TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 19, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS1
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
19 JUNE 1974
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iDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JUNE 1974
CONTENTS
Moscow Provides Brief, Factual Coverage, Scanty Comment . . . .
1
East Europe Allies See Unchanged U.S. Aims, Defend Kissinger .
4
Bucharest, Belgrade, Tirana Give Varying Treatment of Tour . . .
7
SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES
Politburo Shows Confidence About Foreign and Domestic Trends . .
10
EUROPE
Soviet Leaders Call for Progress at CSCE, MBFR Talks . . . . . .
18
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Moscow Publicizes Strong Criticism of JCP Policies . . . . . . .
21
INDOCHINA
PRG Memorandum Denounces "Continued" U.S. Vietnam Involvement .
23
Hanoi Presses Drive to Improve Labor Productivity, Management .
25
Cambodian Developments Draw Moderate Front, Peking Comment .
29
CHINA
College Enrollment Begins, No New Policy Changes Indicated . .
30
NOTES
PRC Nuclear Test; PRC-India Relations; Malayan CP;
PICA Ideological Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
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IVIXON MIDEAST TOUR
MOSCOW PROVIDES BRIEF. FACTUAL COVERAGE. SCANTY COMMENT
Moscow media have continued the muted, straightforward reporting
on President Nixon's Mideast trip, briefly noting his arrival in
each country. Apart from a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on
the 18th pegged to the U.S.-Israeli statement, Moscow comment for
the second week as been confined to PRAVDA's weekly international
review. TASS and the central press gave some aspects of the visits
fuller treatment, summarizing statements by the U.C. and Egyptian
presidents opening the Cairo talks and the statement of principles
issued at the and of that visit, as well as dinner speeches in
Damascus and the U.S.-Israeli statement concluding the President's
visit there.
M
Predictably, Soviet leaders did not mention President Nixon's
Middle East tour in their Supreme Soviet election speeches. Aside
from a bread hint by Brezhnev that the USSR might be entertaining
the idea of resuming diplomatic relations with Israel in his own
election speech, the Soviet top leadership confined Middle East
references to standard formulations. Meager Soviet comment on the
Arab-Israeli issue generally has also continued the same tack:
Without mentioning the President's tour, Moscow has complained
about "fabrications" in Western newspapers regarding Arab-Soviet
relations and has continued to portray the Soviet Union as Middle
East peacemaker.
MOSCOW COMMENT The PRAVDA review on the 16th noted that the
Arabs had rightly regarded the United States as
"the accomplice of the Israeli aggressors," but that the new
international climate provided an opportunity for a change in the
nature of U.S.-Arab relations. Obliquely suggesting Moscow's
misgivings over the implications of this change, PRAVDA ascribed
to "cold war advocates" a desire to interpret the President's
trip "in their own way and use it for a campaign aimed at under-
mining Arab-Soviet friendship." The paper claimed that the Arabs
themselves were rebuffing such attempts, and cited a Beirut paper
as stressing that developing relations with the United States
should not supplant the "historical friendship" with the Soviet
Union. The PRAVDA review displayed sensitivity over what it
described as "rightwing press" assertions that U.S. policy would
lead to elimination of the USSR's influence in the Middle East.
Replying to "Western observers" who were displaying enthusiasm for
"'Americanization' of the Middle East," PRAVDA recalled Secretary
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Kissinger's assurance in his 6 June news conference that the
United States had neither the intention nor the capability to
eliminate Soviet influence from the region.
The Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Arabic on the 18th
saw the U.S. affirmation of readiness to provide Israel with
weapons on a long-term basis and supply "substantial" economic,
assistance as encouragement to the Israelis to maintain their
occupation of Arab territory. While the broadcast cautioned
against alleged U.S. and Israeli efforts to postpone resumption
of the Geneva conference in order that they might deal with the
Arab states separately, it did acknowledge that "certain changes"
had occurred inthe.United States' Mideast, policy which gave the
Arabs "an opportunity to alter their relations with ,America.'..,
it ascribed much of the credit for these changes to the Soviet
Union.
COVERAGE OF VISIT In limited reports on the various speeches
made during the trip, Moscow has tended to
play up statements that coincide with its own propaganda positions
on the Middle East problem. Thus, an Arabic-language broadcast
on the 14th cited Egyptian President as-Sadat as declaring that
disengagement was only a step toward solving the issue on the
basib of Security Council resolutions. Syrian President al-Asad
was similarly quoted by TASS on the 16th as calling disengagement
a first step toward a firm peace. The TASS account noted President
Nixon's remark that the first steps already taken were only a
beginning, and the task was now to advance step by step toward
a just and lasting peace. TASS also cited the President as saying
the United States understood Syria's concern over the Palestinian
question.
In reporting the U.S.-Egyptian statement of principles, TA3: on
the 14th made no mention of the fact that the document called for
a peace settlement that would take into account the "legitimate
interests of all the peoples of the Middle East, including the
Palestinian people." The account did note that the statement
declared peace could only be attained through negotiations within
the framework of the Geneva peace conference. TASS also reported
that the United States and Egypt would begin negotiating an agree-
ment on nuclear energy, and that a provisional agreement would be
,concluded this month on delivery of U.S. nuclear fuel to Egypt.
A 37 June 'PASS report on the U.S.-Israeli statement also noted that
the two countries would sign an agreement on cooperation in nuclear
energy and U.S. delivery of nuclear fuel to Israel, and that a
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temporary agreement on the sale of such fuel would be signed this
month. The TASS account focused on the matter of aid, reporting
that the President reaffirmed that military deliveries would be
continued on a long-term basis and that the United States would
give "substantial economic 'aid "' to cover Israel's expenses in
maintaining its military potential.
TASS on the 16th reported without comment the announcement on the
resumption of U.S.-Syrian relations. TASS reports on the U.S.-Israeli
and U.S.-Jordanian statements noted the President's invitations
to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and King Husayn to visit the United
States, but the invitation to President as-Sadat was not mentioned
in TASS' report on the U.S.-Egyptian statement. Other than a two-
sentence report on the President's arrival in Jiddah, the visit to
Saudi AraLia was ignored.
BREZHNEV CN MIDEAST In a possible hint of Soviet readiness to
resume diplomatic relations with Israel,
Brezhnev in his 14 June Supreme. Soviet election speech declared
that "progress" toward a settlement would create conditions for
the development of Soviet relations with "all" countries of the
region. This is by far the broadest hint of this nature to be
made by any Soviet leader since the October war.* Heretofore,
the only remarks on this subject had been limited to the assertion
that the Soviet Union did not oppose Israel as such but only its
policies. Gromyko took this position in his 21 December 1973
address to the opening session of the Geneva conference. He
added that "the situation may change when Israel will confirm with
deeds its readiness to accept an honest and mutually acceptable
settlement." Kosygin had indicated much the same position when
questioned at a Stockholm press conference on 5 April last year
about resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations. According to NEW TIMES
,(No. 15, 13 April. 1973), Kosygin,. said,,theLSoviet Union. believed- .
the state of Israel had a right to exist, "but this does not mean
that we can come to terms with its aggressiorL."
On other Mideast issues, Brezhnev referred rpprovingly to the
Sinai and Golan disengagement agreements, but in keeping with
recent Soviet comment described them as "only the first steps."
He declared that examination of the "main questicns" at the Geneva
peace conference would be an "extremely complicated task" which would
* Israeli Foreign Minister Alon was reported by.Jerusalem radio on
19 June as saying he saw no change in the USSR's Middle East policy
and that relations with the Soviet Union "are as'bad as they have
ever been since diplomatic relations were broken."
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require the joint effortc3 of the "states" taking part in the
conference. Although he did not refer directly to Palestinian
representation, his use of the word "states" rather than parties
or participants could be taken as an indication that Moscow might
be inclining toward Palestinian inclusion under the auspices of
the Jordanian delegation. The Soviet Union has not spelled out
its position on this point; it is on record only as endorsing an
undefined Palestinian presence at Geneva. It is equally possible
that Moscow is still undecided on the best way of handling
Palestinian representation as long as the concerned Arab states
and the Palestinians have not thrashed this out among themselves.
OTHER SOVIET LEADERS Remarks on the Middle East problem in
election speeches by other Soviet leaders
reiterated standard themes. Podgornyy on the 13th said only that
despite the fact that a start had been made on talks for a political
settlement, "a highly complex situation" still prevailed in the
region. Kosygin on the 12th noted that the conflict was shifting
to the arena of political settlement, and declared that the "forth-
coming continuation" of the Geneva conference must lead to a
solution of the "main problems"--Israeli withdrawal from all
occupied Arab territories, insuring the lawful rights of the
Palestinians, and guaranteeing the security of all states of the
region.
Gromyko, speaking in Minsk on the 10th, insisted that disengagement
was only the first step toward a settlement and the first step,
in the "liberation of Arab lands." He predicted that the struggle
for a genuine settlement within the Geneva framework would be a
difficult one. Unlike the other Soviet leaders, Gromyko repeated
previous Soviet admonitions against partial measures: "One cannot
allow just half measures to which Israel and its protectors would
like to restrict themselves," he declared, adding that Israel had
yet to furnish proof of its readiness to turn from a "policy of
aggression" to a policy of peace.
EAST EUROPE ALLIES SEE UNCHANGED U.S. AIMS. DEFEND KISSINGER
With varying degrees of intensity, scattered comment from Moscow's
orthodox East European allies generally argued that President
Nixon's tour did not signify any basic change in "imperialist"
aims in the Middle East, but was undertaken because of "realistic"
U.S. awareness of the new Arab clout stemming from successes
in the October war and the oil embargo. These countries'.commentators
saw a connection between the trip and the President's Watergate-related
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difficulties at home,. reiterating their standard charge that the
President's critics are motivated mainly by opposition to detente.
Such motives were flamed by Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
for the attacks on Secretary Kissinger, in the wake of the Secretary's
Salzburg press conference. The orthodox East European comment also
duly included tributes to the Mideast role of the Soviet Union,
under Brezhnev's leadership.
U.S. POLICY Czechoslovakia's Brati.s.lava PRAVDA on 13 June,
viewing the President's trip e,a "unrluestionably
the high point of a demonstration of the 'new' U.S. policy" in the
Middle East, charged at the same time that the United States and
"other imperialist forces" aimed, as before, at capitalist ex-
ploitation and undermining of progressive forces in the area.
Dominant in U.S. thinking, the commentary added, was the real-
ization that oil is found in the Arab countries, not in Israel.
Another Bratislava paper, SMENA, declared on the 19th that the
results of the President's visit to Israel confirmed that there
were "no essential changes" in U.S. policy toward the Arabs or its
political, financial, and military support to Israel. On the 15th,
a dispatch from RUDE PRAVO's Washington correspondent predicted
that while the President would be welcomed throughout his tour, he
would be repeatedly confronted with the "decisive," still unsolved
Palestinian problem, first raised by President as-Sadat during
the Cairo visit. The dispatch paid tribute to the results of
Moscow's "patient And unostentatious diplomacy" in persuading the
Arabs to accept a UN settlement. The East Berlin domestic service
on the 18th grudgingly praised the President for pressing Israel
into a "change of course" toward a peaceful solution. The commentary
doubted at the same time whether the President's influence could be
"decisive" on this score.
While Prague; Sofia;. and East. Berlin took a largely cynical view
regarding allegedly unchanged U,S. pro-Israeli policy, Poland and
Hungary were relatively muted on this score. Thus, ZY.CIF, WARSd%AWY
on the 12th was favorable in tone in attributing two basic aims to
the President's trip: first, to convince the Arabs through aid
agreements that the present, more evenhanded U.S. policy represented
"a durable change"; and second, to show Moscow, on the eve of the
President's trip there, his readiness to cooperate with the USSR
in restoring peace to the area. The paper noted in this connection
that President Nixon "is known as a consistent advocate of detente
and coexistence." And the Budapest daily MAGYAR NEMZET, also on
the 12th, praised the timing of the trip--after the troop disengagement
agreements and before the next phase of the Geneva negotiations and
the Moscow summit--and predicted that a just settlement could be
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achieved "if all sides display good will." An 18 June connnentary
on Budapest domestic TV, while characterizing current U.S. Mides.st
policy as "a double game," assessed the overall results of the tour
as "fruitful" and "successful" with regard to detente and to the
President's standing at home.
WATERGATE In pointing to domestic motivations for the President's
trip, Bratislava PRAVDA on the 12th stressed that he
"is under the furious pressures of the adversaries of detente, and
this is reflkseted'!: in the course of the Watergate affair" and the
Congressional impeachment deliberations. In favorable tones, the
commentary noted that the Middle East trip could divert attention
from these domestic matters and direct it toward the Nixo-,:: Admin-
istration's efforts to complete the transition from a policy of
confrontation to one of negotiation. In a similar vein, c talk on
the Budapest domestic radio on the 10th...remarked that "while the
wrangling over the raising of impeachment charges is in progress
in Congress and in other forums, the American President is obviously
concentrating his efforts on international diplomacy." And the
12 June ZYCIE WARStAWY also gave the President the benefit of the
doubt in commenting that "it would be a considerable simplification
to place this trip, as some commentators are doing, merely in the
context of the political showdown between the White House and
Congress," adding theft "its scope and significance reach far beyond
Washington."
KISSINGER The Hungarians, followed by Czechoslovakia and Poland,.
promptly denounced the charges against Secretary
Kissinger which occasioned. his threat to resign at his 11 June press
conference in Salzburg. Early the next day the Budapest radio carried
a comment from its New York correspondent to the effect that, in
the U.S. domestic'controversy, "the attack is now directed, through
the person of the Secretary of state, against the main foreign policy
line of the Nixon Administration." A Budapest TV commentary the
same day predicted that the possibility of Kissinger's resignation
would cast a shadow over the President's talks with both Arab and
Israeli leaders. This talk, as well as the government paper MAGYAR
'EIRLAP the next day,, publicized favorable comments on Kissinger by
Senator Fulbright and other Congressional leaders.
Subsequent attacks on the Secretary's critics by Polish media
culminated in a 16 June Broniarek commentary in the party daily
TRYBUNA LUDU. Entitled "Rumors and Insinuations," the article
construed the charges against Kissinger as a warning from pro.-
Israeli elements to the Secretary and President Nixon that they
should not lose sight of Israel's interests during negotiations
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with the Arabs. The article also characterized the charges as
"a new stage (since H. Kissinger has been spared up to now)" of
the alleged campaign by U.S. politicians, such as Senator Jackson,
against U.S.-Soviet detente.
A Washington correspondent's dispatch published in Prague's RUDE
PRAVO on the 14th, while cautioning that speculation regarding
Kissinger's guilt or innocence would be premature, denounced
the raibirg of "old charges" against the Secretary at this
juncture--at the start of the President's Mideast trip and before
the Moscow summit. Charging that the Washington POST played "a
considerable role in the anti-Kissinger campaign," the dispatch
added that "once it proved impossible to wreck Nixon's trip to
Moscow, Kissinger was placed on the firing line."
BUCHAREST. BELGRADE, TIRANA GIVE VARYING TREATMENT OF TOUR
A sizeable volume of Yugoslav comment was uniformly favorable
both with regard to the President's tour and to Secretary Kissinger,
while the Romanians have thus far refrained from commenting on the
trip, limiting their coverage to brief, factual reports. Albanian
comment, predictably hostile to the President and Kissinger, viewed
the tour as symbolizing both conflict and "collusion" between
Moscow and Washington.
ROMANIA As the only East European country that has relations
with Israel, Romania was virtually silent about the
trip, limiting its coverage to terse reports. Refraining from
comment, it avoided having to join or break with the other Warsaw
Pact countries in their praise of the Soviet Union's role in the
Middle East situation. The party daily SCINTEIA noted in a Cairo
dispatch on the 12th that the "normalization" of U.S.-Egyptian
relations was taking place "in the framework of important develop-
ments which occurred in the Mideast situation, that is, the Geneva
conference and the disengagement on the Sinai and Golan fronts."
However, it avoided any reference to either the U.S. or Soviet
mediating roles. This contrasted with a 1 June SCINTEIA article
on. the Syrian-Israeli disengagement, in which Gromyko and the Soviet
Union were given praise equal to that for Kissinger and the United
States.
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade media before and during the trip, took a.
positive view of the President's initiative in visit-
ing the Mideast and expressed opt{mism that the visit would serve
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useful purposes. Belgrade generally displayed little concern that
the visit might create problems in U.S.-Soviet or Arab-Soviet re-
lations.
Describing the visit as "undoubtedly useful," BORBA on the 11th
viewed it as. necessary to "disclose the depth and complexity!' of
the Mideast crisis, but noted that its "full significance" would
be measured by progress achieved in oettI,ing :the .crisis; "',B11grade
media repeatedly emphasized that the crisis could not be settled
without resolving the Palestinian question, and on the 15th a
TANJUG commentary singled out as the "greatest result" of the
visit up to that time the U.S.-Egyptian statement recognizing the
"interests" of the Palestinians. TANJUG pointed out, however,
the distinction between "interests" and "a real act of granting
recognition to the national rights. of the people of Palestine,"
which "is still rejected in practice." Even prior to the sign-
ing of the communique, Belgrade radio commentator Milutin Milenkovic
on the 12th pointed out Arab satisfaction with the trend in U.S.
relations, citing the opinion of unnamed Ara?.; sources that the
United States had "essentially changed its position" on the Mideast
situation and was adopting "an objective, and even a neutral,
mediating" role between the. Arabs and Israelis. Milenkovic
qualified these observations by noting that "no breaking up of
the real alliance" with Israel had occurred.
Yugoslav comment on Moscow's-attitude toward the trip shifted
somewhat following the tumultuous.: welcome given the President
in Egypt. A Teslic BORBA commentary on the 11th, the day before
his arrival, maintained that the visit was "welcomed" not only
by the Arabs and-the Israelis but also by the Soviet Union, which
saw the tour as a "component and indispensable part of joint
American-Soviet efforts to reach a just solution of the crisis
through negotiations in Geneva." The Egyptians' enthusiastic
welcome for Nixon, however, saemed to raise questions about
possible Soviet irritation. On the 17th Zagreb radio commentator
Milika Sundic described the Cairo treatment as an "embarrassing
episode" which, he said, would be "quickly forgotten, if for no
other reason than because it is not in the interest of the United
States to upset relations with Moscow." Claiming that Washington-
Moscow relations remained not only good "but even better," Sundic
predicted that Cairo would do all in its power to "iron out its
difficulties with Moscow as soon as possible."
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Comment on Kissinger's Salzburg press conference was generally
sympathetic. On the day after the news conference TANJUG cited
Arab press comment that allegations against Kissinger were the
result of a "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at undermining the visit,
and Belgrade radio commentator Kosta Timotijevic forecast that
Kissinger "has all the chances to survive politically both the
present and who knows how many future presidents,"
ALBANIA Tirana comment emphasized that the United States had
not abandoned its close ties with Israel and that
President Nixon was aiming at strengthening Washington's "imperialist"
influence in the Arab countries at the expense of Moscow, even though
the two big powers continued to operate in "collusion" against the
Arabs, On the opening day of the trip the Tirana domestic radio in
an unattributed commentary outlined the President's three main
objectives: to present U.S. "imperialism" as "peaceloving" and to
gain "political capital at home"; to erase the image in Arab minds
of the United States as "pro-Israeli, warmongering. and profoundly
hostile" to the Arabs; and to "undermine" Moscow's position, just
as Moscow was trying to do to Washington. The Washington-Moscow
rivalry, however, was viewed as tempered by an "understanding"
between the two that fundamental Mideast problems should remain
unsettled so that the two superpowers could emerge in the future
in the role of "arbiters of the fate of the Arab peoples under the
guise of so-called special responsibilities" in the Mideast.
The party daily ZERI I POPULLIT, in an article carried in full by
ATA on the 13th,contgnded that President Nixon was practically
forced to visit the Arab states in order to seek a "disengagement"
between them and the United States once he had seen the "dark
perspective" both for the United States and Israel resulting from
Arab successes in the October war, the oil embargo, and rising
public opinion in favor of the Arabs. The daily warned the Arabs
to beware of "vain promises for peace" and "various diplomatic
maneuvers."
Picking up American press reports on Kissinger's alleged wire-
tapping role, Tirana portrayed the allegations as facts. In an
unattributed article titled "Kissinger--Participant in the Water-
gate Scandal," ZERI I POPULLIT on the 11th cited the Washington
STAR-NEWS as reporting that "he had failed to speak the truth"
in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last
September. Although Kissinger's Salzburg press conference was
ignored, ATA on the 18th interpreted the Mideast visit as designed
to save both Nixon's and Kissinger's "skins."
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SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES
POLITBURO SHOWS CONFIDENCE ABOUT FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRENDS
In the current round of electioneering for the USSR Supreme Soviet,
begun on 18 April. and completed on 16 June, Soviet leaders have
sought to project a public image of confidence about the course of
world affairs. Following the pattern of previous elections, most
of the leaders' speeches were made at republic or regional
gatherings and were carried in full by local media and reported
in abbreviated summaries in the central press. The speeches in
Moscow by the CPSU Politburo troika--Brezhnev, Podgornyy and
Kosygin--received the most extensive national publicity, with
Brezhnev's climactic election speech the only one to be carried
in full by the central press and on all domestic radio channels.
The version of Kosygin's remarks which appeared in MOSKOVSKAYA
PRAVDA, however, was slightly longer than Brezhnev's speech,
which in turn was longer than Podgornyy's.
In the distribution of plaudits, Brezhnev was praised lavishly not
only by members of his own political entourage but also by leaders
of unmistakably independent stature. The conspicuous display of
support for Brezhnev's leadership, which has been subjected to
increasingly heavy veiled criticism since mid-October of last
year,* suggests that the praise may be essentially an exercise in
public relations designed to project an image of "monolithic
unity" on the eve of President Nixon's visit to Moscow.
TROIKA ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS Kosygin staked out a position as
the most consistent advocate of
international cooperation within the leadership in his remarks
carried live on Moscow domestic radio on 12 June. Podgornyy, on
the other hand, adopted the stance of a more cautious supporter
of detente in his 13 June speech, emphasizing still urgent
internaticnal problems and paying greater deference to the special
role of Soviet might and initiative in compelling Western leaders
to recognize the futility of a policy of confrontation toward the
Soviet Union. In this respect, the .twa -leadera::seemed, to be
addressing constituencies at different ends of the political
spectrum.
* For background on leadership developments, see the TRENDS of
15 May 1974, page 15, 30 May 1974, pages 23-37, and 12 June 1974,
pages 29-30, and the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT OF 29 May 1974, "The Struggle
for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences."
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Brezhnev, in closing nut this round of speeches on the l'th in
a live broadcast from the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses,
avoided both extremes in giving the most detailed exposition
of Soviet foreign policy, Brezhnev dwelt on Soviet detente
initiatives, breaking new ground in some areas, while at the
same time paying homage to Soviet defense might and eschewing
the more outspokenly internationalist orientation of Kosygin.
All three leaders, as well as virtually all others speaking
during the election campaign, reaffirmed the recent Soviet
priorities in world affairs, combining a recognition of the
decisive role of U.S.-Soviet relations in furthering the aims,
of Soviet detente diplomacy with condemnation of Peking for
its alliance with the most reactionary elements of "imperialism."
Kosygin returned repeatedly to the theme of international, inter-
dependenco, arguing that the balance of power and the level of
armaments made detente and international cooperation the only
feasible solution to internationp' disputes. What was urgently
needed, he maintained, was "a new 4ystem of international
relations which corresponds to the interests not of just one
state or a narrow group but of all mankind." Notably, most of
these remarks were dropped from the slightly abridged version
of his speech which appeared in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Kosygin
pointed to favorable developments in Vietnam and the Middle East
and the "substantial progress" since the 24th CPSU Conprois in
1971 in eliminating "'iotbeds" of international conflict. He
noted that Washington and Moscow had agreed to "coordinate"
their foreign policies in the interests of peace.
Podgornyy, avoiding the internationalist rhetoric of Kosygin,
focused instead on the role of Soviet might and the changing
world balance of power its effectuating the "turnabout" from
confrontation to detente. His assessment of the state of the world
also contrasted with that of Kosygin. According Lo Podgornyy,
detente was gaining strength, but because it was outly in its
initial stages, it was "hard to say" how long the rest of the trip
would take. Shelepin and Ponomarev had anticipated Podgornyy:.in
pointing out that detente was only in its first stages. Podgornyy
pointed to the "highly complex" situation in the Middle East and
the continuing struggles in Vietnam and Cambodia as trouble spots
threatening "the outbreak of new armed conflicts." His emphasis
on the pitfalls in the international situation was underscored
by his warning about the "increasing nuclear missile potential"
of China. Only Grechko, among the top Soviet leaders, has previously
evinced similar concern, in remarks made last January in an awards
speech in Kazan that were deleted from the abbreviated summary
published in the central press.
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Brezhnev seemed closer to Kosygin than to Podgornyy in his
c,ptimistio account of Soviet detente diplomacy, his portrayal
of the "obvious progress" in U.S.-Soviet relations, and his
closing remark that the change of government in Portugal,
not that in Chile, represented the prevailing trend in world
affairs. Like Kosygin, Brezhnev saw progress in Vietnam rid
the Middle East and concluded that the 24th Congress peace
program plank on eliminating "hotbeds" of conflict was being
successfully fulfilled. Brezhnev placed particular importance
on reaching further agreements with the United States on arms
limitation in announcing readiness to sign a ban on underground
nuclear tests and reach agreeement on lim:ting the development
of new types of weapons. He dismissed "pessimistic assessments"
in the foreign press about the President's upcoming visit.
But like Podgornyy, Brezhnev made only passing reference to the
theme of international interdependence. While acknowledging
with Kosygin the foreig policy role of Soviet defense might,
Brezhnev went on to note that because of a "failure to halt the
arms race," Moscow must continue to strengthen its defense might.
At the same time, Brezhnev drew from arguments by spokesmen
from Moscow's prestigious foreign policy institutes in maintaining
that national security was not sync,nymous with military might.
In. a remark that seemed Clearly aimed at those opposed to
limitaUiauscon,:the.Soviet atrategic.:arsenal, Brezhaev,played down
the risk in limiting or reducing Scviet arms, arguing that the
greater danger lay in continuing the arms race.
OTHER LEADERS ON KGB chief Andropov, speaking in Stupino,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS near Moscow, on 5 June presented one of the
strongest cases for detente, arguing at length
that it is the "logic of life" and that despite any "turns and
zigzags," Western leaders will pursue detente because they realize
it is "the only possible and necessary basis for relations between
states with opposing systems." He especially praised summit
meetings and declared that Moscow is determined to make the talks
with the President productive.
Foreign Minister Gromyko, speaking in Minsk on 10 June, also
praised summitry and the benefits of improved U.S.-Soviet
relations, declaring that the imminent summit talks "must be no
less important than the previous ones." Shelepin, speaking in
Leningrad on 3 June, cited Lenin on the value of peaceful
coexistence in facilitating domestic development. He welcomed
the dampening of "hotbeds of dangerous confrontation and war,"
the movement toward a Middle East settlement, "the historic
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Soviet-American agreements," espec!.ally on avoiding nuclear war,
and the prospects for long-term international economic relations.
Kirilenko, speaking in Sverdlovsk on 11 June, stressed the
importance of the improvement cf 11.S.-Soviet relations and the
efforts to end the arms race. He lauied the productiveness of
past summitry.
Grishin and Pelshe and Shcherbitskiy also roundly praised the
successes of Soviet detente diplomacy in briefer remarks on
foreign affairs, while Shcherbitskiy praised in particular
improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Ponom:.rev stressed the "extremely
important" results of detente, but he went on to criticize increased
military spending in the West. Shelepin and Gromyko did the same,
adding that it is necessary to continue strengthening the Soviet
armed forces even while pursuing detente.
Suslov, speaking in Leningrad on 11 June, blended caution with his
optimism about world affairs. While praising the "outstanding
successes" of Soviet policy and noting "a certain lessening of the
military danger," he pointed to the "huge" military spending in
the West and the creation of "new types of weapons of annihilation."
Rejecting "bourgeois-apologetic" and "revisionist" arguments that
capitalism is changing its nature, he recalled the "lessons of the
past" that the Soviet Union should do everything to strengthen its
defense ao as not to be caught unprepared. The version of Suslov's
speech published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA included the observation
that detente is "based precisely" on the change in the world balance
of power in favor of socialism. Suslov was also reported to have
declared that the successes of Soviet detente diplomacy "create
opportunities for further peaceful offensive and open more favorable
prospects for further pushing ahead by revolutionary forces . ... ."
The 8 June PRAVDA version of Mazurov's speech, delivered in Minsk
the previous day, portrayed him as clearly downplaying East-West
detente, ab a stressed the overriding goal of "strengthening the
world socialist system" and comSin{.ng a "constructive" approa,'h
to foreign policy with "a firm rebuff to imperialist aggressiun and
uncompromising struggle against the class enemy." However, the
version of his speech carried in SOVIET BEL'JRUSSIA included some
favorable comments on detente av well, including statements
expressing confidence that the new leaders of France and West Germany
would continue to seek good relations with Moscow.
Defense Minister Grechko, not surprisingly, dwelt on the limitations of
Soviet detente diplomacy. Speaking in Moscow on 4 June, he urged the
Politburo to base its foreign policies not ou the most probable course
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of world events but on worst possible case assumptions.
Grechko noted that strcngthening peace and s.rongthan ag defense
ore "indivisible" goals. He attributed the positive changes in
the international siLuation to past strengthening of Soviet
economic and military might and pointed out that the Weat was
continuing to increase military preparation9,,*
TROIKA ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Within the Politburo troik6,
Kosygi^ again emerged as the most
forthright advocaL of economic reforms tailored to the requirements
of a modern industrial society and the tastes of the Soviet niidd]
class. Stressing the complewsntary nature of central and local
der7lion-making and the availability of skilled personnel at alp,
leve13 of society, the premier pointedly recalled the rocantt "ve.ey
important" decision to grant enterprises in light industry auth.,,,?'ty
to determine production quotas on he basis of I'd:i.'r.act ties" witr
trading agencies. This decision, he oatd, was motivated by the reed
for greater responsiveness by industry to consumer demand. In
addition to a7 "ending to work "now in progress" tova, 1 reforms in
industrial manr,E?zent, Kosygin was 1.vish with praise for the
achievements and potentials"ies of Soviet science and technology
in promoting economic and social progress.
The remarks of Brezhnev and Podgornyy on domestic affairs for the
most part followed conventional lines, the most notable exception
being Brezhnev's references to the role of science in promoting
economic progress. In particular, Brezhnev praised the great
cont-cibution made by scientists, mentioned the anniversary of the
USSR Academy of Sciences and praised its "outstanding" president,
M.V. Keldysh.
OTHER LEADERS ON The speeches of Andropov, Kivilenko, Mazurov,
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Griehir.,, Shelepin, Shcherbitskiy, Masherov,
Ustinov and Solomentsev concentrated on a
broad range of economic issues, while those of Polyanskiy and Kulakov
focused almost exclusively on agriculture. Andropov in particular
appeared to argue for significant reforms, declaring "it would be
incorrect to think :;hat the socialist system by itself ensures us
* The TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 4-6, discusses in more detail
some recent .. guments of Grechko and other military leaders on the
interconnection of detente and Soviet defense poly-y.
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all the necessary blessings." He stressed the overriding
importance of "questions of raising the effectiveness of public
production and the introduction into praictice of the achievements
of the scientific-technical revolution."
Agricultural overseer Kulakov pol%ited to the need to inculcate
Soviet administrators with a "feeling for what is new, [to] know
the fine points of modern technology, economics and organization
of production, and find the most effective ?,aths for deciding
growing tanks." He cited Lenin's injunction not to be satisfied
with traditional methods of managing the economy but "without
fail to go further and without fail to strive for more,-
Devoting much of his speech to economic modernization, Belorussian
First Secretary M.asherov pressed hard for a change frow "archaic
methods" of admi.nistratio"to "a modern, scientifically-based,
rational system" in both produc4ion any' social spheres, declaring
that "without this, ar.~ other measured to speed scientific-technical
progress, as the-_V say, will not pay off o produce proper return."
He stressed t.hrr: economic administration now depends increasingly on
computers, mathematical methods and other scientific achievements,
and 'te encouraged uinistries to experiment. These remarks were not
carried in PRAVDA'n abbreviate;: version of his speech.
Dwelling on leadership of the economy, improvement of planning and
incentives,, and use of scientific-technical achievements, First
Deputy Pre`jier Mazurov declared that under present conditions.
questions of labor productivity, return on ir-restment and quality
of production are "the main yardsticks of economic activity,"
rather than only questions of quantitative plan fulfillment.
He praised the "skilled cadres of workers, specialists and economic
leaders" and stated that the CPSU Central Committee demands "a truly
party style of work, a scientific approach in all spheres of
economic activity." In comments reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA but
not in PRAVDA, he noted that industry is changing over to a two-three
tier system of production associations and that new measures are
presently being worked oui: to make economic levers more effective.
CPSU Secretary Demichev, in his speech as reported in the Moscow
LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA of 1 June, emphasized that "the strength of our
economy ensures the strength of our defense" and that the United
States--the most powerful country of the capitalist world--is forced
to talk to us on equal terms." Stressing the need to shift
production emphasis from quantity to quality, he declared that "we
rust bear in mind that our products are going onto world markets
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on a broader and broader front and are competing with goods
which capitalist firms produce," and that "we can. and must
produce goods not worse but better than in the most highly
developed countries." He praised the work of the Academy of
Sciences, "the 250th anniversary of whic,, -..e are observing."
He went on to declare that "science now has turned into a
direct productive force in society" and that "its achievements
facilitate speeding the growth of labor productivity, savings
in working time, and raising the quality and reliability of
products." Only the referenci to the ace.d,a,my's anniversary was
included in PRAVDA's version of Domiahev's speech.
Ustinov, like Demichev, also praised the Academy of Sciences,
while Shelepin and Pelshe limited their praise to the general
achievements of Soviet science.
Suslov's comments on the economy were notable primarily for the
admission that meat shortages are continuing despite the efforts
to overcome them. He stated that "we still have difficulties
in supplying the population with some provisions, in particular,
with meat and meat products" an.. that "although the production
of meat in 1973 increased by 1.7 million tons over 1969, some
oblasts are still short of :ueit." This passage appeared only
in the LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA version of his speech.
TREATMENT OF EREZHNEV While almost all speakers lauded
Brezhnev, some--Kirilenko, Mazurov,
Pelshe, Grishin, Shelepin, Solomentsev and Rash idov--ww~?te lavish
or even servile in their praise. Andropov, Mazurov, Kunayev,
S':alov, Podgornyy, :tomariov, Rashidov and Ponomarev refer ced to
the Politburo "headed hy" Brezh,.Lev--the first such usage by
Andropov, Mazurov, and Suslov. This deference by the latter
three Politburo members appears to reflect different motivations
from those or Brezhnev's cronies Kirilenko and Kunayev and the
habitually servile Rashidov. Presumably, the more indeperent-
minded Politburo members were determined to project an image of
solidarity on the eve of the Moscow summit.
Most praise centered on Brezhnev's role in foreign rather than
domestic affairs, with some--especially Kirilenko---appearing to
credit foreign policy successes to Brezhnev, while others--notably
Andropov---appearing to champion their own viewpoints on foreign
policy and to associate Prezhnev with those views. Kirilenko
praised Brezhnev's "political wisdom, organizational talent and
selfless work" and his "outstanding personal contribution" to
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foreign policy, and he attributed the improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations largely to the two U.S.-Soviet summit meetings.
Gxishin, who called Brezhnev head of the Central Committee, also
stressed the "important role" in detente played by Brezhnev's
visits to the United States, France, West Germany and India,
"the nc+gotiations conducted by him and:the treaties and agreements
signed by him." Praising Brezhnev at 3angth, Pelshe cited
Brezhnev's "huge personal contribution" to formulating and
conducting foreign policy and his "tireless, fruitful activity"
in this sphere. Shelepin likewise called Brezhnev an "outstanding
party and state figure" and attributed "the large number of
important international actions" to the "huge personal contribution"
of Brezhnev. Mazurov also praised Brezhnev's "big personal
contribution" to developing the economy, culture and. peace.
Solomentsev called Brezhnev an "outstanding" leader and praised
his "huge personal contribution" to socio-economic development,
peace and agriculture."
Though not lavish in praise of Brezhnev, Kosygin managed to concede
Brezhnev a "great creative contribution" to: foreign policy.
Gromyko also noted Brezhnev's "hug." contribution, and Andropov his
"tireless" work for peace a.id his "selflessness, wisdom and courage"
in foreign affairs. Outside of calling Brezhnev head of he
Politburo, Suslov, Podgornyy and Ponomarev had few compliments
for Brezhnev. Least solicitous toward Brezhnev was G'rechko, whose
speech reflected concern about possible military cutbacks.
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EUROPE
SOVIET LEADERS CALL FOR PROGRESS A'r CSCE, MBFR TALKS
in their references to the CSCE and MBFR in their pre-election
speeches, Soviet leaders have, combined criticisms of the West
with renewed professions of confidence that the deadlocks
presently.affecting both conferences could be broken. Kosygin,
for example, in, referring to the CSCE, called on the West to
undertake a "high-level" assessment of the progress to date,
seemingly suggesting that an appropriate response would find a
r;;orresponding resonance., in Moscow and open the way to a successful
conclusion of the second stage. Brezhnev, in referring to MBFR,
avoided the usual criticism of the West for allegedly seeking
one-sided-advantages and professed the Soviet Union's willing-
ness to enter into "partial measures." In the meantime, Soviet
cotmnent has be3un to link the prospects for progress with the
upcoming Presidential visit to Moscow, suggesting that the time
is appropriate for a final push to reach agreement.
CSCE In his election speech on the 12th, Kosygin said that
"a great deal" had been accomplished but that "along
with the positive results some dark sides have emerged."
Observing that the conference "cannot adopt decisions which
would contradict the legitimate interests of its participsnti,
or would signif.;, interference in their internal affairs," he
went on to invs'.e.the.West to undertake a serious assessment, of
the current situation. He saidA
We hold that the time has come when every state
participating in the conference should assess at
a high political level the results of the work
done so far at the conference and adopt
responsible decisions that would open the road
for completion. of the European '.Terence . . . .
The weekly Moscow radio international observers' roundtable
on the 16th echoed, this proposal, saying that "the time has
come" for conference participants "to examine at a responsible
level exactly. where the-'diplomats. in Geneva have now moved and
to adopt decisions that will pave the way toward concluding
efforts."
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Brezhnev, in his speech on the 14'.h, also struck a conciliatory
tone, refraining from any charge that the West was attempting
to interfere in Soviet domestic affairs. But he did assert that
dailegatiuns of "some states" were introducing proposals "which
they know are unacceptable and have no relation at all to the
matter at stake." He then asked rhetorically whether those who
wet, "pursuing tactics of delay and procrastination" could
propose an ",Alternative" to a successful conclusion of the
conference. While thus hinting at the possibility that agreement
might be blocked, he expressed confidence that "satisfactory"
decisions, "useful to all," could ba fo;ind, providing that all
"retain a sense of reality" and allow themselves to be guided by
"concern for the peaceful future of Europe," He repeated his
call that the concluding stage of the conference should be
attended by "politicians of the very top level," but remained
silent on the timing of the proposed summit.
The least conciliatory in tone of the leaders' speeches was that
of Foreign Minister Gromyko in Minsk on the 10th. After noting
that "a great deal of work useful to all" had been accomplished,
Gromyko asserted that "there are contin'aing attempts to place
various o'&stacles" in the path of the conference. He went on to
declare that "we resolutely ccr?emn sucr attempts." It may be
significant that this passage was omitted in the TASS, central
pr^ss, and Moscow radio summari..s of the speech; the local Minsk
radio carried the si:ech live. Podgornyy on the 13th, although
not explicitly mentioning CSCE, was also critical of the West.
"In exchai+_ee for detente," he said, "some Western politicians
are vainly counting on squeezing out for themselves unilateral
military advantages, or trying to win from the Soviet Union and
the other socialist countries changes in their domestic order
according to the recipes of bourgeois democracy."
MBFR Although little of substance regarding the force
reduction talks was mentioned in the election speeches,
two significant statements were made by Ponomarev and Brezhnev.
Ponomarev, speaking on the 10th, in his brief passage on CSCE
and MBFR made the most direct public linkage of the conference to
the force reduction :talks yet made by an elite-level spokesman.
He stated that "positive results of the all-European conference
would also give impetus to the Vienna talks on reducing armed
forces and armaments in central Europe." The linkage of progress
at Vienna to a successful conclusion at Geneva has been all but
ignored in routine Soviet comtent, appearing only from time to time
bur never in the blunt lan6uage that Ponomarev used.
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Brezhnev's passage on MBFR included a hint that the Soviet
Union would possibly agree to limited$ partial measures as
a first step in the force reduction negotiations. After
observing that it is difficult to achieve the "grer,t goal"
of total disarmament, he went on to say:
We are willing to enter into partial measures
to limit and reduce arms. This determines
particularly our position at the talks on
reducing armed forces and arms in central
Europe. We consider that there is a
possibility in the near future to achieve here
the first concrete results--given, of course,
good will on the part of all parties to the
negotiations.
Brezhnev omitted any time element in his speculation on the
possibility of an early agreement. The standard Moscow line
since Brezhnev first introduced the general outline of the
Soviet position at MBFR in his speech at the World Peace
Congress in October 1973'has been that stepe could be taken
as early as 1975, and the Soviet formal proposal in Vienna
in November proposed the first initial cut for 1975. It is
also notable that Brezhnev avoided any criticism of the West
for allegedly trying to achieve a en^-sided advantage at they
expense of the Warsaw Pact. This omission reinforces the
impression that his remarks may herald a Soviet agreement to
accept an initial-partial reduction measure limited to U.S.
and Soviet ground troops only. This would be in line with
the idea of a symbolic cut aimed at getting the talks off
read center, which East Eurot-ean spokesmen have recently
strezsed.
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COMMUNIST.nELATIONS
MOSCOW PUBLICIZES STRONG CRITICISM OF JCP POLICIES
An articl; in the May 1974 issue of the CPSU Central Committee
monthly journal PARTY LIFE, written by Argentine CP leader A. Fava,
contains the first authoritative Moscow comment on the November 1973
Japanese Communist Party Congress. The piece, an abridgement of an
article published in the Argentine CP theoretical journal, expresses
"profound disagreement" with JCP positions. In November 1973
PRAVDA had carried brief summaries of the congress proceedings,
but had withheld coimient other than noting that the JCP had arbitrarily
interpreted Soviet foreign policy and made an "unfounded" demand for
the-,return--of several islands.held by the Soviet Union since World War II.
Fava concentrated his fire on three major areas of disagreement:
Soviet detente with the United States, attitudes toward the inter-
national communist movement, and the JCP's?call for the return of
the northern islands. Demonstrating continued Soviet sensitivity
to the charge that it is snuggling up to American imperialism at
the expense of smaller socialist states, the article took pains to
refute JCP charges that normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations
aided U.S. efforts in Vietnam. The article also criticized the
JCP policy of equating Soviet:and Chinese efforts to normalize
relations with the United States and for que^tioning steps toward
peaceful coexistence.*
The article also charged that the JCP, which opposes the convening
of a new world party conference, had attempted to "counterpose"
fraternal parties. JCP calls for restoration of communist unity at
its-.congress were.dismissed by Fava as in fact "an appeal for the
creation of a special grouping" and an attempt by the JCP to
"legalize the formation of isolated groupings of individual parties."
In this conjunction, the article recalled that the JCP had selectively
invited., delegations to its congress.,. -excluding, among others, the
Soviets and Mongolians.
* The article is similar to a February editorial in PARTY LIFE
which ostensibly attacked the views of a Spanish CP official, but
h ch also. represented. a comprehensive statement of"Soviet views on
detente:andthe international communist movements. 'See the TRENDS
of 20 March 1974, pages 9-10.
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The Psva article saved its most biting criticism for the JCP
stand on the northern territories issue. It called the JCP
demand that the Soviet Union return the islands "unprecedented"
in the history of the international communist movement. Further,
it charged the JCP leadership with assisting J4pan-s "revenchist"
forces and, worse still, with doing "great harm" to Japan's
"workers- and?: dt ddt-dt1 c..-movement . "
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-23-
INDOCHINA
PRG MEMORANDUM DENOUNCES 'CONTINUED' U.S. VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT
The PRG Foreign Ministry has issued a 15 June memorandum on the
occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the 13 June
1973 Joint communique following the Kise:inger-Le Duc Tho Paris
talks, "denouncing the continued U.S. military involvement and
interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." Although
reported to have bean sent tc the Soviet Union, China, Poland,
Hungary, Britain, France, Indonesia, and Iran as participants in
the Paris international conference on Vietnam or as members of the
International Commission for Control and Supervision, as well as
to the UN Secretary General, it was not said to have been
addressed to the United States or the GVN. Similar PRG documents
sent to the Paris conferees in April and August 19%3 had included
the United States and Saigon as recipients, but more recent ones
have not.*
Initial DRV endorsement of the memorandum came in a Hanoi radio
commentary of -the 19th pegged primarily to dissatisfaction with
U.S. and Saigon actions, as revealed at the recently resumed
Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks. This same commentary also
offered Hanoi's first reaction to an 18 June statement issued by
the U.S. embassy in Saigon, charging that it contained "shopworn
slanderous allegations" that "distort the truth and distort the
cause of the current tense situation in South Vietnam."
Transmitted by VNA on 18 June, the lengthy PRG memorandum reiterated
long-standing communist charges that "more than 25,000 U.S. military
personnel in civilian guise" are directing and commanding Saigon's
military operations and thit "many high-ranking U.S. military and
intelligence personalities" have come to South Vietnam to "devise
plans, supervise, and urge" Nguyen Van Thieu to step up the war.
In its condemnation of the United States for "illegal introduction"
of war materiel into South Vietnam, the memorandum repeated the
now routine allegation that F-5E aircraft recently provided to the
GVN have been "manned by U.S. pilots to take part in the operations
of the Saigon army."
* For background on these previous notes and memoranda, see the
TRENDS for 6 March 1974, pages 11-12, the TRENDS for-18 April 1973,
pages 1-3, and the TRENDS for 11 October 1973, pages 12-14.
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The memorandum charged that "authoritative circles" in the U.S.
Govertment have made "extremely cynical and deceptive allegations"
in an attempt to justify U.S. "involvement and interference" in
South Vietnam. To back up these accusations, the memorandum
quoted Secretary Schlesinger as claiming on 21 May that the United
States was "naturally committed" to assist South Vietnam and cited
recent Kissinger revarks that i:he United States was "morally and
politically, if not juridically committed" and that the U.S..
obligation to South Vietnam stems from its having been "long and
deeply involved" there. Construing these remarks is a U.S. attempt
to legalize its South Vietnam "military involvement," the memorandum
argued that the United States was now using the Paris agreement as
a ,tnew political and juridical basis to prolong its commitments"
to Saigon, and it recited in some detail the U.S. obligation and
responsibility under the Paris agreement to "respect the independence
and sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Vietnam. Declaring that
the signing of the Paris agreement was the "only new commitment
the United States has made with regard to South Vietnam, the
memorandum asserted that the Paris agreement constituted a "natural
negation of any commitments the United States has made so far to
the various groups of its henchmen in South Vietnam."
Uncharacteristically, the memorandum devoted relatively scant attention
to condemning the Saigon administration. Its two major complaints
against the GVN stemmed from it having "arrogantly rejected" the PRG's
22 March six-point proposal for achieving "peace and national concord"
in the South and its actions that allegedly brought about the recent
deadlock in negotiations at La Celle-Saint-Cloud and at the JMC talks.
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HANOI PRESSES DRIVE TO IMPROVE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, MANAGEMENT
In the wake of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Federation of Trade
Unions (VFIU) this February, Hanoi has launched an emulation drive
enlisting the trade union organization in overcoming long-standing
problems of low productivity and poor economic management. The
emulation movement--promoting "productive labor to build socialism
with industry and thrift"--bears some resemblance to past movements
but gives a greater role to the trade unions than did the last previous
such campaign, which was launched in early 1970 and continued through
the beginning of 1974.
Hanoi's continuing preoccupation with improving labor productivity
reflects North Vietnam's very real and severe problems in labor
management, problems graphically outlined, for example, in an article
in the April issue of the party theoretical journal HOC TAP by Vice
Chairman of the State Planning Commission* Che Viet Tan:
The labor productivity of our economic sectors generally
remains low, in some cases even tens of times lower than
that in developed industrial countries. Due to the after-
maths of war and shortcomings in economic management,
the labor productivity of a number of sectors recently
dropped further, in some cases down to only 50-70 percent
of prewar levels.
Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan and other speakers
at the February trade union congress addressed themselves to these
problems and anticipated the launching of the emulation movement. Le
Dunn asserted that the "number one task of the trade unions today is
to launch an enthusiastic revolutionary movement of workers and civil
servants emulating one another in productive labor, boosting labor
productivity and practicing thrift, and successfully implementing the
resolution adopted by the 22d Plenum of the 'JWP Central Committee.!'**
*' 'Che Viet Tan has long been a member of the State Planning
Commission, but the first known reference to him as a vice chairman was
in the 10 April 1974 NHAN DAN. A report in an August 1970 journal,
CONG TAC KE HOACH (THE PLANNING TASK), stated that Tan was in charge
of salaried labor planning.
** Le Duan's 11 February speech ~o the congress is discussed in the
TRENDS of 21 February 1974, pages 20-22.
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Hanoi first publicized the new labor emulation campaign on 27 March,
when North Vietnamese media revealed that the DRV Council, of Ministers
and the Trade Union Federation Presidium had "recently" issued a
joint resolution to launch an emulation movement for productive labor
to build socialism with industry and thrift. Later propaganda
identified the Join resolution as "Resolution No. 46" but did not
publicize its text or report the data it was adop*ed. A speech by
VFTU leader'Hoang Quc:: Viet, published in the trade union paper
LAO DONG on 3 April, revealed that the VFTU Central Committee had
met from 26 through 28 March to study the joint Yesolution and
initiated a resolution guiding trade union eci,;ilons in the emulation
movement.
The VFTU Central Committee resolution, published in the 17 April
issue of LAO DONG and summarized by Hanoi radio 10 days later,
offered detailed guidance on conducting the movement. In particular,
it listed six measures to develop and organize the movement: Education
of workers and civil servants in the new tasks; organization of
conferences at lower levels to discuss state plan fulfillment, to
participate in enterprise management, and to prepare to sign collective
contracts; mot{vation of workers and cadres to make emulation pledges
ar.d to overf'ilfill plan goals; consolidation and expansion of "socialist
teams and units" as the nuclei. for the movement; implementation of
the state's award system and policies; and solution of livelihood
problems among workers and civil'.eervants in coordination with state
agencies.
VFTU-STATE RELATIONS The labor emulation movement initiated
in 1970 was launched by a resolution of the
Oa, ci1-of Ministers,* not bye joint resolution with the VFTU as
was the case this year. Some recent Hanoi propaganda has called
attention to the need to increase the trade unions' stature and
responsibility, aid the issuance of the "Joint" resolution seems to
be a deliberate step serving this objective.
Hoang Quoc Viet touched upon this point in his speech carried in the
3.,April LAO DONG. He noted that the VWP third congress iu 1960
had advocated "elevating the position of the trade union" and allowing
it to become a school of state and economic management and of
* The 1970 Council of Ministers.resoluticz, No. 20-CP, was dated
20 January 1970 and publicized in February of that year. The 1970
emulation movement is discussed in FBIS Special Report No. 301,
7 August 1970, "North Vietnamese Problems and Policies as Outlined in
La Duan's Februarq'1970 Article," page 27.
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19 JUNE 1974
communism. He suggested that the injunctions of the congress had
not always been implemented, but that the current joint resolution
was aimed at doing so. Again, in a report to a VFTU conference
broadcast by Hanoi on 17 May, Hoang Quoc Viet cited Le _Duan as
stressing the importance of huildinl, a network of correct relations
among the party, state, and masses and added that: ". ... we should
begin by developing correct relations between the Council of
Ministers and the trade union federation."
Le Duan had noted in his trade union congress speech that a "recent"
Statute on the Organization and Activities of the Council of Ministers*
had "listed the major principles on the relationship between;s,theratate
and trade unions." He added that:
. . we must have as soon as possible documents of legal
value defining the responsibilities and rights of trade
unions in connection with their participation in economic
and state management. Trade unions have the right to take
part in the drafting of such documents and all other state
regulations having to do with labor productivity, work
conditions, and living conditions of workers and civil
servants.
COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS Propaganda or. the current emulation movement
has suggested that the primary initial step
is the signing of collective contracts between the directors and trade
union committees in industrial, construction, or business units.
According to the VFTU Central Committee resolution, these contracts
should "clearly state the primary norms and methods to be achieved, and
clearly stipulate the responsibility of the management agency, workers
and employees, and trade union in achieving the production plan,
protecting socialist property, implementing labor policies and systems,
and improving labor and daily living conditions for workers and
employees."
* These statutes on the reorganization?of the Council of Ministers
have not been publicized in available Hanoi media but have been
referred to on other occasions in the propaganda and seem likely to
have provided the framework for changes in the Council of Ministers'
leadership in recent months. The head of the DRV State Legislation
Ct~mmie"lion, Tran Cong Tuong, in a series of articles in NHAN DAN from
1 through 12 April, revealed, that the statute had been promulgated
by the Council of Ministers on 1 November 1973.
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Hawci media have carried' several reports on progress in signing the
collective contracts,, and on 15 June the radio revealed that this
question was discussed in detail at an 11-13 June conference-called
by the VFTU to review implementation of Joint resolution 46. In
addition to the leadership of the trade union, the.-radio reported
that the VFTU conference was attended by Vice Premier Phan Truong
The, who has special responsiblity for industry and communications,
and by "several ministers and vice ministers and representatives of
various branches at the central level."
The report on the conference indicated that efforts to sign collective
contracts since the adoption of the joint resolution had improved in
comparison with earlier periods, but that there were also "shortcomings
and wealt.points ." It revealed the severity of these shortcomings with
the acknowledgement that about 30 percent of the contracts that were
concluded "contained unrealistic commitments because measures to
implement them wern lacking and the responsibilities of the trade
unions were not clearly defined."
Collective contracts have previously played a part in North. Vietnam's
industrial managemetit,* but they were not a major ingredient in the
last previous labor emulation movement and haVe-,not?'always.been
successful. Past problems with collective contracts were pointed out
in a 29 May Hanoi radio interview with Minister of Trade Hoang Quoc
Thinh. The minister praised the results in implementing resolution
46 and noted-that prior to the guidance offered by the new resolution,
contracts were signed in some localities but "suffered from: many
shortcomings." Judging by his remarks, the former problems were much
like the current ones. He noted that there had been no coordination
between the signing of the contracts and the training of the employees
and that, as a result, the contracts were "undemocratic, unrealistic,
and ineffective" and some were too broad or impractical to implement.
* The trade union's role in signing such contracts was discussed
for example, in the North: Vietnamese "trade union law"-adopted- at the
seventh session of the DRV National Assembly, Second Legislature, on
14 September 1957.
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CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS DRAW MODERATE FRONT, PEKING COMMENT
While Cambodian Front propaganda routinely claims that recent
student demonstrations in Phnom Penh and the Long Boret cabinet
crisis are evidence of heightened contradictions within the
Cambodian Government, at the same time Front media have avoided
the references to an imminent insurgent military victory that
marked propaganda at the start of the dry season last fall.
Recent Front comment lauding the insurgents' advances
during the past dry season has reflected the currently more
cautious military outlook and stressed insurgent confidence
That their objectives would be achieved through a protracted
military struggle.
Typically, a 13 June AKI review played up the insurgents' ability
to strike unexpectedly, hit enemy weak points, and gradually wear
down the opposition--a shift from last fall's calls for massed
attacks against Phnom Penh and other government strongholds. Less
attention is also being paid to U.S. aid to Cambodia and alleged
efforts to bring about a "sham peace"--issues which drew shrill
complaints from the Front earlier this year.
Peking has endeavored to show solidarity with the Front, publishing
an 8 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article supporting the Phnom
Penh students and at the same time handling the United States with
discretion. A 15 June PEOPLE'S DAILY article signed by Yin Chih-sheng
treated the issue of the U.S..role in Cambodia more in sorrow than
in anger. Highlig%ting the "tragedy" of American interference in
Phnom Penh, it noted U.S. press reports that the Phnom Penh regime
was beset wii.h increasing problems despite extraordinary efforts to
support Lon Nol by the recently appointed U.S. ambassador--whom
PEOPLE'S DAILY did not name. Though acknowledging past and present
U.S. assistance to Lon Nol, the article asserted confidently that
the situation in Phnom Penh has nonetheless gone from "bad to worse."
Drawing a lesson for-theUnited States, it advised that.-the U.S.
experience over the past four years has shown that "it is the
Cambodian people fighting heroically, arms in hand, who determine
the destiny of Cambodia, not the traitorous Lon Nol and his ilk,
or the superpower on the other side of the Pacific." Suggesting
that it is in the interest of the United States to accept this
view and end it:s involvement in Cambodia,..the paper added that
"although the master of the Lon Nol clique.admits and laments the.
helplessness of the United States before the situation in Cambodia,
it is blind to a truth that is obvious to all, and here lies its
tragedy."
CONFILENTIAL
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CHIN-A
COLLEGE ENROLLMENT BEGINS. NO NEW POLICY CHANGES INDICATED
Fukien and Kwangtung provinces have announced their annual college
enrollment drives with pronouncements reflecting last year's
campaign, to retain cultural revolution educational reforms. That
campaign had criticized those who sought to emphasize only academic
criteria for admission. The formal procedures for admission this
year remain "voluntary application, recommendation b;' the masses,
approval by the leadership and reexamination by the colleges
concerned"--the same as before last, year's reforms--but both
provinces' enrollment announcements stress that political criteria
receive primary emphasis in judging applicants.
Foochow radio.non 8 June broadcast the first, and more detailed,
discussion of enrollment procedures and requirements, noting that
students must both "observe revolutionary discipline" and have the
spirit of "going against the tide." Like last year, students must
also have at least two years of practical work experience, and
those with a poor class background but a good performance record
are eligible for admission. So that the "masses" can choose
applicants correctly, all educational policy directives are to be
made available to them, outlining "procedures, qualifications and
student quotas." Quotas are apparently complicated, with categories
including women, youths with poor class backgrounds, youths sent
to the countryside, Overseas Chinese and minoritii.,s. The broadcast
stressed that while political qualities of applicants must be put
"before everything else, their cultural level must be considered as
an essential qualification."
Canton radio on 18 June carried a NANFANG DAILY commentary announcing
that full-scale fall college enrollment work had begun, with the goal
of creating "massive ranks of wotker-intellectuals." The commentary
stressed the role of the masses and warned of the danger of revisionist
sabotage of the correct educational line. It also'harkened back to
the campaign last winter against admission "through the, back door" in
warning cadres against "selfish considerations" and making "indiscr'.m-
inate use" of their powers. An accompanying broadcast related the
recent experience of a Kwangtung county party committee in admissions
work. The report noted that applicants "undergo examination in moral,
intellectual and physical education," illustrating that the examination
system has been modified but not eliminated.
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r10 T E S
PRC NUCLEAR TEST: Peking's 18 June announcement of its nuclear
test on the 17th reflected no change from the Chinese nuclear
disarmament staace set forth in Peking's last test announcement
of 28 June 1973. Again using the concise format adopted in
November 1971, the latest announcement repeated Peking's inten-
tion to break the superpowers' nuclear monopoly, not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons, and to work toward the complete
prohibition of nuclear weapons. It added a reference to the
"excellent situation" brought about by the Chinese campaign to
criticize Confucius and Lin Piao and specified that a "new nuclear
test" had been conducted, in contrast to last June's announcement
which cited a "hydrogen bomb test." The USSR promptly reported
the test on TASS and Moscow radio, drawing from 'Western accounts
before the test was officially announced in Peking. As usual,
TASS has reported adverse reaction and official protests from
Japan, Australia, and other Asian cr'untries. A Moscow domestic
radio report on the 18th made light of Peking's att'.mpt,s to
Justify the tests by "defense needs,,"
PRC-INDIA RELATIONS: Demonstrating Peking's cautious receptivity
to improved relations with India, Central Committee Vice Chairman
Yeh Chien-ying on 13 June told a visiting Indian delegation that
"the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples had a long
history," adding: "We believe that the traditional friendship
between the two peoples will surely be further consolidated."
NCNA reported that the vice chairman-had a "cordial:.and "ftienddly
conversation" with the delegation, composed of members of the D. S.
Kontis Memorial Committee; Kontis was an Indian physician who worked
in China during World War II. Yeh Chien-ying had received a Kontis
delegation which visited China a year ago, but at that time NCNA
did not report the vice chairman's remarks during the reception,
noting only that there was "a cordial conversation in a friendly
atmospluire." NCNA reported on 12 June the UN Security Council's
resolution recommending that the General Assembly admit Bangladesh
to the United Nations. UN Representative Chuang Yen noted that
"new developments" in South Asia had made Bangladesh eligible for
UN membership and repeated the line,Vpiced by.V.ice Premier.
Teng Hsiao-ping on 12 May, that "we are ready to develop.-
good-neighborly relations with the countries on the subcontinent on
the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to
further enhance our traditional friendship with their peoples."
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MALYAN CP: The clandestine Malayan CP radio station in China--the
Voice of the Malayan Revolution---has recently taken pains to show
that the 31 May establishment of PRC-Malaysian diplomatic relations
has not affected Malayan CP policy toward the Razak government nor
undermined the party's support for China. Broadcasts have continued
to feature battle actions of the communist-led insurgents and to
attack harshly the policies of the "Razak clique." An 8 June
commentary rejected Razak's call for the surrender of the communist
insurgents, made upon his return from China, and exhorted the
Malayan "people" to persist in armed struggle. In justifying
Peking's welcome for Razak, the clandestine broadcasts have high-
lighted the historical precedent of Chinese communist support for
Stalin's efforts during World War II to reach nonaggression pacts
with CCP enemies, including militarist Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.
An 11 June article cited Mao's assurance at the time that Stalin's
accommodation with the fascists was merely evidence of Moscow's
"growing socialist strength" and would not affect CCP solidarity
with the Soviet Union.
PRC IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN: Amplifying earlier RED FLAG articles, an
18 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has called for the creation of a
"huge contingent of Marx..-(t theoretical workers" who will dare to
make "frontal at',acks" in fighting for the victory of Marxism.
Suggesting that little telief is likely for leaders now be`_n3
criticized, the editorial states that such contingents can be
developed only in the "storms of mass struggle." The editorial
calls on party committees to put the building of theoretical
forces on the.r "agenda of major items. The editorial carefully
indicates that, the theorists will not operate without controls,
specifying that "even the worker-peasant-soldier tt=retical
workers must pay attention to remolding themselves" and muss: not
be civorced from production or succumb to "ivory tower" specializa-
tion. To help insure that theorist contingents sta"" under party
control, the editorial ordered that the conr_ingeats be built step
by step "from the leading organs down."
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Peking ;(1081 items)
(13%)
24%
OAU Somalia
(-?-)
9%
(--)
771
(Chou Greetings
(--)
3%]
(--)
4%]
Indochina
(26%)
6%
(--)
sib]
Criticism of Lin Piao
(7%)
6%
(--)
5%
and Confucius
Middle East
(6%)
4%
(--)
5%
[12th Palestine
(3%)
3%]
National Council
Korea
(1%)
4%
(--)
5%
"Superpower" Indian
(2%)
4%
(4%)
3%
Ocean Contention
Bangladesh UN Seat
(--)
3%
(4%)
3%
Latin America Nuclear-
(--)
3%
(--)
3%
Free Zone Treaty
These statistics are based on the voicecast cam;nentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
ti denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
meat or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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APPENDIX.
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16JUhE 1974
Moscow (2337 items)
Supreme Soviet Elections
[Brezhuev Speech
(Podgornyy Speech
[Kosygin Speech
So' 'iet-GDR Friendship
treaty 10th Anniversary
Cc agratulatio-as to
Mongolian Leaders on
Election
Soviet-Portuguese
Diplomatic Relations
China
Chile
OAU Summit, Somalia