THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 AUGUST 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977606
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 4, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
4 August 1970
26
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 August 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The situation in Cambodia is discussed on Page 1.
Developments in Israel are examined on Page 3.
Lao /
/(Page 4)
The Shah of Iran has again expressed his frustration
over US policy. (Page 5)
/(Page 6)
Bolivia
The Uruguayan Government has responded indirectly to
the kidnapers' ransom demands. (Page 7)
Polish
Annex.
East Germany/
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CAMBODIA
The battle for Kompong Thom continues, but the
Communist offensive appears to be losing some of its
momentum. According to an intercepted Cambodian
Army message, government defenders have reoccupied
most of the key buildings in the city; urgently
needed supplies of food and ammunition have been air-
dropped to government forces.
The enemy still holds the town of Skoun. A re-
lief column from Kompong Cham has been halted a short
distance east of the citj.
The planned offensive to retake Kirirom has en-
countered more delays. Press reports indicate that
?enemy harassing attacks near Sre Khlong have blocked
Route 4, preventing the movement of supplies and rein-
forcements for government units already proceeding
toward the resort town. A provincial official says
that Communist troops around Sre Khlong must be dis-
lodged before a full counterattack on Kirirom can
be made. He also claims that the enemy is still send-
ing reinforcements into the Kirirom area despite heavy
allied air strikes.
In the only other significant military action,
a government command post in northwestern Kompong
Speu Province reported yesterday that it was sur-
rounded and under attack by a large Communist force.
The local commander said he had taken heavy losses,
and asked for airborne reinforcements.
Meanwhile, there are signs that the Communists
may be planning new attacks on Kampot city and on
the Chakrei Ting cement factory in Kampot Province.
An intercepted message has reported that "hundreds"
of Communist troops are now in position north and
east of both locations. The message also claims
that these forces will attack when South Vietnamese
troops are withdrawn.
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Prom Tep Savang, one of Cambodia's
articulate spokesmen, has been sent to
more
Paris
able and
to open
an information office.
2
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ISRAEL
Mrs. Meir's government still retains? a comfort-
able parliamentary majority and the support of the
great majority of the people despite the departure
of the right-wing Gahal party. Although the Gahal's
vote to leave was very close, its departure hurt Mrs.
Meir, who wanted to keep together the "wall-to-wall"
coalition that had been in office since the eve of
the 1967 war. The coalition was unwieldy and dispa-
rate, but it served as the symbol of Israeli unity.
Mrs. Meir's willingness to forgo the Gahal
partnership at this early stage of the
peace effort underscores the gap between
her own views and the dogmatic nationalism
of Gahal leader Menahem Begin. Mrs. Meir
retains the backing of Minister of Defense
Dayan, but only time will tell whether the
cut-down cabinet will be better or Less
able to negotiate a settlement. Israeli
requirements for a peace settlement remain
high, and Mrs. Meir has pointed out before
that her government without Gahal will be
no less resolute in the defense of Israel's
"vital security needs."
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LAOS
there is additional evi-
dence that the recent heavy attack on government posi-
tions near Tha Tam Bleung had a political as well as
a military objective. The Communist troops that
routed a government battalion in the attack on 31 July
have abandoned the positions they seized, and the level
of military activity has returned to the normal rainy
season low.
4
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IRAN
The Shah has again expressed his frustration
over US policy toward Iran, particularly on military
sales and oil.
At the head of the list of items discussed with
Ambassador MacArthur was the Shah's concern that the
Foreign Military Sales Act, which would authorize a
credit of $100 million for Iran to purchase US mili-
tary equipment, still has not passed Congress. The
delay, with no end in sight, causes him to wonder
whether he can depend on the US to supply the mili-
tary equipment he wants over the next five years.
He continues to worry about the threat to the area
from the USSR and radical Arab nations, and is de-
termined to expand and modernize his armed forces.
Although he would prefer to buy most of his sophis-
ticated equipment from the US--particularly air-
craft--he said there are others waiting in the wings
to sell. He specifically mentioned the French Mir-
age.
In the past; the Shah has followed through
on some threats to turn- elsewhere for equip-
ment--witness the arms agreement with Mos-
cow in 1967.
He spoke "more in sadness than in anger" about
the refusal of the US to give a special oil quota,
which would have permitted Iran to sell oil in the
US and helped to pay for military equipment.
The Shah was most bitter, hOwever, about the
failure of the Western oil consortium to increase
oil exports from Iran rapidly enough. He singled
out two US companies--Texaco and Socal .(Standard of
California)--as the main offenders. He suggested
that they might be taken over by the government and
replaced by German or Japanese companies that are
more willing to cooperate.
Iran is approaching a foreign exchange
crunch," and oil revenues are more impor-
tant to the Shah than ever. He had hoped
that the cutback in Libyan production
would be made up in Iran, but thus far
this has not worked out. The Shah undoubt-
edly would prefer to avoid "nationaliza-
tion." Nevertheless, he has obviously -
thought out the implications of such a
move and the depth of his concern suggests
that he might follow through on his threat
if more oil revenues are not forthcoming.
(Although Texaco and Socal own only 14
percent of the consortium, voting within
the organization is such that the two com-
panies could exercise a veto in many in-
stances.)
5
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BOLIVIA
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URUGUAY
In a communiqug issued by the Ministry of Inte-
rior yesterday, the government said that it will not
exchange all of the imprisoned Tupamaros for the kid-
naped American AID official and the Brazilian diplo-
mat.
President Pacheco evidently decided that
the terrorists' demands provide no basis
for negotiation or a direct reply, because
they are impossibly high. He therefore de-
cided to make an indirect reply through
the Ministry of the Interior.
The government's response reflects both
Pacheco's belief that he should not nego-
tiate directly with the terrorists and
military pressure against any action that
might hint of weakness. The US defense
attache reports that the Uruguayan mili-
tary will not tolerate a capitulation be-
cause this would represent an end of law
and order in the country. Whether the
Tupamaros will respond with less extreme
demands remains to be seen.
7
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POLISH FEARS ABOUT EAST GERMANY
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Top Secret
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