THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015055
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 15, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 15, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B( I ),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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March 15, 1976
Table of Contents
SYRIA-LEBANON: Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi told
Ambassador Murphy yesterday that he sees no
way to control the situation in Lebanon other
than to intervene with regular Syrian forces.
(Page 1)
LEBANON: President Franjiyah has refused to resign
unless impeached by parliament and convicted
by a high court. (Page 4)
EGYPT-USSR: President Sadat's call for the abro-
gation of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship
treaty indicates that he no longer expects to
be able to improve relations with Moscow.
(Page 6)
NOTES: France; Italy-Spain (Page 8)
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Latakia
Syrian Military Units
--jib Armored division
Infantry division
PLA Units
1 infantry battalion
Area of Sep tion
Mediterranean Sea
Al Qutayfaht,
oute to Lebanon)
ArDamascus
./r-
T Special Weapons Unit
(Exact location unknown)
Saudi
Arabia
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SYRIA-LEBANON
During a scheduled talk with Ambas-
sador Murphy yesterday, Syrian Chief of
Staff Shihabi responded to the ambassa-
dor's query about Syz?ia's options in
Lebanon by asserting that he now sees no
way to control the situation other than
to intervene with regular Syrian forces.
Shihabi said that he was not recommending
that Syrian regulars be sent in, but that
he could see no alternative given the cur-
rent drift of events.
The US defense attache in Damascus believes
that at least one Syrian division--the 3rd Armored
at Al Qutayfah--has increased its state of readi-
ness. He also believes that the 3rd division would
be the division to be used if the Syrians intervene
in Lebanon. A tour of the Damascus - Al Qutayfah
area by the attache yesterday, however, failed to
provide any positive indications that any Syrian
forces were being readied for intervention, although
he did observe some minor military activity that
could be considered unusual.
Ambassador Murphy describes his conversation
with Shihabi as one of unrelieved gloom, punctuated
by Shihabi's repeated frustration over what he
termed are Syria's "limited possibilities" to do
anything about the situation. Shihabi did not rule
out further Syrian mediation, but he expressed
doubt that Syria would be able "to play that game
any longer." Shihabi stressed that the Lebanese
cannot manage their own affairs and said that the
only solution is to get rid of the entire Lebanese
leadership. At one point, he mused that annexation
may be the only answer because the Lebanese are
fast becoming a threat to area stability.
Shihabi repeatedly stressed that the Lebanese
army no longer exists and that there is no prospect
of putting it back together as an effective force.
He added that the some 5,000 Syrian-backed Pales-
tine Liberation Army forces already in Lebanon are
inadequate to maintain security. Shihabi dismissed
the notion that some sort of Arab League force could
be used.
(continued)
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In response to the ambassador's concern about
the security situation in southern Lebanon Shihabi
suggested that only Syrian regulars could effectively
police the area. He speculated that Israel might
understand that the Syrians were only acting as a
peacekeeping force and were not a potential threat.
Shihabi's pessimistic mood almost certainly
accurately mirrors the frustration that Syrian lead-
ers are experiencing and their feeling that they are
running out of options. President Asad's indefinite
postponement of his visit to Paris, schedu.ed to be-
gin today, underscores the seriousness with which
Damascus views the situation.
Asad, however, is not likely to be stampeded
into a high risk action, and Shihabi made it clear
to Ambassador Murphy that he was only confiding his
own disgust with the situation and was not suggest-
ing what course of action Asad would finally take.
Asad almost certainly prefers to continue his ef-
forts to press the Lebanese to reach a political
accommodation themselves
Asad also has some military options open to
him short of military intervention.
Asad could also
position regular Syrian forces closer to the Lebanese
border. Even if Asad decides to introduce Syrian
regulars, he is likely first to authorize a limited
move into northern Lebanon in hopes that this would
provide a sufficient political shock effect.
The dilemma for Asad now is that he has staked
considerable personal prestige on achieving a suc-
cessful Syrian mediation. He is concerned to pre-
serve the enhanced stature as an Arab leader that
he has gained through his efforts to date, and he
wants to avoid giving further ammunition to his
critics, such as President Sadat. Thus, the dan-
ger in the present situation is that Asad, despite
his caution and his desire not to provoke an Is-
raeli counterreaction, could decide that some form
of intervention by Syrian regulars is necessary to
protect his heavy political investment in Lebanon
and to preserve his Arab leadership credentials.
(continued)
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The dilemma the Israelis face in assessing the
current situation is that they recognize that Syrian
leverage is crucial to resolving the crisis but are
uncertain as to the ultimate consequences of a Syrian
intervention. The Israelis are concerned a,Dout the
security vacuum created in the sensitive southern
border area by the collapse of the Lebanese army,
and they could persuade themselves that the intro-
duction of Syrian regulars would add enough uncer-
tainty to the situation to justify some Israeli in-
tervention into southern Lebanon.
Nevertheless, the Israelis will weigh Syria's
moves carefully and although they are likely to re-
spond to a substantial Syrian intervention, they may
stay their hand if the Syrians confine themselves to
northern Lebanon and the Beirut area. Even a limited
Syrian move, however, is likely to trigger an increased
Israeli alert and some mobilization.
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LEBANON
President Franjiyah announced yester-
day that he will not resign unless im-
peached by parliament and convicted by a
high court, as provided in the Lebanese
constitution. He clearly hopes that Moig-
adier Ahdab will in the end allow him to
stay on rather than risk the new round of
heavy fighting that probably would result
from an extended political impasse or
from a military move against the presi-
dential palace.
The President, who had earlier said he would
step down if asked by parliament, is in effect
saying that he will not resign under any circum-
stances. The high court required to try impeach-
ment cases has never been created and could not be
established without new legislation signed by the
president.
Ahdab is increasing the pressure on Franjiyah
to resign, and on the politicians to force him to
do so. He threatened yesterday to use force against
the President.
The chances for a
military showdown increased last night, when the
pro-Franjiyah radio station broadcast apparently
authentic statements by Phalangist leader Jumayyil
and National Liberal leader Shamun declaring that
the President's resignation would not "constitute
a solution" to the crisis.
(continued)
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Egypt has remained unusually silent on the
recent turn of events in Lebanon. Cairo was re-
ported late last year to have readied a contingency
plan for military intervention in Lebanon in the
event of further deterioration, and it is possible
that the Egyptians will again dust it off. They
would await further developments before taking pre-
cipitate action, however, and it is unlikely that
they would move against Lebanon in the midst of
current problems with Libya and the diplomatic tan-
gle with the USSR. For the moment, the Egyptians
appear to be avoiding public comment that could stir
up further trouble or provoke Syrian anger.
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EGYPT-USSR
President Sadat's call last night
for the abrogation of the 1971 Egyptia,1-
Soviet friendship treaty indicates that
he has finally written off any expecta-
tion of putting his relations with Mos-
cow on an even keel and will no longer
make even a pretense of maintaining a
civil relationship.
The 15-year treaty itself is essentially a
meaningless document, but it has served as a symbol
of continued amity between the two states through
the many upheavals in their relations over the last
five years.
Sadat did not specifically mention other agree-
ments with the Soviets, such as the accord, sched-
uled to run through March 1978, that permits them
the use of naval repair facilities at Alexandria,
but it seems entirely possible that abrogation of
this accord will follow. The Alexandria shipyard is
the only major repair facility available to the So-
viet Mediterranean Fleet.
Sadat recently received a letter from General
Secretary Brezhnev flatly refusing further arms
aid. The Egyptian President told Ambassador Eilts
last week that the tone of the letter had convinced
him of the accuracy of other information he had re-
ceived that the Soviets are attempting to foment
unrest in Egypt in an effort to overturn his gov-
ernment.
For the Soviets, Sadat's abrogation of the
treaty will have important symbolic, and perhaps
practical, consequences. Moscow places more stock
in such treaties than their substance warrants; it
regards a friendship treaty as a tangible expression
of the desire for, if not necessarily the fact of,
a close and congenial relationship. Egypt's abroga-
tion will be seen not only as a declaration of pres-
ent antipathy but also as an expression about fu-
ture bilateral relations.
(continued)
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The Soviets will be discomfited by the fact
that it was Sadat, not they, who took the initia-
tive, and the abrogation will revive memories of the
ignominious expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt
in 1972.
The Soviet leadership is almost certainly di-
vided over how best to handle the Egyptian situa-
tion. The hard-liners may argue that Sadat is in
serious political trouble and that, if Moscow re-
mains unyielding, he will either come around or be
replaced. Moscow's perception of Sadat's political
trouble may have prompted Soviet rejection of his
recent overtures. Those Soviet officials who have
favored a more flexible policy will probably argue
that thus far the inflexible policy has widened the
breach with Cairo without impairing Sadat or
strengthening the USSR's putative friends in Egypt.
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NOTES
The French decided yesterday at a meeting of
joint float finance ministers to withdraw the franc
from the European joint float.
The immediate cause of Paris' decision was the
heavy cost of supporting the franc within the float's
narrow limits--roughly $4 billion since mid-January.
The underlying causes of the franc's weakness are
Paris' inability to bring inflation down to a rate
close to those of its major trading partners in the
float and prospects for a substantial deficit in the
French current account this year. Paris left open
whether it would rejoin the float in the future.
The French are likely to try to negotiate changes in
the joint float's structure and will probably seek
to have the joint float's margins widened substan-
tially from the present limits of 2.25 percent.
Spanish and Italian officials now stress possi-
ble political repercussions as well as familiar eco-
nomic arguments in their attempts to head off a US
decision to curtail shoe imports.
Italian officials suggest that such a US move
would hurt the ruling Christian Democratic Party in
the event of a national election this year and would
add to public criticism of the US resulting from the
Lockheed and CIA controversies. The Spanish minis-
ter of industry has linked the shoe import isSue to
ratification of the recently negotiated US-Spanish
treaty of friendship and cooperation. US import
restrictions would inject nationalist sentiment into
the treaty issue and would intensify economic con-
cerns.
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Top Secret
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