THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 JULY 1967

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005973918
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 21, 1967

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005300230001-3
The President's Daily Brief
-----T-Op-S-ec-r-gt 21 July 1967
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DAILY BRIEF
21 JULY 1967
1. Soviet Union
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2. Soviet Union -
Middle East
3. Mexico -
Communist China
The United States Intelligence
Board yesterday approved Special Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate 11-13-67
on Soviet policy toward the Arabs.
Here are its main points.
--Despite the Arab collapse last
month, Moscow still wants to expand its
influence in the Middle East, using the
radical Arab regimes to undermine US
influence.
--Soviet leaders have a tricky
problem, however, in trying to woo the
Arabs by giving them arms while at the
same time avoiding another Arab-Israeli
war.
--The Soviets already have replaced
much of the aircraft and some of the
other equipment the Arabs lost in the
war, and have probably given general as-
surances that all of the losses will be
made up.
--Final decision on ultimate sup-
ply levels, however, will probably be
delayed. Moscow will want to keep both
its political and material support from
going beyond a point likely to stimulate
provocative Arab moves or pre-emptive
Israeli action.
--Moscow has already expanded its
presence in the area, and a further in-
flux of Soviet advisers, instructors,
and technicians can be expected. The
Soviets will continue to be leery of
formal base agreements and will almost
certainly avoid signing defense pacts,
but we expect an increased Soviet mili-
tary presence in Arab ports and mili-
tary facilities.
The rag-tag batch of leftists the
Mexican police picked up Wednesday were
more adept at crime than at subversion.
They were arrested in connection with a
recent bank robbery. Even so, the Chi-
nese were giving them about $1600 a
month.
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4. North Vietnam A recent editorial in Hanoi's party
newspaper admits that the economy per-
formed badly during the first half of
this year.
The early rice crop was said to
be "reduced"--that is, smaller than
last year's mediocre crop. Both nat-
ural causes and poor management were
blamed for this. We have other evi-
dence that drought is continuing to
threaten the rice crop, and we think
there is little chance that Hanoi can
reduce the food imports that have reached
record levels this year.
As for industry, output is said to
be "stabilized" and local industry to
have performed "fairly well." These
are the weakest claims ever made, and
almost certainly mean that production
has lagged behind plans, or possibly
even retrogressed from last year.
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5. Soviet Union
6. Communist China
More demonstrations against Liu
Shao-chi are in the wind. A renewed
drive against his alleged followers
throughout the country can be ex-
pected to sharpen the political in-
fighting, which has already virtually
brought government to a standstill in
some provinces and has disrupted eco-
nomic activity and rail traffic.
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Top Secret
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