CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02014435
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 7, 1951

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7 August 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
SOUTH ASIA
NEAR EAST AFRICA
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4. French Foreign Office now opposes removal of Moroccan Sultan (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Yugoslav Government opposes revision of Italian Peace Treaty (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Italian Government reluctant to face Trieste elections (page 6)�
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SOUTH ASIA
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
French Foreign Office now opposes removal of Moroccan Sultan: 3.3(h)(2)
According to a French Foreign Office official, the
external disadvantages arising from a deposition
of the Sultan now seem to outweigh the internal
advantages, and the situation will be allowed to
rest inthe hope that the Sultan will eventually give in to the French on a
majority of points at issue.
Internally, the Sultan is blocking the French re-
form program. Because he has lost nearly all tribal support and his following
is located chiefly in the cities, the French believe that a suitable replacement
could be chosen and installed without serious disturbances. The international
repercussions of such a move, however, would be serious. French motives
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ttraior
would be misrepresented by the Arab League, which might be supported
by Asian nations and, if the issue reached the UN, by Latin American
nations as well.
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Comment: The Foreign Office estimate of the
internal Moroccan situation is not supported by reports from, Morocco.
The Sultan's intransigence in refusing to permit
the French to impinge further upon his sovereignty has solidified the 'admira-
tion and support of the majority of educated and politically conscious Mo-
roccans, despite the traditional French program of pitting one faction against
the other in order to keep the upper. hand.
The pressure from French property interests in
Morocco, as well as the disinclination in conservative French circles to
permit greater autonomy, will work against any moderation of French For-
eign Office policy in Morocco, no matter who may succeed Juin as Resident
General when he assumes his SHAPE command.
EASTERN EUROPE
5, Yugoslav Government opposes revision of Italian Peace Treaty:
3.3(h)(2)
According to Assistant Foreign Minister Mates,
the Yugoslav Government opposes a revision of
the Italian Peace Treaty because it believes that
Italy may be more interested in obtaining terri-
torial concessions through such revision than in amending the military pro-
visions. Mates says that the Italian Foreign Office has sent a circular tele-
gram to its foreign missions emphasizing the question of territorial
concessions.
According to Mates, the Yugoslav Government
believes that Italy and Yugoslavia should attempt to negotiate a bilateral
settlement on Trieste and other outstanding issues. The Yugoslav Govern-
ment might then inform the NATO countries that it had no objection to a
revision of the peace treaty's military provisions. It would ask these coun-
tries, however, to consider the effect of any increase in the Italian mili tary
establishment on Yugoslavia's position vis-a-vis the Cominform.
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Comment: Yugoslav officials have previously
opposed revision of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty on
the grounds that such a revision would provide the USSR with an opportunity
to justify the Satellites' military build-up in violation of their peace treaties.
Mates' remarks, however, offer further indication that Yugoslavia's oppo-
sition is based primarily,on the fear that an increase ml Italian military
strength would improve Italy's ability to press its claims for the return of
all the Free Territory of Trieste.
WESTERN' EUROPE
,Italian Government reluctant to face Trieste elections:
3.3(h)(2)
The Italian Embassy in London has made an oral
approach to the British Foreign Office with re-
gard to postponing the Trieste local elections,
now scheduled for 7 October. The preliminary
view of the British is that the elections should
not be postponed.
At the same time, Premier De Gasperi has been
urging the US Ambassador in Rome that the
elections should be postponed for at least six
months, preferably a yeal; unless certain electo-
ral provisions favoring Italy are introduced.
De Gasperi said that because of resurgent national feeling the Italian Govern-
ment "could not stand by without injecting itself" into the Trieste elections,
which activity "would not be helpful in the relations with Yugoslavia."
Furthermore, the Trieste campaign would have a bad effect on the coming
municipal elections in Italy. The Cabinet has tentatively decided to postpone
the latter until "the conclusion of the (national) census, which will be ini-
tiated in early November.
Comment: There have been previous reports
that the Italian Government may postpone the series of local elections rather
than face a loss of prestige for the Christian Democrats, such as occurred
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in the spring voting. Suggestions for postponement of the Trieste elections
show a similar concern. The Italian Government may also be concerned
over apparently growing sentiment in Trieste favoring independence of the
area, a movement supported locally by both Italian Communists and a small
group of Slovene parties.
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6 August 1951
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Office of Current Intelligence
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Activities and thethoti'Cor�Fiv- or.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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