TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 7, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
7 MARCH 1973
('VOL. XXIV, NO. 10)
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 CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 MARrH 1973
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV, PRG Assail GVN and U.S. on Prisoner Release, Withdrawal. . .
1
DRV Ministry Spokesman Charges Removal of U.S. Mines Delayed. . .
4
Paris 12-Nation Conference Lauded for Endorsing Peace Accord. . .
5
KHARTOUM EVENTS
USSR Conveys Disapproval of Palestinians' "Senseless Crime" . . .
10
U.S. USSR
USSR Decries U.S. Defense Budget Hike, Avoids SALT II Linkage . .
15
PRC - TAIWAN
Peking Calls for Negotiations with Taiwan Officials . . . . . . .
18
CHILE
Moscow, Havana See Elections as Triumph for Allende Regime. . . .
21
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR
Tito Stresses Closer Ties with Moscow, Continued Nonalinement . .
25
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Gosplan Deputy Chief Sokolov Opposes Cutbacks in Agriculture. . .
27
CHINA
Agricultural Pronouncements Continue Moderate Policies. . . . . .
30
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR AT.TR.,rION 26 FEBRUARY - 4 MARCH 1973
Moscow (2930 items)
Peking 3.378 items)
Vietnam
(9%)
14%
Domestic Isst+es
(45%)
40%
[Paris International
(--)
11%]
Vietnam
(6%)
32%
Conference
[Paris International
(--)
26%]
China
(3%)
7%
Conference
Laos
(4%)
4%
Cambodia
(3%)
7%
Czechoslovak 25th
(19%)
4%
Lzos
(16%)
5%
Anniversary
26th Anniversary of
(--)
4%
DPRK Party Delegation
(--)
4%
28 Feb. Taiwan Uprising
in USSR
Libyan Airliner Downed
(2%)
2%
Libyan Airliner Downed
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior Issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi and other communist media have hailed the international
conference in Paris and the signing of the nine-article conference
act on 2 March as putting an international stamp of approval on
the Vietnam peace agreement. Stress was on the success of the
conference, and there was little attention to such discordant
notes as the controversy over Saigon's attempt to issue a statement
on the exclusive legitimacy of the GVN in South Vietnam. Sino-
Soviet antagonisms were for the most part obscured in propaganda
on the conference, although Peking's NCNA, in noting Gromyko's
remarks on Asian collective security, seemed to be reflecting
pique over Moscow's campaign touting this project it the wake of
the Vietnam settlement.
Hanoi has continued to obscure the U.S.-ARV controversy over the
release of U.S. POW's which held up work at the international
conference for a day, but it has continued to profess concern
over alleged U.S. as well as GVN violations of the provisions of
the peace accord. A 1 March NHAN DAN editorial went beyond other
propaganda when it said the United Mates had made "private
commitments" to see that the accord is properly implemented.
And an editorial in the paper on the 6th, without referring to
any private commitments, complained that the United States has
not sufficiently carried out its responsibilities concerning GVN
responsibilities on the issue of military and civilian prisoners.
DRV. PRG ASSAIL GVN AND U.S, ON PRISONER RELEASE. WITHDRAWAL
Just as Hanoi did not report the 21 February threat by a DRV spokes-
man in Saigcn that the release of U.S. POW's might be held up if
there were not strict compliance with the peace agreement by the
GVN as well as the United States, so it failed to acknowledge that
the work of the international conference was held up last week
while Secretary Rogers, at President Nixon's instruction, sought
and obtained assurance that the DRV would release U.S. POW's within
the 60-day period provided in the peace agreement. VNA reported
on 1 March that a meeting had been held in Paris the day before
by Secretary Rogers and the foreign ministers of the three
Vietnamese parties to the peace agreement "following very grave
violations of the Paris agreement in South Vietnam" and that
"strict implementation" of the aCreement was discussed. However,
Vietnamese communist media are not known to have reported the
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subsequent bilateral meeting at which Secretary Rngers--as he
said at his 2 March Paris press conference--was assured by DRV
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh that the U.S. POW's would
be released by Hanoi in four phases in accordance with the
peace agreement.
Hanoi's closest approach to a discussion of the controversy
came in an article in the 1 March QUAN DOI KHAN LAN which scored
the White House for "raising a hue and cry" about DRV violations
and for "claiming that Hanoi must be held responsible for the
delay in handing over U.S. military personnel." The White House
statements, not further described, were dismissed by the army
paper as "a very brazen slander." The article claimed that the
DRV hr.d correctly implemented the peace agreement while "the
U.S. and Saigon sides have blatantly and systematically sabotaged
the most important and most urgent provisions of the agreement."
Also on 1 March, a KHAN DAN editorial went beyond Vietnamese
communist demands that the United States should help assure
Saigon's implementation of the peace agreement to suggest tha`
there were in fact secret understandings regarding U.S.
responsibilitiej in the postwar period. Declaring that the
United States had signed the peace agreement and set forth
"private commitments [cam keets rieeng] on a number of problems,"
the editorial claimed that the United States has shown that "it
has not attached much importance to its signatures and
commitments."
An indication that the Vietnamese communists expected the United
States to assume special responsibility regarding implementation
of peace accord provisions on civilian prisoners had appeared in
an interview which DRV chief delegate to the Paris talks Xuan
Thuy held with AFP on 10 November 1972. Hanoi media did not
carry the interview, but as reported by AFP Xuan Thuy explained
that the DRV had agreed to separate the issues of the release r!
POW's and Vietnamese civilian prisoners and said that the United
States "should use its influence with the Saigon administration
to urge it" to implement the clause on the detained civilians.
There has been no repetition of the 1 March editorial's
explicit reference to "private" U.S. commitments, and the
propaganda for the most part has reverted to general charges that
the United States has abetted violations of the accord. However,
the 6 March NHAN DAN editorial said that "adequate attention" must
be given to the issue of civilian prisoners and complained that
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"in the past month and more, the United States has not correctly
and actively .-arried out its responsibilities" concerning the
problem of military and civilian prisoners.
DEADLOCK ON While the controversy between Hanoi and
VIETNAMESE POW'S Washington on the release of American POW's
appeared to have been settled, Hanoi and
Front media reported on the 6th that the four-party Joint Military
Commission (JMC) on the previous day had reached a deadlock on
the question of Saigon's return of Vietnamese prisoners of war.
Liberation Radio noted the communist objection to the low figure
on prisoners Saigon had proposed to return in the second phase of
the Vietnamese POW exchange and said that even the United States
"had to admit that each side had to retu.?n at least one fourth of
the total number of personnel registered on the namelist." The
deputy head of the PRG delegation, Dang Van Thu. was quoted as
warning that Saigon must take steps to avoid prolonging the delay
in the prisoner exchange because otherwise future exchanges will
be adversely affected. He also declared that the PRG would not
discuss other problems if the return of the second group of POW's
was not solved satisfactorily. Thu was quoted-as "demanding that
the U.S. delegate shoulder responsibility for implementing all
articles of the Paris agreement" and as "stressing that he should
not be obsessed only with receiving U.S. military personnel, while
at the same time condoning the Saigon administration's stubborn
attitude and refusal to return PRG military personnel."
WITHDRAWAL OF Communist complaints about the implementation of
U.S. TROOPS provisions on the withdrawal of U.S. troops were
spelled out in a 1 March statement by the PRG
delegation to the four-party :AMC. The statement charged that the
United States had refused to discuss the modalities for troop
withdrawal and that the JMC and International Commission for
Control and Supervision (ICCS) had been unable to supervise the
withdrawal of foreign troops. It maintained that U.S. communiques
on troop withdrawals are "unacceptable" because the withdrawals
were unsupervised and "there is no practical or legal basis to
confirm how many troops the United States has withdrawn and
whether the withdrawing tro-.;ps have taker, with them all arms,
munitions, and war means as provided for in Article 8" of the
cease-fire protocol. The statement rejected the contention, in a
25 February note from the U.S. delegation, that the United States
was correctly implementing the provisions on withdrawal. It
accused the United States of attempting to "cover up its secret
maintenance in South Vietnam of disguised military personnel as
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well as the illegal transfer of arms, munitions, and war means
to the republic of South Vietnam." Condemning such "tricks,"
the statement demanded that the United States give proof to the
JMC and ICCS of the number of troops withdrawn and of the
removal of their weapons and that it ensure effective control
by the control organizations over future withdrawals.
In the pattern of propaganda beginning in mid-February which
made specific charges of alleged U.S. violations, a NHAN DAN
editorial on 5 March again claimed that the United States iias
not carried out the provision on troop withdrawal "undk.r due
supervision and control," that it has evaded the dismantling
of U.S. bases, and that it has not "strictly and quickly"
implemented the protocol on removal and deactivation of mines
in North Vietnam.
MOVEMENT OF SAM'S Hanoi and Front accounts of the 28 February
INTO QUANG TRI session of the JMC noted that PRG representa-
tive Dang Van Thu rejected allied charges
that the communists had installed SA-2 missile sites at the Sanh,
Quang Tri Province, since the start of the cease-fire. Thu
reportedly recalled that PRG delegation head Tran Van Tra, at
the previous session of the commission, had stated the PRG
position that "there has been absolutely no movement of missiles
or technical weapons since the time the agreement came into
effect." Thu added that "nobody has the right to ask the PRG
to withdraw any of its units from the area under its control."
He was also said to have "served notice" on the U.S. delegate in
connection with the latter's "threat to use violence against the
area controlled by the PRG"--an evident allusion to General
Woodward's statement at the 28 February JMC meeting that if the
communists failed to move the missiles the United States and its
allies would reserve the right to take appropriate actions.
DRV MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CHARGES REMOVAL OF U.S, MINES DELAYED
Hanoi's policy of avoiding discussion of the prisoner-release
controversy was also evident in propaganda related to U.S. mine
clearance. On 1 Ma-,ch a statement by the DFV Foreign Ministry
spokesman, release! at a Hanoi press conference, charged that
no mines had been cleared and maintained that the United States
has "deliberately violated the spirit and letter of the protocol"
on mine removal. At the press conference, Major Pham Lam, a
member of the DRV delegation on the problem of the mines,
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criticized the alleged U.S. delay in some detail, among other
things noting, without elaboration, that scheduled operations
did rot begin on 26 and 27 February and that on the 28th U.S.
personnel returned to their ships, which withdrew from their
positions near the coast. Thus, consistent with Hanoi's
silence on the controversy over POW's, Pham Lam obicured the
fact that the suspension of preparations for clearing the mines
at that time was related to Hanoi's delay in releasing the
second group of American POW's. On 4 March a brief VNA item
recalled the 1 March foreign ministry spokesman's protest and
noted, again without further explanation, that on the 4th U.S.
representatives and the U.S. fleet assigned to clear mines had
returned to the Haiphong area.
Pham Lam complained about various alleged U.S. interpretations
of the accord: He criticized the position that delayed-action
bombs would not have to be (''pared since they were not mines,
and he assailed the view that mines need only be cleared from
the central channel of rivers and not from one bank to the other.
The latter point elaborates on cryptic references in the foreign
ministry spokesman's statement as well as in the 26 February
DRV Government statement that the United States was trying to
evade responsibility for clearing mines on the inland waterways.
Pharr Lam also complained about U.S. failure to provide equipment
to th_~ DRV, noting that North Vietnam had been given no means
to transport five-ton "pipes" which were to be used to destroy
mines. And he took the United States to task for failing to supply
the means for removing mines on the grounds that the U.S. Navy does
not have such equipment.
The issue of mine clearance continued to be pressed in :omment on
the 2d with an article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, accusing
the United States of "nurturing the dark scheme of continuing
the blockade of the sea entries of the DRV in an attempt to
prevent transport between our country and others and to isolate
North Vietnam."
PARIS 12-NATION"! CONFERENCE LAUDED FOR ENDORSING PEACE ACCORD
HANOI DRV propaganda, highlighted by a 3 March NHAN DAN editorial,
greeted the 2 March signing of the act of the international
conference on Vietnam as a great victory for the Vietnamese people
and for world peace. Underlining Hanoi's satisfactic-., a report
from the Paris correspondent Hong Ha, published in NHAN DAN on the
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4th, claimed that the act "contains nearly all the contents"
of a draft act proposed by the DRV delegation "with the
agreement of the PRG delegation." The editorial on the 3d set
the tone for other comment when it maintained that the act had
"increased the juridical value on the international arena" of
the peace agreement and had provided a "new political and
juridical basis" for the struggle to make the United States and
Saigon respect and implement the accord.
The NHAN DAN editorial. also credited the act with affirming the
"important position and great prestige'of the DRV and PRG and the
"powerful support" of the socialist countries for Vietnam. The
controversy at the conference over the PRG's position was
reflected in Hong Ha's report on the 4th, which noted GVN Foreign
Minister Lam's attempt at the 1 March meeting to have his
statement on the exclusive legitimacy of the GVN be made an
official document of the conference; the report also quoted
Gromyko's objections to the proposal.
Hanoi's reports on the conference had taken note of PRG Foreign
Minister Binh's meetings with other delegates, including UN
Secretary General Waldheim. However, it was not until 7 March
that Hanoi radio carried a more detailed report on "meetings
and an exchange of views" between Waldheim and Binh, noting for
the first time that the Secretary General had confirmed that they
had discussed the PRG's establishment of a liaison office and
designation of observers at the United Nations.
The 3 March NHAN DAN editorial, like other propaganda, decried
alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace accord and
warned: "These acts pose a great danger to the Paris agreement . . .
and have, in a dangerous manner, increased the tension in Vietnam
and Indochina as a whole." In a similar vein, DRV Foreign
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh had warned of the dangers to peace in
his press conference statement at the close of the international
conference. Trinh maintained that "Vietnam's experience since the
1940's has proved that foreign military involvement and interference
and domestic fascism in the service of neocolonialism are the origin
of war." He went on to advo:?re an end to such policies, the
achievement of reconciliation and concord, and respect for
scif-determination in South Vietnam, warning that "only in this way
can pence in Vietnam be maintained and consolidated. Otherwise,
violations will grow from small-scale hostilities to major conflicts,
and peace will be wrecked. . . ."
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The Chinese have authoritatively endorsed the results
of the Paris conference as providing an "explicit
international guarantee" for the "fundamental national rights
of the Vietnamese people" acknowledged in the 27 January peace
agreement. The basic thrust of the brief speech by Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei at the find session of the conference
on 2 March and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial the next day was that
primary responsibility for implementing the Vietnam settlement
tests with the four signatories and that the other parties
represented at the international conference have now committed
themselves to respect the settlement. This approach accords
with Peking's welcome for the agreement as removing a major
source of tension in Asia.
Peking's coverage of the conference proceedings included the
text of the act, texts of the speeches by the Vietnamese
communist delegates, and reports on Chi's meeting with Secretary
Rogers on 25 February and his dinner for the Secretary on
1 March. Peking's accounts of speeches by-other delegates were
generally straightforward except for the South Vietnamese and
Soviet foreign ministers. NCNA dc:fsively observed that "while
presenting no positive views" on the issues, Gromyko had
"boasted" that the Paris agreement had proven the effectiveness
of what Moscow calls its peace program. Most notably, NCNA took
the opportunity to respond to Moscow's campaign touting its
Asian collective security project in the wake of the Vietnam
settlement Ac:ording to NCNA, Gromyko sought to bring the
Indochina situation "into the orbit of that 'collective
security system."' (During the period when it adamantly opposed
negotiations on Vietnam, Peking had repeatedly charged that
Moscow was seeking to bring the Vietnam question into the orbit
of Soviet-U.S. cooperation.) Turning Moscow's language back
against it, NCNA observed that the Asian collective security
system "is none Lther than a 'policy of grouping, a policy of
ranging some states against others."'
Peking did not indicate that Chi joined in the criticism of GVN
Foreign Minister lam at the 1 March session for pressing the
notion that his government is the only legitimate one in South
Vietnam. However, Chi apparently was alc.ie in delivering a
formal speech at the final session on the 2d. Alluding to the
contention over the PRG's status, he complained that "certain
people" still want to deny its existence. And apparently as a
fur%he: demonstration of support for the PRG, he went on to
specify that "the Saigon authorities" have been creating serious
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incidents, taking particular note of attacks on the communist
delegations to the JMC. In his main address at the conference
nn 26 February he had observed ;.hat violations of the agreement
had occurred but did not blame particular parties.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the conference included the
United States in its indictment of -violations of the agreement,
though it singled out "the Saigon authorities in particular."
Earlier, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 1 ::a,:ch--seconding PRG
and DRV protest statements of 25 and 26 February--spelled out
charges against Saigon and added that the United States had
delayed the removal of mines in North Vietnam and refused to
dismantle its military bases in the South. The editorial noted
cryptically that these acts not only violated the relevant
provisions of the agreement "but also made it difficult to
implement other important provisions."
Reflecting Peking's interest in the tttuation, the 1 March
editorial asF"rted that strict imple?.rentation of the agreement
would contribute to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia.
In his context it pointed out, rather cautiously, that "people
cannot but show concern" over violations of the agreement.
MOSCOW Moscow media's reporting of the closing events of the
international conference included Foreign Minister
Gromyko's departure statement on 3 March. He expressed hope
that all the parties would "observe strictly and punctually" the
provisions of the Paris agreement as well as the act signed at
the conference, a document which he said has "great positive
significance. The Moscow press published the text of the act
promptly on the 3d, but there is little available independent Soviet
comment. The TASS press review on the 5th reported that IZVESTIYA
expressed hope that the conf?rence decisions would serve the cause
of "the establishment of lasting peace"; the paper stressed
"editorially," TASS added, that "it is necessary to exclude any
possibility of the resumption of interference in whatever form
in the internal affairs of Vietnam."
Moscow promptly took issue with Peking's account of Gromyko's
speech* at the Paris conference in a Mandarin-language broadcast
* Although Hanoi media reported that Gromyko had participated in
the criticism of GVN Foreign Minister Lam at the 1 March session,
Moscow is not known to have reported Gromyko's remarks. A dispatch
published in PRAVDA on the 2d, reporting DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh
Le's press conference on the session, quoted Le as saying only that
Lam's claim of sole legitimacy for the GVN was rejected by the
"other delegates."
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on the 2d which claimed that Peking "slandered" and iauncned an
"unbridled attack" on Gromyko's statement. Moscow argued that
Gromyko's remarks renewing the Soviet proposal for a collective
security system in Aoia were "completely it order" ant would
"remove the basis for forming any kind of alliance and for any
imperialist intervention." Echoing othpt recent Soviet
propaganda in the weeks since the pea-a agreement was signed,
the broadcast went on to charge that Peking's policy is aimed
at forming a temporary alliance with "the imperialist bloc" and
not objeczfag to the retention of U.S. armed forces in Asia.
The notion of U.S.-PRC "collusion" has contirjed to be expressed
in other Moscow propaganda. vor example, an item in PRAVDA on
4 March reiterated that the PRC takes an "indulgent attitude"
toward the fact that although the Vietnam war has ended, the U.S.
military presence in that part nf the world "is not being
reduced."
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KHARTOUM EVENTS
USSR CONVEYS DISAPPROVAL OF PALESTINIANS' "SENSELESS CRIME`'
Moscow has again conveyed its disapproval of terror tactics in
reportage on the 1 March seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy
in Khartoum by members of this Palestinian Black September
Organization (BSO) and their killing of three of the five
diplomatic hostages the following day. In keeping with the
guarded Soviet trer;tment of pant terrorist incidents, Moscow's
reaction has been :onfined to brief media reports of events
surrounding the se:lzure of the embassy and the deaths of incoming
U.S. Ambassador NoA.1l, outgoing U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Moore,
and Bel.eian Charge ?i'Affaires Eid.
Press comment thus far has been limited to brief "reference
information" on the BSO appearing in PRAVDA on 4 March, appended
to five short TASS dispatches. In apparent effort to transfer
at least some of the opprobrium from the Palestinian organizations,
PRAVDA referred cryptically to "certain facts" suggesting ties
between Black September and "certain extremist non--Palestinian
organizations." It recalled the BSO's responsibility for aircraft
hijackings as well as for the "attacks" on athletes at the Munich
Olympics and on embassies in Bangkok and Khartoum "and a Cairo
hotel"--an allusion to the assassination of the Jordanian prime
minister in Cairo in November 1971. At the time Moscow all but
ignored the assassination, which was acknowledged only in a one-
senterce TASS report from Cairo that at-Tall "was killed today"
at t' entrance to the Sheraton Hotel.
PRAVDA's "reference information" was repeated without attribution
in a Moscow broadcast to Britain on the 4th which also remarked
that the BSJ "unites a few extreme groupings of Palestinians."
Echoing a past theme of Soviet comment on terrorist activities,
the PRAVDA information note added that "numerous representatives
of the Arab public" consider such actions "tremendously damaging
both to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Arab
countries' common struggle against the consequences of Israel's
aggression." A Moscow domestic service broadcast on 5 March
similarly called the terrorists' action a "senseless crime"
which did "immeasurable harm" to the national libera'Zion movement.
Noising that "bourgeois news agencies" had already forgotten
Israel's downing of the Libyan airliner, the broadcast claimed
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that the reaction of "Western ptvpagandists" showed who benefited
from such te.rorist actiono &q that in Sudan. The broadcast
said it was impossible not to agree -aith the Cairo AL-AHRAM, which
editorially called the attack on the embassy and the killing of
three Western diplomats a blow to the Acab people's struggle
against "Israeli aggression."
While TASS' initial two-sentence report on 1 March said "Palestinian
partisans" were holding the American ambassador and other diplomats
hostage in Khartoum, subsequent reporr.ago has almost uniformly
described the perpetrators as members of the "terrorist" Black
September. There has baen no comment on the incident in Moscow's
broadcasts to Arab audiences, but programs on 3 and 4 March briefly
reported developments, again ascribing the events to this "extremist"
or "terroristic" organization. A 5 Mer,h broadcast in Arabic
said that PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, reporting the BSO action,
published extracts from the telegram sent by Sudanese President
Numayrl to President Nixon in which "he described the killing
of the foreign diplomats as despicable" and said his country
definitely rejected such a means of solving problems.
As in its reportage and comment surrounding the Munich incident
last September, Moscow has again taken pains to dissociate the
chief fedayeen groups, such as Fatah and the overall umbrella
organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
from responsibility for terrorist actions. Thus Moscow's raports
have repeatedly pointed out that PLO chairman and Fatah leader
Yasir 'Arafat in a telegram to Numayri insisted that "the
organization which he heads" had nothing to do with the Khartoum
incident. But TASS on the 7th did acknowledge that Numayri, in
a radio and television speech on the 6th, charged that the Khartoum
branch of Fatah had a hand in the seizure of the Saudi embassy.
TASS cited Numayri as saying "specifically" that the head of the
Fatah office in Khartoum had left for Libya in a Libyan plane
several hours before the attack on the embassy, and it added that
Numayri announced the termination of Palestinian organizations'
activities in Sudan. TASS disseminated, in conjunction wi'-h this
Khartoum report, a Beirut-datelined dispatch noting that the PL1.
publication FALe:STIN ATH-THAWRAH had rejected any link whatsoever
between Fatah and Black September and had pointed out that the
BSO was not represented in any organ of the PLO.
U.S. REACTION Reporting President Nixon's 2 March press
conference, TASS noted that he said a
senior State Department official had been sent to Khartoum to
seek the release of the diplomats held hostage there by the BSO
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7 MARCH 1973
"terroristic organization." The President said, TABS added,
that the United States would do everything it could to get
them released but that it would not yield to the blackmail
demands of the terrorists. A short TASS dispatch on the 7th
reported that President Nixon, addressing a ceremony at the
State Department commemorating the two American diplomats killed
in Khartoum, pointed out that U.S. policy is not to submit to
international blackmail and asked other governments to take the
same firm stand.
EVENTS IN JORDAN Moscow has reported--but drawn no direct
connection between--the demands of the BSO
terrorists in Khartoum for the release of Palestinians held in
Jordan and the Jordanian Government's decision confirming death
sentences meted out to this group. But Soviet reportage has
briefly and indirectly indicated Moscow's concern over the
latter development, with TASS on 5 March citing the Paris LA
NATION as emphasizing that execution of the "Palestinian patriots"
might "greatly damage Arab unity."
A TASS dispatch from Khartoum on the 3d acknowledged the BSO
demands for the release in Jordan of a group of Palestinians
"accused of preparing a state coup" and of a n'imber of political
prisoners, as well as the release of Robert Kennedy's assassin,
Sirhan Sirhan, and members of the Baader-Meinhoff "terrorist
group" arrested in the FRG. Subsequent reports broadcast by
Moscow in Arabic on the 3d And 4th indicated that the demands
had been scaled down, with the terrorists insisting on the
release of Palestinians held in Jordanian and "Saudi Arabian"
prisons and said to be calling for the release of Palestinians
arrested "in some countries."
Without recalling the Khartoum demands, TASS on the 5th reported
from Amman the Jordanian Government decision confirming the death
sentences handed out by a military tribunal on Fatah leader
Abu Dawud and other Palestinian guerrillas arrested in February.
They were charged, TASS noted, with infiltrating into Jordan in
an attempt to sL.age a coup d'etat.* (The clandestine "Voice of
* A PRAVDA analysis of the Palestinian movement last August cited
"the committing of terrorism inside Jordan" among various "desperate
acts" perpetrated by soma Palestinian organizations which had
gr,.itly damaged the reputation of the entire resistance movement.
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Palestine," in a broadcast on 27 February, admitted that Abu
Dawud had entered Amman "to carry out a suicide fedayeen operation
against King Ilusayn's regime and tc paralyze the political
activity which the king began in the United States.")
TASS subsequently reported a growing campaign in Arab countries
in protest against the death sentences, citing massages to
Arab heads of states by PLO leader 'Arafat and Algerian leaders.
And in promptly reporting King Husaya's appointment of Lt. Gan.
Raoul al-Kilani as director of general intelligence and national
security eflairs advisor, TASS added the observation, in an
Amman-datelined report on the 6th, that "local circles" viewed
the appointment as an indication of a tougher policy toward
the Palestinian i .asistance move-went.
BACKGROUND Moscow has consistantly handled extremist fedayeen
actions with caution, treating them in reluctant
and implicitly disappruving fashion when mentioning them at all.
Its coverage of the Munich events last September glossed over
much of the detail, anel there were only semiofficial expressions
of regret, confined to trief statements by sports officials and
organizations. * While displaying the same restrained approach
with regard to the Khartoum incident, Moscow seems to have been
a shade less hesitant in this instance to brand tht actions as
those of "extremists" and "terrorists."
Subsequent to the Munich events, Podgornyy had gone on record
at a 14 September banquet for the visiting Iraqi president with
a declaration that "we cannot look with favor on the actions of
certain elements who harm the Palestinian movement." Gromyko
had been more explicit in his 26 September address at the UN
General Assembly when he said it was impossible to approve of
the terrorist actions of "certain elements" in the Palestinian
movement, which led among other things to the tragic Munich
events. Declaring that "their criminal actions" had struck
a blow at the Palestinians' national interests and aspirations,
Gromyko expressed Soviet opposition to acts of terrorism "which
violate the diplomatic activity of states and their representatives,
transport, communications," and the normal progress of international
contacts and meetings.
* Soviet meiia's treatment of the Munich incident is discussed
in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 23-24, and 13 September,
pages 18-21.
4
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A Kornilov article in NOVOYE VREMYA (do. 42, 13 October 1972)
deplored "rash extremist acts of terror such as the hijacking of
civilian aircraft, attacks on nonmilitary targets, and the
assassination of individuals," observing that such actions
seriously damaged the prestige of the Palestinian movement.
Most recently, the same Soviet weekly (No. S. 2 February
1973), in a column "answering young readers" on the Black
September Organization, explained that "progressive forces
rightly point out that the methods employed by Black September
ultimately do harm to the just struggle waged by the
Palestinian Arabs."
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7 MARCH 1973
U. S, - U S S R
USSR DECRIES U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET HIKE, AVOIDS SALT II LINKAGE
Reacting with a proiictable show of dismay to the announced boost
in U.S. defense expenditures projected in the draft FY-1974 U.S.
budget, Moscow has deplored the boost as an expression of the
continuing influence of the "military-industrial complex" on
U.S. policy and as a reflection of an attitude that is inconsie"pnt
with the developing spirit of detente in U.S.-Soviet relations.
At the same time, in keeping with he policy of circumspection it
has observed since the opening of SALT II in November, It has
refrained from dwelling on the negative implicationb of .his
criticism for the prospects in SALT and has continued to draw
attention to positive as well as negative indicators of U.S.
intent in this regard.
BUDGET HIKE Voluminous Soviet criticism of the new U.S.
defense budget has focuse1 on the charge that
the planned increase in expenditures is due primarily to increased
outlays for strategic weapons. Moscow has complained that this
runs counter to the spirit of the tim.:s. Typic't was the charge
by PRAVDA coamentat.or Victor Mayevskiy and carrescondent
B. Strelnikov in the 31 January issue of that E,aper that the
budget proposals were in "flagrant contradiction to the period
of easing in tensions." While avoiding any detailed analysis
of specific weapons programs embodied in the budget proposals,
the commentaries have referred in general terms to strategic arms
implications. Mayevskiy and Strelnikov, for example, referred
to new "superweapons," and V. Berezin, writing in RED STAR on
3 February, mentioned U.S. plans for new submarine-launched
missiles.
Moscow has been generally reticent about linking these criticisms
of the budget to the prospects for SALT. However, USA Institute
head Georgiy Arbatov in an article on U.S.-Soviet relations in
the latest issue of KOMMUNIST--summ.iri.zed serially by Moscow
radio between 1 and 5 March--noted that the new budget request
came in the wake of the SALT I agreements as well as the Vietnam
cease-fire. He implied that the expanded military budget was
one of the "leftovers" of the cold war in U.S. policy that
presented an obstacle to further normalization of U.S.-Soviet
relations. An unusually detailed article on the budget in the
8 February PRAVDA UKRAINY by that paper's military observer
V. Zharov concluded that since the Pentagon was intent on
continuing the arms race, the USSR was forced to strengthen its
own forces.
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MIRV, 'JLMS '11ij.s criticism comes against a background of
Srviet comment expressing concern over current
trends in U.S. strategy, particularly tke programs for
improving sea-based strategic forces and for MIRVing land-
based ICBM's.
Spokesmen have for some time been citing budget figures and
official U.S. statements bearing on thR importance of the U.S.
naval forces--present and projected--in overall U.S. strategy.
More recently, Captain lst rank Ye. Shcheglov, in the 20 February
RED STAR, discussed the "decisive" role of the Atlantic fleet
including the 6th Fleet--the Navy's "forward grouping in the
Mediterranean"--and particularly its nuclear missile submarines.
The Zhc.rov PRAVDA UKRAINY article noted that the U.S, military
press was discussing a U.S. transition to a "sea strategy,"
since, as he put it, underwater missile systems are relatively
invulnerable to a surprise pre-emptive strike. Zharov noted
that the proposed ULMS system was a product of this strategy.
Moscow's sensitivity to the potential impact on the SALT
negotiations of possible. improvements in the U% missile
submarine fleet has been displayed in recent weeks in its
reaction to British press reports that Prime Minister Heath
had discussed acquisition of Poseidon mimsiles in his recent
visit to the United States.*
While Moscow has been reticent about discussing MIRV's since
the SALT I agreements were signed, two recent articles have
mentioned the subject in discussing U.S. strategic programs.
The USA Institute's I. L. Orlenkov, in a survey of the U.S.
Air Force in the December 1972 issue of USA magazine, cited
estimates of the timing of the MIRV conversion on the basis
of U.S. Senate hearings. ._.,uugh he noted that "the rates of
(MIRV) rearmament are considerable," he did not cite MIRV
specifically in concluding that "several" Air Force programs
are aimed at achieving "military-technical supremacy."**
* Moscow's reaction to these reports is discussed in the TRENDS
of 28 February 1913, page 25. Shcheglov's discussion of the U.S.
Atlantic fleet complements a previous analysis by him of the
Pacific Fleet in the 20 April 1972 RED STAR.
** In proceeding to discuss other elements of the U.S. strategic
strike force, Orlenkcw offered an argument for maintaining the
role of strategic aviation in the strategic forces when he noted
that aircraft "allow one to react to an alert signal without
making an irreversible decision to launch strategic missiles--
a decision fraqght with suicidal consequences."
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The Zharov PRAVDA UKRAINY article also focused on MIRV and
noted that the system would considerably enhance the U.S.
nuclear strike potential.
SALT II Arbatov, in the KOMMUNIST article, appeared to
have U.S. weapons development In mind in asserting
that the initial SALT agreements will take on lasting
significance only if "attempts are not made to seek loopholes
in order to accelerate the arms race in those spheres not yet
embraced by treaties." Otherwise, however, Moscow has not
directly linked its expressions of concern over U.S. strategic
weapons development with the SALT negotiations. It has sustained
an even-handed approach to SALT, limiting its direct comment
since the opening of the second round to occasional reaffirmations
of Soviet interest and to reiterations of Brezhnev's hopeful
remarks on the subject at the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebrations
last December.*
TASS, in brief reports on President Nixon's inaugural address
and on remarks by Secretary Rogers to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on 22 February, singled out their statements on continued
U.S. interest in the negotiations, including Rogers' remark thaC the
United States was "encouraged" by Brezhnev's reference to the
desirability of a gradual reduction in strategic weapons. The
only extensive commentary on ShLT II, by Boris Svet;ov in the
first 1973 issue of NEW TIMES, was generally objective and
noncommittal but notable for its warning against those in the
United States who were hoping to obstruct the second round by
calling on the government to continue arms development to acquire
"trump cards" for the negotiations. Svetlov's reference to tip,
permanent consultative commission established by the first
session of SALT II is the only Soviet mention of that body to
date since the TASS communique at the end of the session on
December 21.
* Soviet and East European bloc comment on the opening of SALT II
is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 18-20, and
29 November, pages 13-14. Brezhnev's remarks are discussed in the
issue of 4 January 1973, pages 28-29.
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7 MARCH 1973
PRC-TAIWAN
PEKING CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH TAIWAN OFFICIALS
Against the background of Peking's strengthened international
position :.ighlighted by the 22 February communique on Dr.
Kissinger's 15-19 February visit to China announcing the
establishment of liaison offices, Peking took the occasion of
a Taiwan anniversary that has been ignored in recent years to
accelerate its campaign encouraging moves toward reunification
of Taiwan with the mainland. Peking's first major overture to
the ROC concerning peaceful negotiations since the period of
"peaceful coexistence" in Chinese foreign policy during the
mid-1950s took place at a meeting sponsored by the united f;ont
organ, the CPPCC, marking the 26th anniversary of the 28 February
1947 uprising on Taiwan against the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek
government. Major speeches by PRC Overseas Chinese expert
Liao Cheng-chih and former Kuomintang general Fu Tso-t as well
e_. several briefer addresses all stressed the need for
reconciliation, with Fu Tso-i's keynote address specifically
urging ROC officials ;:o begin negotiations.
Thta marked the first time Peking has observed the anniversary
since 1965 and the first major celetration of the event since
the 10th anniversary in 1957. In keeping with the discreet
approach taken by Peking in the period of developing detente
with the United States, the treatment of the anniversary avoided
portraying the uprising as a model fo,7 insurrection today and
muffled invective against Chiang and his entourage.
The major speakers at the anniversary meeting were obviously
chosen for their special ties to the Kuomintang.. Liao Cheng-chih
in the son of a famous ::uosintang martyr who was associated with
Sur: Yat-sen. Fu Tso-i is the former IQIT commander of Peking who
surrendered to the co+amunists after peaceful.negotiations in 1949.
tsecause of his s"ort.-. -der and his subsequent honored position in
the PRC hierarchy, though never in positions of real power, Fu
has traditicnal'?r been held up by Peking as a model for ROC
officials in Taiwan to follow. Fu had made a similar speech on
3 February 1956, 'packing a Chou En-lai report four days earlier
which called fur "peaceful liberation" and negotiations with
Chiang. Chou has not yet lent his personal prestige to the
current effort.
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Setting the stage for Fu's keynote address, Liao Cheng-chip
dwelt on themes present in PRC comment on Taiwan over the past
year in playing up Peking's strengthened domestic and inter-
national position. Liao cited in particular PRC entrance into
the UN, improved relations with the United States and Japan,
as well as the 22 February Sino-U.S. communique and recent peace
agreements in Vietnam and Laos to demonstrate that the "situation
is now very favorable" for the liberation of Taiwan. Calling
attention to a feeling of common pride among people on both aid's
of the Taiwan Strait over Peking's accomplishments, he noted that
many Taiwan "compatriots" have returned to tour and visit
relatives, helping to promote "great patriotic unity." Addressing
ROC officials, Liao asserted that the "general trend and the
desire of the people" to liberate Taiwan "is now very clear" and
warned them not to "miss the opportunity to make contributions to
the unification of the motherland." Promising that Peking regards
all patriots as "one big family whether they come forward early or
late," he assured all who work for reunification that they will
be treated with "due respect" and will be forgiven past wrongs.
Fu Tso-i's "few words to the military and administrative personnel"
on Taiwan dwelt in the most explicit terms thus far on the
improvement in Sino-u.S. relations in order to show the futility
of the ROC's continued reliance on Washington, and he alluded to
possible ROC-USSR ties in warning against shifting reliance to
"someone else." Calling unification the "trend of the times"
that "no force whatever can obstruct or undermine," Fu gave notice
to officials on Taiwan that they "should no longer cherish any
illusion about outsiders." Asserting that American policy toward
Taiwan had changed as "is very clearly shown in the two Sino-U.S.
communiques," and callin?, attention to Kissinger's remarks "of
late" that the UniL'4 States favors a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan problem, Fu asked rhetorically: "It is obvious: how long
can Taiwan rely on the United States? Absolutely not long."
Moving immediately to the problem of possible Soviet involvement,
he warned against the "dream of relying on someone else,"
asserting the ROC "must not make a fresh error." Claiming that
President Nixon has now become committed to a policy of coexistence
with China that will make it "absolutely impossible for the United
States to maintain its former relations with Taiwan for long," Fu
claimed that the United States at the same time would not "allow
Taiwan to 'cooperate' with anybody else to disrupt peace" in Asia.
He cited La this connection the 1972 Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique
which affirmed the two sides' determination to oppose "any third
party" seeking hegemony in the axea.
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Pointing out that "this situation cannot be changed," Fu got
to the main point of his address with a patriotic pitch: "We
are awl Chinese. Why couldn't we talk for the sake of the
sacred cause of unifying the motherland?" Citing the authori-
tative example of Mao Tse-tung's trip to Chungking in October
1945 to conduct talks with Chiang Kai-shek, Fu said the two
sides should come together and talk, "the sooner the better."
Avoiding any specification of PRC terms for the talks, Fu
merely asserted that Peking remains open to either formal
sessions or informal cuntacts, and that it would remain silent
on the talks if so desired by Taipei. In an effort to reassure
ROC officials with "doubts" that they will receive good treatment
during the raiks ard after unification, Fu cited not only his
own position despite his Fast record as a "war criminal" but
pointedly mentioned the example of PR., treatment accorded the
most famous ROC returnee to the mainland, former ROC President
Li Tseng-jea, whom ne made a point of calling by his honorific
name, Li Te-lin.
PRC media devoted extensive coverage to the 28 February meeting
but have thus far not folluwed up with significant comment.
Radio Peking extended its usual 30-minute programs on 1 March
to 45 minutes in order to cover the session, while Peking's
programs to Taiwan were extended from the usual 15 minutes
to 45 minutes. The only subsequent developments related to
Taiwan have been a 3 March: report describing the arrival in
Peking of a former ROC commercial attache in Australia and a
1 March account of a meeting of Chinese residents in Japan
which stressed the importance of Taiwan's liberation.
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CHILE
NDSCOW, HAVANA SEE ELECTIONS AS TRIL14PH FOR ALLENM REGIME
E:.c.ensive but repetitive Moscow comment and more limited Havana
comment or the 4 March Chilean legislative elections have
treated the outcome as a triumph for the Popular Unity (UP)
government and a vindication of its program. Both Soviet and
Cuban media have emphasized that the UP managed the difficult
feat of increasing its share of the popular vote over that
obtained in the 1970 presidential elections, ignoring the fact
that the earlier election was a three-way race while the current
contest involved only two major contenders.
Moscow and Havana also stressed that the opposition's effort
to obtain two-thirds control of the Chilean Senate--the number
required to impeach President Allende--had been thwarted for the
most part ignoring pre-election statements by key opposition
spokesmen emphas'zing their goal of a simple majority of the
popular vote. Although pre-election comment had noted the
opposition's view of the contest as a plebiscite and Allende's
denials that thin was the case, there was scant reference to
this point in postelection comment. Moreover, Moscow and
Havana conveniently chose to play down the opposition's
continuing control of both houses of congress, while highlighting
the UP's increased representation in the two chambers.
MOSCOW Exultant Soviet reaction to the election was typified
by a 5 March TASS commentary by Nikolay Chigir.
Hailing the "new major success" by the UP, Chigir noted that the
tendency of the party in power in Chile to lose popular support
with the passage of time had been reversed by the Allende regime,
with the election serving to demonstrate "convincingly" that
the government had "considerably gained in strength in two years
and four months" in office. Like other Soviet commentators, he
alleged that the aim of the "reactionary" opposition was "to
seize political power" by gaining two-thirds control of the Chilean
Senate and stressed that this goal ha-! been rejected by the
electorate. Chigir characterized the outcome as "a victory
of the entire Chilean people" who favor "further implementation
of the program of revolutionary socioeconomic transior.ation"
paving the way to Chile's "further socialist development."
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Although Moscow comment focused on the opposition's failure to
gain the two-thirds control of the Senate and or the gain's
made by the regime, a Radio Moscow commentary beamed to Latin
America on the 6th recalled this opposition's contention that
the elections were "a kind of plebiscite to decide the fate
of the popular government" wherein Allende would have to
"quit and make way for the opposition" if the UP obtained less
than half of the voc.es. However, it went on to denigrate the
notion as "unconstitutional in its very essence," implying
that the government's continuing min,irity status would not produce
a retrenchment: "The government led by President Salvador
Allende is fully determined to continue realising its program cf
radical transformations."
Some Moscow comment o!;erved vaguely that the Chilean electoral
results would have a salutary influence on the political
situation elApwhere in Latin America. Thus, a PRAVDA article in
the 7th termed the election "a graphic illustration" of the "sig-
nificant" political changes taking place on the continent and
concluded that it would be "difficult to overestimate" its
impact on "the direction of further development of events is
Latin American u,untries." In a similar vein, Radio Moscow
the day before predicted that tae Chilean balloting would have
"broad political repercussions" on Latin American "democratic
and progressive cit?lea." The "strengthening" of the government's
position, it alleged, was "evidence of the upsurge of the liberation
processes, not only in Chile but throughout Latin America."
Despite Moscow's et'allient reaction to the elections, there were
sums intimations of doubt about the future stability of the
Allende regime. A Radio Moscow commentary on the Sth for example,
cited Chilean leftist sources as alleging that Chilean extreme
rightists "generously supported from the outside" have not
eschewed their coupist plans and that "the danger of civil war
remains very real." It concluded, however, that Chilean workers
were prepared "to repulse any reactionary attempts to foil
revolutionary changes."
HAVANA There has been very little Cuban resent on the
elections thus fat--a limited reaction that may be
related to Havana's fundamental skepticism about elrationr in
general and more specifically to its reservations about the
feasibility of Allende's effort to build socialism within the
confines of a "bourgeois" system. Last September Castro had
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buen embarrassed by foreign prose reports that he had privately
alleged that the Chileans would have to abandon "bourgeois
legality" if their revolution was to progress. While he
strongly denied the reports, they appear consistent with his
views on revolution in Latin America.
Havana's initial reaction was by domestic TV commentator Jose
Maria Gonalez Jerez on the 5th in an analysis of the Chilean
and French elections. Both contests, he alleged, demonstrated
"the victory of the people, their radicalization, and their
cleatcut veer toward th4 left--a characteristic of this nascent
post-Vietnam phase." Observing that opposition efforts to gain
the necessary two-thirds control (f the Senate for Allende's
impeachment "fell flat," Gonzal_., Jerez hailed the election
result as "a splendid battle won by the people," one that "sets
up more favorable conditions" for the UP to implement its program.
The only other monitored Cuban commentary, by PRENSA LATINA
correspondent Pedro Lobaina, examined the results of the
senatorial, races in Santiago province and their implications
for the 1976 presidential contest. In a Santiago-datelined
dispatch on 6 March, Lobaina noted that former Chilean President
and leading Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei was the chief vote-
getter among the senatorial candidates--the opposition captured
three out of the five of the senate seats at stake in the province--
and concluded that he had "emerged as the possible candidate for
the right" in the 1976 presidential elections. While noting
that of the two victorious UP candidates the Chilean Communist
Party's (PCCh) representative had garnered slightly more votes
than that of the Socialist Party (PS), he declared that it was
"still premature" to forecast who the left's presidential candidate
would be. Lobaina concluded that emergence of "a clear maen ity"
for either the PCCh cr the PS would "undoubtedly" influence the
choice of Allende's successor. PRENSA LATINA on the 5th had
carried a PS Political Commission statement declaring that the
election had resulted in the party's maintaining "its position
as the foremost political force in the UP."
Lobaina's commentary was unusual, since Havana has only rarely
acknowledged the sharp political rivalry between the two major
elements in the UP coalition. Although P&%NSA LATINA correspondents
in Santiago have reported to Havana in great detail on policy
and ideological conflicts between the PCCh and Allende on the one
hand and the more radical PS and extremist Leftist Revolutionary
Movement (MIR) on the other, these :.sports have rarely appeared
in Cuban media, presumably because of Castro's desire to avoid
any impression of interfere'ice in the internal politics of his
closest ally in the hemisphere.
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The only available Havana cowaentary on the internadine prtr-.dlection
conflict was by Lobaine on 8 Februat'y. Reporting the adoption
of the Up political platform after "two weeks of intensive debates
on tactics," he noted that "discrepancies among the ruling parties
arose over differing priorities." Without spelling out the
positions of either tarty, he indicated that the PCCh regarded
the consolidation of existing gains and the improvement of the
efficiency in state-run industries as a "key taskl" the PS argued
that "top priority" must be given to enlarging the "socially
owned" sector of the economy. While noting that top PCCh and PS
leaders, "in a unity gesture," had sat alongside Allende at
a political rely, Lobaina implied that the modus vivendi might
not survive the elections. The new UP platform, he charged,
"does not define the issues of the recent polemics." The document,
he went on to say, "appears to demonstrate, rather, the desire
of the UP parties to keep discrepancies from going any further
with just a short time to go before the crucial parliamentary
elections."
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C(INY10BNT1A1, YBIN TKKNDN
7 MARCH 1911
-29
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR
TITO STRESSES CLOSER TIES WITH MO COW, CONTIMIED NONALINEMENT
More cordial. relations with the Soviet Union, along with steadfas?
adherence to ~he nonalinement policy, were underscored by Tito in
a lengthy irtd rvisw published in the 23 Fabruary issue of VJESNIK,
the authoritative Zagreb daily ')f tl+e Socialist Alliance of
Worki.ng People (SAWP) of Croatfs. The interview, which also
included remarks on Belgrade's relations with the Peopio's
Republic of China and the United States, steered clear of the
internal situation--stil.1 marked by a continuing purge of "liberal"
elements, the latest victims being the top three officials of the
SAWP of Serbia.
The Yugoslav President was interviewed by VJESNIK editor Dare.
Janskovic on Brioni on S February, but the interview was not
publicized until the 21st when the TANJUG dourest?,c service
carded the text, published in identical form in VJESNIK two
days later. After discussing Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle
East ("the USSR has a right to be interested in the Middle East
situation"), Tito stressed that Belgrade's cooperation with the
Soviet Union was increas'ng, mainly in the economic caalm.
"Since our relations with the Soviet Union improved severrt
years ago," he noted, our economic croperation has developed
constantly." He added that the USSR "is now in third place,
and it could soon be in first place in our trade with foreign
countries." Alluding to the Soviet loan granted to Bol,grade
last November, Tito remarked that "as for the credits, who else
would give us half a billion dollars or even more than chat--
600 to 700 million?" and added that the amount would increase
to a billion within a year or two. The USSR, he remarked, is
also a valuable market for Yugoslav goods which cannot be sold
in Western markets.
Tito made it clear that the bad feelings aroused by the 1968
Czechoslovak crisis no longer stand in the way of improved
Moscow-Belgrade relations, noting that "what happened in
Czechoslovakia has been outgrown" although Yugoslavia's
disagreement with the intervention is well-known. "The Soviet
Union iu not at war anywhere," he added, praising the USSR's
"pacification" course and its "enormous" i?upport for liberation
movements in Vietnam and elsewhere.
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CUN Y I DIiNT I AL PI TZNDS
7 MARCH 1973
Tito portrayed Belgrade's policy of nonalinsment as approveJ by
the Soviet leaders, "primarily Sreshnsv," who "told me they
fully agree" with this policy as "beneficial In the struggle
against impartalism." At the as" time, he remarked that "a
little bit of time was needed" before the Soviets could publicly
express this view. Regarding the Soviet loan, he Losisted, as
Belgrade commentaries had last November, that the Yugoslavs had
made "nu political concessions" to get the loan. He declared
that Yuji Levi. is accepted we a nonalined socialist country
outalle the Warsaw Pact," pointing out that Belgrade had also
accepted credits from the West, including the United States,
"and yet we have not joined the Atlantic pact." One factor
underlying Tito's emphasis on continued nonallnement was high-
lighted by a Moscow-datelined report in the same newspaper on
the 28th stressing Yugoslav-Soviet disagreements on questions
of bilateral trade.
The Yugoslav leader portrayed re Litions with Poking as improving
though understandably less devslo,)sd than those with the USSR,
with which Belgrade has party and cultural as well as economic
ties. He insisted that he would not take sides in the Sino-
Soviet conflict, saying he had "told this to Comrade Brashnev,
too."
Relations between Belgrade and the United States, Tito declared,
"are not only normal but ale good, ragarclass of the fact that
we do not agree with their policy"--a disagreement hit said had
not prevented increased tourism and economic relations between
the two countries.
PRAVDA COVERAGE A Belgrade-datelined TASS report of Tito's
interview carried in PRAVDA on the 24th
briefly cited his reference to Belgrade's nonalined policy,
though not including his remark that the policy had Soviet
sanction, and featured his portrayal of developing Moscow-
Belgrade relations. While predictably omitting his favorable
remarks on relations with Peking, PRAVDA did include his
criticism of .unspecified attempts "to equate the USSR and the
United States" because both are big powers, without taking into
.account the respecti';o countries' specific actions.
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7 MARCH 1973
-27-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GOSPL N DEPUTY CHIEF Sd4DU/ OPPOSES CUTBACKS IN AGRICULTURE
In the wake of calls by Premier Kosygin and Gosplan Chairmen
Baybakov to cut back on construction starts, Gosplan First Deputy
Chairman Ti. .Sokolov has written an article in the February
PLANNED ECONOMY expressing concern that this may be done at
agriculture's expense. Where Saybakov at the December Supreme
Soviet session had sharply assailed the proliferation of local
construction projects. Sokolov came out in their defense on
grounds that such projects have enabled farms to most their urgent
construction needs. The journal containing Sokolov's article was
signed to pr,mss on 11 January--three weeks before the demotion of
top agricultural spokesman Polyanskiy. Kosygin and Baybakov have
usually associated themselves with the interacts of industry,
while Sokolov is a longtime agricultural spokesman like Polyanskiy.
The current drive to cut back local construction projects was
launched by Kosygin at a 30 Septeober Gesplan meeting. Kosygin
harshly assailed the proliferation of new construction projects
and especially the ballooning of construction financed with
noncentralized investments, which in 1971 exceeded the plan by
3.2 billion rubles. Baybakov's report on the 1973 plan at the
December ,upreme Sov i.t session likewise complained of "great
excesses" in the use of noncentralized investments, such as the
construction of unnecessary projects not stipulated in the plan
'nd the resultant diversion of material and labor resources from
construction of "very important" projects.
To ensure completion of the "most important" projects, the 1973
plan placed limits on capital investments made through noncentralized
sources. This, according to Saybakov, was designed to ensure that
the economic priorities atip!:` ted in the five-year plan would be
maintained. He pointed out ,..at the previously adopted level of
investment for agriculture was being retained, but there were also
hints in his speech that this sector may suffer. For example, in
citing the need to limit noncentralized investments, he exempted
projects fini..ced by sovkhozes operating under full cost-accounting
or using special-purpose bank credits, but he said nothing about
projects of other sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
The implications of the Kosygin-Baybakov austerity program appear
to have alarmed Sokolov, who emerged as an outspoken defender of
agriculture immediately following his appointment as Gosplan first
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CANPIDENT IAL IBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973
deputy chairman in the spring of 1970. In his latest article
Sokolov indicated that agriculture is highly dependent on
non-centralised investments because centralised funds are
still being diverted from that sector. He pointed out that
agricultural construction tasks were overfulfilled in 1971-72,
but only because of the overt ulfLlleent of non-centralised
financing. And he warned that "attempts to limit farms' rights
to use noncentralised capital investments under the pretext
of a shortage of material resources are objectively aimed at
housing back the growth of the material-technical bane of
agricultural production," especially since centrally funded
materials are not used for many farm construction projectr..
In another article, in the February ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE,
Sokolov had also discussed agricultural needs and urged industry
to seek out additional possibilities for producing more
fertilizer and equipment for agriculture.
CUTBACKS IN Sokolov's warnings appears to be directed at
"NONPRODUCTiON" cutbacks in the so-called "nonproduction"
sphere, which now accounts for only 15 percent
of state capital investment in agriculture end includes such
projects as the construction of rural housing, schools, hospitals,
and the like. Figures cited by Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. Gusev
in a February 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE article indicate that
while agriculture this year will retain approximately the previously
planned level of funds--16.4 billion rubles--construct 6an of
production facilities will increase, esp,e:aily for the two
priority fields of livestock complexes and land Lm;rovement.
Construction of livestock complexes will increase from 622 million
rubles in 1972 to 1.1 billion for 1973, while an October 1972
Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree "significantly
increased" investment in land improvement, raising it to 5.3 billion
rubles, according to Gusev. The increases were apparently obtained
at the expense of the nonproduction sphere.
Sokolov, like Polyanskiy, has favored increases in construction
not only of rural production facilities but also of rural housing
and other nonproduction projects as a means of raising rural living
standards. After transferring to Gosplan, Sokolov managed to alter
Gosplan's planning practices so that beginning in January 1971.
production and nonproduction projects In agriculture were planned
jointly rather than independently. The result, according to
Sokolov, has been better provision of resources for rural housing
and cultural projects, which in the past usually received the
leftovers. Investment in rural nonproductiun projects increased
conciderably in 1971 and building materials for such projects
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CON le II)IGN'I'IAI, FBIH TIU NQN
1 MARCH 1973
financed by kolkhozaN and sovkhozes were supplied from central
and republic resources, although, as Sokolov complained, some of
these materials were still being divertud to industrial uses,
Prospecto In this field appeared to briithten when RSFSR Premier
Voronov, whose republic was singltd out In 13 October 1971 RURAL
LIFE for delaying fin,ences and rea"urces for rural conatruct-ion,
was removed in late July 1971 and the Central Committee and
Council of Ministers adopted a 26 August 1971, decree levying quotas
on ministries for the production of building materials for rural
construction.
But the proliferation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz constructiou projects
presumably contributed much to the swelling of non-centrally
financed construction and to the abuses condemned by Baybakcv.
An article by L. Braginskiy in the February QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS
criticized the absence of central controls over kolkhoz construction
projects and urged that ouch projects be included in the plan.
Even Sokolov in his recent article conceded the need to improve
control of construction financed by kolkhuses and aovkhozes in order
to a,'oid "excesses" and "mismanagement," but the thrust of his
argument was to expand rather than restrict the scope of such
construction.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973
CHINA
AQRICULTURAL PRONOIJNCENENTS CONTINUE MODERATE POLICIES
The annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring planting, released
on 2 March, indicates no change in agricultural policies in the
wake of last year's disappointing harvest. The editoriai calls
for continued implementation of the party's moderate rural
policies, which have been in full effect sinco the fall of 1970,
following the second party plenum at which the position of
Lin Piao and the radicals was eroded. The "most important task"
for the coming year in agriculture, according to the editorial,
is intensif ication of "criticism aiming at the political and
ideological essence of the revisionist line pushed by swindlers
like Liu Shao-chi." Policies advocated include continued stress
ota all- ound develcpment and agricultural diversification, and
an unusually strong directive to cadres to personally work on the
farms, including "places with harsh living conditions." Implying
that natural conditions `his year are no better than those which
were vesponsibls for last year's disappointing harvest, the
editorial quotes "comrades" to saying' "If there is any doubt as
to whether or not there will be natural disasters, w4 must be
prepared for this eventuality. If we do not knew whether the
dater will be serious or mild, we must be prepared for a
serious one."
Continuation of recent ~:mliciea had been clearly indicated in
several provincial and central articles calling for agricultural
diversification even though grain harvests were down. A
28 February Peking radio commentary reiterating this line noted
that "merely grasping grain, that is, developing an economy
through one single sector, cannot satisfy the varied needs of
the state and of the people's daily life." This is a direct
attack on policies advocated at the height of the cultural
revolution when grain was stressed to the detriment of other crops.
The reversal of that line had not been reflected fully in the media
until the spring planting editorial in 1971, but a September 1970
editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, shortly after the second party plenum,
had laid the basis for the changes by denouncing leftist as well
as rightist errors in agriculture. There have been several recent
provincial references to that editorial as a continuing guide to
correct policy.
The 28 February Peking radio commentary criticized the view of
"some comrades" who have apparently decided that the answer to
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CONNIDENTIAL NiIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973
current grain shortages in to plant more "high-yield crops"
such as so-cghum and corn. Rejecting any quick-fix solution
to grain shortages, the commentary ,pointed out that low-
yielding crops can eventually be made to yield more and that
in any case emphasis on output alone, "causing an unbalanced
proportion of the crops planted, will affect the people's
daily life and the fulfillment of state plans."
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