POLLARD SPY CASE'S LARGER ISSUE: WHY SPY ON FRIENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600400027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 6, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

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6 June 1986
Pollard spy case's
larger issue: Why
spy on friends?
Israelis seen as second only to
Soviets in seeking data in US
Such preparations ana promises suggest to some US
officials a broader Israeli government involvement in
the case. Others maintain that these new details fail to
disprove Israeli government assertions that the oper-
ation was organized by a cadre of officials within
Israel's intelligence bureaucracy who were operating
without broader government authority.
Admiral Turner and William Colb also a former
CIA ector, declined to discuss the extent of Israeli
espionage actitivies in the US.
A classified 1979 CIA report on Israeli intelligence
activities said that information on secret US liand
collection of scientific ' intelligence in the were top
priorities for the Israelis. The former chief of the Jus-
tice Department's internal-security section has been
quoted as saying that Israeli intelligence was the second
most active foreign intelligence service in the US. The
most active spy network is run by the Soviet Union.
"We always assume that they [the Israelis] have a
high degree of activity," says a former US intelligence
official. But he noted that clandestine efforts by Israeli
agents and the risks of being exposed would normally
be balanced against the large amount of information
Israeli officials could gain through legitimate channels
and contacts. US and Israeli intelligence services coop-
erate closely on matters of mutual concern.
"Any intelligence operation has to answer three
questions: How important is the information? What are
the risks- of being- exposed?- What- is -the result if
exposed?" Mr. Colby say?
He notes that the US has had agents in "various
countries around the world," but that certain close
allies have been considered off bounds for clandes-
tine operations. "We would be out of our minds if we
spied on Canada. The negative results on such a close
ally would be ridiculous," Colby says.
Likewise, some observers say it is hard to believe
that the Israeli government would jeopardize its solid
relations with the US and $3 billion in US aid simply
to maintain an illicit back channel for classified US
documents. "When you weigh the benefits of spying
aginst friend or foe, the closer the friend the less
likely there are to be benefits," Turner says. "I can't
see where the Israelis have much of anything to
benefit from a man like Pollard."
He noted that the Pollard case underscores the
need in democratic countries for a system of checks
and balances, similar to those in the US, to ensure
that intelligence officials are held accountable for
their actions and their mistakes.
By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The Jonathan Pollard espionage case has sparked a
broad federal investigation into alleged Israeli spy ac-
tivities in the United States.
And it has raised questions about why friendly coun-
tries spy on each other.
Of course it goes on," says former Central Intelli-
nce Agency director Stanfield Turner, referring to
ch activities. "But there is a big erence. enyouu
spy on an enemy you risk having your agents captured
and Jailed, or killed. When you spy on a friend, you risk
considerable embarrassment and impact on your for-
eign policy.'
In the wake of Pollard's guilty plea on Wednesday to
charges that he supplied Israeli officials with stacks of
sensitive US military secrets, Israel is working to mini-
mize any damage from the case on US-Israeli relations.
The Israeli government has said little about the
Pollard case, but officials have repeatedly stressed that
the former Navy intelligence analyst's spying was an
unauthorized espionage operation carried out without
the knowledge and support of the Israeli government.
Some Reagan administration officials have their
doubts. Details of the Pollard case contained in court
documents show that the Pollard spy ring was well
organized, well financed, and involved an Israeli Air
Force colonel, an Israeli intelligence officer, the science
consul at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, and an
employee at the embassy. All four were named in court
documents as unindicted co-conspirators.
In addition, the documents indicate that other Israeli
officials and diplomats may have been present at meet-
ings when Pollard delivered stolen US classified docu-
ments. US Attorney Joseph E. diGenova says the inves-
tigation is continuing and that individuals cited in the
court papers are the subject of probes.
As a reward for his espionage, Pollard was told that
he had been granted Israeli citizenship and that after, 10
;years of spying in the United States he would move to
:Israel and live under a new identity as "Danny Cohen,"
the documents say. In addition, a foreign bank account
was set up with the understanding that $30,000 would
be deposited in the account each year during Pollard's
anticipated 10 years as an Israeli spy.
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10
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
4 June 1986
STAT Attack on SALT-2 is no laughing matter
By LARS-ERIK NELSON
W ASHINGTON-From one
White House official came a
startled giggle, From an in-
telligence official, there was a serious
"Hmmm, that's a good question." From
the Arms Control Agency, the answer,
after a day of thought, was "Nobody
knows the answer to that."
The question that produced this dis-
play of mumbles and grins: "Now that
President Reagan has thrown out the
SALT-2 treaty, what are we going to do
if the Russians start concealing their
nuclear missile deployments, covering
up submarines, spoofing our satellites,
hiding data from their missile tests?"
The Reagan administration re-
sponse: Giggles, "Hmmms" and an un-
easy shuffling of feet.
A more serious response from a
career State Department official: "If
the Russians cheat in the future, we
won't have any basis for complaint.
There is no standard any longer." Adds
a Senate expert: "If they start to con-
ceal their tests, we won't have any right
to call them on it."
In the past, if the Russians covered
up a nuclear missile silo or encrypted
data from a missile test, the United
States could challenge them at the
Standing Consultative Commission.
That forum wasn't perfect, but it did
clear up some U.S. misgivings about
possible Soviet cheating.
No longer will the Russians be
obliged to answer any questions about
their strategic nuclear force. By junk-
ing SALT-2, Reagan has taken them off
the hook.
What the administration has over-
looked in its lust to slay the "fatally
flawed" treaty, is that SALT-2 was two
treaties-a U.S.-Soviet intelligence
agreement, and a cap on nuclear
weapons.
As an intell' treaty, SALT-2
worked overw a min 1 t
tage of the U.S. it obligid the Soviets ta
maintain an ' pen skies" policvfor
sophisticated It forced
the Soviet military to less secretive
than it Drefer&
Article 15 said, "Each party under-
takes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verifica-
tion ... of compliance with the provi-
sions of this treaty."
The ban on concealment appli
Not any more. Where once we used
to complain that the Russians en-
crypted some of the telemetry (radio
data) from their missile tests, now they
are free to encrypt all of it. "We've
thrown out the baby with the bathwa-
ter," says former National Security
Council expert Roger Molander.
Reagan's SALT-2 decision has been a
triple play: It has antagonized the Euro-
pean allies, it has given the Russians
freedom to return, if they choose, to a
nuclear build-up in total secrecy-and it
has united Democrats on an arms-
control policy.
The first challenge to Reagan's deci-
sion will come next month-not from
the Russians, but from House Demo-
crats preparing legislation to bar him
from spending any money to violate the
limits on SALT-2.
Under the plan, engineered by Rep.-
Les AuCoin (D-Ore.), Reagan would
have to abide by SALT-2 ceilings as
long as the Russians do. It is a strategy
that short-circuits the Constitution-but
it has worked before: Last December,
AuCoin used the power of the purse to
force the administration not to test
antisatellite weapons as long as the
Russians don't.
N EXT MONTH, House Democrats
will submit a bill to force
Reagan to dismantle Minuteman
missiles if he proceeds with his plan to
arm more B-52 bombers with cruise
missiles. Normally, such extra-Constitu-
tional diplomacy wouldn't have a
prayer. But the Democrats are conclud-
ing, in the words of one staffer, that
Reagan's tough-sounding policies "real-
ly don't protect this country's national.
security."
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 Use of Disclosures
ARTIC+..i:4F NSW YORK TIMES
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or Release 2pD 029 %: CIA-RDP91-009 1 R000600400027-2
STAT Administration Often Unveils Secrets,
At Risk to Security, for Sake of Policy
By LESLIE H. GELS
Species to The Nsw York Thuse
WASHINGTON, June 1 - The Rea-
gan Administration has been following
a, pattern of disclosing highly classified
information to support its foreign poli-
cies, even though a number of Adminis-
tration officials say these disclosures
have endangered intelli-
gence sources and meth-
News ods. This fits the well-es-
Analysis tablished practice of its
predecessors, with two im-
portant variations: In the
memory of a number of past and
present officials, the Reagan team
does it more often. And this Adminik-
tration has been more aggressive in
threatening the news media withproee-
ution for conveying similar intelli-
STA.Igence information to the American
people.
This has set off a struggle between
press and government over what Intel-
ligence data should be made public and
who should decide. William J. Casey,
the Director of Central Intelligence,
once again highlighted those issues
with more threats to the press last
week concerning coverage of the trial
of Ronald W. Pelton, a former official
of the National Security Agency who is
STATaccused of spying for the Soviet Union.
By the week's end the White House had
moved to soften the threat somewhat.
Today, In separate television inter-
views, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger, while supporting the
view that journalists who break the law
on disclosing intelligence secrets
should be prosecuted, called for volun-
tary restraints and appeals to journal-
ists' sense of responsibility.
While the Administration's thrust
with frequent warnings in recent
weeks, its own role and reasons in di-
vulging such information have re-
ceived scant attention.
As Representative Les Aspin, chair-
man of the House Armed Services
Committee, put it: "Every administra-
tion wants to have it both ways - to
keep its secrets, and to reveal them
whenever doing so is useful for their
politics and policies." The Wisconsin
Democrat, a former Intelligence Com-
mittee member, added that in his judg-
ment a number of Administration dis-
closures have been "more damaging to
our gaining necessary information
than the press disclosures the Adminis-
tration is complaining about."
Administration disclosures include
revealing the most sensitive communi-
cations interceptions in the recent case
oi' Libya and the Soviet Union oft a num-
ber of occasions, as well as releasing
satellite photographs regarding Nica-
Both j=& um pmss MW I
the right to publish unauthorized infor-
mation. But Admiral Turner insisted
that the press then had to accept the
risks of prosecution.
In 1982, the Administration made
public aerial reconnaissance photo-
graphs that intelligence officials said
proved Nicaragua, with Soviet and
Cuban aid, was assembling the largest
military force in Central America and
was supplying Salvadoran guerrillas.
At the time, a senior Administration of-
ficial said: "It's a no-win situation. tIf
we go public with the information, we
may lose our ability to continue collect-
ing in the field. If we don't, we may lose
our chance to build public support fir
The disclosures also include an inci-
dent last year in which the Central In-
telligence Agency offered the press de-
tailed information provided by one of
the highest-ranking Soviet defectors of
recent times.
Testimony at Spy Trial
Last week the disclosures entailed a
Federal prosecutor, for the first time
using information supplied by the
United States intelligence community,
speaking in a spy trial of the general .
American capability to "exploit,"
'.process," and "analyze" Soviet mes-
sages.
In each instance, according to Ad-
ministration officials, intelligence offi-
cers and others have argued against
disclosure on the ground that adver-
saries, knowing they were being seen
and heard, could take steps to block
these processes in the future.
To some Administration officials and
others, these authorized dislosures
have been more damaging to intelli-
gence collection than the unauthorized
press disclosures of recent weeks that
have so exercised Administration lead-
ers. These include press accounts of the
details of Libyan messages after Presi-
dent Reagan had talked publicly about
the substance of those messages re-
garding terrorist activities in Berlin.
Of the greatest concern to the Admin-
istration were reports that an Amer-
ican spy had told Moscow that United
States submarines were involved in lis-
tening to Soviet communications, infor-
mation presumably already In Mos-
cow's possession.,
When to Go Public?
Nonetheless, the weight of opinion
expressed by officials of past and
present Presidential administrations is
that the one in power has the right to
decide when intelligence must be com-
promised to advance policy.
"I've always been of the view that an
administration has to be able to make
the judgment when to disclose, even if
intelligence people are opposed," said
McGeorge Bundy, President Ken-
nedy's national security adviser. He re-
called Kennedy's decision to reveal
satellite photographs of Soviet missiles
in Cuba in 1963 as a legitimate exercise
of this right.
P( Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral
who was. President Carter's intelli-
gence chief, went further, saying that
"we always have, to make compro-
mises" in balancing intelligence
sources with policy considerations.
But, he said, it i! "impossible to make
this judgment fro outside the Govern-
ment." ,I{
the policy."
As it turned out, according to oft
dais, the Administration neither lost
its intelligence access nor convinced
many of the extent of the military
threat. But the photographs might have
been useful to Soviet intelligence.
In 1983, after the Soviet Union shot
down a Korean airliner, killing 289 peo-
ple aboard, Secretary Shultz revealed
that American listening posts had in-
tercepted the radio conversations be-
tween the Soviet pilot and his control.
lers.
The disclosure may have failed to
prove his point that the Soviets knew
the plane was not an Intelligence air-
craft and, as far as many intelligence
officers were concerned, told Moscow
that the United States could intercept
important Soviet military communica-
tions.
The Case of the Defector
In late 1985, the Central Intelligence
Agency made a determined effort to
tell reporters details about their inter-
rogation of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a key
Soviet intelligence agent who appar-
ently defected and then slipped out of
American control and returned to Mos-
cow. The C.I.A. told its side, as some of
Its officials acknowledged at the time,
to show that he had been a valuable in-
former, former, contrary to White House asser-
tions of his uselessness.
A number of Administration officials
at the time maintained that these
C.I.A. disclosures tipped off Moscow to
what Mr. Yurchenko had divulged, in
the same way that Mr. Casey is seeking
to prevent the press from telling Mos-
cow and the American public about Mr.
Pelton's alleged disclosures.
Earlier this year, Mr. Reagan pub-
licly spoke of the Administration's
knowledge of messages sent to and
from Tripoli and its diplomatic posts.
He said these proved Libyan involve-
ment in the terrorist attack April 5
against a discotheque in West Berlin, in
which two people were killed and 230
others wounded.
Several intelligence officials though4
the disclosure would allow the Libyans
to prevent similar interception in the
future.
As to the decision to make disclo-
sures at the Pelton trial, Edward P.
Djerijian, a White House spokesman,
said last week that it was "made by ap.
propriate Government authorities
after careful consideration of the de-
and,
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cause the national security'