SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN WEST BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-1-30-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 20, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

, NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-15-1-30-0
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MEMORANDUM
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
NATIONAL SECURITY. C
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSI
FROM:
?
GENT INFORMATION
y 20, 1971
Helmut SeCnnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin
This memo follows up our brief talk in San Clemente on the issue of a
Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin.
MORI C03317429
Why do the Soviets want this? In practical terms, they do not need such an
office. Members of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin are able to move
freely in and out of West Berlin, with no obstacles apart from those of
their own making. Conversely, West Berliners desiring Soviet consular
services could travel to the Embassy in East Berlin were it not or obstacles
placed by the East ? and which in any event should disappear once the Four
Power agreement comes into force.
Therefore, one must conclude that there is no practical reason or motive
for the Soviets to insist on establishing an independent official representation
in West Berlin. Supporting that conclusion, is the fact that the Soviets have
not indicated at all that they would even consider lesser levels of represen-
tation (such as a consulate or the use of consular agents) which might have
been more appropriate in relation to the amount of genuine consular work
involved. The Soviets have insisted on the fullest possible representation,
a Consulate General.
From the Soviet viewpoint, the establishment of a Consulate General in West
Berlin will permit them to:
-- further their theory (and the G)DR's) that West Berlin is an indepen-
dent political entity totally separate from East Berlin;
? expand and facilitate Soviet influence over all aspects of life in West
Berlin; and
SECRET
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I.
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tEr
?create for t elves a continulat WestBerlin hasir (four
statue) for their ail German rights in lieu of the Gieet.c riLn basis
they heve renounced.
What are the rielts for se Aside iron, the fniflflrnest of the go rat s7vat
objectives noted above, the tellies would be put in the position of tacitly
admitting that they have no role in Last Baritz*. eerious doubt would be east
on the continued vitality of the our Power status for ail of iserlin, .e.tetag
with this 4.-osztes the ieereased risk that the Eoviete, once so officially
establietied in West Berlin would accede to Glele pressure to tad the residual
hkilied presence in Last Berlin ft.*., official access and military patrols)
which is highly enibarassing to the Gait,
iinVinS gained an official establishment such as this in West Beriire the
eovlets wusId heve achieved a tactical advantage in say subsequent disputes
and eon's-et:dials with the Allies, Inevitebly, the eoviete will seek to
**peed their attivities into an establishment impressive enough to support
their eventual role as a Fourth OeCiapying Power, At some paint, the s
would feel Lorene to draw the ;tee and will with to prevent this sort of
ereelon. 13ut the Allies will have to take Into aecount that the fesviets right
barge violation of the roue t-'ower Agreement and threaten a eoteeter-breee4h
of the Agreement as a whole. Particularly e.itb the pieesure the Allies
would feel from the Ce-rmans. there is little likelihood that the Allies wout4
run that risk, (it is net inconeeivable that the 6ovlots might attempt to later -
fere with A stied -- not German traffic as a counter to ..11ied attempts to
curtail their expiesioe in West Berlin. )
As I aireay mentioned to you, there is also the question of how this soviet
adevirice (whoa added to other le esters oncessiesti and the only martinet
practical benefits of likst Agrees-teat) would be read by the Berliner*, it is
entirely possible that there will be considerable public dissatisfaction to the
extent that as Agreement would not be ecceetable. The questioe S.oviet
presence
is 'nest Berlin is already reeeiving great Intereet in Berlin. The
1;71 chairman, Peter Loretta, on July IS b*rged'MAW it" y that eventually
the three Allies would be leduced into handling current est Berlia affairs
through the Consulate, sed the 0111C0121411 would be a )(tint administration, of
'West Berlin by all rolir Powers. if this line gains great currency. it will
quite possibly affect choices of lavesbeient1 relecatien, ete.* and may even
revive for matey Berliner* the sense of physical danger and insecurity which
wes so real in the immediate poet-war days. This nr111 ni,;.t assist in mdl*-
taming the eisileility of West Berlin.
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25X1
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tenc to wkon. a s rite4 ttAi the past several
osed to the kdQaa a Ctivatc General., though
onr atiar8 So1et ,oreeence was setab1a if the Three
so inclined. Then the FRG made a svdtb. Bahr and hi* col.
leagues be arguing that indeed, the existence of a.,.....onsulate w,rJuid enhance
the Nilled theory beeause it would be clear that the f-3viets had a consulate
just as did the Greeks. for example. making ,clear,...-r that the Three Powers
were serkrerne. This sort of argument is an exercise in ctuestion-begging.
for the Greeks (4r any other non-FT:41X Power) catindt be equated *ith the
oviet* in tbie situation.
It may be useful to look briery at the question 4 wider vht1 aus)ices the
?sulate Cameral would be ,reated (assuming in sit there would be
accreditation to the Three Comistaadants). Lf the -:ns U. late were -zosne--ted
with the Soviet Embassy in test a would clearly a ripe?ar (utidgr A Illed
tho.ory) to be a lecal arm of the =',oviet goveraing authority in ;4=iiiit tier
its similarity to the Allied toissions in West Berlin. and its g*I ,:onriev:tion
with th letLtribassy, would make it triort diffLult for the A lASI to & riplt
that the area f anpliabitity 41 the Four Power status had not been reduced
to West Berlis.
AlOrnatIvely, the%.;onsniskte General %:ouid be subordinateto the ,Soviet
Embassy In BO** lhati would operate under the auspices of the,
c:onsular ,Z;onveatio* which wouiet be exteaded to Berits. it can be argued
that thie ii,pproach would still entail damage to our legai theory bezaut,e
B*rtia (for zAirpOlf** of the owentton and the scope the ,-,:onsulate's
yurisdietton) would he sobstantially distinguishable from Last 1q-tin and to
that natant undercut our iM to continued Four Power status for ail
of Berlin, N. ',travel/tag. this relatively slight diaadvantage would by *fislvt
greatly rltri-130lee in this
For a iSbrisulate to be established cootie ted with neither the z*oviet lltArtbasey
In Last J3.tiii nor with the !--oviet Zmbassy in Bonn (and under the Consular
-;onvontion) the effect +nook) be the moat serious The West would have
aece,ted a liscrimtaation undorc,uttiAg the Four P er *tato* concept witiwut
any resible courstr-argim-tents against the'.4.:.,evtet three-state theory.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-15-1-30-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-15-1-30-0
?
Th 't ?oxi the ng havebeet the roast
rat issuef eviet presence u at B--r?in (most
sting Lexie* is locate? in the British3iir). Their -,resent
Positionthat ey leave severe, doubt* but * L:oneiliste General, but
they vvotaid lac* wish tctiik it if it were the only thing standing in the way
at 44 satisfactory Berlin agrearrient; this concession shoirld nat rott4e until
ftaal stage of tht negotiatinn*, and only it the major iseues rtf It ester's
oisc?ra had first been resolved. The French have **natty been ambiguous
25X1 this, though lately they g; eil-ro to have sided with the Germans accepting
the orepotial. te conversation on July 9 Ambassador ativagoargues
told ibettiiirrirtv ft ot hostile in pti*de ta the open g
(Th?
Of the neg4tte Oa, in vehich the Ctiorausta s
of jive
d by
&isv ets to the isarie el Vii.G representation of est lieritet in
any event, the FRG is now very trittell itk favor Of ,a,,:kZ.Htliagt '....012$111,4144,0 nut
refuses to af:40 f.,kotittt trade lrit*tort which, the Gortriacts argue curiously,
would bolster the oviet argunient that at fiorlin nee *a independent Political
entity.
1,*
*
t?gp $;'?iP
in rdies to det;reatee *Ay tAtp1iatias an esycntrtietri I lrease in od
r": C sitin West lett-lin vireu;ai affect the city's state*. the 1;;5, had proposed
(with less than tUgusto) the establishment in liAitt .rin of a US cuituraL
center (tict,:redited to the zi:.oviet0). The t:leviets have in effect said no (it alto 4
ac4r*ditvd to the 00it e,iiritetry of C;ultural Affairs, said the 4-,ovieta), Saftt
.r.5142,r aims have toad's *t clear they do not want t raisin this possibility again
for fear of ,jeopardising the negotiatients. mbassedor Rab has recommended
that we, drop the idea complete;y.
The ,Alior rnetliod have been erripioying t *duce,the 4:a ot
desist pirliKe has been to lasist (la accorilanceLt
a :twit f5,?ovist expansion (inciodinautate Gensrel,
after ea Agreement s ktaci4 is actually being
this timtng point further, :;:tate! has been *eeking clear
that the Attlee woYal4 stat.puoik'ally at the signet:ire of er1in A sr /tern eat
that, 'erste from it, th stero item igterid toLhiriz specified
crosses in l,oviet activitte ring the year following the eignature a the Fleet
Protocol. At the :Jot,tk mettin,g, Abrasistinv professed an inability to under
stand by the arrangesnentefr tht increased Soviet 3:Vence Zanaat b nri:ind
in the tett a the 1,,greettient, or at * mitriimarn, ia an tigr,4ed. Four rower
etatemerit issued at the patron time,
fib":11c
f7,,F en:1V.!
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