G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: NIE

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G-2 COI TRISilTIOI TO NtE-41: PRO3A E Dpi 1 OP ' 8
IN THE DISPUTE TO THE 321D OF 1951
de 1
In October 1947, following a wide-spread internal revolt and an
invasion by Pakistan tribeamen, Maharaja Hari Sigh, the Hindu ruler
of Ja t and Kashmir, acceded the Princely state to India, and
simultaneously appealed to India for military assistance. Indian try
were flown idiately into the area and began operations to restore
order. Later Pakistan sent its regular arzap unite into Western Eae it
and soon the forces of India ' and Pakistan were engaged in an undeclared
war, which was confined solely to the state of razhmir. Piiting
continued until January 19+9, at which time the United Hationa succeeded
in arranging a Cease-Fire Agreement. The two forces continued to occupy
the areas they held at the time of the cease fire. This Save India
the most important part of aehmir, including the Valle, while Pakistan
occupied that area known as "Azad (Free) lhebmir.," ccmpriaseed of the
noitbern paw of the state and a narrow strip In the southwest.- Both
countries withdrew a part of their forces from the State, but
considerable numbers continued to be disposed, along the Cease-Fire line.
Until the recent upsurge of tension, the military situation in
bznir remained relatively unchanged, except for minor violations
of the Cease-Fire line.
About 1 July 19.51, India began concentrating forces on the Pakistan
borders, moving over 60,000 troops, including all beer aruorod units, Into
East Punjab in the vicinity of Amritsar across the border from the important
Pakistan communications and cotmmercial, center of Tahoe. At the same time,
the 20th Division In Calcutta was strengthened and certain snail unite
in Assam wore moved up to the East Pakistan' border. On 14 July, Pakistan
countered the Indian moves by ordering approximately 40,000 reinforcements
to the vicinity of labors and Wazirabad.
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The a' ilipyznent of the reepaactive forces, as of 20 August 1951,
was as follows:
INDIA - (Total Ar>q strength - 400,000. Six infantry divisions,
one Lite of Canication division, and one armored division,...) Three
infantry -divisions and one Line of Conounication division in Kashmir
(total approixi atsly 65,000); tiro infantry divisions, one armored
divisions an armored brims, and four independent infantry brie
in lit Punjab near Amritsar (total over 75sO00); one infsntry division
at Calcutta (total 20,000); seven independent brigades placed throughout
India for internal security.
PAKMMN - (Total Armq strength - 197,000. Seven infantry
divisions) One infantry brigade and 20 Azad Kashmir battalions in
Khohmir (total 18,000); two infantry divisions and mat of a third,
and one armored brigade plus smaller units in the area of Lahore and
Waaz irabad (total 57,000 ); one infantry division at Peshawar (15.,000);
one infantry division at Dacca (10,000)p one infantry division at
Quetta (12,000); and one infantry division at Baha lpur (7,500).
IT. A. 20,k
KasbmLT is not important to the Indian oconoaaay. India is in no
was: psndent on Sa hmiri products for her economic well-being. Trade
bets en India and hmlr is limited as there is only one roaad between
the . cOnnecting Pathankot, India with Jammu, Kashmir. Direct connections
between India and the Valley of E bair at ina .r are poor as the
road from Jamu most cross the 9,000 ft. Benibaal pass which is ante .ttont:
izqwaabla during than winter.
Timber Is Y bmir'a chief item of export, but India imports none
from aabm1r as the logs can be transported profitably only .by being
floated down the rivers which flow into Pakistan. Other important KaphMir
P
export items., fruits and vegetables, cannot be profitably transported
to India due t, their perishability.
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Inaei ch as aohmir shawls, blankets, wool, and we glen goods, wood
carvings, papier mache, silk manufactures, and carpets are manufactured
only on a small scale, and find a ready market in Pakistani Indian
participation in this trade is very s.l.
The difficulty of transporting heavy machinery and equipment into
Kashmir fran India han discouraged the investment of capital there.
The lack of minerals, other than a little coal which is consumed locally,
is a further deterrent to investment.
Becbiuoe of its geographical. setting Kashmir'e economy is directed
almost entirely toward Pakistan. In no measure can Kashmir be considered
to be important to the Indian economy.
The possession of Itaehriir by India could be urged to bring economic
pressure on Pakistan through control of the water supply. Pakistan
is in a precarious position as regards her water supply asrone of the
rivers which she depends upon for the irrigation of 19,000,000 acres of
land risen in her own territory. among the six rivers on which Pakistan
depends for irrigation purposes, the Chmab, the Jhelum, and the Indus
flow through Kashmir. The Chenab lies wholly within the Indian-held
section of Kashmir while the Jhelum originates in the Indian-held
portion and floes through Pakistan-occupied Xwbmir Into Pakistan. Even
the Indxw river, which rises in Tibet, flows through Indian--bold territory
before it reaches Azad (Free) Kashmir and finally Pakistan.
The denial to Pakistan of sufficient water from the rive fly
through heir vould be a serious blow to the Oconcaay of the entry.
The Pakistanis claim that their irrigation canals are so intarlinked
that if the water supply of one river is rectrict?d, practically all
the eanais would be adversely affected. The maintenance of an adequate
water in the West Punjab is of the utmost Importance to Pakistan
as it Is the principal wheat-growing area of the nation. Vlthout adequte
water the agricultural value of Vest Punjab and the Sind mould be
negligible, and the area would revert to draught conditions
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II A. 3 .
In relation to a possible conflict with Pakistan, Kashmir is
important to India in that Indian units in Kasmir would be in a
favorable position to launch an immediate attack on the important
military supply center of Rawalpindi, and capture the only Pakistan
ordnance factory at nearby Wah. General Headquarters of the Pakistan
Arry is also located at Rawalpindi, Furthermore, an attack from
Kashmir toward Rawalpindi would endanger the rear flank of the
Pakistan forces in the vicinity of Wazirabad and force the Pakistan
Arry to fight on a greatly extended front,
In relation to a possible conflict with any other nations Kashmir
is of little strategic importance to India except as a buffer zone
.against invasion from the north. It would be alr-ost impossible for any
sizeable land force to care from, the north,, cross through Kashmir, and
successfully invade India. The trails leading into Kashmir from the
north are passable only to men and animals and then only for a few
months out of each year,, and it would be impossible logistically to
support any invasion force via these trails.
11. A.. 5.
IndWa primary reasons for wanting Kashrir are political rather
than military, therefore, from the military point of view there is no
particular urgency or time factor involved in the diagxate.
II. B. 2.
Kashmir is of extreme importance to the Pakistani economy. The
economic life of the West Punjab and the Sind is dependent to a great
extent on a continuous supply of water from, the Indus, Jhelum, and
Chenab rivers which flow through Kashnir. A denial of water to these
areas wou..d have a serious effect on the Pakistan economy as the area
is the chief wheat producing region in Pakistan.
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Due to its geographic location, the econor:y of Kashmir is
oriented toward West Pakistan, The only two roads that are open
throughout the year connect Srinagar and Dowel' Kashitr,, with
Raavaalpindi and Abbottabad in Pakistan. The only railway connection
from Kashmir to the outside is a branch of the Pakistan North West
ratlr, Ninety percent of Kashriras timber is floated down .the
Indus, Jhelum, and the Chenab rivers to such collecting points as
Jhelum and Wazirabad in Pakistan. Because of their perishable
nature, the bulk of the fruits and veeatablea produced in Kashmir
is sent to Rawalpindi and supplies an area deficient in such produce.
The rain market for woolens and carpets is the West Punjab and the
North 7dest Frontier Province,
As Pakistan is her major source of supply, Kashmir, with a
population of 4,000,000 is naturally a very important market, Pakistan
exports to Kashriir considerable quantities of rock Wit, and meets
most of Kastuar1e requirements of sugar, pulses, grain, leather, and
oil seeds a Kashmir imports large amounts of raw and manufactured
cotton from the West Punjab, and her requirements of patrol and patrol
products have been met primarily from the Attock oil field of West
Pakistan,
Ii B. 3,
In relation. to a possible conflict with India, Kaehrir is of
strategic importance to Pakistan. Possession of Kashmir would enable
Pakistan Arrq units to flank any Indian force attempting an invasion
of West Puiajab0. Furthermore, with Kashmir in its possession, Pakistan
would have a rruch shorter comon border with India to defend than
would be the case if India controlled the State. Loss of Kashmir to
India would threaten the Pakistan flank and permit the massing of
Indian troops within easy s triking distance of the only Pakistan ord-
nance factory at v ah and the city of Rawalpindi., which is an important
m4itary supply center and the location of General Headquarters of the
Pakistan Armed
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It is. thought that the Pakistan leaders attach great importance
to holding; Kashmir. Prime Minister Liaquat All than expressed this
feeling; in the following words, "Kashrd.r is a vital necessity for our
$ua*vival. It is like a cap on the head of Pakistan, If I allow India
to have this cap then I am always at the mercy of India. The very
position - the strategic position of Kashmir - is such that without it
Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous goverment that
might come in India."
Pakistan probably attaches no strategic importance to Kashmir with
regard to possible war with nations other than India except, perhaps,
as a buffer zone against invasion from the north or northeast, Any
invader from the north would face tremendous difficulties in trying to
rove troops, equipment and supplies through the extremely rugged mountains
that are characteristic of Kashmir,
II. B. 5. A
Although Pakistan considers Kashr.`ir to be strategically important
in relation to IIndia, Pakistange present positicxis in Azad Kashmir
are adequate for defensive katrposes, and consequently, frcm the military
point of view,, no particular urgency or time factor is involved.
t4atta 1y, Palo atan desires all of Kashmir, but in view of the
present conditions, it is believed that, from the military standpoint,
Pakistan probably would be satisfied with the status quo.
in. AA (i).
In an all t war with Pakistan, India probably would be victor-
ious, provided that Pakistan received no outside help. Initially,
probably neither country would be likely to gain a decisive victory,
In the first stages of an all=out war, Pakistan right even win a few
victories. But in tit. , the balance probably would be tipped in Indiatre
favor as her advantages in troop strength, trained reserves, manpower
reseces, and industrial capacity made then !selves felt, and ultimately
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Pakistan would be forced to sue for peace, A major Pakistan meakneas
lies in the fact that its transportation and cormunications network
in West Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to attack as it parallels
the Indian frontier.
(2). In a limited action designed to take all or part of Kashzir,
India., with her present superiority of troops in the area would probably
be able to complete the conquest of Kashmir, but the rugLed terrain of
the country would rule out a quick easy victory. The greatest success
probably could be obtained by launching a determined attack against West
Punjab and drives; through Lahore toward Rawalpindi; the initiation of
this operation to be followed shortly by a full-scale attack in Kashmir
The drive in West Punjab would prevent Pakistan from sending heavy
reinforcerents into Keshmir,
In any type of engagement with Pakistan, India would benefit
greatly by open Afghan intervention against Pakistan. Such intervention
would force Pakistan to divert a part of her limited forces in order to
fight on two fronts, Should Afghanistan continue in its present role,
it would still be beneficial to India because Pakistan must station the
better part of two divisions near the Afghan frontier to counteract
border raids., prevent a general tribal uprising over the Pushtoonistan
issueD and to meet the threat of possible overt Afghan intervention in
case of an Lido-Pakistan rar. The possibility that Afghanistan would
intervene on Indiaea behalf is sugP,ested by indications that Afghanistan
is being encouraged, if not actually supported., by India to provoke
incidents along Paktstanes tribal border areas, Fran the Afghan point
of viowD an Indo-Pakistan clash would improve the changes of Afghanistan
to achieve its goals in the PuahtoDistan issue,
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Though India made the first troop movements in July, it appears that
this action was designed to prevent or contain a possible attack by
Pakistan, and not to provoke a war. These moves indicate, also, that
India is prepared to accept war, if necessary, and that she is determined
to see the Kashmir elections through. The recent concentrations in the
vicinity of Amritsar place the striking power of the Indian Army in excel-
lent position to invade West Punjab, capture the grain belt of Pakistan
and cut the lines of communication into Kashmir. The concentration of
this force in such a strategic position thus serves to deter the Pakistan
Army from starting any disturbances in other areas by showing Pakistan
that India is ready for any eventuality.
III C. 2.
These moves do much toward constituting a complete preparation for
an all-out war against Pakistan. India now has roughly 90% of her combat
strength on the Pakistan borders in position to attack. No other move-
ment of troops would be necessary. The status of stockpiling of supply
is not known, out it is believed that the Indian forces have sufficient
supplies to carry out at least a major initial attack. One factor which
must be considered is the shortage of POL supplies. Prior to the Iranian
oil dispute, the Indian Army requested a 50$ increase in the oil supplied
them by Burma Shell and Caltex but these companies were unable to meet
this request. The amount of Indian POL supplies on hand is not known,
but indications are that these materials are in short supply.
III C. 3.
In general, climatic considerations would indicate optimum conditions
for ground operations and for supporting tactical air from October through
November: Operations are possible throughout the winter but cold in the
north and lack of water in the extreme south would restrict Indian ground
operations. Conditions in the Punjab itself should remain favorable for
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operation throughout the remainder of the winter until approximately
1 April.
In the Punjab and Sind, the rainy season begins to give way in
most years in late August and there is little rain after 15 September.
Well into September the major rivers in the north, such as the Ravi and
Sutlej, will be deep and generally unfordable, and rivers in the south,
including the Indus, will be up to several miles wide and unfordable
though relatively shallow. I?iovement,is generally easy in the inter-
stream areas (e.g. between the Ravi and Sutlej, from Amritsar toward
Multan and Bahawa].pur.) However, steep-sided but narrow irrigation canals
may hinder use of such areas. After September the level of the streams
will drop rapidly. The major rivers are rarely fordable at any time in
the foot hills north of Lahore and Amritsar, but should be easily bridge-
able in many -places from October to April. During the same period in the
south the stream levels become very low, but shifting courses and quick
and loose sand in the braided stream beds will create risks for vehicular
crossings. Streams in I:ashmir and Jammu are often glacier and snow-fed
and should be at their lowest stages in mid-winter from late December
through February. These streams should be bridgeable or fordable in most
places throughout the period from October to Ilarch.
Cross-country and off-road movement should be relatively easy in the
Punjab and Sind from late September to April. Cross-country movement of
wheeled and'tracked vehicles in the foothills of the northern Punjab and
in Kashmir and Jammu is always restricted by steep slopes. In the mountains
of Jammu and. Isaahmir snow and cold at higher elevations and in the passes
may hamper operations intermittently from late September through early March,
but passes are rarely impassable except for short periods in mid-winter
(January or February).
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In the south, on the borders of Rajputana and the Sind, lack of water
will restrict operations in the Thar Desert. Many shallow wells and springs
may be dry from January to mid-June.
Cool to cold weather in Kashmir, especially from December on, would
require the use of warm clothing and would probably impair the combat
?ffectiveness of Indian troops from the south or the east.
III D,
The opinions of Indian military leaders on the chances of an easy
victory over Pakistan are not known. On the basis of available information,
G-2 currently is of the opinion that, despite the disadvantages facing
Pakistan, India could not gain an easy victory over its neighbor.
III D. 2. b,
With memories of the previous fighting in Kashmir, communal rioting,
and the effects of the recent trade war still fresh 1j mind, Indian leaders
must be aware of the destruction and chaos which probably would be involved
in a war with Pakistan. However, border incidents, communal rioting, or
even emotional instability among government leaders could set off hostili-
ties.
III D.
The disadvantages for India of launching a war with Pakistan appear
to outweigh the possible advantages, and barring a complete surrender to
emotionalism on the part of Indian government leaders, a deliberate resort
to war by India does not seem likely.
xl~
It is probable that individual Communist agitators in India are stirring;
up the discontents which can breed communal disorders. However, the present
pre-occupation of the leaders of the Communist Party of India (CPI) with
organizational difficulties and the current emphasis on "united front"
tactics, with a view to achieving success in scheduled elections, rather
,than on violence of any sort indicates that Communist agitation for
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violence at present is of secondary importance in current party programming.
It is not believed that the
peak level simultaneously.
IV A. (1) , p
In an ,all-out war with
come*initial victories, but
obsolete equipment, lack of
party can carry on a number of operations at
India, Pakistan would probably be capable of
eventually, due to a shortage of supplies,
indigenous production, dependence on foreign
sources for supplies, and the superior numbers of the Indian Army, Pakistan
would probably be forced to withdraw and sue for peace.
I ).
It is doubtful, under the present conditions, that Pakistan could
achieve success in a limited attack in Kashmir with or without a simul-
taneous limited invasion of India. In Kashmir, Indian forces now outnumber
Pakistan forces at least three to one. Pakistan at present cannot strengthen
her forces in Kashmir without weakening her forces in some other vital area.
Furthermore, India is expecting trouble now and would not be caught by
surprise.
IV C.
Pakistan's recent troop movements probably do not indicate a desire to
provoke war and appear to be defensive in nature. It is believed that Pakistan
will not deliberately initiate hostilities. Public statements to the contrary
by government leaders probably are issued in the pursuit of political objec-
tives.
IV C. (I)_
Pakistan military moves do not indicate a state of complete readiness
for war. At present Pakistan's forces are strategically placed to defend
Pakistan against an Indian attack from any direction. However, further moves
would be necessary before Pakistan forces would be in an advantageous position
to attack India. Pakistan, like India, is short of certain supplies and
could not hope to be successful in along, full-scale war without access
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to outside sources of supply,
IV D.l._ b
G-2 has little evidence as to what Pakistan military leaders believe,
but in view of the odds against them, it is probable that they would not
start any war which depended for success on an early United Nations Cease-
Fire arrangement. India probably would not agree to any cease-fire until
Pakistan forces had at least been driven back to their original position.
IV D. 2. a.
The Pakistan leaders undoubtedly know that a war would involve heavy
casualties and possible defeat,
IV D 2, bb
Pakistan leaders are cognizant of the exposed position of East Pakistan
and are taking steps to strengthen the area. However, in the event of war
with India, the forces in Fast Pakistan are still inadequate to defend
successfully against an Indian invasion, and this fact probably exercises
a deterring effect on Pakistan military leaders.
c.
Pakistan undoubtedly considers the possibility of an Afghan attack in
toe event of war with India. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that
in the present emergency, the ';ighth Division, though initially ordered to
a position in southern .Jest Punjab, was later ordered to remain in the Quetta-'
Chaman area near the Afghan border.. Furthermore, certain Afghan leaders have
stated that in the event of war, Afghanistan would be on the side of India,.
Pakistan leaders have been+tryiri; to establish friendly relations with
Afghanistan but have had little success.
IVY
The disadvantages to Pakistan of launching a war with India outweigh the
possible advantages and barring a complete surrender to emotionalism on the
part of government leaders, a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan does
not appear likely.
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If the Government of Pakistan continues to permit the press and radio
to incite the people, public clamor may retch the point where the Government
will be forced to war by popular demand. At present, this point has not
been reached and the Pakistan Government still has control of the situation,
and can. continue to control it if the government so desires,
The one unknown element in the present situation is the possible conduct
of the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. It has been known for some time
that, there is a definite militant group in Pakistan who agitate for aggressive
action in Kashmir. The Akbar Khan conspiracy was in part a manifestation of
this agitation. The question is whether those officers arrested in the Akbar
Khan conspiracy comprise all or the main part of the militant group or whether
a large number remained undiscovered. In any event, some or all of the mili-
tant group are in prison, and the Pakistan Government has been alerted. The
recurrence of such an event appears improbable.
In West Pakistan, it is believed that trials being carried on with
reference to the 8 March 1951 conspiracy have resulted in'the arrest of many
Communist party leaders and would tend to preclude high-level. planning to
exploit communal problems. Agitators who work on such problems on a con-
tinuing basis would of course continue operations. In East Pakistan where
Communist efforts are closely coordinated with Communist Party of India
actions, there is evidence of Communist activity designed to exacerbate
the situation,
XL_
If India carries out the elections for a constituent asuambly in Kashmir,
Pakistan may attempt intervention. This could be done in many ways, that mos'~
likely being uprisings by the tribes within Kashmir, followed by the entrance
of Pakistan tribesmen. India has stated that if war breaks out it will not
be confined to Kashmir alone.
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Under the present conditions of tension, any border violation by either
country may start a war. Both countries realize this and profess to be
making every effort to prevent any action which might start an all-out war.
Barring serious border incidents, communal rioting, or a complete
surrender by the'various leaders to their emotions, neither country is
likely to initiate hostilities. It appears now that the iiasYmaisr Constituent
Assembly will be held. Pakistan undoubtedly will continue to protest to
the United Nations, but it is believed that she (Pakistan) will not deliber-
ately initiate hostilities to prevent the elections. Popular feeling in
Pakistan undoubtedly will become more intense, but competent observers in
Karachi feel that the Pakistan Government can control this situation.
Strong nationalist feelings do not appear to be a, problem in India.
Vi l
United States security interests in India and Pakistan, from the
military point of view, appear to be chiefly concerned with possible air
and naval bases in those countries. Since an outbreak of hostilities is
not anticipated before the end of 1951, it appears that United States
military security interests in the area will be little affected by probable
developments in that period.
Present-tension will make future defense of the Middle East more
difficult, by preventing planning for a joint defense in which both India
and Pakistan normally would participate.
As one of the most mpoxtariit soya*rcaa of strategic materials to the
.United States, the continuation of production, transportation, and export
trade of these materials from India and Pakistan in the event of Mr is an
important military security interest of the United States. If military
operations are limited only to Kashmir and adjacent areas in India and
Pakistan, it is unlikely that the production and trade of raw materials
important to the United Stater would be significantly affected.
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On the other hand, if military operations spread to East Bengal,
the production and export of jute would be seriously curtailed, as would
the mining and processing of mica in the State of Bihar., the source of
80 percent of Indiaes mica output, Access would probably be denied to
the shipping facilities of the port of Calcutta In West Bengal, an ir-
portant export port for rica, Iyanite., shellac and jute, as well as
beryl and ranganead,. Interruption of operations at manganese mines in
Madhya Pradesh or of port facilities at Vizagapatem would have serious
effect on United States industry since over 30 percent of United States
supply of this critical rdneral is currently being 'obtained from India,
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