PRESS REPORTING ON LAM SON 719

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 3, 1971
• Content Type: CABLE

REF: A. WHSw1007.
SECTION ONE OF TWA SI Af/u p r'i F.+
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7 ..--'''a "
SENSITIVE 031115E MAR 71 VIA CAS CHANNELS
THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY HENRY A. KISSINGER
1) - THE PRINCIPAL' OBJECTIVE IS TO "MISE AU POINT" THE PROBLEM
OF WAR; NEWS, ESPECIALLY THAT CONCERNING THE BATTLEFIELD IN LAOS,
'IN WHICH THE PRINCIPAL INVOLVEMENT IS BY-THE RVNAF. THIS IS THE
BATTLEFIELD WHERE,THE SUCCESS OF WHAT. IS CALLED "THE VIETNA IIZATION .
PROGRAM" WILL'.BE DETERMINED (WE CALL IT THE SECURITY RESTORATION
PROGRAM, LEADING TO SELF-RELIANCE, SELF-MANAGEMENT AND SELF-
IMPROVEMENT)*' THIS 'PROGRAM IS BASED ON DAILY PROGRESS IN ORDER
2) THE CAMBODIAN VICITORY WAS HAILED AS (ONLY) A HALF-WAY
SUCCESS FOR US BECAUSE CF 'THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY AND BECAUSE IT. WAS ?. NOT 100 PER CE NT OUR JOB. NOW9 EVERYONE'
IS LOOKING CLOSELY AT THE LAO BATTLEFIELD BECAUSE (ACTIVITY THERE)
WAS INITIATED BY US. ,.THEY WILL BE EVALUATING US, LOOKING TO SEE.
WHETHER OR NOT-WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COMPLETELY CONTROL THE
BATTLEFIELD. THEY CONSIST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, THE PACIFISTS
IN THE U.S. AND THE NOISY AND PERFIDIOUS COMMUNISTS. THUS, THE
LAO BATTLEFIELD IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE CAMBODIAN BATTLEFIELD,
OR EVEN THE INTERNAL BATTLEFIELD, AND WE MUST MAKE GREATER
EFFORTS IN ALL AREAS. WE MUST MAKE GREATER EFFORTS PAV ICULARLY. `
IN THE AREA OF WAR NEWS. THE PROBLEM OF "AUTO-CRITIQUE!' MUST
BE CORRECCTED.
3) - FACTS CONCERNING ABOUT '30 ' OR 40 U.S.. WAR. rORRESPONDENTS Now
AT KHE SANH. THE U.S. ARMY DOES NOT ALLOW THEM TO VISIT THE
BATTLEFIELD. NOR DO, WE ALLOW THEM TO GO. WHILE THEY NEED TO FIND
NEWS TO SELL PAPERS, THEY DON'T HAVE NEWS BUT MUST STAY BEHIND
MANY DAYS. SOME OF THEM DO NOT HAVE FOOD AND GRAB THE RATIONS
OF-OUR COMBATANTS. 'THESE CORRESPONDENTS ARE "REPRESENTATIVES"
OF. BOTH THE "HAWKS* -AND THE "DOVES" IN THE U.S.
BECAUSE THEY ARE UNABLE TO GO ANYWHERE, THEY ARE READY TO
PRINT ANYTHING THEY HEAR. THEY PLACE THEIR HOPES IN THE
SPOKESMEN OF THE DBATTLEFTELD HEADQUARTERS, BUT THESE SPOKESMEN
ARE TOO WEAK. FOR THAT REASON, THEY PICK UP NEWS FROM ANYONE
AND SOMETIMES FROM U.S. HELICOPTER PILOTS. WHEN THESE PILOTS
SEE THAT WE HAVE SUFFERED 10 DEAD O THEY SAY THAT THERE WERE MANY
?DEAD; WHEN THEY RECEIVE ENEMY GROUND FIRE, THEY CALL IT INTENSE.
B. WHS-1008
SUBJECT:. PRESS REPORTING ON LAM SON 719
FOLLOWING IS--A FREE TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM DRAWN FROM A SAL
GIVEN BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO GVN SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICERS
TO.ADVANCE TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY..
THOSE ARE THE L'0C #L j Q8LEm_S.? .. .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7
 wa:a.al~/yLy 'wpn ~+ .ia iif~i`tUwGU i. t -icu r~t~ra.. yr uc.rENSE,
HE',JGS, THE MINISTRY"TF INFORMATION. AND THE PREMIER'S OFFTCE.
FOR THAT REASON! THERE HAVE BEEN DISCREPANCIES, ESPECIALLY WITH
REGARD TO NUMBERS..,WITH SOME SAYING `600. OTHERS 900. AND ST TLL
OTHERS 2,,000.' THAT FACT PROVES THAT THERE IS NO UNITY WITH
'REGARD TO NUMBERS. EACH AGENCY GIVES OUR DIFFERENT FIGURES.
. THE GREATEST PROBLEM IS THAT, INFORMATION DISSEMINATES OLD
NEWS. WE DO NOT YET HAVE (PROPER) INFORMATIOrN TECHNIQUES.
WE MUST FIRMLY GRASP THIS. TECHNIQUE IN ORDER TO AVOID TRYINd TO
TURN DEFEAT INTO VICTORY. IF WE DO- NOT MASTER THIS TECHNIQUE,
WE- MAY FIND OURSELVES IN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ,PRESS
ATTACKING US, RUNNING THE HEADLINE "WITHOUT THE U.S. VIETNAMESE
MILITARY STRATEGY WOULD FAIL". THE PRESS DOES NOT CLEARLY
UNDERSTAND THAT FIGHTING IN LAOSIIS LIKE. FIGHTING NORTH VIET-NAM
ITSELF, NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN .FORCE INFANTRY. THAT'S NOT TO
;.MENTION WEATHER, THE FACT THAT. THE ENEMY HAS 4 OR 5 DIVISIONS
NEARBY 'AND MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY THAN AT' DIENHIENPHU.
5) PRIOR TO THIS; IN 1970, WE FOUGHT THE ENEMY IN CAMBODIA, IN
APRIL AND MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ATTACK *MRS OR - R4 I N
;LAY, JUNE,. aR JULY, 'A.S HE HAD PLANNED, ' AND WE WERE VICTORIOUS.
THE NEW LAOS BATTLEFIELD IS THE DECISIVE BATTLEFIELD OF THE
WAR (BATILLE DECISIVE D,'UNE GUERRE). THIS IS A WAR CARRIED
BEYOND OUR TERRITORY IN ORDER TO FIGHT.,THE ENEMY OUTSIDE THE.
UU5L AND BAKE I.T..JPPOSSIBLE FOR. HIM TO ENTER. THE HOUSE. SO 'WE
IUSDONNE.RON? THE LAO, BATTLEFIELD.
DEFINITIVE 'CONMENTAIRE
THE PRESIDEKT
-THE PRIME.; MINISTER `.,.. "
ON THE WAR COME ONLY.FROM
THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
THE j-'NT GENERAL STAFF ; ;`'
F' THE' QUESTION- IS. ASKED: WHY DO WE CARRY THE WAR TO LAOS?
.SUCH QUESTIONS CAN ANSWERED ONLY. BY RESIPONSIBLE OFFTCT-A1.5
7) - 'THE PROBLEM OF DAILY WAR NEWS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
R'f GE9ERAL POLITICA WARFARE DIRECTORATE., BUT THE GPWD MUST,TELEPHONE
MILITARY REGION 1. THIS PRIVIDES UNITY. GENERAL LAN CALLS ME
.EVERY DAY TO INFORM OF THE WAR NEWS BECAUSE I VERY MUCH WANT TO
. KNOW THAT NEWS.' WITH -REGARD TO ENEMY CASUALTIES AND OUR OWN
BOTH YESTERDAY"S AND TODAY'S ARE TO BE COMBINED. IN ANNOUNCING
7
PRIMARY NEWS, FOR EXAMPLE: THE ENEMY SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES.
IF WE HAVE` CASUALTIES, THEN SAY: WE SUFFERED CASUALTIES BUT THE
ENEMY'S CASUALTIES' WERE 5 TO 7 TIMES GREATER. W. MUST. ".CAREFULLY
PREPARE" THE NUMBERS. DO NOT ANSWER THAT OUR CASUALTIES ARE NOT
YET COMPLETELY KNOWN. IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE SUCH COMPARISONS
AS ONE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FOR EVERY 10 ENEMY CASUALTIES ON A
'MINIMUM BASIS. ~ FIND ' PROOF' OF THAT RATIO ONE OR TWO DAYS LATER.
REMEMBER THAT NO :"BATTLEFIELD ? PRODUCES EXACT BODY COUNTS. ONLY
THE GPWD DISSEMINATES OFFICIAL FIGURES,
;8( - THE TECHNIQUE OF PROVIDING WAR NEWS NECESSITATES AFFIRMING
EVERYTHING WE HAVE SAID TO BE LHE TRUTH. WE HAVE A GREATER
CAPABILITY TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY THAN DOES THE PRESS.' GPWD IS
PvcpnNSIBLE.. (FOR DISSEMINATING! NEWS) TO BOTH THE FOREIGN AND
1 UP SECRET SENSITIVE
LIC PRESS AND MUST THEREFORE DISSEMINATE ACCURATE FIGURES.
,THE TECHNIQUE OF DISSEMINATING WAR NEWS.
 No Objection
FINAL SECTION OF TWO,,.
T 0 P S E C. R
ca.
E T SENSITIVE 0311152 MAR 71 VIA CAS CXANNELS-',;
r r-
FROM. AMBASSADOR_BUNKER, SAIGON 0340
NEWS DURING OPERATIONS
THE CAMBODIAN .BATTLEFIELD: "TO DATE THE
. ENEMY `HAS SUFFERED 19,9000 CASUALTIES," (FOR INSTANCE)*
IT IS,NECESSARY'TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE ERRORS ARE IN?
ORDER TO CORRECT THEM IMMEDIATELY..
WE NOW HAVE A FREE PRESS. BUT WE MUST KNOW WHO ARE OUR
FRIENDS, OUR ENEMIES AND THE "NEUTRE." REMEMBER THAT REPORTERS.'
LIKE TO "CONFUSE" SPOKESMEN WHO GIVE OUT' IMAGINARY NUMBERS IN
ORDER TO EMBARRASS THEM., PERHAPS TODAY WE GIVE OUT IMPRECISE,
NUMBERS, BUT TOMORROW WE WILL GIVE OUT PRECISE NUMBERS BECAUSE
WE WILL-KNOW MORE.,, PERHAPS GREATER CR THE SAME.
THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY IENRY A. KISSINGER
'9) THE MINISTER . OF DEFENSE AND. THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF MUST
"CLEAR" WAR NEWS WITH GENERAL LAM. WE NEED TO HAVE SUmE UP- UUH
PEOPLE OUTSIDE IN ORDER TO ASSIST HEADQUARTERS SPOKESMEN BECAUSE
MILITARY REGION I 'DOES NOT HAVE FOREIGN-LANGUAGE QUALIFIED
PERSONNEL'AND THUS CANNOT "HANDLE"-WAR NEWS. WHEN PEOPLE ARE
"ACCREDITS" TO THE BATTLEFIELD. HEADQUARTERS, WE NEED NOT FEAR.
THAT THEY WILL ATTACK US; ON THE CONTRARY, WE MUST SPEAK
FORCEFULLY TO RECTIFY THE ERRORS CAUSED BY'MISTAKES IN THE PRESS.
WE SHOULD NOT BE WEAK-WILLED. WE 'MUST "ELUDE" THEM.,
10) - THE PROBLEM OF WAR NEWS ABROAD. THE NJREIGN MINISTRY SHOULD
PROVIDE TIMELY AND ADEQUATE REPORTS TO AMBASSADOR LAM AND
AMBASSADOR BUI__DJEM ON THE BATTLEFIELD SITUATION..IN LAOS. AND
CAMBODIA. PRIORITY IS RESERVED FOR THESE. TWO PLACES. OTHER
PLACES ARE LESS (IMPORTANT)
BUT ~IT IS NECESSARY TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE, "PARLER, LE
LANGAGE UNIQUE." "DON'T ' BE LIKE THE AMBASSADOR AND THE MILITARY
ATTACHE IN "ERITAINt
IT'IS NECESSARY TO FOLLOW THE "VERSION OFFICIELLES".
"COMMENTAIRE POLITIQUE" SHOULD NOT BE MADE. DO NOT CONTRADICT
SAID~-. REPEAT YOURSELF. WHEN EVERYONE IS SAYING.
WHAT HAS PEEN
.
THE SAME THIN(3' TOEN THE TRUTH' HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED. YOU SHOULD
NOT .SPEAK AS A MILITARY SPOKESMEN RECENTLY DID ON 22 FEBRUARY: "THE'',-
V--
HAS KILLED 600 ENEMY SOLDIERS AND "DESORGANISE" 2 REGIMENTS OF THE
ENEMY'S, 312TH DIVISION.. WHICH PARTICIPATED I N THE BATTLE
w? A,. DIENL No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7
JW(1ti'11it' :) Jlw . w
 ,YDU No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7
w F'4
IS NECESSARY TO OYE CLEV R: IF WE CANNOT FIGHT HERE, WE IGHT
E
TRI
K
SOMEPLACE ELSE; IF WE CANNOT STRIKE DIRECTLY, THEN S
DIn OVALLY.
IT IS NECESSARY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE ABOVE WORDS
11) - VN PRESS SHOULD NOT. SEND CORRESPONDENTS TO QUANG TRI
BECAUSE THESE CORRESPONDENTS KNOW NOTHING AND WRITE ERRONEOUSLY.
FROM NOW ON, V N PRESS WILL NOT HAVE CORRESPORUEN13 ON THE
BATTLEFIELD AND WILL ONLY USE THE GPWD "VERSION" WHICH REFLECTS
GOVERNMENT-ISSUED NEWS AND OFFICIAL FIGURES. r
12) NOR. CAN THE MINISTRY OF INFORNATI~N SAY, ANYTHING OTHER
T THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID REGARDING Ni t4BERS. ONCE THE
H
A
THAN W
TIONS HAVE SAID SOMETHING, THEY MUST CONTINUE TO SAY
RADIO STA
NG THE SAME' APPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT, THE PREMIER,
TH
I
THE SAME
. DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WE MUST FOLLOW THE OFFICIAL FIGURES
AND THE "COMMENTAIRE" OF THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION..
13) WITH 'REGARD TO WAR NEWS,. GPWD MUST CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN THESE BATTLEFIELDS:
THE INTERNAL'BATTLEFIELD
THE CAMBODI.ANDBATTLEFIELD
- THE LAU BAi TLLr ILL1.-- _
M to THE PAST 24 HOURS AND UNIFY OFFICIAL FIGURES.
... DAY
E C
SU
OR RE USE
IT IS NECESSARY TO SPEAK CONTINUOUSLY. I WE ,REST
IT TAKES TIME TO
"
TION
"
.
SPECULA
SPEAK, THEN THEY WILL ENGAGE 1w
__ _ ..- nnnnr. nrTnAt MFICT BE MAnP OF
IAT
ION
L
. +........
-
AT
CLEAR Ur SrECU
GROUNDLESS AND UNRELIABLE NEWS ISSUED 13Y NEWS AGENCIES. WE MUST
ENTHUSIASTICALLY WELCOMING THE VICTORIES ON T H E LAO BAT LE-
ORTEN THE WAR
.
FIELD THIS IS GREAT STRATEGIrM TO SH
14) -1 THE TELEVISION STATION FILMED MANY REPORTS FROM THE BATTLE-.
_ ___ .....we.'r.en
M f AfIC III T MV PT)
FRO
U
OD
A
"L
I
, ,.
r ILLD i N CAPMB
TO DISSEMINATE MANY'PICTURES. WE NEED TO DISSEMINATE MANY BASIC
-r.nv t+TV it AT TnM 02111 I.1ntltJvT
S ON
C
UTai.N?F
ZACKGROUND uV
"DEVOILER" MILITARY SECRETS. FOR EXAMPLE, DON'T ANSWER QUESTIONS
LIKE: WHERE WILL ,YOU FIGHT NEXT? HOW MUCH LONGER? SAY THAT YOU
.DON'T KNOW. YOU .MUST FOLLOW OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS: IT IS A
SPECIAL OPERATION ALONG THE VIET-NAM-LAOS BORDER,- LIMITED IN AREA
AND DURATION, AND IS AIMED AT CUTTING THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AND
THE ENEMY'S OIL PIPELINES. THAT OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
CENTRAL
C
T
A
K
AND THE ENEMY DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO AT
VIET-NAM. HE IS CONFUSED AND AFRAID BECAUSE HE-wILL BE RUNNING
"
"
SELF-CONSUMING.
OUT OF FOOD FOLLOWING A. PERIOD OF
WE NEED TO "CANALISER" AND "ENBRIGADER" THE CORRESPONDENTS
ON THE LAO BATTLEFIELD. ORGANIZE OFFICERS TO GUIDE 4 OR 5
REPORTERS TO. INSPECT OUR VICTORIES.
SUGGESTIONS FROM..THE' MINISTRY: OF DEFENSE:
THE G'EIiERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DIRECTORATE NEEDS WAR NEWS
BY 5 O'CLOCK FOR THE 60' CLOCK AND 10 Q' CLOCK BROADCASTS OF VTVN,
AND FOR EXPLOITATION AND COMMENT BY RADIO SAIGON AND ARMY RADIO.
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FbREIGN AFFAIRS: WELL-
_- ~
Y I No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/1-7_: L_OC-HAK-490-3-16-7 ~,~~~.
 TH>! 1""AMROftA141n1"1A'1"1'f rt'i'?r1 tw
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7
RES
EACH DA UN UP PAST 94 HD1t12 AND UNIFY FTOTA1 E'71?~
U
IS NE
E
R
S
i.
.
S
A
AV. SPEAK CON1INUO13SLY. IF WE REST OR REFUSE TO.
SPEAK
TH
,
EN THEY-. WILL ENGAGE IN "SPECULATION." IT TAKEN TIME TO
CLEAR UP "SPECULATION". IsMINEDIATE CORRECTION MOST BE MADE OF
GROUNDLESS AND UNRELIABLE NEWS ISSUED AY NEWS AGEfN1CTES - WE M
ST
U
CON
mar.
IDE N ? nAT .OUR, NEWS IS ACCURATE.
THERE SHOULD' BE NO FEELING OF DEFEAT WH,ILXHE PEOPLE ARE
C i'f'tff/nr.r\w?,"w.. ? ., .aw. ~. .. .. .,. __._. e__- --
FIELD. THIS IS A GREAT STRATEGEM TO SHORTEN THE WAR.
14)'-. THE TELEVISION STATION FILMED MANY REPORTS FROM THE B
T
-
A
TLE
.
FIELD 'IN CAMBODIA,. BUT WE'VE SEEN NOTHING FROM LAOS
WE NEED'
.
TO DISSEMINATE MANY PICTURES. WE NEED T0' DISSEMINATE MANY BASIC
AR SI
U
-- -
I
N
- --_,.._
+
O
" "
A.
, 1.rULW!/V17 1
DEVOILER MILITARY SECRETS. FOR EXAMPLE, DON'T ANSWER QUESTIONS Z TY1". ? WHERE IJT1 i
t!rnerw~ .. r...... .-. ....._ _ _ ___~- _
.YOU
O
SAY
??,,,/.,..? .r
..... A..r.?
A11A A IOU
DON'T KNOW. YOU MUST FOLLOW OFFICIAL PRONOu NCEMENTS: TT TS A
SPECIAL OPERATION ALONG THE VIET-NAM-LAOS BORDFR_,- LIMITED TNN AREA
THE E,NEP3Y -.S OIL PIPELINES. THAT O3JECTIVE, HAS BEEN' ACCOMPLISHED
AND THE ENEM
O
?
Y D
ES
NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO ATTACK CENTRAL
VTET-N
M
A
. HE IS CONFUSED AND AFRAID EECAUSEI HE WILL, BE RUNNING
O
UT OF FOOD FOLLOWING A PERIOD. OF "SELF-CONSUMING."
WE NEED TO "CANALISER."? AND "ENBRTOADER" THE CORRESPONDENTS
,ON, l Hr. LAO BA TLEFIELD. . ORGANIZE OFFICERS TO GUIDE 4 OR 5
REPORTERS TO IH$PECT. OUR, VICTORIES.
SUGGESTIONS ..FROM THE-' MINISTRY'' QF DEFENSE:'
'BY ' 5 O'CLOCK FOR THE 60' CLOCK AND 10 O'CLOCK BROADCASTS OF VTVN,
Al D OR EXPI
O
T
t
,
I
AT O
4 .AND COMMENT BY RADIO SAIGON AND ARMY RADIO.
SUGGESTIONS` FROM ',THE MNISTRY OF FbREIGN AFFATRSs
IN. ADDITION TO OFFICIAL FIGURES.' WE NEED REPORTS FROM ~.,Er L
KNO
R
WN
EPORTERS BECAUSE THE REPORTS OF THESE REPORTERS ARE MORE
ACCEPTABLE ABROAD THAN OFFICIALLY RELEASED FIGURES.,
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MOI AND GPWD:
REQUE Z THE MRI B DIRECTED TO PROVIDE COMPLETE AND
ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE LAO BATTLEFIELD TO CENTRAL OPERATIONS
FOR'. EXPLOITATIONLBY GPWD. IN THEORY IT IS THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE, ;BUT IN ACTUALITY, IT IS THE RESPONSIBIL.~TY OF T.HE GPWD TO
PROVIDE WAR NEWS BECAUSE THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS APPOINTED
GPWD AS ITS OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN. GPWD WTWV SEND SOMEONE Ti) MOT TO
IRL DIRECTIVES. OF THE PRESIDENT.
WHEN DISPATCHING MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE TWR IN
LAOS, MRI JS DIRECTED JO FORWARD IHESE TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/17: LOC-HAK-490-3-16-7