Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
20 SEPTEMBER 1966
7t771-SEG-PR-E,_1_
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
50X1
50X1
ouX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
DAILY BRIEF
20 SEPTEMBER 1966
1. North Vietnam
2. North Vietnam
3. Vietnam
4.
At Annex today is a brief discus-
sion of North Vietnam's agricultural
difficulties--between bad weather and
the dislocation of war, prospects for
the 1966 grain harvest are less than
bright.
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1 50X1
5. Great Britain
6. West Germany
After three meetings with Erhard
during the past week, General Julius
Klein says that the chancellor is "very
much a harassed and anxious man" about
his trip to Washington.
The majority of Erhard's advisers
are'counseling him to call the visit
off, and if this is not possible, are
telling him that he must come back with
some success or he will be politically
finished. Since prospects for success
on the offset question are considered
dim, the only idea the chancellor has
had so far is to get President Johnson
to agree to visit West Germany "to show
his interest in Europe."
50X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1, jxi
7.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
ANNEX
North Vietnam: Agricultural Difficulties
There are strong indications that belts will be
worn tighter in North Vietnam this winter. The
prospects for the 1966 grain harvest are not promis-
ing.
Grain, especially rice, is the country's major
food source. There are two rice harvests each year--
one in the spring that provides about one third of
the supply and one in the fall that produces most of
the remainder. This year the spring crop was well
short of last year's and the regime is being con-
spicuously silent about the upcoming harvest. Usually
Hanoi trumpets predictions of great success well in
advance.
Rice is a tender crop to raise--abundant water
is needed at one stage; too much at another stage
will ruin the crop--and North Vietnam has been hav-
ing some poor luck on weather. But a contributing
factor is the dislocation caused by war. With the
logistic system damaged by bombing, and the priority
use of the system for movement of war supplies, food
shipment from the villages to heavily populated areas
takes second place. -Then there are also war-related
shortages of manpower.
There will be no starvation, but one immediate
effect has been a rise in food prices on the free
market. The regime is certainly capable of keeping
the lid on inflation but this in turn creates prob-
lems with black markets and hoarding.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1-
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004700220001-1