BRIEFING NOTES FOR DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001000090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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BRIEFING NOTES
FOR DCI
Because I have been concentrating in these
remarks exclusively on the Vietnam question, I would
like to take a couple of minutes for a very brief and
quick swing around the rest of the world, to give you
some idea of other problems which. continue to demand
their fair share of our attention:
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Middle East
I. In the Middle East, we see little prospect for any
progress toward solution of Arab-Israeli differences.
A. The Israelis are approaching the point where
Mar
they w erns i- nosessary Ica, take mili-
eve n
tary reprisals--against Syria, ornJordan, or
.tke SYrrfK -d`rect
both--for the resumption of Arab-terrorism
and sabotage in Israel and in occupied Arab
territory.
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B. The Israelis continue to insist that the Arabs
must agree to direct negotiations, and bring
an end to the state of belligerency.
II. Even the more moderate Arabs, however, insist
that direct negotiations are out of the question.
ofher
A. They hope that the United Nations, or third:-
wAl"fors
country media?, can work out some solution
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which will bPring -about Israeli withdrawal a> & Cr
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without requiring the Arabs to recognize the
existence of Israel.
B. Nasir, for once, is a relative moderate, but
this means little more than that he recognizes
what a beating he took., and how unrealistic
it would be to resume the fighting at present.
1. He is in deep financial trouble, although
he has persuaded the richer Arab oil
states to give him a subsidy of
$3O million a year so that he can keep
the Suez Canal closed without financial
c 1:Yagsar. .
2. He has also agreed to pull his troops
out of Yemen, and this time he has actu-
ally begun to implement the agreement.
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This will probably lead to the defeat
or collapse of his puppet regime there.
A. The present situation in South Arabia is
chaotic enough without any further meddling
by Nasir.
1. The British are determined to declare
Aden and the associated ystates inde-`~~p
._mo ~7'
pendent, and pull out
2. The government which the British had
established collapsed; the local army
has so far refused to take over; and the
two rival nationalist groups causing the
unrest--both originally established by
Nasir--are feuding bitterly about who
will take over when the British leave.
IV. When the Arab-Israeli fighting stopped, the Arabs
felt that the Soviets had let them down, but
Russia now has apparently emerged with stronger
influence than ever.
A. The Soviets began replacing the aircraft,
tanks and guns the Arabs had lost with a
dramatic, showy air lift.
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1. Military shipments have now slowed
down to the level which prevailed before
the fighting in June, and it will take
another year to replace the Arab inven-
tories.
2. The Soviets have reaped considerable
credit from the airlift and from their
incrc 4
naval presence in the Med:Lterranean,
however.
3. They have also increased the number of
Soviet technicians and advisers in the
Arab countries.
Communist China
I. In Communist China, the evidence is that Maa- Pck1Kq
+hc
M ,e---tuna has been forced to moderate h6s Cultural
Revolution, at least temporarily.
A. The major emphasis now is on getting in an
adequate harvest and distributing it--and on
getting the unruly Red Guards back into their
classrooms for the first time in more than
a year.
B. If the purge and the fighting had continued,
China would quite probably have wound up in
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a state of paralysis, or gone back to the
old fragmented "warlord" days.
C. It remains to be seen whether Mao and Marshal
Lin Piao will try to resume the Cultural
Revolution at some later date. No Mo ,n* ber its `J s4flk
D. The- gue t~ or of who wins ou ho sueceee'dS
Mao could concoivably ha an e :ect on the
c:a rses of the S o-s et---d-i 't6,; but what
6VJQLr ?he -outcome-we see no reason to expect
any reduction in the implacable Chinese Com-
munist hostility toward the United States.
Southeast Asia
I. In Southeast Asia, the war in Vietnam tends to
obscure the fact that fighting persists in Laos,
where about half of the country is in Communist
hands, and that there is a spreading Communist
guerrilla campaign in Thailand.
II. In Indonesia, General Suharto has j-ust about
completed the sidelining of former President
Sukarno, but he faces a long hard task of estab-
lishing political and economic stability.
A. The country owes about 2.7 billion dollars
as a result of Sukarno's military purchases
and?grandiose projects, and lacks even such
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rudimentary elements as a working trans-
port system for getting back on its feet.
B. Sound new political parties are slow in
development, and the survivors of the Com-
munist Party are beginning to work with
left-wing nationalists in opposition to
Suharto, especially in central Java.
i. The new nations in Africa are going to continue
to present us with a succession of crises. There
is only a thin veneer of capable leadership. So-
called nations are an unworkable conglomeration
of hostile tribes. Russians, Chinese, and even
Cubans are at work wherever they find openings,
to some extent against each other, but in any
case against the West.
A. Nigeria is a case in point. It was the
most populous country in Africa, with as
good a chance as any for economic viabil-
ity, a competent administration trained
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by the British-.-and some 250 tribes--
Muslim, Christian, and Animist.
1. Nigeria needed no Communist instigation
to explode into the present civil war.
2. The Eastern Region--so-called Biafra--
appears to have lost its bid to break
away, and the British are trying to
arrange a settlement, but I cannot
hold out any great hope for the future
unity of a country where feuds are so
bitter that few prisoners are taken,
and victory may end in massacre.
B. In the Congo, prospects appear to be getting
dimmer for peaceful settlement.
C. Sanctions are not going to solve the Rhodesian
problem, and so the new African nations will
increasingly insist that it is the duty of
the United States and Britain to end white
rule in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese
Africa.
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I. I do not have time even to thumbnail all of the
active and potential trouble spots.
A. India, for example, is going to need
food imports for the next several years at
least. The ruling Congress Party controls
less than half of the state governments. No
solution is in sight for Kashmir, and there are
recurrent border clashes with China, so India,
with all its other problems, arms against
both Pakistan and China.
B. Or we could spend a day on Latin America,
where Castro, despite the Bolivian setback
and the death of Che Guevara, is determined
to bring about new revolutions. He still
supports insurgency in Venezuela, Colombia,
and Guatemala, and is working to establish
assets for rebellion in Haiti, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, and other countries where
he sees the opportunity.
II. There are still Korea, Cyprus, Greece, De Gaulle,
Britain and the Common Market, the Panama Canal
problem, possible Latin American arms races--but
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I feel I have given you enough of a sampling
to establish that we are in no danger of running
out of problems.
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