AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
paweitiFor Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO0270 OWAV-6CONTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-021
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TOO912AOO27OO911OO33-4,,; If
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
-Sensitive Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
FGI
This publication is available
on microfiche.
To get a microfi he copy of this
publication call=(OCR/
DSB); for future issuances in
addition to or in lieu of
hard copies, call=
(PPG/RD).
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information has been Authorized for Release to... _
Foreign Government Information
Derivative Classification by 006266
Review 20 years from date
Derived from multiple
All material on this page
is unclassified.
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01 CQb 8ITA Rp P p9NT00912A002700010033-4
AFRICA REVIEW (U)
22 December 1978
CONTENTS
Israel-Kenya: The Continuing
Relationship (S NF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Since 1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli
rescue raid on Entebbe, Israeli military
assistance to Nairobi has grown, and Tel
Aviv now plays an important role in the
development of the Kenyan armed forces.
(S NF NC OC)
Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli
Ties (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty may be signed within the next
few months is causing Nigerian military and
civilian leaders to reassess their country's
continued participation in the informal al-
liance of Arab and black African states that
crystallized during and after the Middle East
war in 1973. (C)
Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes in Horn of Africa (U) . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Somalis continue to support the Western
Somali Liberation Front and the Ethiopian
Somali border issue remains as alive as ever.
(S NF)
NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01&A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORLON
Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S) . . . . . 15
Senior military officers in Upper Volta's
armed forces have become disaffected over
President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to
abide by the constitution and resign his
military commission. (S NF NC OC)
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Approved For Release 2002/01 /3& *i TRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/04~36RFGIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
25X1A
Israel-Kenya: The Continuing Relationship (S NF)
Kenya's commanding general and chief of staff is
25X1 C
lanning a visit to Israel early next month, 25X1C
The general an severa
military relationship between the two countries. Since
mid-1976 when Kenya aided the Israeli rescue raid on
Entebbe, Israeli military assistance to Nairobi has
grown and Tel Aviv now plays an important role in the
development of the Kenyan armed forces. (S NF NC OC)
Limited Israeli military aid to Kenya began in the
early 1970s. The nature of the relationship changed
markedly after Entebbe. Israel, to repay Nairobi for
its help, responded to what the Kenyans saw as the
growing isolation by antagonistic neighbors, such as
Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania. (S NF NC OC)
Shortly after the raid, the Israelis began providing
small arms and ammunition and conducted a survey of
Kenyan intelligence requirements. They agreed to help
the Kenyans establish three intercept sites on the
Ugandan border and subsequently three additional sites
on Kenya's border with Somalia. (S NF NC OC)
Last fall, the two countries signed their first
major arms deal--a $50 million agreement under which
Israel was to provide Gabriel naval surface-to-surface
missiles for four Kenyan patrol boats, antiaircraft
guns, and ammunition. (S NF NC OC)
Early this year, ti)e relationship expanded when
Israel agreed to train more than 90 Kenyan Air Force
personnel. In June, five Israelis traveled to Kenya
to survey the country's logistics needs. (S NF NC OC)
junior staff officers will tour Israeli military facil-
ities, observe weapons demonstrations, and discuss future
Israeli military assistance to Kenya. (S NF NC OC)
The move underscores the growing importance of the
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01// TA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30'~E44TRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
Israeli technicians currently are directing Kenyan
workers in Mombasa in refitting patrol boats with Gabriel
missiles. A course on 20 mm antiaircraft guns for Kenyans
has recently been completed, and an Israeli helicopter
pilot is on a one-year contract to provide instruction
in Kenya. (S NF NC QC)
25X19 Future arms deals apparently will include the sale
of Israeli-built 155 mm howitzers and possibly more
sma arms. In addition, the two countries reportedly
are discussing the possibility of establishing an Air
Force technical training school in Kenya staffed by
Israeli instructors and a combat engineering training
program to be conducted in Israel and Kenya. Nairobi
may also request a modest course on armor and mechanized
tactics. (S NF NC QC)
Why the Israelis?
The Kenyans have been carrying out a long-term
military modernization and expansion program since 1975,
when the growing strength of their neighbors finally
jostled them into paying more attention to their security
needs. Tension with Uganda's unpredictable President Amin
after Entebbe spurred additional measures, as did the
Somali incursion into Ethiopia last year. (S)
Nairobi turned to the West for military assistance
and the West responded. Eager to anchor Kenya at a time
when most of her neighbors were moving leftward, the
West conducted surveys, signed agreements for equipment,
and promised training programs. As a result, Kenya has
begun to receive supersonic fighters, helicopters,
artillery, tanks, and antimissiles. (S)
Like many other Third World countries, however, the
Kenyans have shown dissatisfaction with the cumbersome
machinery of the West's various military assistance
apparatus. To some in Nairobi, the West has been insensi-
tive to the urgencies of Kenya's situation. Despite
Kenyan pleas, for example, the British were unable to
establish an air route to deliver a load of ammunition
in the wake of the Entebbe operation that Kenya would
have needed to withstand an Ugandan attack. Moreover,
the Kenyans like so many other Third World buyers, can-
not understand what they see as a discrepancy between
Approved For Release 2002/01/3059T2DP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01$964$MA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
attestations from Washington of their importance and the
failure to make promised weapons available more quickly.
(S)
Israel is limited in what it can offer, and the
Kenyans probably have more reasonable expectations of
Israel than they do of others. Nonetheless, the Israelis
have generally followed through quickly convincing Kenyan
leaders that Tel Aviv has a better understanding of their
problems. There are similarities between the two coun-
tries' situations--both have found themselves at one time
or another relatively underarmed and surrounded by
potentially hostile countries. (S)
The Israel military also lends "more relevant"
experience to Kenya's situation. Climate and geographical
conditions are similar. In addition, both countries' ad-
versaries are primarily armed with Soviet equipment.
These factors may lead to a further strengthening of the
military relationship between the two countries. (S)
The Israelis apparently are not training Kenyan
pilots, but the introduction this year of Kenyan main-
tenance and ground crew personnel to Israeli methods
could help lay the ground work in the small Kenyan Air
Force for the kind of professionalism and efficiency it
will need to be effective against more heavily armed
opponents. The same could hold true for any Kenyan ground
force units trained by the Israelis. (S NF NC OC)
The Israelis are not likely to be able to offer
Kenya large quantities of major end items unless the
United States approves transfer. If Washington grants
permission, however, Kenya could become a candidate in
the 1980s for some of Israel's US-built fighters as well
as some artillery and armored personnel carriers. (S)
The Future
The gains for Israel are primarily political, though
Kenya is not likely to risk getting out in front of other
African states by becoming the first to resume diplomatic
relations with Israel. (S)
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01iRtTA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
Tel Aviv will usually pursue any reasonable prospects
for arms sales and, because of its relative state of under-
development, the Kenyan military has good potential as a
future customer, both for small arms and other basic needs
as well as larger items that have become obsolete for the
Israelis. (S)
Although the relationship is of growing importance
to both countries, it could easily be severed by a change
in the political climate. Kenya broke relations with
Israel during the 1973 Middle East war and has generally
assumed a low political profile vis-a-vis Tel Aviv since,
despite the growing military ties. Kenya's role in the
Israeli raid on Entebbe cost it some standing in the
Third World and prompted many African nations to distance
themselves from Nairobi when President Amin threatened
revenge. (S)
Nonetheless, as long as it remains discreet, the
military relationship between the two countries may well
be able to weather all but the most critical developments.
The Israelis have long been able to keep their relation-
ships with various African countries fairly quiet. In one
case--Ethiopia--they were even able to maintain military
ties for several years after a radical change of government.
(S) (SECRET NOFORII-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
Approved For Release 2002/01 jA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/3& $iTRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
25X1A
Nigeria: Reassessing Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties (C)
The possibility that an Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty may be signed within the next few months is
causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to re-
assess their country's continued participation in the
informal alliance of Arab and black African states that
crystallized during and after the Middle East war in
1973. There appears to be growing sentiment within both
the military government and the emergent political par-
ties to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel.
The key obstacle to resumed ties is Israel's cooperation
with South Africa, which conflicts with Nigeria's key
foreign policy objective of eliminating white minority
rule and apartheid. (C)
The Afro-Arab relationship rests primarily on a
trade-off of support on Middle East and southern Africa
issues. An Egyptian-Israeli treaty would erase the need
for such an arrangement in the eyes of the Nigerians.
The Nigerians have for some time privately criticized the
Arab states for not extending as much support to the
struggle for majority rule in southern Africa as black
Africa has for the Arab cause in the Middle East. They
point to the paucity of material aid from the Arabs and
charge that the majority of poorer African states have
not received adequate economic compensation from the
Arabs for severing their ties with Tel Aviv five years
ago. The Nigerians are also sensitive to often heavy-
handed attempts by the Arabs to expand their influence
in Africa--particularly those by Libya and Algeria,
which are regarded by the Lagos government as competitors
for leadership in Africa. Nigeria, which itself is not
dependent on Arab assistance, has always insisted that
Afro-Arab cooperation must be mutually beneficial and
based on mutual respect for sovereignty. (S)
Should Egypt and Israel reach an agreement in the
near future, it is possible that Nigeria's present mili-
tary government could normalize relations with Israel
before the scheduled changeover to civilian rule in
Approved For Release 2002/01/36~CLU RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/3 r-8A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
October 1979. Head of State General Obasanjo recently
told visiting Egyptian presidential aide Salem that
Nigeria could not reestablish relations with Tel Aviv
while Israel denies the Palestinians their right to
self-determination and continues to occupy part of
African land (the Egyptian Sinai). This formulation
suggests that Nigeria would be prepared to consider re-
newed relations with Tel Aviv if an Egyptian-Israeli
treaty contained guarantees for Palestinians acceptable
to the Egyptians and resulted in Israeli withdrawal from
Egyptian territory. (C)
If the military regime does not act, Nigeria's
future civilian government (assuming the transition to
civilian rule occurs) might do so. The US Embassy in
Lagos has reported that recent conversations with some
influential members of two of the three major political
parties that will contest elections next year indicate
there is considerable sentiment for the reestablishment
of relations with Israel. This includes the northern
Muslim-oriented party, which reportedly is taking clan-
destine campaign funds from Libya. The US Embassy sus-
pects that pro-Israeli sentiment also exists in the
third major party. (C)
Any initiative by Lagos toward Israel will be
heavily dependent on Nigeria's perception of Tel Aviv's
relationship with South Africa, given the Obasanjo
regime's preoccupation with southern Africa, which we
believe a civilian government is likely to share. A
rapprochement with Israel is potentially threatened by
the present government's acute sensitivity to reported
Israeli arms sales and alleged nuclear cooperation with
Pretoria. There are signs, however, that Nigerian con-
cern over Israeli ties with South Africa may be easing.
Nigerian Foreign Minister Adefope recently told a US
official that his government has received assurances
from the Israelis that Tel Aviv will end its arms sales
and curtail trade with South Africa. We cannot confirm
that the Israeli Government has in fact made such a
decision. (C)
Should Nigeria resume relations with Israel, several
other moderate African states which have benefited little
from Arab aid would quickly follow suit. Indeed, they
may well take the initiative if Nigeria does not. These
Approved For Release 2002/01/5?c-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
countries, including Ghana, Zaire, Zambia, Liberia, Ivory
Coast, Sierra Leone, Central African Empire, and Kenya,
were among the last to break with Tel Aviv in 1973. In
the past, they have expressed varying degrees of interest
in renewing ties with Israel, although none has so far
been willing to take the lead. (S)
For some other African states, particularly the
poorer predominantly Muslim countries, the choice would
be far more painful, and an early wholesale African
desertion of the Arabs should not be expected. Despite
their frustrations with the Arabs, approximately a dozen
African states are in fact receiving from the Arabs im-
portant development aid and credit loans that are used
to offset the increased cost of oil imports that they
cannot realistically expect to receive from Israel.
They also must consider the unstated threat of an oil
boycott. Most African countries would find it difficult
to secure non-Arab oil suitable for their refineries. (S)
(SECRET)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :. CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/3( EMIRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
DAROD Tribal group
Somali-in habited area
South
Yemen
ibARio'
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/MCUA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0EIZtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
25X1A
OGCR
Nationalism Frustrates Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
in Horn of Africa (U)
The high point of the Ogaden fighting that involved
some 30,000 Somali regular forces ended in March 1978,
but the Somalis continue to support the Western Somali
Liberation Front and the Ethiopian-Somali border issue
remains as alive as ever. There may be as many as 50,000
guerrillas in southeastern Ethiopia with the majority
of them in Harerge Province and an undetermined number
of personnel from the Somali. regular Army serving as a
leadership cadre for this force. (S NF)
The Root of the Problem
Hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia are rooted
in intense nationalism based on each side's interpretation
of history and age-old religious and ethnic rivalries
that took a more tangible form during the last century
when Ethiopia acquired vast new territories--including
the Ogaden--from the former colonial powers in the Horn.
The conflict is further complicated by each country's
concept of "nation." The Ethiopians base their definition
on territory, considering ethnicity to be mere tribalism
that impedes nation building. The Somalis base theirs on
ethnic common feelings, to which territorial considera-
tions are secondary. These definitions collide in the
case of the Ogaden and surrounding areas. (U)
Somalia refuses to budge from its claim that "the
people of the Ogaden and adjacent regions, which were
annexed by Ethiopia in the late 19th century, have a
right to self-determination." Actually, there were no
international frontiers in the Horn of Africa prior to
the 1880s. From the fourth to the seventh century,
Ethiopia was a small, powerful Christian empire--the
Axumite kingdom--that was centered on the provinces of
Tigre, Begemder, Welo, Shoa, and Gojam in the Ethiopian
highlands. It was dominated by the Amhara and Tigrai
peoples whose influence by the seventh century extended
from the Nile valley northeastward as far as Mecca in
22 December 1978
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/011?G' iIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/WpCA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
Saudi Arabia. Until the mid-1880s, the territory east
of the Ethiopian highlands was known only as the Somali
coast. The region was inhabited by the nomadic Afars,
Gallas, and Somalis, who migrated throughout this un-
claimed desolate territory. (U)
The Early Inhabitants
The Afars moved into the Danakil (west of Djibouti
in the Rift Valley), southern Eritrea, and the Djibouti
area in the seventh century A.D. and have remained there
to this day. Early in the 10th century, the Galla
(or Oromo) people settled on lands east of the Afars
and dominated the Ogaden region in the south, or parts
of it, for the next 500 years. The Somalis who already
were Islamized by the 9th century, started migrating in
small irregular groups in the latter part of the 10th
century; within 200 years they occupied most of present-
day Somalia, and the Issas (ethnically related to the
Somalis) from the northern coastal region had displaced
the Gallas in the areas adjacent to the Afars. In the
11th century the Darod Somalis started their trek south-
ward from the northeast coast of Somalia. It took them
roughly 500 years to drive out or subjugate the Galla and
gain control over most of the Ogaden region and another
300 years to reach the Giuba river (near the present
Kenya border), finally stopping at the Tana river in
Kenya by 1909. Thus, the Somalis have had an expanding
presence in this region for nearly 1,000 years. (U)
Although it is impossible to be precise about the
population in Harerge, Bale, and Sidamo Provinces, ethnic
Somalis make up the majority of the estimated five to
six million inhabitants. Organized along kinship lines,
the Somalis are divided into six clan families. The
largest of these is the Darod which consists of several
clans; the most important ones include the Ogaden,
Migertein, and Marehan (President Siad's clan). The
Ogaden clan is divided into some 17 subgroups that are
located mainly in the area of the same name.* These
people also constitute the core of the Western Somalia
Liberation Front's insurgency against the Mengistu regime.
(U)
*There is uncertainty about whether the Ogaden was named after the
Ogaden clan or vice versa, but it is a common practice throughout
Africa to identify an area or locality by the ethnic name of the
inhabitants.
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/0198ORECIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/SflCRBIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
The advent of Islam provided another source of ten-
sion in the Horn. During the seventh century A.D., the
Muslims challenged the power of the Ethiopians and cut
their empire off from the rest of the Christian world.
This ushered in a long period of sporadic "Jihads" (re-
ligious wars) that reached their zenith in the 1540s
when Somali Muslims overran this mountain kingdom. Pe-
riodic retaliatory forays against the Muslims brought
the Ethiopians into limited contact with the lands east
of the highlands. These actions over the centuries de-
veloped into a religious power struggle for control of
the Horn that still hovers around the current conflicts.
(U)
Ethiopia's first real involvement with the Ogaden
and vicinity coincides with Emperor Menelik II's ter-
ritorial expansions to create modern Ethiopia in the
1880s, at the same time that Britain, France, and Italy
were dividing up the rest of the Horn of Africa. Me-
nelik's objectives were to take control of the neighbor-
ing lands to establish a buffer against European encroach-
ment and to "redeem all territories that once were a
part of the empire," according to Ethiopian tradition.*
He conquered the Harer and Jijiga areas in 1889, imposed
his rule over the Afars to the north, and in 1891 moved
southward into the Ogaden, Bale, and Sidamo regions.
Effective Ethiopian control over the Ogaden was really
never established, nor has there ever been a substantial
presence of the Ethiopian people among the inhabitants-
even today. (U)
The Boundary Question
France and Britain established the boundary between
French Somaliland and the British Somaliland protectorate
in 1888, and in 1894 the British and Italians fixed the
frontiers between their respective Somaliland protector-
ates. Establishment of these borders around the areas un-
der European administrative control was an alien proce-
dure to Menelik and his predecessors who traditionally
*Menelik's concepts of Ethiopia's former frontiers extended to
Khartoum, Sudan; Nyanza Province in Kenya; and included all Galla
country (southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya).
22 December 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/31SEEca1WRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0SI EtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
annexed territory in name only, without benefit of bound-
aries, treaties, or even a presence. Thus Ethiopia was
forced to define its borders, especially in the east,
for the first time in its long history. The boundaries
between Ethiopia and the French and British Somalilands
were settled in 1897, but only after the Europeans gave
up much of their territorial claims and Britain obtained
guarantees for Somali herdsmen on both sides of the border
the right to move freely across the line for grazing
and water. The first (1897) treaty between Italy and
Ethiopia on the boundary with Italian Somalia did not
agree with the map, so it was never signed by either
party. The second agreement in 1908 was just as vague
as the first, but it was signed after Italy compensated
Ethiopia for a 49,210-square kilometer (19,000-square
mile) tract of land and ceded all of the Ogaden and its
people to Menelik. This treaty was still disputed in
1960 when Somalia became independent and voided all prior
boundary agreements. The existing frontier between Ethi-
opia and the former Italian colony is still just a UN-
imposed provisional administrative line of uncertain
legality. (U)
The often repeated accusation about Somalia's obses-
sion with territorial expansion obscures some basic issues
concerning the treaties that created Ethiopia's eastern
frontiers. The Somalis claim that the British and Italian
agreements with Menelik violated prior treaties with
the various Somali clan families. The 1884 and 1886
treaties with five Somali clan families provided for
British protection of the Somalis and their territory
from increasing Ethiopian encroachment and administra-
tion of the British Somaliland protectorate in return
for Somali logistical support for Aden. These treaties
also denied both parties the right to unilaterally cede
Somali territory. To get Ethiopian recognition of the
border with its protectorate, however, the British aban-
doned their claim to most of the Baud region and allowed
Menelik to annex it. This, in effect, was an abrogation
of British obligations to the Somalis. (U)
A similar treaty between the Italians and Somalis
in 1889 placed southern Somalia under Italy's adminis-
tration and protection from Ethiopian encroachment in
return for a substantial annuity. Following their de-
feat at Adowa by the Ethiopians in 1895, the Italians
Approved For Release 2002/0$ 42ECIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0$=EtIA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
withdrew their claim to most of the Ogaden in return
for control of Eritrea; the 1908 treaty not only ceded
the rest of the Ogaden to Ethiopia, but identified the
Somali "tribes" that went with it. (U)
The government of Ethiopia claims that the British
agreement of 1897 is valid and that the Somalis must
recognize this border; but the 1908 treaty. with the Ital-
ians still requires an interpretation before any settle-
ment on the frontier with this former colony can be made.
Ethiopia also argues that the 1950 provisional administra-
tive line deprives Ethiopia of a large portion of its
territory, but Addis Ababa would consider renouncing
this claim if Somalia recognizes the line as the de jure
boundary. Although Ethiopia's claim to Somalia was re-
jected by the UN, it still maintains that much of the
Somaliinhabited area of the Horn was formerly part of
the Ethiopian empire. (U)
Outlook
The prospects for a peaceful settlement of Ethio-
pian-Somali differences over the Ogaden are not promis-
ing. Indeed, the Ethiopians-emboldened by the recent
success of their hardline military policy toward seces-
sionist guerrillas in Eritrea-will probably be more de-
termined than ever to crush the Somali-supported guer-
rilla movement in the Ogaden by force. Tactical suc-
cess in Eritrea-if it can be sustained--will, addition-
ally, enable the Ethiopians eventually to redeploy some
of their veteran combat units back to their original
base of operations in the Ogaden, thus increasing pres-
sure on the Ogadeni insurgents. The Somalis, for their
part, appear equally determined to upgrade dramatically
guerrilla force levels in the Ogaden and to encourage
increasingly aggressive insurgent operations there.
(S)
Moreover, before any negotiations-even of an ex-
ploratory nature--to resolve the Ogaden dispute can begin,
Ethiopia demands that Somalia cease its support for guer-
rilla activities, publicly and formally renounce all
Irredentist ambitions in the Horn, and pay reparations
for war damages in the Ogaden. The Somalis, on the other
hand, continue to demand autonomy for all inhabitants
Approved For Release 2002/019961 'IA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01$ aS 1A-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
of the Ogaden and show no willingness to abandon their
official or covert support for the guerrillas. Indeed,
to do otherwise would be politically risky, if not fatal,
for Siad or any other Somali leader-given the continuing
strong national commitment to the "Greater Somalia" concept.
(S) (SECRET NOFORN)
Approved For Release 2002/01/3DC1tA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/3: aCIML-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
25X1A
Upper Volta: Military Dissatisfaction (S)
Senior military officers in Upper Volta's armed
forces, have become dis-
affected over President Sangoule Lamizana's refusal to
abide by the constitution and resign his military com-
mission. Lamizana, a four-star general who assumed
leadership of Upper Volta's civilian government last May,
relies on the Voltan military for his principal source
of political power and is reluctant to sever this rela-
tionship, at least until he is certain that he has
established a secure civilian power base. (S NF NC OC)
The senior officers have also grown dissatisfied
with Chief of Staff Baba Sy, who has constitutional
authority to force the President's resignation but
refuses to do so. Baba Sy cannot ask for the Presi-
dent's resignation, however, without jeopardizing his
own position--he is past the mandatory retirement age
and in an effort to cushion military pressure for his
resignation, the President has requested Baba Sy to
stay. (S NF NC OC)
Although Lamizana may be aware of the growing dis-
sension among his military officers, it is highly un-
likely that the President will resign his military
commission in the immediate future. Lamizana has also
had to face a series of minor incidents of civilian
unrest--a student demonstration during Upper Volta's
national day celebration and a threatened air controllers'
strike last October. His continued failure to comply
with the constitution will, however, exacerbate the
disaffection his senior military officers already harbor
against him. (S NF NC OC)
The military is intent on ensuring that the civil-
ian government runs legally and could feel obligated to
act if Lamizana does not resign h4s commission in a rea-
sonable amount of time. The military could also force
Bab a Sy into retirement--the officers are concerned
with advancement possibilities and probably feel a
Approved For Release 2002/01/36~?FkTRDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/~gCl -RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
peaceful purging of these senior officers is desirable-
and replace him with a military leader who would be
more forceful in demanding Lamizana's resignation. (S
NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
Approved For Release 2002/01/3k7c-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0 i lA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
FOR THE RECORD
25X1A
South Africa: The frequency of urban terrorist acts and
sabotage has increased noticeably in the Johannesburg
area during the past three weeks. While there is no in-
dication that widespread urban violence is imminent in
South Africa, this flurry of low-level incidents indi-
cates a pattern of urban violence that is slowly increas-
ing, despite extensive government security precautions.
(C)
Last year there was a spate of urban bombings during
the Christmas season: a large shopping center in Johan-
nesburg and several police stations were damaged. This
year's incidents appear to be targeted more toward delib-
erate sabotage rather than acts of wanton terrorism that
produce backlashes from both the white and black commun-
ities. Thus far, the Soweto Community Council building,
a symbol to many urban blacks of government authority,
has been bombed. Also, a depot supplying government-
owned black beer halls was set afire and a large dynamite
factory near Johannesburg was extensively damaged. (C)
In October, the Minister of Justice, warned the
white population to expect increased terrorism, partic-
ularly from the African National Congress, the largest
of the exiled liberation organizations. During November,
the government publicly acknowledged on two occasions
that trained guerrillas were infiltrating South Africa
from neighboring black states. The police have begun a
series of arrests of urban blacks that may be related
to underground terrorist activities and they can be ex-
pected to mount larger security crackdowns if the sabo-
ta a e continues. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL) ORPA,
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/O E~IA-RDP79T00912A002700010033-4
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010033-4