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? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A004900150001-7
The President's Daily Brief
--TorSe-6ga._ 27 December 1966
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DAILY BRIEF
27 DECEMBER 1966
1. Yugoslavia
2. Indonesia
The series of violent demonstra-
tions against US Vietnam policy must be
embarrassing to the relatively liberal
men now dominant in the party and the
government. The top leadership had ap-
proved the idea of peaceful protests,
but surely had not anticipated violence.
We suspect that conservative ele-
ments in the party may have spotted an
opening to provoke trouble and thereby
express their dissatisfaction over cur-
rent political trends in Belgrade.
Another factor in the violence may
have been the general erosion of central
authority in recent months. This has
reached the point where even the police
are now sometimes unsure whether to take
action in situations which they would
have waded intd a year ago without hesi-
tation.
The stop-and-go drive to force
Sukarno out has picked up steam again.
General Suharto seems to be looking to
early next spring as the culmination
of his phased program against Sukarno.
But it would be easier all around if
Sukarno should see fit to take a trip
abroad well before then. He is prob-
ably being pressed to do so now.
The big military parade set for
tomorrow in Djakarta is presumably to
be a show of force to impress Sukarno
with his weakening position.
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3. Soviet Union
4, Nigeria
27 Dec 66
CIA researchers have taken a new
look at the question of computers in the
Soviet economy. Some of their findings
are summarized below:
--Because of their concentration on
computers for military and scien-
tific purposes, the Russians are
far behind the US in the use of
computers for solving commercial
problems. Moscow uses less than
15 percent of available computers
for commercial work; nearly 60
percent of ours are so employed.
--In terms of numbers, we have more
than 15,000 computers for commer-
cial purposes; the Soviets have
less than 500.
--Because of this great lag, the
Russians have to employ about
three million people to do their
accounting work--most of which is
still done by abacus and desk cal-
culators. One Soviet scientist,
who likes to play with projections,
predicts that his country may be
suffocated by paperwork. He calcu-
lates that if present methods re-
main in force, the volume of paper-
work will increase by 3,000 percent
by 1980.
The slide downhill toward a breakup
of the country and civil war continues.
The head of what remains of the federal
government seems to be seriously under-
estimating the strength of the recalcitrant
governor of the Eastern Region. Both are
under pressure from close aides to abandon
.further efforts to negotiate. Both are
collecting weapons and preparing for the
'worst.
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5. South Vietnam
6. North Vietnam
7. Jordan
27 Dec 66
Ky's minister of labor told US
Embassy officers today that he thought
the port strike might last only two or
three days. He said that he is trying
to isolate the two strike leaders from
their parent union and from the steve-
dore companies. This may be largely
talk.
?Both of the rebel union leaders
are now said to be threatening to broaden
the strike to include other dockworkers
throughout the country, as well as other
?types of workers in Saigon.
Husayn has succeeded in delaying ;a
final Arab decision on the entry of for-
eign troops and planes into Jordan.
Predictably, the Jordanian tactic
evoked a new rash of invective from the
Palestine Liberation Organization. The
official radios in Cairo and Baghdad were
also critical of the delaying tactics.
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Top Secret
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