CYPRUS: GREEK AND TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 3, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Handbook
Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Military Capabilities
Secret
2 4r
3 April 1967
ARCHIVAL RECORD No. 0630/67
PLEASE RETURN TO
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 April 1967
Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Military Capabilities
1. Although the Cyprus situation has been
relatively quiescent in recent weeks, tempers con-
tinue to flare and acrimonious exchanges occasionally
occur during the quarterly rotations of the Turkish
military contingent on the island. The most recent
rotation, on 30-31 March, passed without serious
incident, but the possibility that the situation
may escalate into a crisis is a continuing one.
This handbook was prepared to provide data on cur-
rent Greek and Turkish military capabilities, and
updates a similar study done in January 1964.
2. If open conflict were to break out between
Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue, the ad-
vantage would lie with the Turkish side. With its
larger socioeconomic base and more powerful armed
forces, Turkey could defend its own territory and
air space. If Ankara launched a limited offensive
against Greek Thrace, it could possibly take Salo-
nika. However, since they are organized and equipped
primarily to fight a defensive war, the Turkish
armed forces lack the sea and airlift capability
necessary for a prolonged campaign against an island
objective such as Cyprus. On the other hand, they
could probably seize and hold the closer to shore
Greek islands in the Aegean.
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated with
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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3. The Turkish Army's advantages include good
discipline and morale along with the excellent
fighting quality of the troops. Its weapons and
equipment are fairly modern, and the state of train-
ing is good. However, the army is handicapped, as
are the other Turkish services, by a shortage of
junior officers and NCOs. Most senior commanders
are without combat experience. Lack of combined
arms training would also limit the Turkish Army's
effectiveness in large operations. The most serious
materiel shortages are in armor, vehicles, commu-
nications equipment, and low-level antiaircraft
weapons.
4. The Turkish Air Force enjoys a relatively
high state of combat readiness. If challenged by
the Greek Air Force, it could control Turkish air
space and such adjacent areas as Cyprus and the
offshore Greek islands. Its defensive capabilities
are somewhat reduced by the lack of all-weather air-
craft, gaps in the early warning and air defense
communications systems, and the inadequacy of stocks
of reserve equipment in the country.
5. Turkey's navy is unable to conduct large-
scale operations. Its capability is confined to
mine-laying and mine-sweeping operations in coastal
waters and in the straits.
Greek Capabilities
6. In a military conflict with Turkey, the
Greek armed forces could extend no aid to Cyprus
or any of the Greek islands, but by falling back
to a succession of prepared defensive positions,
the Greek Army could probably hold back any Turkish
advance somewhere in the vicinity of Salonika.
The Greek Army is moderately well equipped and
trained, and the troops are of good caliber. Its
major weaknesses are shortages of armor and com-
munications equipment.
7. The Greek Navy lacks modern ships and other
equipment. It has a fair capability to perform
escort, patrol, antisubmarine, and mine warfare
operations.
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8. The Greek Air Force has a fair defense
capability over mainland Greece, but it could con-
duct only very limited offensive operations outside
this area. During an initial period of conflict,
it could function effectively in close-in ground
support missions, but this capability would fall
off rapidly because of its poor logistical base.
Its communications system is inadequate.
Capabilities in Cyprus
9. In Cyprus itself, the tactical superiority
of the Greek Cypriot side is unquestioned. Greek
Cypriot forces number about 31,000 including re-
serves, and there are 5,750 Greek Army troops on
the island. Government--i.e., Greek Cypriot--mili-
tary and paramilitary units are much better equipped
than their Turkish Cypriot adversaries and are backed
by a Greek force on the island which is far larger
than the mainland Turkish contingent there. The
Greek side also controls the more important popula-
tion centers, including all major ports, as well
as all movement on the island.
10. Although the Greek Cypriots have predom-
inant strength on the local scene, they have sev-
eral weaknesses. The most serious of these is the
dichotomy of objectives and underlying mistrust be-
tween Cypriot officials and the Greek representa-
tives on the island. This lessens the Makarios
government's freedom of movement, as does the
presence of British and United Nations forces on
the island. The Greek side also lacks airpower
over Cyprus and the surrounding waters. In the
event of armed intervention by Turkey, the Turkish
Air Force could soon establish control of the air.
It could neutralize virtually any target on Cyprus
within the first day or two of operations, but it
could not prevent the overrunning of the Turkish
Cypriot positions.
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11. Turkish Cypriot forces on the island con-
sist of about 10,000 irregulars, badly armed, poorly
trained, and with declining morale. They are sup-
ported by a force of about 650 regular Turkish troops.
Turkish Cypriot forces are confined to a number of
enclaves scattered throughout the island. Although
considerable strength has been massed in several
of these enclaves, these forces are for the most
part in isolated villages and would be able to offer
little resistance if subjected to a determined at-
tack. Even the major Turkish strong points would
not be able to hold out, more than a few days unless
Turkey intervened.
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3 April 1967
Talking Paper for Intelligence Handbook Cyprus: Greek
and Turkish Military-Capabilities
1. This handbook was issued to come shortly after
the quarterly rotation of the Turkish military contigent
on Cyprus, completed on 30-31 March. Although this rota-
tion passed without serious incident, heated exchanges
occur occasionally during the rotations and tempers con-
tinue to flare over the Cyprus situation, which could
escalate into a crisis at any time. The handbook was
self-initiated and was prepared to provide data on cur-
rent Greek and Turkish military capabilities, both over-
all and on Cyprus.
2. Routine external and internal dissemination is
recommended.
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Q* '
ALB.
Kastoria ?
! 8 Koza 7
Ioannina)
3
0
Trikala HCG
q0' Gelibolu Izmit
Alexandre j;
[;~HMCI Fs
G REECEHHAGS
4
?'RAMC
HMCI & I - Higher Military Command of the Interior and Islands
HAGS - Hellenic Army General Staff
HCG - Headquarters, Central Greece
RAMC - Headquarters, Archipelago Military Command
26
P dAdapazari
Tuzla
Commando
* ANKARA
T U R K E Y
Adanal
GREECE AND TURKEY
Army Order of Battle
FEBRUARY 1967
4I
29 Kars
51 Sarikamis
20
Siirt
Yereva n
?
Doguba azit
LJ N
IRA Q
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BLACK SEA U.S.S.R.
?LARISA LEMNO?
PREVEZA ?.
?NEA ANKHIALOSM LESBOS
GREECE 4ITILINIi ?AKHISAR
AKRA ARAXOS TANAGRA
AKRA 0 ELEVSIS0TATOI
?,
KALAMAI
?KHANIA
?IZMIR
RODHOS 0 ?.,
RHODES
MERTED
* ANKARA
T U R
CRETE 0 CYPRUS ONICOSIA
TIMBAKION
?ERZURUM
BATMAN
GREECE AND TURKEY
Air Force and Naval Air Bases
FEBRUARY 1967
TURKISH 0
Runway: 8000'+ Runway: 5000-79991 Runway: 2000-4999'
?TOPAL
?YENISEHIR
?MERZIFON
0SIVAS
K E Y
?KAYSERI
Yerevan
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i PF
MSCO
Argostbl ion
?
Patrai is
a MSCO
Salamis ATHENS
5 DD
3 SS
4 DDE
4 PF
3 PGM
2 MMC
6 MSC
8 MSCO
?Kh3nDD
CRETE i DDE
RHODES
Istanbul'
I PC
Kasimpasa 8Go1 k
BLACK SEA U.S.S.R.
Tbilisi.
10 SS
8 PC
6 PCE
k PTF
2 MMC
6 MSC
i YMP
2 PGM
I MMC
GREECE AND TURKEY
Naval Order of Battle
FEBRUARY 1967
DD Destroyer
DDE Destroyer Escort
SS Submarine
PC Patrol Craft
PCE Pat. al Escort
PF Frigate
PGM Motor Gunboat
PTF Fast Patrol Boat
MMC Coastal Mine Layer
MSC Coastal Mine Sweeper
MSCO Old Coastal Mine Sweeper
YMP Mine Planter
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NIEDITERRANEAN SEA
Myrtou Bellapais' 341Pentadaktylos
Man ... r,,----
\ BAY
Pe:isteronari
r 33
Makheras
Monastery
FAXIAG( ST.1
H.4}.
LARNACA
BAY
CYPRUS
Disposition of Greek Cypriot
National Guard
and Hellenic Army Units
F32
700
Polemidhia Camp
?
Limassol
.1KR(.TIPI
FPBA) 13AY
Dt CNG Greek Cypriot National Guard
HA Hellenic Army
LI SF Commando Units
Area containing Turkish
resistance elements
500 Strength
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SECRET
GREECE and TURKEY
Strength of Forces
Strength x ,115,000
,- , .,. _ .. , 376,267
Tank
Infantry
10
Post M-Day Divisions 6
Armored R-7777777 4
Brigades Arm. Cavalry O
4
Infantry 10
4
Light g6 238
Tanks
Medium 422v az ;? 1,282
Armored Personnel Carriers 690
1 8
AIR FORCES
Strength
Combat Aircraft
Transport Aircraft
23 400
42,209
337
SURFACE-TO-AIR LAUNCHERS (NIKE)
NAVAL FORCES
Strength
Surface Craft
Submarines
MWWW~r~ 70
GREECE
TURKEY
165
204
65840 3-67 CIA SECRET
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SECRET
GREECE and TURKEY
Basic Resources
(1966 Estimates)
Population
Mates 15-49
Fit for Service
GNP
Budget
Military Budget
Population
Males 15-49
Fit for Service
20.1 million On Cyprus
$13.5 million
On Cyprus
$350 million
B
d
u
get
3' rr
Military Budget $8 million
SECRE
65839 3-67 CIA
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$1. i billion
T
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Command and Liason of Hellenic/Cypriot Armed Forces
FEBRUARY 1967
PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS 1-x-x-x--x-x-xI
Minister of'Defense
Greece
Minister of the Interior
and Defense
o-o-o-01
o
o r 1
Cyprus Army
Maj. Gen. PANTELIDES
National Guard
Headquarters
Lt. Gen. PROKOS,
Hellenic Army Personnel
Serving with Nat'l Guard
Supreme Commander
Cyprus Armed Forces
Lt. Gen. GRIVAS
r- ?
Hellenic Army
General Staff
0- 0-0-.0-J
Navy Admiral
MENELAOU
Hellenic Army Division
Maj. Gen. TSOUMBAS
Hellenic Army
Units in Cyprus
Hellenic
National Defense
General Staff
Hellenic Army
Contingent
Command.
Theoretical chain of command. Now only rare contacts.
- -- - Operational control in case of war.
-o- Direct contact authorized.
-x- Occasional discussion on military matters.
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CYPRUS
Turkish Cypriot machine gun position near Kokkina
Soviet-made T-34/85 Medium Tank in Cypriot Army Exercise
CONFIDENTIAL
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