THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 JUNE 1973

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993848
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 13, 1973

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The President's Daily Brief
13 June 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
June 13, 1973
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
13 June 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodian Prime Minister In Tam's enthusiasm for his
office has steadily declined, but he reportedly in-
tends to stay on the job and do what he can to cope
with the country's problems. (Page 1)
Although Venezuela's current initiative ?to relax OAS
restrictions against Cuba appears to be foundering,
the Latin American trend toward closer relations with
the Castro government is expected to continue; this
trend is examined in detail at Annex. (Page 2)
Information from various sources indicates that Mex-
ico has requested observer status in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance or will do so soon.
(Page 3)
France/
(Page 4)
Anxious for a resumption in the canal negotiations,
Panamanian authorities are trying to show good will
by keeping down the level of anti-US propaganda.
(Page 5)
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CAMBODIA
Since taking office a month ago Prime Minister
In Tam's enthusiasm for his office has steadily de-
clined, largely because of President Lon Nol's un-
willingness to share his power.
In Tam claims he is being isolated from the
daily running of governmental business by a combina-
tion of arbitrary decisions on the President's part
and the hostility of senior Cambodian Army officers.
Some of the latter appear to be supporting Lon Nol's
efforts to keep In Tam in check in order to block
military reforms--including the replacement of in-
competent and corrupt commanders. In Tam is also
concerned that several unpopular economic decisions
that must be made soon may damage his political
career.
Nevertheless,
In Tam intends to stay on as Prime Minister
an o the best he can to cope with the country's
problems. If he could obtain the political support
of fellow council member Sink Matak, he might be
able to make some inroads on Lon Nol's authority.
It does not appear that Matak can be counted upon,
however.
the prospects for ef-
fective government in Phnom Penh remain poor.
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VENEZUELA-CUBA-OAS
The Venezuelans are having trouble lining up a
majority of OAS members for a resolution permitting
each member to decide for itself whether to honor
the sanctions against Cuba. Venezuela may have to
abandon its campaign for now.
This does not mean a reversal in the Latin
American trend toward closer economic and
diplomatic relations with the Castro gov-
ernment. This trend is examined in detail
at Annex.
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MEXICO
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Mexico has requested observer status in the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance or will do so soon.
The USSR and its Eastern European allies
recently have been trying to establish
stronger economic links with non-Communist
nations through CEMA. Finland recently
became the first non-Communist country to
conclude an agreement with CEMA; Iraq,
Iran, and India have been approached.
Mexican participation in the Soviet-Zed
CEMA would be in Zine with President
Echeverria's aggressive foreign policy
and his desire to be more independent of
US influence in the world economic arena.
He is reaching out to any nation or eco-
nomic grouping--regardless of its ideo-
logical orientation--that allows him to
exhibit this independence. Echeverria
may hope that association with CEMA will
bring economic benefits and increase ex-
ports, although nothing significant would
develop soon.
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FRANCE
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NOTES
? Panama: Anxious for a resumption in the canal
negotiations, Panamanian authorities are trying to
show good will by keeping down the level of anti-US
propaganda. They have also hinted at some additional
flexibility in their negotiating position on the
duration of US jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and
the transition of authority from the US to Panama.
Spain: The new cabinet to be sworn in today
is likely to be even more rightist than its prede-
cessor. Conservative representation has been in-
creased at the expense of adherents of the Catholic
lay organization Opus Dei. Foreign policy is ex-
pected to reflect the commitment of the new Foreign
Minister, Lopez Rodo, to Spain's integration in
Western Europe. Although generally well disposed
toward the US, he is also a tough negotiator and
a firm defender of Spanish economic interests.
Thus, the Spanish position on bilateral issues with
the US may become more rigid.
Sudan: The Numayri government states that the
prosecution of the eight Black September terrorists
accused of the murder of US and Belgian diplomats
last March will begin next week. The terrorists
apparently will be tried before a civil rather than
a military court. The charge of murder carries a
death sentence or, if the court concludes there are
extenuating circumstances, life imprisonment. The
government may have decided to move at this time in
the hope of distracting the Sudanese public from
recent price increases and in the hope that other
Arab capitals will be too concerned with the UN de-
bate on the Middle East to focus full attention on
the trial.
(continued)
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Japan-Cuba: Tokyo is considering lifting its
12-year ban on Japanese Export-Import Bank credits
to Cuba as a means of obtaining a sharp increase in
the current low level of Japanese exports to that
country. In recent years, Cuba has pressed Japan
for credits to finance purchases of heavy industry
products, including machinery, ships, and motor ve-
hicles. Tokyo has held off thus far out of defer-
ence to US wishes, but may now feel it can no longer
afford to do so.
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CUBA - LATIN AMERICA
During the past year six countries in the hemi-
sphere have established or restored ties with Havana.
Others seem likely to act soon.
Many Latin American leaders--faced with a ris-
ing tide of nationalism--have become convinced that
US Government and private interests in the hemisphere
are somehow incompatible with their own overriding
goals--economic development and "independence."
There has been a broad transformation since the mid-
1960s in Latin American attitudes toward the US and
the rest of the world, involving a shift toward far
less concern over any external threat to hemispheric
security.
The Castro regime has not merely been a passive
beneficiary of this thinking, but since the late
1960s has sought eagerly to strengthen it. The
shift in tactics was prompted by the repeated fail-
ures of Cuba's subversion policy, mounting economic
difficulties, and Soviet pressure. In mid-1968,
Havana began to reduce its tangible support to Latin
American revolutionary groups and initiated a concen-
trated effort to normalize relations with selected
governments in the hemisphere. Castro and other
Cuban leaders toned down their revolutionary rheto-
ric. Havana pursued low-level contacts--athletic,
cultural, and technical exchanges. Cuba's efforts
to improve its image included earthquake relief to
Peru, Chile, and Nicaragua.
Cuba gives lip service to Latin American de-
mands for revision of the Law of the Sea, but in
carefully worded generalizations that minimize con-
flict with the pogition of its chief ally, the USSR.
Castro has also voiced substantial support for the
right of the English-speaking Caribbean states to
participate fully in inter-American affairs. In
these and other problems, he is encouraging the con-
cept of hemispheric unity in dealing with the US.
The Cuban effort began to bear fruit in 1970
when Chile's Allende re-established diplomatic rela-
tions. Chile thus joined Mexico, which had never
broken ties with Cuba. In the last 12 months, Argen-
tina, Barbados, Peru, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago and
Guyana established or restored relations.
Cuba's success in reducing its isolation stems
in large part from the fact that many Latin American
governments see normalizing relations with Havana
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as a relatively "safe" way to demonstrate "independ-
ence" of the US. Faced with the domestic pressures'
of fervent nationalistic emotions, many governments -
see such an image as a virtual necessity.
Some governments, such as Peru, Argentina, and
Venezuela, apparently feel that by obtaining Castro's
revolutionary endorsement, they undercut leftist op-
position groups and cause the termination or at least
curtailment of Cuban support to local guerrilla or-
ganizations.
Others have sought improved ties with Havana to
gain Cuban support for cherished foreign policy po-
sitions, particularly those involving actual or an-
ticipated US opposition. Latin Americans have ob-
tained Cuban backing on a number of issues, including
demands for sovereignty over natural resources and
removal of restrictive US trade barriers and "coer-
cive" economic measures. Panama's Torrijos has from
time to time toyed with the thought of trying to
use Cuban backing for his canal aspirations in an
effort to get concessions from the US.
Some governments also view Cuba as a potential
customer. Cuba imported goods worth approximately
$10 million from Mexico in 1972 and recently signed
a $29-million contract with Peru for 110 fishing
boats. Trade with Chile is continuing, Argentina
proposes to sell corn to Cuba, and Venezuela has
announced that talks on the sale of petroleum to
Cuba are under way.
Finally, many Latin Americans are convinced
that efforts to isolate the Castro government have
succeeded only in tightening the Soviet grip on
Cuba. Many governments believe that the OAS sanc-
tions policy cannot last much longer and wish to
avoid being the last to join the anti-sanctions band-
wagon. There is also a lingering suspicion that the
US may act unilaterally to reverse its own Cuba pol-
icy, thus embarrassing those governments that adhered
faithfully to the sanctions.
Cuba's reintegration into the hemisphere will
probably continue at its present gradual pace.
Venezuela and perhaps Panama are likely in the near
future to restore formal relations. Others are ex-
pected eventually to fall in line. In any case,
support for the OAS sanctions will continue to de-
cline. The two-thirds majority required to lift
the sanctions probably cannot be mustered this year
but the anti-sanction forces need only one or two
more votes to achieve the "moral victory" of an ab-
solute majority.
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