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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
29 MARCH 1966
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DAILY BRIEF
29 MARCH 1966
1. Ecuador
2. Yemen
At a meeting of Ecuador's leading
politicians this? afternoon Clemente Ye-
rovi was selected as provisional civil-
ian president. This came after the
junta relinquished power to the military
high command, and the people in turn
took to the streets.
The situation this afternoon is
bordering on chaos. Large-scale demon-
strations are continuing in Guayaquil
and the transport workers' strike has
evidently gone nationwide. In Quito,
the police are not bothering to restrain
the transport workers, who are distribut-
ing liquor, blocking roads, and urging
the people to violence. Ambassador
Coerr has advised the State Department
by phone that students have seized the
national radio and are broadcasting ap-
peals fora "national revolution."
The selection of Clemente ,Yerovi
plus the imposition of a'state of siege
may help to quiet things somewhat, but
we expect acute political instability
for some time.
Egypt says that it is willing to
reopen the Harad peace conference on
Yemen next month, but Saudi reaction to
the proposal is still unclear. At the
same time, Nasir is beginning to with-
draw his troops in Yemen to new'posi-
tions in the western part of the coun-
try; this should give them .a more flexi-
ble defense with less logistic strain.
The, Saudis of course are suspicious of
these moves and are again asking for
US military, gestures of support,
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3. Soviet Union
Brezhnev's policy speech to the
? party congress was apparently a rather
bland affair. Although the full text
is not in, the TASS summary suggests
that it was most notable for its lack
of stridency and its skirting of con-
troversial issues.
In the foreign policy section,
Brezhnev repeated the standard charges
of US "aggression" in Vietnam and again
laid the blame for the deterioration in
US-Soviet relations at the door of the
US. On China, he made a passing refer-
ence to the "unsatisfactory" state of af-
fairs and then restated Moscow's readi-
ness to talk with the Chinese leaders.
Brezhnev's remarks on other foreign
policy topics were also along standard
lines. The net impression is that Mos-
cow is not interested in major new moves
at this time.
The summary of the speech contains
no mention of either Khrushchev or Stalin
by name. Khrushchev, however, was dealt
with indirectly through references to
"miscalculations" and "undue haste."
Brezhnev also indicated that there
would be more undoing of Khrushchev's
innovations by proposing several changes
in the party's operations and structure.
One of these, a decision to give the
party presidium back its old name "polit-
buro" carries with it heavy overtones of
the Stalin era.
Brezhnev's discussion of economic
matters was largely routine. His line
on literature and art, however, was hard
and threatening toward any departure from
party policy.
? Tomorrow the congress begins to
"debate" the Brezhnev report.
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4. North Vietnam
5. South Vietnam
Hanoi's first public comments on
the Soviet party congress today indicate
a continuing careful effort to remain in
the middle between Moscow. and Peking.
Relations between the North Vietnamese
and Soviet parties were vaguely charac-
terized only as "the kind of fraternal
relations which prevail in the social-
ist camp."
The cities of Hue and Da Nang were
outwardly quiet again today, but there
is no sign of a decline in political agi-
tation against the Ky government. A
transportation strike in Hue is report-
edly planned for tomorrow.
There were signs today that Tri
Quang's militant Buddhist faction in
the north remains unwilling to accept
Ky's compromise proposal for a partially
representative council to draft a con-
stitution. A Hue radio station broad-
cast a resolution signed by one of Tri
Quang's associates which was as uncom-
promising as ever.
The resolution, which purports to
originate with Buddhist chaplains in the
I Corps area, threatens to call on Bud-
dhist soldiers to act against the gov-
ernment if Saigon takes reprisals against
the soldiers and students taking part in
the "struggle."
Premier Ky is impatient to reas-
sert the government's full authority in
the northern provinces. He told Ambas-
sador Lodge today that he intends to
keep talking and explaining for another
week. After that, he said, he will take
"very, strong measures" if necessary to
re-establish control in the affected
provinces.
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6. Cambodia
7. Indonesia
8. Communist China
Sihanouk publicly, admitted for the
first time last week that the Cambodians
are "closing our eyes" to the smug-
gling of Cambodian rice to the Viet Cong.
His statement probably comes from recog-
nition of the futility of his earlier ef-
forts to prevent the flow of rice to
South Vietnam, where prices are higher
?than those his government offers.
The new Indonesian foreign minister,
Adam Malik, has approached Ambassador
Green directly for US assistance to fi-
nance emergency rice purchases. Malik
said that it was now politically possi-
ble to receive openly US funds for food.
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