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.0011.1.1.(
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WitimelOMPWP
C.I.G.
Oqober_2946_
COPY NO.
.(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REOUIREMENTS--GHINA
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intellivence
1. The proposed N.I.A. directive in the Appendix hereto was prophrs4
at the suggestion of represenbatives of the Intelligence Advisory T3oard
at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff round table dis-
cussion. The appropriate representatives of the I.A.E. submitted their
own agencies suggestions for these requirements, collaborated in their
synthesis, and unanimously approved this final draft, with which I fully
concur.
2. It is coasidered that such national intelligence requirements
should be approved by the National Intelligence Authority, since the
President made this Authority responsible
for planning, developing and
coordinating the national intelligence ' for which these require-
ments are an indispensable guide.
3. It is therefore recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Doard
concur in the submittal of the enclosed draft memorandum to the National
Intelligence Authority.
HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence
DUD R7V Dilic9/4/9/0E6)
c&tflp / ert 17172
QUG CL L.. ;:;IV LLASS
JUST M.XT i;;I 1;:?2
atilimmor
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ILLEGIB
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?.
1 L.)
ENCLOSURE:
DRAFT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREAENTS - CHINA
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board
1. Attached hereto is proposed N.I.A. Directive, Motional Intelli-
gence Requirements - China," which was prepared at the suggestion of re-
presentatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board at an Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff round-table discussion. The appi:opriate
representatives of the I.A.B. submitted their own agency suggestions for
these requirements and collaborated in their synthesis. This final draft
has the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central intelligence and
the Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. It is felt that the production of national policy intelligence
on any nation or area must be based upon those elements of intelligence
which are regarded by the national government essential to planning
for and maintaining the national security and interest in regard to that
nation or area. Since these essential elements of intelligence have so
direct a relationship to current U. S. policy, a brief statement of U. S.
policy for China was required. Pending completion of arrangements to
secure such statements of U. S. policy from the State Department, the
following brief of U. S. policy in the China area was prepared from th..i&
0444-4400
State Department or guidance
in the determination and delineation of these essential elements of
national intelligence:
a. Overall U. S. policy with respect to China has the
following major features. The United States seeks the de-
velopment of a peaceful, unified and democratic China under
Enclosure
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I
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COPS
. LPL" V I ii111.
a National Government comprising all political elements;
rillerlangnir
supports the principle of non-intervention by foreign govern-
ments in China's internal affairs; is prepared) under certain
conditions, to assist in the rehabilitation of the country
and improvement of its agrarian and in-Austrial economy; and
encourages the development of foreign trade and private
enterprise in China.
1. Non-Intervention. The United States believes
the management of China's internal affairs is the re-
sponsibility of the Chinese people, and would oppose
intervention by any foreign government; it would
oppose vigorously any further efforts by foreign
nations to split off and control Chinese provinces.
Soviet expansion in the Far East, if it occurs, would
threaten world stability, and hinder the realization
of U. S. objectives in China. Revival of Japanese
and German influence in China may constitute a future
threat to U. S. policy objectives in China.
b. Rehabilitation. In economic assistance to China, the
United States mill give more favorable consideration to projects
for the rehabilitation and development of transportation and
communication facilities agriculture, and consumer goods in-
dustries than to heavier industries; it will encourage the
Chinese Government to approach the problems of internal re-
covery through international cooperation rather than through
nationalistic trade policy and through a tariff policy adapted
to China's resources and markets rather than to the development
of a self-sufficient economy.
c. Foreign Trade. The United States favors an equality
of opportunity among all nations for trade and enterprise in
China, extension of the areas of private enterprise whether
Enclosure
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ILLEGIB
Mnor
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q..,qj lir 44.,
Chinese or foreign and assurance of nondiscriminatory treatment
of foreign companies and nationals in China and adequate pro?
tection of the legitimate rights of property.
3. It is not the intent to publish such statements of ;policy in
directives but merely to employ theM for guidance in the research operations
necessary to formulate National Intelligence Requirements.
4. C.I.G. proposes to prepare, as soon as practicable, similar
National 'Intelligence Requirements on other areas; Korea and the Middle
East having. been agreed as the next areas to be covered.
S. It is recommended that the
14411,44 tativireA. a44
a. Approve the attached proposed N.I.A. Directive,
"National Intelligence Requirements ? Chna."
b. Limit distribution of this directive, classified
"Top Secret," to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies
of the I?h.:3. in 'idshington, to those theater or overseas
area commanders selected by the Viar arid Navy Departments,
and to those chiefs of missions designated by the State
Department.
,.....0710101411=4"
Enclosure
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Approved For Release 2001/t)3I,310:.IA-R,D,P181,1.10.0728R000100040021-7
APPENDIX
DRAFT
PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TUITaREMENTS--CITINA
INTRODUCTION
1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to
the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary
to announce and maintain the essential elements or national intelli-
gence desired and a list of intelligence requirements from which those
essential elements may be produced. These statements as a uoup will
he.eeafter be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and rill
ferm the broad basis for coordinated directives by all agencies for
the production of intelligence.
2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures
and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the imple-
mentation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these re-
quirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing
their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essen-
tial. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circum-
stances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed
quarterly.
Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements--China are
published herewith in two parts as follows:
Part I - Essential Elements of National Intelligence
Part II - National Intelligence Requirements
3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements,
tEe Central Intelligence Group will immediately undertake to coordi-
nate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will rec-
ommend to the National Intelligence Authority, in three months from
?MaingirT
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,
?L,
Appendix
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date of publication, any changes in this directive or in methods and
procedures which have been evolved and which should be applied as
standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence
Requirements.
1. ESSENTIAL ELEidENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
1. The Essential Elements of National Intelligence consist of that
foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Gov-
ernment in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conduct-
ing foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and utherwise planning for
and maintaining the national security.
2. The following Essential Elements of National Intelligence for
the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central
Intelligence Group and to the Tour intelligence agencies who will assist
C.I.G. in producing national intelligence on that area.
3. What are the developments in the China area* to show increased
activity by the U.S.S.R. to:
a. Split off territory from China?
b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
d. Discredit U. S. Forces and aims in China?
4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:
a. Cessation of hostilities?
b. Coalition?
c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.S.R., U.S.?
d. Economic and agrarian development?
* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Outer
Mongolia, and Korea.
leMENN
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iL
5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the
Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?
II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced
as a guide to the intelligence pertaining to the China area which,
,vhen met, would fully satisfy the Essential Elements of National
Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis
upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordi-
nated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence
agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be prop-
erly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.
2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit
intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to,
U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace unity,
democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade.
Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects, as individ-
ual items, analytic reports, etc., during the three months from date
of issue:
a. Trends of policy of the National Government with respect to:
(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and
locus of power, civil liberties, educat!on and labor.
(2) Industrialization including the integration into China
proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enter-
prise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in
China, and Chinese foreign trade.
b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with
respect to terms for participation in coalition government reor-
ganization of their armies and control by the National Government,
relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls
over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.
r4...-
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1,./UN DLI
c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R.,
with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleav-
age between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National
Government, contiguous territories, the U. S., and domestic Chi-
nese issues.
d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including
Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, includ-
ing details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpil-
ing; construeLion or improvement in air facilities and construction
or improvement in all communications networks.
e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists wibh details, and
evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of
military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Man-
churia, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.
f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist
China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes
which are influenced or reached by it.
g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special em-
phasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese
Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R.,
and U.S.A.
h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese
minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists,
U.S.S.R. U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.
i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and
steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light
metals.
A. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by
the National Government and the Chinese Communists.
GIG
Appendix
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k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the
National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities
of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic
support.
1. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency crf air,
ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide
replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorgan-
ization.
in. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mon-
golia and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and
Chinese Communists.
n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the reestab-
lishment of American business and foreign trade.
0. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new con-
stitution and when it will come into effect; (2) British plans for
developrant of the naval base and the strategic plan it is designed
to implement; (3) actual (as against purely chauvinistic) position
of the Chinese government regarding the return of Hongkong to China.
2. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japan-
ese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern
Manchuria.
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.ittuostoott CONFIDEN
Octobox_j...24,6_
CENTRAL Dirr;LLIcalia: CROUP
NATIONAL IL117212.',ICF3NC:
Ven_esmeljattlie DireAtem,pf Central IntrAm.
1. The proposed 11.I.A. Directive enclosed 11-.9rerdth was prepared at
the sugpation of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board
at an Interdepartmental Coordimating and Planning. Staff round table
discussion. The ttpra-opriate representatives of the I.A.13 submitted
their own agencies' s1g4e3tions for these requiremonts, collaborated
in their synthesis, auld u1y approved tlAie final draft, re....th
which I fully concur1
2e G.iG.proposes to proprAro, as coon as practicable, eirzilar
tional Intelligence itequirezerts on other a.reus, Korea, and t1.7) :addle
rast having been agreed utlen as tal0 11;17:1 t,J0 bcovava.
3. It is racerzended that the Director of Central 1nte1li4once end
thA.) Intelligence Advisory Board; acting for the rlational Intelligence
Authority pursuant to 'Paragraph 3 of Directive :\ie. 1:
Approve tiae attached geoposed Directive, 'Motional
Intelligence Requirements--;Chine.
b. Agree to limit distribution of this Directive, classified
%ITO? SECRET", to ti,a C.I.G. and the intelligence avr.eios of the
I.A.B. in Washington to those theater or overseas area command-
ers selected by the War and Nov Departments, and to those chiefs
of missions designated by the State Department.
7.1
OU21.1 et..0.7)
Juvr tVaT
iorr s. wow
Lieutenant General, Ira
Director of Central Intelligence
??? IL4?0
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25X1A
clirit=i!gf
711.
ed For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040021-7.
CON.H.I',
E 't!CL O
DEiTHAL
ODHE
PROPXEL N.I.A. DIRECTIVE
NATIONAL INTELLIMCS REQUIRRAENTS - CHINA
..'/4uraVed by the:irector. of Central IntelIi ?once
t?,A0tin
nantWO1
ar
Con.currence
of
the
a
tonal
tte11-1
elligence Ad qor) Board
,t=6.Auuthort.t ? AtmUantto
Directive
INThl/DUCTION
1. In order to fulfill the National intellirence :ulission as civen to
the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it i6 necessary
to announce and maintain the essentialleiiteuts of national intelli-
,
'a
Gence desired, and a list of intellii,ence requirements from which those
A
essential:elements may be produced. These statenents as a Group will
hereafter be known as "National intellionce ?Requirettents" and will
lora the broad basis for coordinted directives by all agencies for
the production of intelligence.
2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operatinG procedures
and the IT,echanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the imple-
mentation of ifttional Intellicence Requirements by publishinc these re-
quirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing
their contents on that intelligene currently recorded the most essen-
tial. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circum-
stances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed
quarterly.
Accordingly, the National intelligence hequirements Chiaa are
published herewith in twoparts as follows:
Part I e. EasentiaWle=nts of National Intelligence
Part II ,?!. National Intelligence Requirements
3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements,
the Cmntral Intelligence Group will inmediately undertake to coordi-
nate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will rec?
commend, in three months from data of publication, any changes in this
7
losure
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25X1A
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owommasOft
direedve or in methods and procedures nnve been evolved and which
should he applied as stanolnL operatLnL, procedures Ar luplemontint;
liational In Requiremonts.
I. ES5M1tL r7V!,1:TS OF liAT10,1AL
1. Tne Essential Uements of National intelligence consist of that
foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Gov?
ernment in makinez, sound decisions, developing loreign policy, conduct?
ing foreign relations, avoidinF, surprise, and otherwise planning for
and maintaining the national security.
2. The folloning 'ssential 'awionts of ;iational intelligence for
the China area are announced aLd constitute a directive to the Central
intelliy,ence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist
C.I.G. in producing w-tional intelligence on that area.
3. Vthat are Lhe developments in the China area to ehml increased
activity by the V.S.:.>.R. to:
a. :;plit off territory lrom China?
b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
c. Secure unilateral political or economic inlluence in China?
d. Discredit U. S. forces and aims in China?
ithat is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:
a. Cessation of hostilities?
b. Coalition?
c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.:Suit., U.3.?
d. Economic and agrarian development?
* China (including ;,..anchurial Inner gongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer
Mongolia, and Korea.
Enclosure
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ti
TOP 67,CRET
5.'.:nat are thn capabilities and probable intentions of the
Chinese Gonnunist Party in political, economic and military spheres?
II. NATIO:iAL ITLLIGF Ct QULtriLNA2E;
1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced
as a guide to the intelligence pertainint; to the China area which,
when t, muld fully satisfy the sentll lents oi 14ational
Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis
upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordi-
nated among the appropriate offices of C.I.U. and the intelligence
agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be prop-
erly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.
2. The specific lormulations in this section are designed to elicit
intelligence YAbich will aid in judging the success of, or threats to,
U.S.-China policy in respect to the 1:,oals of Chinese peace, unity,
democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade.
Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects, as individ-
ual items, analytic reports, etc., durin!' the three months from date
of issue:
a. Trends of policy of the National Government with respect to:
(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and
locus of povker, civil liberties, education and labor.
(2) Industrialization including the integration into China
proper of Ianchurian industry, state control and private enter-
prise Government finance, agrarian reform) foreign business in
China, and Chinese foreign trade.
b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with
respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reor-
ganization of their armies and control by the National Government,
relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls
over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.
TOP SSCIFT
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25X1 A
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olietIPEE
c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R.,
ulth special omphasis on high-levolliaison, or on sips of cleav-
age batmen the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National
dovornmont, contiguous territories, the U.S., and domastic Chinese
issues.
d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including
Manchuria, and, in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, includ-
ing details of air, ground end naval forces; evidences of stockpil-
ing; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction
or improvement in al/ communications networks.
e. Soviet military aid to Chinese L'ommunists with details, and
evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of
militar,y" significance batmen Communist-controlled Shantung, Man-
churia, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.
f, Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist
China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes
which are influenced or reached by it.
Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special em-
phasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese
CorQmunists, National Uovornment, other political groups, U.S.S.R.,
and U.S.A.
Ii. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese
minority* parties) attitude towards National Government, Communists,
U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.
j. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and
steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light
metals.
le Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by
the National Government and the Chinese Communists.
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? I,
ditatanittri:`
/
k. Communiet military potential* in comparison with that of
the National Goverment, inducting reserve:31, equipment) capabilities
of both air and around forces, and ability to provide looistic
support.
:;ationalist military potontiall status and efficiency of
air, sround and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals bo.
provide replacements of erlaipment; and actual progress of military
reorgnization.
la Currant poiiticaL developments in Inner ,1Aongolial Outer non-
gone, and 3inkiang, with. S pe c ial reference to the U*SOS.R. end
Chine se Comunis ts
n. Uovernmental relations and policies affecting the reestab-
lishment of American business and fore- n trade.
Infamation on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the now con-
stitution and when it will come into effect;
2,i io w iereabouts and employment of approxime.tely v30,000
Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwanstung Army formerly in
Northern lianchuria.
b
1 '
? 1 ti k
,
LNCLOSIME
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25X1 A
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''.!'::-C!!!! VV.
v jerL
C.;.:i.`Y IR) , LL
( DL;TaritreloN
MOP
10 Octoboy_atk
CENTRAL INTL' LLIMIZE GROUP
WITIONAL INI.V.; U1:0X
Veattorand3re Ay the Dix.? of Cent a1.4 Intelliarm
I. The proposed Li.A. Directive enc/osed herewith was prepared at
the suggention of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board
at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Plenrdng Staff round table
discussion. The appropriate reixresentatieree of the I.A.B. subaitted
their own agencies' sugpetions for these requirements, collaborated
in their synthesis, end unanimously approved this final draft, with
which I fully concur.
2. C.I.G. proposes to prepare? as soon as practicable, eimilar Na-
tional Intelligence Requirements on other areas, Korea and the. Middle
East having been eereed upon as the ne:et are= to be covered.
3. It is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence
Authority pursutext to Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Direetive No. 1:
11. Approve ? the attached proposed LI.A. Directive, "National
Intellipnce Itequirements--China".
J. Agree to limit dis-tribution of this Directive classified
"TOP SECRET'', to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies of the
I.A.B. in lashington, to those theater or overseas area corenand-
ors selected by the War and Navy Depertnents, and to those chiefs
of missions designated by the State Department.
REVr;Aci.',
orn e L:141p CIN
cy
-1
cu ,s2 f:;111 UV LASS
'MT ? le. I!. fiEXT HEY AUTH; .ila 104
.111???????????????????
25X1 A
HOYT S. VANDENIERG
Lieutenant. General, USA.
Director of Central Intelligence
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25X1A
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En C L 05UHE
D h A i T
PROPO5EU N.I.A. DDECTIVE
NATIONAL .LMLIGNCE R%1JRFAE;A'S -CiiIA
???????????????...../.0.11. 1?????????**10.4.14.nor ????????
;,
11 "Wk..
lb )rov(!d by the 7,)1rector of Central Intellirence
ridth the Jnanimous Concui-renc,e. Advisory r?oard
- Ac t1nz ? r1 i?IIit1li ence Auti-oi=1:'''ttrourili.t, to
Paapj ofr.irective 14 ()*Ti
INMOLUGTION
1. In order to fulfill the National intellicence itassion as givnn to
the National intellienco Authority by the President, it is necessary
to announce and.iaaintain the essential
elemonts of rational intelli-
genc.2 desired, and a list of inte1116enco
essential elements may be produced. These statements as a group will
hereafter bo known as "National. intelligence Requiments" and will
from which those
lora the broad basi for coordinated directives by all agencii0for
the production of intelligence.
2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operatin procedures
and the a-nechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the imple-
mentation of ational intellicence Requireicentn by publishin:, these re-
quirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, aad basing
their contents on that intelligence currently regarded thn most esren-
tial. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circum-
stances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed
quarterly.
Accordingly, the National intelligence Pagpirements - China are
published herewith in two parts as follows: -47
CuAitzra. 12,t.tur74_,&1_
Part
1--eliftl--44=t-caligurre-6
Eel') 1-frE.5
i'art II - L4Itiona1 Intelligence gogalasepieata
3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements,
the CIntral intelligence Group wilQmmediatelyundertake to coordi-
nate the various intelligence directives based thereon and wi rec-
comend, in three months from date of publication, any changes in this
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25X1 A
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diroctive or in methods and procodurea whi61 Luxe been evolved and which
should he applied as standin oporatIn& proced.ures for implementiw,
flational intelligence Reqdrements.
Ti:S67.'; .71 A I, 5'7, -L. Ci P, Tifil:h-0 AL i. 1LL1O2.GE
3., The, F,ssinitiab 9-024rtts of N a tional intollience consist of that
foreign intelligence which is curmatly essential to the national Gov?
orrnent in makity: sound decisions, developinc foreim policy, conduct?
fornicn relations, avoiding; surprise and otherwise planning for
and :Inalintaininc Vim national F.!?!)C1.!..rity.
2. The follawingn7ssential of ::ational Intellizence for
the china area are announced and constitute a dix?ective to Om Central
IntolW;yence Group and to the four intelligence agencles who 'dal assist
i.n prodvicing national intelli[mace on that area.
?tp
Reat are the devaloprzpets in the China areal to show increased
activity by the to:
a. f:4plit off territory from China?
b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
c. 6ecuro unilatoral political or eoenomic influence in China?
.d. Discredit U. S. Yorces and aims in China?
1. that is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:
a. Cessation of hostilities?
b. Coalition?
c. Forein relations, particularly uitb US. 5., .S.?
d. Economic and agrarian development?
41- crn rn-oirMrig7s7'xia uria, J.nner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Cuter
Mongolia, and Korea.
r
Finclosure
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25X1 A
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JOINOMIT
flat are the capabilities and probable intentions of the
Chinesn Corzunist ?arty in political, economic and military. sphores?
n13 s 8:411.
II. NATIOAL IN1nLiGMC7: 42==Z=
? s ,4.11 1,4'5
1. The following National Intelligence t'.r.erEpAtielettit4e are announced
as a guide to the intelligence pertaininz to the China area which,
When met, would fully satisfy therissentialtlis=ais of Ziational
IntelWenco. The revrittzertirt are to bo regarded as the basis
upon which all phases of intellience production can he fully coordi-
nated among tho appropriate offices of G.I.G. and the intelligence
agencies, and in order that sll
Itellience operations may be prop-
erly intecrated to produce the desired essential nlemeras*
2. Th- specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit
intnlligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to,
U.S.-China policy in respect to tho joals of Chinese peace, unity,
dflmooracy ond vnhauilitation? non-interwIntion, and foreign trade.
Intelliotnce is dosired on the follovin;L linted subjects, as individ-
ual items, analytic roports, etc. durinl: the throe months from date
of issue:
a. Trends or policy or the national Government with respect to:
(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of overntaent and
locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor*
(2) industrialization includinc the integration into China
proper or 21anchurian industry, state control and pri.vate enter-
prise, government finance, agrarian raforrao foreign business in
China, and Chinese foreign trade*
b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with
respect to tnrms for participation in coalition government, reor-
ganization of their armies and control by the National Oovernment,
relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls
over the administration of Communist-dominatod areas.
Enclosure
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25X1 A
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04110,401000f
?
0. Relations between the Chinese Coramists and the U.S.S.R.,
with special emphasis on high-lovel ntaison, or on signs or c.1003P-
age between the CCP and U.S.S.R., in policy towards the Nation:a
(lowrnmant, contiguous territories, the U.S., and domestic Chinese
issues.
d. Soviet militanr strength and disposition in China, including
Manchuria, and in North Korea, Vongolia and Soviet Siberia, includ-
ing details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpil-
ing; construction or irproveationt in air facilities and construction
or improvement in all communications ni3tvorks.
e. Soviet military aid to Chinese L'Oral.rtUrlitita with detaib, and
evidences of .41.4r increase or decreases information on traffic of
militaz7 significance batman Comenistecont,rollod Shantung, 't,lark-
churia? and North Korea, or trans-4314;011= traff.ic.
f. Activities of Soviet, agencies in le.uomintang and Comanist
China, and effoctivvness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes
which are influenced or reached by it.
Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special em-
phasis on tbe attitudes of the Ideal peoples toward the Chins=
Communists, National Governmemt? other political groups, U.S.S.R.,.
and U.S.A.
h. Strenthi compositions organization and leadership of Chinese
minority parties; attitude towards National Ocvernment? Coommists,
U.S.S.11.9 freedom or function under National Government.
i. The dawlopment of Chinese industry* particularly iron and
steel, shipping, electric power, Unttilesa petroleum /and light
metals.
I, Crop conditions and food reaervea in the areas controlled by
the National Government and the Chinese Commactistas
ENCLOSTRIE
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25X6
25X6
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)
`ki I/44
te Co nit milt,ary potential, in comparison with that .of
the 11.J.t1ona1 Goverment, including reserves, equipment? capabilities
of both air and ground forme" and ability to provide logistic
sapport.
1. Nationalist military potentias status and efficiency of
air/ ground and Gaa forces; a bilitr of indUstry and Dausi,nals
provide replacoments of equipmnt; end actual pmexcas of militarir
rotarg,:alizatiorh,
Carront po1iticA dervelopments Door onolia, Otr 'don.
geliai and Sinkiang, with spocia reference to the U.S,S.a. kald
Chinese Communists.
no Uoverrmental rovlatione and policies affecting the reestab-
lishment of Azerican busilless ilrid foreign trade,
0, information on Ifongkong regarding (1) nature .of the new con-
stitation and when it will ccsne into effect;
IL The vihereabouts and employment of approxizatAy 780/000
Japanese troops of the old Japanese n.venetung Army formerly in
Northern, Lianchuria.
Err, rci
=CLOSURE
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?
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\CA.*
ge PA
rAtIc.
cj10,\,
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ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
021-7
C
A'.? ?'7.1
? 4.,
4>t,
up
PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA
Approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the riatelligence Advisory Board
Acting for the National Intelligance Authority Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of M.A. ffirective No. 1
44')4. , .., ,
,. 9N NI
??,,,,..
4,
?%0 I/
INTRODUCTION
1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given
the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary
etrtc*
to announce and maintain the4essentialsoSimmedo of national intelli-
to
gence desired, and a list of,intelligence reeptiremeftioev objectives from
which those essential,selemmartS may be produced. These statements as a group
will hereafter
form the broad
theoproduction
be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and will
basis for eeerdmallsed-direetiveo-by-all-ageneiee-Per
of intelligence.
2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures
and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the production
of intelligence based on a formulation impiententa4ien of National Intelli-
gence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area,
i.e., the China area mad basing their contents on that intelligence
currently regarded-the most essential. or this purpose, these-kairlsrme44en,
? will obtain until circumstances demand *1414P -44a revision.
In any event, *hey-It-will be reviewed quarterly.
Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are
published herewith in two parts as follows:
Cur
Part I I/1Essentia104eem4614 of National Intelligence
Part II - National Intelligence Re4%.!4t!tento Objectives
3, Tipen-pubilesAlem-ef-tAwto-Na4kenfti-IrAelikgenee-RoquiremewboT
C voilQ(nj 'c
The Central Intelligence Group will immeelksAmIy-tolderbake--4,-eserdimaile
c,01c?,f,,"
Athe-var4ous-inIkeiligenee-direwitives-based-ithereem-wid-will recommend
in three months from .date of publication, any changes in-ts
41.11M59,1,0,111
?
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25X1A
Approved
tfl
alPectrft.
40 21-7
Co. "??- pi.. ? 6,g...A 6 C. ...001,
012-&a-melahedo-wit4-preeedtwee-witieh-ktime-)9een-eveive4-md-witielt
oC?104 , 0; (
skettlei-14-81#14.(1-E6.otamel&ng-eperatiolg-itreeedtweo-ger-implemom7Jakng
Naemai-Inbellitonee-Requiremen4o.
CoAnts.cl.
I. ESSENTIALSEOW OF NkTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
eUr r .11\
1. TherEssentiaLisIemenots of National Intelligence consist of that
foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Gov-
ernment in making sound decisions, developing foreign polioy, oonduct-
ing foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for
and maintaining the national security.
t 4\ ci?se
2. The following likteetterL,41.emeaats of National Intelligence for
the China area are,announoedj arat4emotiaesiireeeel;:ite4enZ feisei"
pf irif't,
iAte4Iigenee-Grettp-ame-4,84-fewp-imitelligemee-stgemeiewiII-a11440,
OTIT6m-in-precitte4nc-mktional-kalaeiligemee-en-thati-area,
5. What are the developments in the China area* to show increased
activity by the U.S.S.R. to:
a. Split off territory from China?
b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
d. Discredit U.S. Forces and aims in China?
4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:
a. Cessation of hostilities?
b. Coalition?
C.
Foreign relations, particulary with U.S.S.R? U.S.?
d. Economic and agrarian development?
On rivauLiioIiuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang
Mongolia, and Korea.
and Outer
Enclosure
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Approved For Relea,s81-00728R000100040021-7
L.
5. Nhat are the capabilities and probable intentions of the
Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?
II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE iikwiRiimsitpa OBJECTIVES
1. The following National Intelligence Objectives are announced
as a guide to the production of intelligence pertaining to the China area
C..if Ic.tEsscZk (-As
which, when met, would fully satisfy the4ia441-esle4a-ts of National
Intelligence. These obleotivea are to be regarded as the basis
upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordi-
nated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies.
and-ift-erder-Cia4-al&-ia4olligesse-epelmailiens-aar-lis-preperly-amlaegrateel-4?e
pre4aee-ithe-desired-essentiai-eiemea**.
2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit
intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to,
U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity,
democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade.
Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects: as indiwid-
sal-i*eas7-amaky4ke-repepts7-84e,7-ebwing-*ke-4hreemeatks-frea-dalbe
ef-issae-
Gkk,
a. Trends ye policy of the National Government with respect to:
(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and
locus of power, oivil liberties, education and labor.
(2) 7
astrialization including the integration into China
proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enter-
prise, government finance, agrarian reform foreign business in
China, and Chinese foreign trade.
b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (COP) with
respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reor-
ganization of their armies and control by the National Government,
relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls
over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.
Enclosure
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25X1A
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r
TrIAL
o. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R.,
with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleav-
age between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National
Government contiguous territories, the U.S., and domestic Chinese
issues.
d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including
Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, includ-
ing details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpil-
ing; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction
or improvement in all communications networks.
e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and
evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of
military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Man-
churia, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.
f. Activities of 6oviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist
China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes
whi-'e influenced or reached by it.
g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special em-
phasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese
Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R.,
and U.S.A.
h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese
minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists,
U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.
i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and
steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light
metals.
Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by
the National Government and the Chinese Communists.
Enclosure
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25X6
25X6
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"A;Vidlifigger/MMPg.
opeellitter
k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of
the National Government, including reserves, equipment capabilities
of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic
support.
1. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of
air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to
provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military
reorganization.
m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mon-
golia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and
Chinese Communists.
n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the re-estab-
lishment of American business and foreign trade.
o. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new con-
stitution and when it will come into effect;
p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000
Japanese troops of the old Japanese Drangtung Army formerly in
Northern Manchuria.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040021-7
25X1 A
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6 nov 1946
fal;),:AttiM OR M. :LODZ
CITAT311,L114
AlartRa 11.1r:ILIS
tr,nLaciocacz
stojuott sata.onal Trxtmlli5,:onozt
Darenta Cat 30 Ootabor 19136.
10 At .1.1f.1 Al.wzIt, 2946 toi;) ti r .t pormanont ?
tri11 membera it VOW 41,5Dilad that Nati Intalinee R0qu.tr0itanta
!:3bo.ulti Ix* .davaio thtt coordintata1 col1Aotlon pr000dnavo to .
thoto nation,44.1.11Ltmrorvicra.".atz et.rea, by arela
? VI .ttd yvaa .. C.10
th talo o.wo, t4inclo 414 0 -W,Vans34,1 r..a.seartla aanbea?*4 talg
a.gt4notata,p roraramo abv,re.. ? Al,thowill t;Iese 111110.4170:.na %aye, rot
Ilioc?n? !:orr4a14 af:tooptati by tho NIA, it is .reco.;:i.tadtt.
designate a ralroLm4::.nt4t!..,-,.te for 1,ntsrdepurtzta414.11 raeatinc
3130 3 tw?or;4,43.1-12"4.60 Ttoati 2173$ ';,..lov.r 4".iar DtliNirtavirL liktildi,r4c4 to
draw up a aooakainatod col.looVion or 1.1.bvIallantfation
of tra
1Cl C TEAL
cat., TZ/3'
a I!! ?
AZ ,
r;CV
Ircie
14 Roply
de :ingcl
OZegi
1.4
VOlar
JA,Lins S. LAX,
Secretary) 1Z *LA.
Central Re cords72"
Secretariat-1
Registry-1
Return to ICAPS -1
OCD -2
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inftWlyyrat. ?
/10.1.11.
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040021-7
NATIONAL INT1LIGT,NC7, RF,OIRWMS--CHINA
are most anxious to publish NIR-China 111, which you con-
curred in at the 10th meeting of the I.A.B. on November 7th. In
accordance with your recommendation at that time we have not published
this paper pending your informal clearance of the implementing directive.
This implementing directive was prepared by your collection represen-
tatives who reached a full accord on November 22 on the divisions of
the collection tasks incident thereto. Sach representative was to ob-
tain your clearance and notify us, but to date we have only received
clearance from State.
are most anxious to expedite this matter. The subject was
first suggested by your deputies at a meeting on August 30. As I
mentioned, it was approved by you on November 7 and the implementation
has been in your agencies since November 25. As soon as we can pub-
lish this paper, we will be able to undertake VTR on other important
.areas. As you realize, the enunciation of these requirements is
particularly important to a directed effort Of 0801 as .well as the
agencies.
P90 GATE/ a
OHIO COW orq
ONIO CLAti GL
4UT-........? NUT OEV
Liy4247-
TYPE C12!---.
n:v CL4SS
N4 72
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BRIEF ON 111.11111
The first item on the agenda which was
postponed from the last meeting, is a proposed
directive setting forth the national intelligence
requirements for China. This was scggested and has
been approved by your representatives who work with
ICAPS. Because of the importance of this directive,
it is suggested that we act for the N.I.A., as
authorized by N.I.A. Directive No. 1, in issuing
these requirements as an N.I.A. directive.
r,.?0 --. REV DATE BY
Di1C :CM1) 11 E
ORIG cuttla 11:EV CLASS
JUST NEXT BEV AVM RR 10.2
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25X1A
25X1A
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BRIEF ONI11111111
The final item on the agenda is a proposed directive
establishing the national intelligence requirements for China.
This also has been approved by your representatives who worked
with 'CAPS. In fact, the development of this directive was
suggested by your representatives, who felt that, before attempt-
ing to establish these requirements on a global basis, a single
country - namely, China -- should be used as something of a test
case. Because of the importance of this directive to the
national intelligence program, it is suggested that we act for
the NIA, as authorized by NIA Directive No. 1, in publishing
these requirements as an NIA directive.
Are there any comments on
1.10 REY PLTY
__ -, L. .
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CMG GEM? /0 CPI TYPE 0 .1"---
OGIS GLASS ---c-TIICkS / ("Ell S' "S ....4i
JUST lit..X I' REV AUTO: li.z 1.;-2
'
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1?04.1 ??????Ten?
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january 19117
'11?M.1071,,,VaIR V,YRaft, r.g.)1
1.T.'4:Err!z1V0.., McDC,&a.T.D
Sdbject tSonoe ftwildrements ** China
Mere is 01,41.osed 11,0,41111th for ,y0ur information
cew oi' ramorandurt l'rom tho rtrector a Central
InteLnco 4.4 Conaral Chambarlito zral,4 tx above.,
datod 23 January 1947.
100a CT.1"1,TAL
rzclosura (1)
DOC REV 1JATE/2" -- EY 0,..Zeigit?-..
...?????????????????........??????????????????
ORKI UPI TYPE
MG GLASS PAGES 11EV VASS
JUST ------. NUT REV AUTiatRil,10.2
7,,L W11(43 T
Carmelo G?fa?e?
Deputy' Director
Distribution:
Central Records (2)
Executive Registry (1)
Secretariat Files (1)
_ONFIDENTIAL-
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,
25X1A
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1:41C01,,
4 gi
rk,A) it.) ?
23, 1.947
117110RANDIN FOR GlL.I7RAL ClIAMBTMLLN :
Subject: National Intelligence Requirements - China
1.. Reference your memorandum of 8 January 19147, subject,
which reads:
1. Approval of was originally given subject, to the
approval of the collection plan drawn up for its implementation.
"2. and its accompanying plan for collection were
accepted as an experiment in the coordination of the collection
of intelligence--China being selected as the field for the ex-
periment. This action was taken with the hope that it mLithct,
lead to a solution of the fundamental problems of the coordi-
nation of ell collection activities and the delineation of in-
telligence responsibilities, although it was recognized that it
and its counterpart, the CIO plan, was more limited in scope
than, and somewhat contrary to, War Department doctrines which
are global in nature.
V
1
tr3. was initiated, NIA Directive No, 7 has
been published, coordinating the entire field of collection
activities. 1111111 too, (which coordinates the responsibilities
'
for the production ofintelligence) is now in circulation and
apparently its approval is in sight. ben approved,
together with NIA Directive No. 7, would appear to obviate the
25X1A desirability of the China experiment.
114. In view of the publication of NIA Directive No. 7 and
the impending publication of the 7nclosure to it is
recommended that and its accompanying collection plan be
withdram.from the consideration of the Intelligence Advisory
Board or at least postponed for consideration to insure that
it be brought into full consonance with the broader directives."
2. Your proposal that CIO discontinue the preparation of National
Intelligence Requirements indicates a misunderstanding of the national
intelligence program as it is being developed by CIG with the advice
and assistance of representatives of the 140 agencies. I, therefore,
believe it advisable to explain this program in some detail so that
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you nay see the part to be
merits, their absolute necessity to
in the performance of his mission,
several agencies.
en:
4444
by Mtqiitelligence Require
-
the Director of Central Intelligence
and their expected usefulness to the
3. In its efforts to comply eith the mission assigned to it by
the President's letter of 22 Jannary 1946 as interpreted in part by
subsevent NIA Directives, the CIO, under my direction, has undertaken
to develop plane "to assure the most effective accomplishment of the
intelligence mission related to the national security," and "to furnish
strategic and national policy intollinence to the President and the
State, War, and Navy Departments, etc." These plans have fallen under
the three general heads of: (a) collection; (b) research or production;
(c) dissemination. Those several specific problems which have been
referred by tho agencies to CIG for coordination have also been studied
in the light of these three basic categories.
L. These three basic plans are designed to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the collection, research, and dissemination of: (a) depart-
mental intelligence; and (b) strategic or national policy intelligence.
By the President's letter, departmental intelligence continues to be the
responsibility of the departments. It has such subdivisions as tactical
intelligence, combat intelligence, operational intelligence, and staff
intelligence. Strategic and national policy intelligence is allocated
by the President to the Director of Central Intelligence. It is com-
posed of such parts as daily digests of current intelligence, situation
reports, special evaluations, and basic intelligence. Overall it is
that intelligence which results from an expert correlation, evaluation,
and analysis of all available intelligence information, including
departmental intelligence, for the ese of the President and top policy
officers of the Government in developing policies for the protection
of the national security. CIG 's interests in this national strategic
intelligence is paramount since the Director of Central intelligence
alone is authorized to produce it. He must, therefore, determine its
collection requirements and procedures, research requirements and
procedures, and dissemination requirements and procedures. To this
end "all necessa9,7 facilities, intelligence and information in the
possession of the respective departments" is by NIA Directive No. I made
available to the DCI.
5. In developing its plans for the coordination of the three
basic phases of intelligence work, CIG has attempted and sincerely
believes that it has given careful consideration to the requirements
of the several agencies as well as to its own requirements. Every
effort has been made to create an appreciation by the agencies of
their interdependability and the logic of closer cooperation.
6. One of the forces behind the original creation of the central
intelligence organization was the lack of some central point there the
intelligence of the four agencies could be correlated objectively, free
from departmental pressures, and evaluated as a ihole.
_CONFIDENTIAL
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?411 44e. l'Oat .41); ti 1,400: 111.0
7. A collection plan can provide for the coordination of SI
collection iTetivities ad procedures whether they are for the collection
of. material for departmental or national strategic intelligence. But
to be a continuing plan not requiring; frequent change it can not contain
directives as to what intelligence material is raoet desired during any
given period. The requirements of today are not the x-equirements of
tomorrow. At most it ccel allocate broad fields to 5 pecialized collectors.
IiIven here provision must be made for ad hoc reallocation on special oc-
casions. The mass of intelligence material available to efficient col-
lectors is such that eelaction must be made. That selection can be made
only by those having, the .eerspective of distance and a knowledge of the
policy or operational officers demand for estimates. No basic Plan for
collection. coordination meets this requirement. Only some epecific
program such as the :IL& providing periodic emidance? leieich can be imple-
mented by the collection coordination plan, will do this. By consulta-
tion with the agencies the NIF,: will insofar as possiblo include in
order of their relative importance the intelligence requirements of
the several agenc:i.es and of GIG. The National Intellicence Requirements ?
will also serve ac guidance for the general activities of Special Opera-
tions. Their absence '41111 leave the coordinators designated by NIA
Directive No. 7 without the guidance they must have for the implementa-
tion of that plan. Because of the above and because of my responsibility
to produce national strategic intelligence, I believe in the necessity
of the prompt issuance of the National Intellieence Requirements for
the strategic areas of the world and must take such steps as appear
appropriate to that end. It is my understanding that other intelli-
gence agencies represented in Lra concur in this opinion. .
8. The oroduction lien is a natural companion of the collection
plan. Vtithout that coordination ?Lich establieher, sound and sure
agency interdependability, each agency munt operate as a sell-contained
unit performing by and for itself all the collection and production
procedures. Allocation in one field requires concurrent allocation in
the other. It can not be expected that the intelligence requirements
of the several agencies for their own departmental intelligence will
produce the. intelligence necessary for the production of national
strategic intelligence. Conversely, there is no intention that the
NI 7. will restrict the reporting by agency representatives abroad in
fulfillment of their parent agency.'s requests? for intelligence of.
current value to departmental intelligence. Nor win the NIR replace
the standing instructions providing for the steady flow of factual
data destined for the compilation or revision of basic or static
intelligence. The NIR are intended only to give guidance as to what
emphasis should be placed 'within the vast field. They have to serve
as a current periodic program for the implementation of the basic
long-range plan. Liis does not preclude the procedure whereby basic
estimates ill be further treated by any or all of' the agencies in
the preparation of their departmental intelligence. But the mere
possession of intelligence in no matter that form is it an end in.
itself. There must, therefore, be a dissemination procedure.
1
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COJ\iFIDFNrrAL
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9. The dissemination plan must insure the rapid dissemination
of all incominG intelligence information to those agencies that may
require it in tlet form. It should equally discontinue the dissemina-
tion of intelligence material which is not wanted and which only conluses
by its oppressive volume. In addition, it should insure the dissemination
of basic estimates required for the development of departmental intelli-
gence. And finally, it should insure the receipt by CIG of all depart-
mental intelligence studies and estimates so that proper strategic and
national policy intelligence maybe prepared by the Director of Central
Intelligence for the I-resident.
10. I, therefore, request that you issue Well directives as may
be necessary to the individuals already designated by you to?assist the
GIG in preparing NIR for the USSR and the ,j,cidle Zest. Invitations for
interagencylaetins to prepare these NI ;1 will be issued in the next
few days.
IL I also request that you Give your concurrence to the immediate
issuance of 111Z China. As you are aware, the preparation of NIR China
was initiated on 30 AuEust 1946 with the idea they would be revised
quarterly. The NIR China was approved by the IAD on 7 November 1946
and the subsequent delay has been the result of consideration of the
implementing directive. Although I believe the detailed implementing
directives for the UIR mill, when the plan is eventually perfected,
insurn the most efficient intelligence production, I am withdrawing
the implementing directive to LIRChina and shall refer the problem
of their implementation to GIG Assistant Director for Collection and
Dissemination who will issue such collection requests as may appear
necessary.
/s/ HOYT 5. VANDFABSRG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence
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