minister Wilson failed in his bid
to have the Community adopt a common
approach to unemployment. Schmidt in-
sisted that each member must alleviate its
own unemployment problem and do it by
non-inflationary means.
The Council was unable to devise a for-
mula for apportioning seats in a directly
elected European Parliament in 1978.
While new proposals are possible, it is not
yet clear whether the issue can be un-
blocked at the next European Council in
July.
Prime Minister Tindemans' report on
European Union was given short shrift;
the long-term development of the EC
could not be discussed objectively in an at-
mosphere so lacking in common purpose.
The foreign ministers were given a vague
mandate to come up with "concrete
proposals," based on Tindemans' report,
for the European Council in December.
The leaders did reach a number of
foreign policy decisions. They issued, for
example, a declaration on Rhodesia sup-
porting British objectives there. In Lux-
embourg, the political directors agreed to
make a demarche to Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus to encourage continuation of the
Clerides-Denktash talks.
The absence of results from the summit
contrasts with progress registered during
the first joint meeting of EC foreign and
finance ministers this week. The ministers
made a long-overdue start on discussing
how the EC budget could be more
rationally used to direct greater resources
into regional and social programs.
SPAIN 26,2-7
Madrid's efforts to isolate the Com-
munist Party suffered a serious setback
last weekend when two major Christian
Democratic groups decided to join the op-
position alliance recently formed by the
merger of Communist- and Socialist-led
coalitions. The government will come un-
der more pressure to speed up moves
toward democratic reform. The political
right, in turn, will galvanize its campaign
against reform.
In separate meetings last weekend, the
Christian Democratic Left, led by Joa-
quin Ruiz Gimenez, and the more conser-
vative Popular Democratic Federation,
led by Jose Maria Gil Robles, agreed to
join the new alliance-the Democratic
Coordination.
The willingness of the Gil Robles fac-
tion to discard its previous rejection of
cooperation with the Communists ap-
parently stemmed from its long-standing
desire to merge with the Christian
Democratic Left. Both factions agreed to
unite and pledged to work toward
cooperation between all Christian
Democratic groups in Spain.
The two groups stipulated that their
participation in the new opposition front
depends on its renunciation of the use of
violence.
The government has taken a tough line
toward the Democratic Coordination,
claiming it is just another Communist
front. The regime struck back at the
Communists by arresting several party
members who tried to hold a news con-
ference to publicize the new front. If the
Communists are brought to trial, the
Madrid government is almost certain to
be the target of a campaign throughout
Europe charging it with the kind of
political repression practiced during the
Franco regime.
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d 1 So L6Vc acl
The removal of Teng Hsiao-ping from
all his offices, announced by Peking on
Wednesday, and the appointment of Hua
Kuo-feng as premier and party first
vice chairman do not necessarily
mean sidetracking of the broad range
of policies associated with Teng.
The shift is apparently not an un-
qualified victory for the party's left wing
and does not provide a long-term solution
to China's leadership problems. A
People's Daily editorial on Tuesday
acknowledged that the party's Central
Committee remains split.
Another round in the leadership
struggle is almost certainly in the cards,
perhaps even before Chairman Mao dies.
(An analysis of the current state of play in
the Chinese leadership struggle appears
on page 18).
25X1
THAILAND 25X1
Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot lost his
seat in the National Assembly in Sun-
day's general election, and with it any
chance of forming the new government.
His defeat was the result of a conservative
backlash against his hard-nosed approach
to negotiations on a residual US military
presence. Key military leaders were con-
cerned that Khukrit's handling of the
negotiations had jeopardized Thailand's
close relationship with the US and the
continued now of US arms and equip-
ment, and they worked actively against
him.
The clear winner is the center-based
Democrat Party, which won some 40 per-
cent of the seats in the National
Assembly. The runner-up Thai Nation
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Party won only 20 percent. Democrat
Party leader Seni Pramot, Khukrit's older
brother, is in line to form the next govern-
ment.
The size of the Democrat plurality puts
Seni in a strong position to form a more
stable government. He has only to gain
the support of one of the three political
parties that received between 10 and 20
percent of the votes to gain a majority.
Last year, Khukrit was forced to rely on a
shaky seven-party coalition to win a vote
of confidence in the assembly.
Seni has the backing of key military
leaders, including former army com-
mander Siwara
The prospect of a relatively stable
center-right coalition backed by the
military clearly lowers the odds of a
military take-over anytime soon. The
presence of Krit in the cabinet would
assure the military leadership that its in-
terests are being protected.
PERU 5S7,62-
in a major speech last week, President
Morales Bermudez tried to defuse coup
plotting by rightist military officers. He
was not successful.
The President admitted that errors had
occurred and that there is talk that the
government is weak. He blamed failing
confidence in the government on
ideologues of the left and the right.
The President gave a spirited defense of
the seven-year-old revolution led by the
military and affirmed that it would con-
tinue firmly, but gradually, on a "Chris-
tian, humanist, social" course.
The President's speech had something
for almost everyone. Some could see it as
a promise to moderate the leftward drift
of his government. Conservatives,
however, are clearly not convinced that
the President intends to take a firmer
hand and rid his government of prominent
leftists like the Prime Minister, General
Fernandez Maldonado.
ARGENTINA 6-6 57
Argentina's new civilian economy
minister, Jose Martinez de la Hoz, has
outlined a comprehensive package of
tough measures to slow runaway infla-
tion, curb wide-scale illegal economic ac-
tivities, and provide investment incen-
tives.
The program amounts to an invitation
to domestic business and agriculture, as
well as to foreign capital, to line up behind
the new military government. It is a direct
challenge to labor, which stands to lose its
privileged position.
The program, the product of months of
work, calls for expansion of the private
sector and a decrease of the state's role in
economic activity. Some specific
proposals provide for cuts in federal spend-
ing, tax breaks and other incentives for
industry and agriculture, and measures to
attract foreign capital.
The minister also plans to seek inter-
national assistance in covering the coun-
try's estimated $1.4-billion foreign ex-
change gap.
The plan is an attack on virtually all
Argentina's economic problems at once.
Some measures, notably freeing the
foreign exchange rate, are already in
effect. The generals are clearly betting
that they can produce an early,
demonstrable success for the benefit of
both critics at home and prospective
creditors and investors abroad.
Though not so presented, the new
program is a categorical rejection of all
aspects of Peronist economics. Wage
limits and permission for producers to
raise prices as needed will depress living
standards for labor, long the favored
group under Peronism. Cuts in federal
spending are to trim the bureauc-
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racy-long a source of Peronist patronage.
Private firms are urged to join state
enterprises in energy exploration and
development. The intention to repeal laws
inhibiting foreign investment also runs
counter to the Peronists' nationalistic line.
Organized labor still has the potential
to disrupt the military's plans, but the
government has taken steps to foster com-
pliance with its policies. Top labor leaders
are under arrest or in exile; the major con-
federation and important labor unions are
under government control. All strikes are 25X1
illegal and stiff penalties face those who
disrupt essential services or productive ac
BRAZIL 4 ~ . 4
President Geisel has once again drawn
the line on what the Brazilian government
considers unacceptable political behavior.
Last week he stripped three opposition
congressmen of their offices and suspend-
ed their political rights for ten years. All
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three had invited the action by attacking
directly and in public the armed services'
domination of the government. This is
the sixth time Geisel has taken such action
since he came to power two years ago. On
every occasion, the punishment has been
the same and directed only at the in-
dividual offender. Repetition reduces the
dramatic impact of each incident, but
their frequency has a cumulative effect
and indicates that some politicians see
provocation as a useful way to dramatize
Geisel's dictatorial powers.
Such episodes also strengthen opposi-
tion to Geisel among conservatives within
the government. There are many, es-
pecially in the armed forces, who think
the President has already gone too far
toward political liberalization.
Geisel is now trying to bring the securi-
ty forces under his personal control, and
political outbursts can only make his task
more difficult. One ousted congressman
may still be trying to exploit this tension
by asserting that he is receiving
anonymous death threats.
Government spokesmen are trying to
squelch rumors that more disciplinary ac-
tions are planned, but some observers
believe Geisel intends to remove almost
all of the opposition's most appealing and
interesting politicians. Such talk
strengthens the probability that the op-
25X6 position will gain even more in the
have heightened public concern. Last
weekend, three bombs exploded in the
capital, causing extensive damage but no
casualties. Public apprehension is es-
pecially pronounced now because the
violence coincides with preparations for
departmental and municipal elections
scheduled for later this month.
were seeking relief for US companies will-
ing to make major investments in Arab
countries. Saudi Arabia, however, is tak-
ing a harder line on easing the bo colt
against US corn anies.
municipal elections in November than it
did in the congressional election in 1974.
COLOMBIA 56-55
The unrest that has been growing in
Colombia for more than two months has
finally led the government to impose
strong security measures. Last week, the
government closed the troubled National
University and two smaller schools in the
capital and authorized the army and
police to fire on anyone who attacks them.
Disorders, including student riots,
guerrilla raids in the interior, and the kid-
naping of a labor leader in mid-February,
6S-6e~
ARAB BOYCOTT MEETING
The semiannual Arab boycott meeting
ended last week in Alexandria, apparently
without any major changes in the boycott
criteria. The large US companies seeking
to invest in Arab countries evidently were
not removed from the boycott list. A
special ad hoc session to consider the
application of the boycott to these com-
panies will reportedly be held in
Damascus in the near future.
The main items of business were to
remove British Leyland and Phillips Elec-
tric Company of the Netherlands from the
blacklist. Leyland already had garnered
Arab contracts after reducing its
operations in Israel. Phillips has just been
awarded-without competitive bid-
ding-a contract from Saudi Arabia
worth $3 billion to install an automatic
telephone system. The US company ITT,
which is not on the blacklist and which
has superior technology, had been actively
seeking the Saudi contract.
Egypt and Syria have asserted that they
DEMAND FOR OPEC OIL
World demand for oil from members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries appears likely to increase by
about 7 percent in 1976 to an average of
29 million barrels per day. Even so,
OPEC production this year will remain
substantially below the nearly 31 million 25X1
barrels per day produced in both 1973 and
1974.
Output during January and February
this year averaged only slightly above 27
million barrels per day, as oil companies
held down liftings in order to dispose of
excess stocks. Stocks are now down, and
OPEC output for the remainder of the
year will probably average more than 29
million barrels per day. This level of out-
put should ease the production and
revenue problems faced by many OPEC
members over the past year.
Global economic recovery is the main
reason for the likely resurgence in demand
for OPEC oil. With the economic revival
picking up momentum, energy consump-
tion will probably rise substantially for
the first time since 1973. Because output
of alternative fuels will rise only slightly,
oil consumption in the non-communist
world will probably rise by about 5 per-
cent; it fell 3 percent in both 1974 and
1975.
We estimate that oil production in
Western countries that are not members
of OPEC will edge up to 17.8 million
barrels per day this year. Output will ex-
pand by about 500,000 barrels per day in
the North Sea and by about 300,000
barrels per day in Mexico, and will
probably fall by another 400,000 barrels
per day in the US.
25X1
25X1
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The rapid rise in the political and military power of
Lebanon's radical and leftist groups has brought a new
and unpredictable dimension to the Lebanese scene. No
single group inside or outside tie country has dominant
influence on the loose alliance or leftist factions.
Radical Muslim and leftist groups are
emerging from the prolonged fighting in
Lebanon with considerable new popular
support, military strength, and political
resolve.
Even before the collapse of the
Syrian-sponsored cease-fire in early
March, the leftists had proved they were a
formidable political as well as military
force that could intimidate old-line
Muslim politicians and directly challenge
the Christian military establishment.
During the renewed fighting last
month, the radicals showed they could vir-
tually silence old-line Muslim leaders and
could inflict chastening defeats on the
major Christian militias. Leftist military
successes were due in part to support from
independent fedayeen groups, especially
Yasir Arafat's Fatah. The military and
political prospects of the left hinge to a
large extent on whether it continues to
receive support from Arafat.
Whatever the relationship between
Palestinian and leftist leaders, the leftists
will be a powerful and influential factor
on the Lebanese scene for some time to
cone. It is conceivable that they may gain
the upper hand during the critical weeks
and months ahead.
The Leftist-Muslim Coalition
The task of controlling or even
negotiating with the extreme left is com-
plicated by the fact that it is a collection
of fringe groups allied mainly by a sense
that together they can gain the advantage
in Lebanon. There is no dominant leader
or faction that can be brought into what
Lebanon: The Left's Ascendancy
would probably have differing points of
view in negotiations for a political settle-
ment.
The rebel Lebanese Arab Army headed
by Ahmad Khatib has been a key compo-
nent in the leftist coalition. We estimate
that Khatib's followers have swelled from
several hundred in late January to
between 2,000 and 3,000 now. Many of
these may be only hangers-on, but most
are trained soldiers who brought with
them arms, ammunition, and some heavy
weapons. Khatib has probably not. been
able effectively to organize his band, and
there does not appear to be any abiding
allegiance to his leadership within the
renegade army, except among a core
group of several hundred.
We have only scant information on
Khatib's political leanings. The success
and fame he has won by cooperating with
the left may lead him to adhere to leftist
political demands. Even so, he may not be
able to deliver all of his following.
Outside Sponsors
The rapid ascendancy of the Lebanese
left has triggered intense competition
among outsiders for influence over in-
dividual leftist groups. Syria, its Pales-
tinian client Saiqa, and Yasir Arafat's
Fatah have been the left's primary
patrons.
Libya and Iraq also supply some small
arms and money, but they have been
prevented by the Syrians-who control
the major supply routes into
Lebanon-from gaining sponsorship over
any one group or establishing any signifi-
cant influence over the leftist movement
as a whole.
remains of the old political system.
Kamal Jumblatt comes closest to being
the leader of the leftist-Muslim coalition.
His long record of speaking out against
the Christian and Sunni Muslim es-
tablishments and his agitation for minori-
ty rights and economic and social change
have gained him stature among younger
Muslim radicals in many parts of the
country. His private militia, moreover, is
the largest in the leftist front.
Although Jumblatt by no means con-
trols his radical allies, his ability to exploit
the inherent weaknesses in Lebanon's
traditional political fabric-its inequities
and rigidities-has been the key to his
success, and, as his allies seem to
recognize, to their recent rise as well.
Most other leftist leaders are locally
based and urban. They have no well-de-
fined ideology beyond a strong commit-
ment to Palestinian and Arab causes, a
desire to overturn Christian minority
rule, and a general penchant for radical-
ism. Their support has conic from disad-
vantaged Muslim and minority groups.
The most successful of these local
leaders are Ibrahim Qulaylat and his ally
Isam al-Arab in Beirut, Faruq Muqad-
dam in Tripoli, and Mustafa Saad in
Sidon. Muqaddam and Saad are scions of
old-line political families, and their
political and social views may be relative-
ly tempered. They arc far outnumbered,
ese newly emerged leftist leaders
have loosely coordinated their military ac-
tions and together may command fighters
numbering in the thousands, but they
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SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND MILITARY GROUPS
INVOLVED IN THE LEBANON CRISIS
Kamal Jumblatt, parliamentary deputy and leader of the Progressive
Socialist Party, is the commonly accepted leader of the leftist coali-
tion. He is head of Lebanon's Druze minority, and under the old
confessional system of government, could not hold the presidency or
prime ministership. His 3,000-man militia-the largest in the coali-
tion-depends on Syria and the main fedayeen groups, Fatah and
Saiqa, for arms and training.
Ibrahim Qulaylat, head of the Independent Nasirite Movement, is
one of Jumblatt's chief allies in the leftist front. His 2,000-man
militia is based in Beirut and has been active in the struggle for the
hotel and commercial districts. Qulaylat has close ties with Fatah and
receives some aid from Libya.
Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, is leader of rebel Muslim army soldiers
whose seizure of army installations in southern Lebanon triggered
the collapse of the cease-fire in early March. His following has
increased from several hundred in mid-January to roughly 4,000
men. His followers have brought with them most of the supplies and
heavy weapons of the Lebanese army.
Brigadier General al-Ahdab, led the attempted coup against President
Franjiyah on March 11. Ahdab appears to have very little backing
from army commanders. An initial endorsement from Khatib's forces
has not materialized into any real support, but his challenge to the
President and his control of Beirut radio have been important
psychological boosts for the leftists.
Major Palestinian Leaders
Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and
chief of Fatah, leads the 400,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon. He
commands 8,000 Fatah regulars in Lebanon and a 1,000-man con-
tingent of the Palestine Liberation Army-the Ayn Jallut Brigade-
normally based in Egypt.
Zuhayr Muhsin, member of PLO Executive Council, is chief of the
Saiqa fedayeen organization controlled by Syria. In effect, he is
Syria's voice in the Palestinian movement. All of Saiqa's 3,000 troops
are now in Lebanon and are directed from Damascus.
Brigadier General Budayri. Commander of the Palestine Liberation
Army, has 5,000 troops now in Lebanon. With the exception of the
contingent under Arafat's command, PLA units are controlled by
Damascus. The PLA was used earlier this year to enforce the cease-
fire, but the sympathy of top PLA commanders for Lebanese leftists
and fellow Palestinians involved in the fighting has undermined the
PLA's effectiveness as a neutral police force.
"Rejectionist" fedayeen leaders, including George Habbash, Ahmad
Jabril, and others, have fought with leftist militias against the Chris-
tians.
Prime Minister Rashid Karami, a Sunni Muslim, has lost much of his
grass-roots support in northern Lebanon to a local leftist leader and
has become dependent on Syrian backing. He still has a certain
national standing that may help him hold on to the prune minister-
ship. Karami's private militia-the Arab Liberation Army-was in-
volved in the defense of Karami's home town of Tripoli in the
fighting against the Christians last year but has not actively partici-
pated in the current leftist-Christian struggle.
Saib Salam, former prime minister, was once the most powerful
Sunni Muslim political boss in Beirut, but has lost most of his
popular backing to radical Muslim leader Ibrahim Qulaylat. Salem
continues to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a settlement
and has generally supported Karami.
Kamal Asad, Speaker of Parliament, is a prominent leader of Leba-
non's Shia Muslim community. He heads a powerful bloc of parlia-
mentary deputies from the south, which signed a recent petition for
FranjiyaWs resignation. Asad is currently helping to arrange passage
of a constitutional amendment that would provide a legal, face-saving
way for the President to resign before the end of his term.
Key Maronite Christian Leaders
President Sulayman Franjiyah, who has never had enthusiastic back-
ing from his fellow Maronites, has lost the support of most Chris-
tians. He personally commands a small militia based in the northern
city of Zagharta and a 300-man Christian contingent from what is
left of the Lebanese army.
Pierre Jumayyil, parliamentary deputy and leader of the Phalanges
Party, is the founder of the conservative Phalanges-the largest Chris-
tian party in Lebanon-and is the most powerful spokesman on the
Christian side. He commands the Phalangist militia, which has well
over 10,000 well-trained fighters, and perhaps as many as 8,000
irregulars.
Camille Shamun, interior minister, former president, and chief of the
National Liberal Party, generally played a spoiler's role in settlement
negotiations last year. ' He has been the most inflexible and unpredict-
able player on the Christian side. His 2,000-man militia has been
active in fighting in Beirut and areas south of the capital.
Raymond Edde, parliamentary deputy and leader of the National
Bloc, is-the son of Lebanon's first president, and leader of the third
largest Christian Party. A leading candidate to succeed President
Franjiyah, Edde has a broad following in parliament and among
conservative Muslims, but is opposed by Syria and conservative
Christians, like Jumayyil.
Ilyas Sarkis, governor of the central bank, is Edde's chief competitor
to replace Franjiyah. Sarkis has no personal following but is favored
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Rivalry between Syria and ata or
controlling influence over the left, com-
bined with challenges from Iraq and
Libya, have given the major leftist leaders
a measure of independence from any one
outside sponsor. Jumblatt, for example,
appeared relatively immune to Syrian
demands earlier this year to stop his
trouble-making, and more recently,
blatantly defied Syrian insistence that he
accept a cease-fire. Only the combined
decision of Syria and Fatah to cut off
military support to Jumblatt finally
brought him to heel.
The Egyptian Angle
Egypt's preoccupation throughout the
Lebanon crisis has been with the prospect
that Syria might strengthen its leadership
in the Arab world by a successful effort to
settle the conflict. Above all, Cairo wants
to prevent anything that would so en-
trench Syria's influence in Lebanon as to
give it virtual control of the country and,
with it, control of the Palestinian move-
ment.
The Egyptians do not have much in-
fluence, but they are doing their best to
thwart Syria, and they have lately become
a disruptive influence. They seem blinded
to the prospect that the alternative to
Syria's political intervention could be the
ascendancy of the left in Lebanon, and
they seem undismayed by the possibility
that the conflict could lead to
Syrian-Israeli hostilities.
Egypt's efforts to aid Muslim leftists
have recently increased as these forces
remainder of the Palestine Liberation Ar-
my's brigade based in Egypt be sent to
emerged to become the principal obstacle
to Syrian mediation. On March 15, Cairo
agreed to Yasir Arafat's request that the
The Egyptians have also dropped any
pretense of neutrality toward the Leba-
nese factions, and have been openly prais-
ing Jumblatt for his anti-Syrian posture.
A Look Ahead
The loose alliance under Jumblatt may
fragment to some degree as a result of the
cease-fire, and the left will not necessarily
be as formidable politically as it has been
militarily. There are differences among
the leftists in terms of personality,
ideology, regional interests, and con-
stituencies that will make it difficult for
Jumblatt to present a united position on
every issue. fie will, for example, have
some difficulty balancing the concerns of
his rural conservative Druze followers
with the demands of the Muslim "street"
constituency of Qulaylat.
The leftists, however, have sufficient
common ground to enable them to remain
the most powerful voice on the Muslim
side and a force that cannot be isolated
and weakened by the old-line Muslim
leaders, by the Christians, or by Syria.
The leftists appear united in seeking sub-
stantial reduction in Christian political in-
fluence, economic adjustment in favor of
the Muslims, an end to quotas by religion
in the government and the army, close ties
with the Palestinians, and a reduction in
Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Most importantly, the leftists appear to
have eroded significantly the political con-
stituencies of moderate Muslim leaders
like Rashid Karami and Saib Salam. The
old-line leaders have proved unable either
to arrest or to capitalize on the leftists'
momentum, and they will probably be in-
timidated in any future negotiations by
the leftists' political and military poten-
tial.
The leftists are not in a position to dic-
tate a political settlement, but they will
not accept a refurbished version of the
Syrian-backed reform package achieved
in February. They will insist on con-
cessions, and their strength will ensure
continuation of de facto partition and will
complicate the problem of reconstituting
an effective national security authority in
Lebanon.
The Palestinians and Muslim leftists
together now control about two thirds of
Lebanon and have reduced Christian con-
trol in Beirut itself. This means that any
new government in Beirut will continue to
be weak and, in effect, will be operating
within a confederation framework.
The potential political ascendancy of
the leftist Muslims and Palestinians in
southern Lebanon will make the Israelis
look at the area as an even greater securi-
ty threat.
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The implications for Syria of the
leftist gains in Lebanon could be seri-
ous. Perhaps the most significant is
that Syria's ability to influence the sit-
uation without the insertion of additional
Syrian regular forces has been seriously
reduced.
have inhibited Asad from pursuing an
even-handed policy.
The limits of Syrian influence in
Lebanon have also been exposed by the
cooperation of Muslim leftists and Fatah
to resist the Syrians. The more direct a
role Syria has attempted to play, the more
the left has united against Damascus'
policy. The leftists and Arafat, in par-
ticular, can be expected to continue trying
to preserve their freedom of maneuver
and to exploit any opportunity for playing
off other Arab states, both radicals and
conservatives, against Syria.
President Asad's actions are also likely
to be constrained by growing opposition
within his military and ruling party to his
Lebanese policy because it has tended to
favor the Christians.
Recent violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank
reflects rising Palestinian nationalism, and more trouble
seems likely. The Israelis show no sign that they are
considering significant modifications in their occupation
policy.
Growing Palestinian nationalism has
fanned two months of violent anti-Israeli
demonstrations by Arab students in the
occupied West Bank. The outbreak will
probably make it more difficult for Israeli
occupation authorities to secure the
cooperation of local Arab leaders to ad-
minister the troubled area.
More serious terrorist violence on the
West Bank against Israeli rule seems like-
ly. On a different level, many Palestinians
are expected to show their hostility
toward the Israeli occupation by suppor-
ting candidates in the West Bank
municipal elections on April 12 who are
sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
Arab students have been demonstrating
since late January. The demonstrations
were triggered by the ruling of an Israeli
magistrate ,permitting Jewish prayer ser-
vices on Jerusalem's Temple Mount-the
site of Islam's third holiest shrine.
The students are also protesting against
,Jewish settlements in the West Bank, par-
Israel: West Bank Arabs Restive
ticularly one set up illegally last
December at Sebastia near Nabulus. The
Israeli government has not authorized the
Sebastia site for permanent Jewish settle-
ment, but the demonstrators fear that Tel
Aviv's decision late last year to permit a
small group of the would-be settlers to re-
main temporarily at a nearby Israeli army
camp is a first step toward permitting a
permanent settlement.
On March 21, the Israeli Supreme
Court upheld the right of police to prevent
Jewish prayer services on the Temple
Mount. This decision has helped to pacify
West Bank Arabs and the demonstrations
have subsided. The territory is tense,
however. The general strike on March 30
in Israel staged by Israeli Arabs was sup-
ported by many West Bank Palestinians
who held widespread but mostly non-
violent sympathy strikes.
The Israelis have responded to the West
Bank agitation by reinforcing their
military and police forces in- the West
Bank and imposing strict curfews on par-
ticularly rebellious towns. The Israelis
will probably institute military rule of the
West Bank if further disturbances should
appear to jeopardize essential city services
or Israeli security.
These measures, however, will not
resolve the political problem underlined
by the West Bank violence.
The Israelis are not insensitive to the
problems caused by their occupation of
the West Bank. The Israeli Education
Ministry, for example, will soon make
available to East Jerusalem's 6,000 Arab
junior and senior high school students a
curriculum nearly identical to the courses
taught when Jordan governed the West
Bank before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The new system is intended to enable
East Jerusalem students to enter Arab un-
iversities-something previously made
difficult by the Israeli requirement that
Arab students study essentially an Israeli
curriculum.
The change in courses suggests that Tel
Aviv, while continuing to regard East
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Tel Aviv-Yafo,_
SECRET
Haifa
WEST BVK
L .\
Ram
Allah
UNDgF
Zon
GOLAN
HEIGHTS
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Jerusalem as an integral part of Israel,
feels compelled to acknowledge the ex-
istence there of strong non-Jewish cultural
and social ties to the West Bank and the
rest of the Arab world.
The Israeli government, however, has
no apparent intention of revamping its oc-
cupation policy in any major way to
placate the West Bank Palestinians. The
government, as well as the Israeli public,
tend to view the West Bank primarily as
territory necessary to strengthen Israeli
security.
Moreover, the Israelis generally believe
that their occupation of the West Bank
has been enlightened, that it has brought
economic prosperity to the area and that
most West Bankers, while not supporting
the occupation, are willing to live with it
as long as it continues to be benign and
does not hinder trade and family contacts.
The recent disorders have prompted in-
creased criticism of the Rabin govern-
ment from both moderate and conser-
vative leaders of the ruling Labor Align-
ment. Some moderates, like ex - foreign
minister Eban, have expressed understand-
ing for Arab grievances and criticize the
government for not being more responsive
to P? I t; d
a es
UPI
the damage to their positions.
This tactic and the political power
usually wielded by the clans will likely
re-elect most of the incumbent mayors
who are running. Pro-PLO councilmen
probably will be elected in some towns,
however, putting increased pressure on
the mayors in those places to be more ac-
commodating to the PLO.
Israeli Plans
Defense Minister Peres, the cabinet of-
ficial responsible for administering the
West Bank, hopes to counter the PLO's
popularity by encouraging the election of
candidates sympathetic to his plans for in-
stituting a limited measure of Arab self-
rule in the area. Ideally, Peres would like
to confer broader powers on receptive
municipal officials after the elections and
to this end he has long pressed a number
of West Bank leaders to agree to his plan.
He has met with little success because
relatively few West Bankers are willing to
cooperate publicly with Israeli occupation
authorities.
To improve the dim prospects for his
plan, Peres has stepped up government ef-
forts against the most blatant anti-Israeli
groups. At the beginning of January, he
prohibited "hostile Arab organizations,
especially groups belonging to the PLO"
from participating in the municipal elec-
tions.
On March 27, the Israeli government
deported to Lebanon two prominent Arab
leftists, both of whom were important
pro-PLO candidates in the municipal
election. Israeli occupation officials also
have the legal authority to veto the
mayors elected by municipal councils, and
they may make use of this prerogative if
pro-PLO candidates do well in the elec-
tion.
mean errands. week has contributed to the current un-
Hard liners, on the other hand, blame rest. The PLO, the Israelis, and King Hu-
the demonstrations on a politically active sayn are all working to strengthen their
minority of Arabs determined to provoke positions through the election. The elec-
trouble. They fault the government for tion will be held in 24 towns throughout
not acting more quickly and forcefully the West Bank, with candidates con-
against the rioters. testing 205 municipal council seats. The
There is also disagreement within both councils, in turn, will elect mayors.
the Alignment and the broader govern- The PLO, reversing its past practice of
ment coalition over the cabinet's handling encouraging West Bankers to boycott
of the Sebastia issue. Leaders of the Israeli-sponsored elections, has instructed
Alignment's left-wing Mapam faction, its members and supporters to participate
and moderates like Foreign Minister actively in the current campaign. PLO-
Allon have echoed Arab demands that the hacked council candidates may be elected
government remove the settlers. in several towns, including Nabulus,
Labor Party conservatives, however, as Hebron, Ram Allah, Jenin, and Tulkarm.
well as the National Religious Party, the The elections pose a new problem for
Alignment's largest coalition partner, in- West Bank clan leaders who traditionally
sist that the Sebastia site be authorized as have headed town governments. For the
a permanent Jewish settlement. Prime first time, many of them face a strong
Minister Rabin has postponed a full challenge from candidates campaigning
cabinet debate on the settlement issue un- on pro-PLO platforms. Many of the
til late April. notables are verbally embracing the PLO
The West Bank municipal election next during the election campaign to minimize
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The Czechoslovak party congress that begins Mon-
day will stress stability and loyalty to the USSR. The
speeches may give some clue as to how President Ilusak
is faring in his struggle with hard liners in the party over
how to overcome the legacy of 1968.
Public preparations for the
Czechoslovak party congress that begins
on Monday have stressed continuity and
stability. A central theme of the congress
will be the correctness of Prague's policies
since Gustav Husak came to power in
1969, with stress placed on Czechoslovak
loyalty to the Soviet Union and Husak's
personal friendship with Brezhnev.
Behind the facade, there are signs that
Czechoslovakia: Party Congress
disputes over fundamental policies have
sharpened with the approach of the con-
gress. It is unlikely that the disputes will
come to a head at the congress itself; there
are too many signs that party leaders
want an appearance of stability. Speeches
at the congress may provide clues,
however, as to whether Husak is gradual-
ly winning out in his battle with hard
liners in the party over how to overcome
the legacy of 1968.
Perhaps the thorniest issue is what to
do with Aleksander Dubcek and the other
leaders of the "Prague Spring" who are
still in Czechoslovakia. Though dis-
credited and maligned, they are visible
and sometimes vocal reminders of the
Soviet invasion.
Their fate is closely linked to the
problem of rehabilitating almost 500,000
former members of the party who were
purged or who simply turned in their
cards in the post-Dubcek era. These men
constitute a pool of badly underutilized
talent in a suffering economy that is
chronically short of labor on the produc-
tion line and at the managerial level.
The state of the economy, in turn, has
added to the tension between Czechs and
Slovaks, especially during a time of
Slovak political dominance. The Czechs
resent the fact that a disproportionate
share of capital investment goes to
Slovakia to bring up its level of develop-
ment to that in the Czech lands.
Husak is trying to deal with the
rehabilitation issue by separating the
problem of Dubcek and other leaders
from the thousands of rank-and-file party
members who were "duped" by the
"Prague Spring" and can thus be redeem-
ed. The policy, called "differentiation,"
has been stubbornly opposed by party
secretary Vasil Bilak and the rigidly
orthodox conservatives who support him.
Recent evidence indicates that the
balance in the party may be swinging
toward Husak and the moderates. The
-D5
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tone of last month's congress of the
Slovak party-the home constituency of
Husak and Bilak-was much more
restrained than in 1971. Surprisingly little
attention, for example, was devoted to the
"threat from the right"-the Dubcek
reformers-that has been a favorite Bilak
theme.
Also, on the eve of the Slovak congress,
presidium member Alois Indra published
an article that the US embassy says
offered unbridled support for Husak and
constituted a thinly veiled attack on Bilak.
Indra has long been regarded as a
hard-line rival of Husak. His apparent
conversion may be another indication of
Husak's growing strength.
Even if Husak's position has improved,
it probably is not strong enough to permit
him to ride roughshod over Bilak and his
firmly entrenched supporters in the party
bureaucracy. Speeches at the congress
may show, however, a trend in the party
toward Husak's position.
Any decision on rehabilitation would
almost certainly come at party plenums
after the congress, when Husak might get
the party to back selective rehabilitation
of most former party members in return
for a continuing policy of no compromise
toward Dubcek and his leading sup-
porters.
Major changes in the top leadership are
unlikely at the congress. As at the Soviet
and Bulgarian congresses, some minor
adjustments may be made. Former presi-
dent Ludvik Svoboda, who is senile and
sick, may leave the party presidium to
retire with full honors. If Svoboda is
replaced, a leading candidate for his place
is Foreign Minister Chnoupek, a staunch
Husak supporter.
Party secretary Frantiisek Ondrich will
probably lose his position because of his
recent transfer to a government
ministerial position. There will probably
be some government shifts following the
congress. Some reports suggest that state
planning chief Vaclav Hula may become a
scapegoat for the country's economic
problems.
The Polisario guerrillas of Western Sahara are capa-
ble of carrying out hit-and-run attacks over a wide area in
southern Morocco and northern Mauritania as well as
Western Sahara. They are dependent on Algerian support
and could not increase their operations substantially
without much greater Algerian help.
The Algerian-backed Polisario Front
has become a significant guerrilla force
capable of conducting harassing
operations in southern Morocco, northern
Mauritania, and Western Sahara.
Estimates of the number of Polisario
guerrillas range from 1,000 to more than
5,000; we estimate the figure to be
between 2,000 and 3,000. A number of the
partisans were recruited from nomads
and territorial police disbanded when
Spain left its former territory.
I he Front depends mainly on Algeria
for arms, training, supplies, and financial
support; some Algerian military per-
sonnel are accompanying the guerrillas in
combat operations. A substantial increase
in guerrilla operations could occur only as
The Polisario Front
part of an Algerian move to up the ante in
its dispute with Morocco over Western
Sahara.
Before mid-1974, when King Hassan
intensified his efforts to acquire the
Sahara, the Front got most of its arms
from Libya, which continues to provide
some weapons and financial support
through Algeria.
The guerrillas, although no match for
Moroccan and Mauritanian forces in con-
ventional fighting, continue to carry out
sabotage and hit-and-run attacks over a
wide area. In addition to small arms, the
guerrillas have used mortars, machine
guns, grenade launchers, and occasionally
SA-7 surface-to-air-missiles in skirmishes
with Moroccan and Mauritanian forces.
So long as the Front has Algerian back-
ARAM
MOROCCO
?oo D
WESTERN
SAHARA
M/ URI"I'ANIA
MALI
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ing, it can continue a war of attrition in-
definitely. Morocco can contain, but not
eliminate, Polisario harassment.
The bulk of Polisario partisans are
from the Reguibat tribe, one of the most
powerful of the Saharan peoples. They
traditionally have followed a nomadic
lifestyle, ranging with their camels across
wide expanses of southern Morocco,
Algeria, Western Sahara, and
Mauritania.
The Reguibats are known for their
ferocity, pride, and ability with Firearms.
Reguibat tribesmen-possibly including
some of the present Polisario
leadership-were prominently involved in
anti-Spanish demonstrations in the
territorial capital of El Aaiun in 1970.
The Front first came to notice as an in-
Guerrillas during training at Polisario sanctuary
surgent group in May 1973, when it at-
tacked a Spanish frontier post along the
Moroccan-Saharan border. The organiza-
tion appears to be the successor of an
earlier Saharan movement that opposed
Spanish control of the territory.
Sporadic Polisario incidents against
isolated Spanish outposts in the Sahara
continued through 1974 and 1975.
Following the agreement in Madrid last
November, which provided for a phased
turnover of the territory to Morocco and
Mauritania, Spanish forces gradually
withdrew to it 70-mile defense perimeter
around EI Aaiun.
The guerrillas moved into the resulting
vacuum, and operated in much of
northeastern and southern Sahara. As
first Moroccan, and later Mauritanian,
troops moved into the Sahara, Polisario
guerrillas began to attack these forces.
Until late January, when Morocco
began extensive sweep operations against
the guerrillas, the Front held several
towns. The Polisario has since been forced
to abandon virtually all of its fixed
strongpoints, but the Front continues to
wage guerrilla warfare in the more remote
desert regions.
Most Polisario militants are Reguibats
and other indigenous Saharans. Some of
the front's known leaders, including
Secretary General Mustafa Siyed el
Ouali, reportedly were Saharan students
who attended law school in Morocco.
There are probably a significant
number of Mauritanjans in the Polisario
as well. The most prominent Mauritanian
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is Baba Miske, a former diplomat, who
frequently appears as a Polisario
spokesman.
Many Saharan tribes probably have
more in common with the Mauritanians
than with the Moroccans. The Hassaniya
Arabic spoken in much of the area is near-
ly identical to that spoken in Mauritania
and quite different from the Maghrebi
Arabic spoken in Morocco.
Political Credentials
Recently, the Polisario Front seems to
have been trying to strengthen its shaky
political credentials, Its provisional
Saharan National Council, established
last fall, proclaimed the formation of the
"Saharan Democratic Arab Republic" on
February 27.
The announcement of the Republic was
clearly intended to counter the Moroc-
can-dominated Saharan territorial
assembly's unanimous endorsement the
day before of a motion to integrate the
Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania. In
further attempts to gain diplomatic sup-
port and delay international recognition
of de facto control of the territory by
Morocco and Mauritania, the Front has
also announced an eight-man
"government" and promulgated a
"provisional constitution."
The Polisario controls little territory
and has in effect set up a government-
in-exile. Algerian and Polisario efforts to
obtain recognition of the new Saharan
"state" have been less successful than
Algiers expected.
Rabat's decision on March 7 to sever
diplomatic relations with Algiers served
as a clear warning to states that value
their relations with Morocco not to
recognize the new state. Thus far only
Algeria, eight other African states, and
North Korea have extended diplomatic
recognition.
The fall of Teng Hsiao-ping and the rise of Hua
Kuo-feng this week have not resolved China's leadership
struggle. The changes may be a result of a compromise
between rival factions of a still-divided party leadership.
China: Tang's Removal
The demonstrations in Peking on Mon-
day, which seemed designed to put
pressure on the party's left wing to ease up
on its campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping,
instead precipitated his removal from of-
fice.
The announcement by the Central
Committee that Teng has been dismissed
from all his positions specifically links
this move to the demonstrations. The left
successfully seized the opportunity to
bring much more serious charges against
Teng. The announcement indicated that
the events of Monday had changed the
situation-Teng's case now required
punishment rather than persuasion.
By contrast, a party directive issued in
late February or early March indicated
that Teng was in a relatively good position
to survive the attacks on him. It reported-
ly stated that Teng was not to be "struck
down" and that his case was different
from those of party leaders purged in the
recent past.
By orchestrating the demonstrations,
Teng and his supporters badly overplayed
their hand. The wide international
coverage of the events angered and em-
barrassed Mao and the left, and may have
enabled them to win the support of
moderates on the Politburo for the
removal of Teng.
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Teng is now out of the succession
sweepstakes, but he retains his party
membership and has been given a chance
to make amends for his errors.
His removal does not appear to be an
unqualified victory for the party's left
wing, Although the decision against Teng
was "unanimous," the left may well have
made some concessions. One could be
that the announcement on Teng is to
mark the end of the current political cam-
paign.
Indeed, the editorial published Tuesday
seemed more sharply focused on Teng
alone than previous articles, and the
reappearance yesterday of Politburo
member Li Hsien-nicn, one of Teng's
staunchest supporters, who had been ab-
sent from public view since mid-January,
suggests that other supporters of Teng
will not suffer.
The appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as
Premier and as first vice chairman of the
party may also be part of a compromise
solution. Hua is not in the leftist camp
and was attacked by leftists in 1974.
There is also some evidence that he may
have been subject to indirect attacks from
the left during the campaign against Teng.
In any event, Hua's elevation to first
vice chairman of the party, a spot left va-
cant by the death of Chou En-lai,
suggests that the removal of Teng will not
necessarily allow the leftists to increase
significantly their influence in the top
leadership. Hua was promoted over Wang
Hung-wen, a young party leftist who had
been next in line for the post.
The appointment of Hua to the
premiership, together with the
reappearance of Li Hsien-nien, the party's
leading economic specialist, suggests that
the current ambitious economic policies
may continue with little change. The
preservation of policies associated with
Teng on a broad range of issues has un-
doubtedly been foremost in the minds of
moderates in the leadership.
Teng's backers may have agreed to
drop their support of him once they were
assured that the relatively moderate Hua
would become premier and would be
promoted to a position in the party of suf-
ficient stature to give him a major say in
policy issues. Hua's new party position
leaves him second only to Mao.
Hua is closely identified with the effort
to modernize agriculture, and when he
was acting premier he frequently indicated
there would be no change in China's
foreign policy. Others in the leadership,
who may have opposed the abrasive Teng
for personal reasons but did not differ
with him over policy issues, may now
close ranks with those who personally
supported Teng, thus giving the
moderates a major voice in policy
matters.
Apart from the opportunities for
factional maneuvering arising out of the
disturbances on Monday, the entire
leadership was probably considerably
shaken by the demonstrations. Although
they were orchestrated to a considerable
degree, they revealed a depth of popular
feeling about the late premier Chou En-lai
and his policies that has no real precedent
since the communists took power.
Large-scale demonstrations apparently
were confined to the capital, but
manifestations of support for Chou also
occurred elsewhere in China. To some ex-
tent, this outpouring of feeling was made
possible by the continuing uncertainty
about authority in Peking:
? Hua Kuo-feng was merely an
"interim" acting premier.
? Tcng Ilsiao-ping remained under
attack, but was not out of the picture.
? The leftists had not been able to
generate momentum in their campaign
against Tcng.
Most leaders seem to have agreed there-
fore to paper over their differences for
a decisive display of authority. All were
acutely concerned about the image of con-
fusion and unbridled rivalry in Peking
that was being presented to foreign
observers, particularly in the Soviet
Union.
The leadership has taken the unusual
step of publicizing rallies today in support
of these decisions, indicating some defen-
siveness about the turmoil on Monday.
Yesterday's decisions, however, do not
provide a long-term solution to China's
Premier Hua (i) with
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua
leadership problems. The People's Daily
editorial on Tuesday acknowledged-for
the second time-that the party Central
Committee remains split. Given the depth
of public sentiment revealed on Monday
and the relatively powerful position of the
moderates throughout the country, a
"backlash" against the left remains a real
possibility.
Another round of struggle is almost
certainly in the cards, perhaps even before
Mao dies.
Further changes in the leadership may
also occur at the high-level meetings now
under way in Peking, but a new rank-
ing may not he fully revealed until May 1.
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