THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976634
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 25, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
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25 February 1969
19
et
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32
*Nicosia(
36
Latakia I
CYPRUS
Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
?32?
Alexlacjgria
?28?
Mediterranean Sea
Cairo
Port Said
Ismailia Suez
Canal '
UNITED
R AB
REPUBLIC
(E e Y P T)
SO 100
MILES
?24-
32
(11
Suez
Haifa.
ISRAEL I
/
Beir t
u*
Tel Aviv-
.Hamah
SYRIA
*Damascus
GOLAN HEIGHTS
Yafo B 43
/WEST Amrnan
Yarmuk R.
2Jeru alem
Dead
GAZA STRIP /./ Sea
'SINAI
PENINSULA
I
\ / JORDAN
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Qina
Hurghada
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HIGH DAM 36
f Sharm ash?
Shaykh
Red
Sea
SAUDI
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-28?
vARABIA
?24-
93478 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
The Arab states are bracing themselves for further Is-
raeli retaliatory attacks. There is still little solid in-
formation on yesterday's air raids, in which the Israelis
attacked what they claim to be two terrorist bases in Syria
on the road between Damascus and Beirut. Tel Aviv may have
calculated that attacks on Syrian targets would have the
least likelihood of stimulating a strong international re-
action. Moreover, by hitting close to the Lebanese border,
the Israelis may have hoped to jolt the Beirut government,
which already has a bad case of the jitters.
EUROPE
All sides in the current imbroglio are sticking to their
positions. The British have succeeded in keeping the Germans
committed to the idea of WEU talks without the French, although
Bonn may still want-to postpone the next meeting from 26 Feb-
ruary to 5 March. Paris, to judge by Ambassador Seydoux's
demarche in Bonn, still refuses to have anything to do with
WEU until the Germans accept the French interpretations of
the WEU treaty. More public and private recriminations can
be expected.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Chances for removing the Bundesversammlung from Berlin
remain uncertain.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin, in his meeting with-Chan-
cellor Kiesinger on 23 February, apparently encouraged the
West Germans to believe that the East Germans might go beyond
the concessions suggested by Ulbricht in his letter.of 21 Feb-
ruary. In that letter, Ulbricht said "positive consideration"
would be given to the possibility of opening the Berlin Wall
for visits this Easter if Bonn would relocate the election
scheduled for 5 March.
Mayor Schuetz has indicated that he and Chancellor Kies-
inger are agreed that any pass agreement must last for at
least a year, and presumably cover all major holiday periods,
not just Easter. They also require that an agreement on passes
be firm prior to switching the venue of the Bundesversammlung.
The East Germans offered to negotiate a pass agreement follow-
ing the announcement of a change of site.
Schuetz has been authorized by the Chancellor to sound
out the East German authorities, but thus far there has been
no reported contact between the two sides. Schuetz has told
Western Allied officials that he has until 28 February to in-
form Bonn whether a decision is still to be made not to hold
the Bundesversammlung in Berlin. A Bonn official spokesman
has also emphasized that speed is essential to the successful
conclusion of a deal.
The Mayor said he expects the pros and cons of the pro-
posed deal to be hotly debated in West Berlin political cir-
cles. The bulk of West Berliners would probably be willing
to sacrifice the presidential election and its emphasis on
Bonn-Berlin ties for the chance to see their relatives and
friends in East Berlin.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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192 194
BURMA
Baotic
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Capitol Special Zone
SOUTH
CHINA SEA
102 114 106 108
-10
93465 1.69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Soviet military forces in East Germany have been engaged
in routine activity over the last three days. There have been
no reports of significant East German harassment of West Ger-
man travel to Berlin.
VIETNAM
Shelling of major target areas continued on the night of
24-25 February, but on a scale below yesterday's and far below
the peak reached on the first night of the Communist offensive.
Sharp ground fighting is under way near several provincial cap-
itals in southern I Corps. In the III Corps - Saigon area,
there is fresh evidence of Communist plans for renewed attacks
against the III Corps headquarters complex at Bien Hoa - Long
Binh and against Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province.
With few exceptions the enemy's main forces have not been
committed. This situation cannot be expected to continue for
long, however, as a number of Communist prisoners captured as
they probed allied positions on 23 February claim that they
were ordered to open up approach corridors for other enemy
units which would soon follow. They say that the main enemy
blows are yet to come.
This enemy tactic has been reported by low-level prison-
ers in Southern I Corps; near Saigon and Long Binh in III Corps;
and near My Thomn the delta.
The fact that the Communists have sizable main
force units available near each of these objectives also gives
substance to the prisoner's claims.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Enemy documents captured just prior to the current of--
fensive suggest that local force and guerrilla units intend
to maintain a relatively high level of activity over an ex-
tended period, rather than to engage in an all-out attack.
They emphasize that the action planned by these units is pri-
marily of-a harassing or terrorist nature designed to disrupt
the pacification program, interdict lines of communication, and
support political agitation leading to popular demonstrations.
Most of Saigon's newspapers, in their initial reaction to
the Communists' offensive, emphasized the enemy's indiscriminate
shelling of civilian population centers. Various editorials
suggested responses ranging from a cautious approach to break-
ing off the peace talks. Some papers felt the Communists shelled
Saigon out of inability to match the 1968 Tet offensive.
Official reaction was characterized by President Thieu's
remark that these were the actions of an "enemy in a confused
and weakened position." Ky, in usual form, told the press that
"if they continue to shell our cities, we will bomb theirs."
During the first rocket attack on Saigon in the early
hours of 23 February, the ?government acted quickly to head off
what it claimed might develop into a coordinated Viet Cong -
militant Buddhist conspiracy. The National Police raided and
closed down the An Quang Buddhist Youth Center and arrested
some 50 students, most of whom are said to have had Viet Cong
leaflets in their possession. Also seized was Thien Minh, the
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
militant Buddhist priest recently given an "official" warning
for delivering an antigovernment sermon.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMUNIST CHINA
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KOREA
According to first reports, a North Korean ship of the
type used to infiltrate guerrilla teams or agents exchanged
fire with a South Korean patrol vessel off South Korea's west
coast yesterday. The North Korean ship was first observed some
miles off the port. of Inchon, west of Seoul and withdrew to
North Korean waters after apparently being hit.
3.3(b)(1)
PERU
Most Latin American governments recognize that the US-
Peruvian impasse could have unsettling repercussions in the
hemisphere. Almost all governments are now reluctant openly
to take sides in the dispute, however, and clearly hope that
5
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
somehow the problem will be settled without a US-Peruvian
showdown--and without their having to take sides.
If it comes to a showdown, many Latin American govern-
ments will be under pressure of public opinion to side With
Peru. This is partly because of their habitual tendency to
sympathize with a fellow Latin American "David" in his strug-
gles with the US "Goliath." Also, the Latin American press
has seldom presented a balanced picture of the US-Peruvian
dispute, which is almost tailor-made for the simplistic ex-
planations Latin Americans are ready to accept when it comes
to "imperialist" pressures by the US against Latin America.
Argentina is currently playing a special role.
/The Argen-
tines have accompanied their quiet approach to Peru with a
noisy public expression of "solidarity" and the "widest col-
laboration" with Peru. This, they say, is to make'it easier
for Peru to accept Argentine mediation if it should come to
this.
PANAMA
Colonel Martinez, who was arrested and deported to the
US yesterday, had given both the junta and the civilian oli-
garchs ample reason to want his removal. The highhandedness
he showed as military chief of staff doubtless alienated his
fellow officers, and the oligarchy probably saw his hand in
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
recent pronouncements by the junta which abolished political
parties and promised important land reform measures.
National Guard Commander Torrijos has clearly emerged as
the country's strong man. Torrijos has always been more will-
ing than Martinez to cater to the interests of the oligarchs.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Top Secret
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