THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015048
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 6, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 6, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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_ _ _
March 6, 1976
Table of Contents
Cuba - Southern Africa:
(Page 2)
Thailand:
(Page 3)
OPEC: A decline in OPEC import prices should give
Saudi Arabia and some other OPEC members
grounds--if they choose to use them--to resist
or curb the decision for a midyear oil price
rise when the oil ministers meet in May. (Page 4)
Notes: USSR; Zaire-Angola; Rhodesia; China-USSR
(Pages 5 and 6)
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EGYPT?ISRAEL?SYRIA
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CUBA ? SOUTHERN AFRICA
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THAILAND
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OPEC
OPEC import prices, on which the oil
producers have focused as justification
for oil price hikes, have declined at an
annual rate of 8 percent since March 1975.
This should give Saudi Arabia and some
other OPEC members grounds?if they choose
to use them--to resist or curb the deci-
sion for a midyear oil price rise when
the oil ministers meet in Jakarta in late
May.
Three factors have contributed to the recent
downward trend in OPEC import prices:
w
--Sluggish domestic demand and substantial.,,un-
used capacity 'apparently induced industrial
r suppliers to cut prices to foreign markets.
--Wholesale price inflation fell to about half
the 1974 rate in most industrial countries.
--The dollar appreciated in 1975, making im-
ports from non-US suppliers less expensive in
dollar terms.
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Changes in the Soviet Leadership
Dropped
Minister of Agriculture Polyansky, no longer in the Politburo.
His position there has been tenuous since February 1973, when he was demoted from first
deputy premier. His loss of Politburo status removes him from the long-term succession race,
but does not help to clarify the positions of other contenders. The move has no very clear
implications for foreign policy, and only some murky hints for the problem of reorganization
?of management of industry and agriculture.
Promoted
Party Secretary Ustinov, from candidate to full member of the Politburo. .
Ustinov is responsible for the defense industry and Soviet space efforts. He is primarily a
manager, not a policy maker, despite .his politburo status. He has made his career in the
government apparatus, worked closely with Premier Kosygin, and transferred to party work
only in 1965. The promotion from candidate to full Politburo member will not significantly
affect the political balance in the Kremlin and casts no light on succession. Ustinov is 67.
Leningrad party boss Romanov, from candidate to full member of the Politburo.
Romanov has been regarded as a corner, and his promotion is no great surprise. He has
acquired national prominence as an innovative industrial manager?by Soviet standards. His
long-term prospects for succession have been improved, but he must still get an assignment in
Moscow to be a credible contender.
Azerbaydzhan party boss Aliyev, to candidate member of the Politburo.
Aliyev's promotion is essentially to provide. Kremlin representation for the Caucasus region.
That has been the only major geographic area without someone in the leadership since
Georgian party boss Mzhavanadze's retirement under fire in 1972. Aliyev is a relatively young
'and quite vigorous leader. As a membcr of a minority nationality, however, he cannot be
expected to move very fast or very far in the Kremlin hierarchy.
Chief of the Central Committee's General Department Chernenko, to party secretary.
Chernenko's promotion was foreshadowed by a series of awards he received on Tuesday. His
career association with Brezhnev covers two decades. Their paths first crossed when Brezhnev
was party boss of Moldavia in the early 1950s and Chernenko was engaged in propaganda and
agitation work there. His more recent career specialization has been general administration,
handling the leadership's paper work. He accompanied Brezhnev to Helsinki in 1975.. Cher-
nenko's promotion to the Secretariat, however, does little more than formalize an existing
arrangement and strengthen Brezhnev's hand in that body.
Pravda chief editor Zimyanin, to party secretary.
Zimyanin is a Belorussian, with presumed links to first deputy premier Mazurov and Belo-
russian party boss Masherov. As Pravda's chief editor he has played an even-handed role on
policy questions and avoided divisive issues. Zimyanin will probably pick up the slot for
culture and the intelligentsia, vacant since Demichev's demotion to minister of culture in
1974.
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NOTES
The few changes in the Soviet leadership made
at the party congress yesterday indicate continuity
in national policy and style of leadership.
General Secretary Brezhnev's public stature
has reached a new high, but he evidently will con-
tinue a consensus type of leadership. There is
still no sign that preparations are being made for
succession.
Agricultural Minister Polyansky, dropped from
the Politburo, was the leadership's scapegoat for
the harvest failures. The elevation of party sec-
retary Ustinov, who maintains overall supervision
of defense industry and space, completes the ap-
pointment to the Politburo of officials responsible
for foreign policy and defense. Ustinov joins
Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko,
and KGB chairman Andropov, all of whom have been
added to the Politburo in the past few years.
Zaire yesterday closed down the Kinshasa
headquarters of the National Front for the Lib-
eration of Angola
Mobutu, who apparently avoided
making specific aid commitments, is not likely to
support a National Front insurgency as long as his
prospects for cooperation with Angolan President
Neto appear good. For the time being, however,
Mobutu will want to keep the Front alive to use
against Neto in the event the Angolan leader does
not live up to the agreement reached a week ago.
(continued)
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Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo
reportedly told London that, during their nego-
tiating session last Monday, Prime Minister Smith
offered immediate parity for blacks in the Rhode-
sian government and majority rule in five years.
Nkomo may be grasping at straws. Both Nkomo
and Smith have a high stake in keeping the talks
going to forestall a renewal of all-out guerrilla
warfare. Smith's proposal was oral only, and the
transcript of the meeting reportedly makes no men-
tion of it.
Insisting that he has "an understanding" with
Smith, Nkomo wants the British to call a constitu-
tional conference in Salisbury before the end of
March. The British are unlikely to take any such
action unless they get an unequivocal commitment
from Smith that he will move toward majority rule.
London's special envoy who visited Salisbury last
week saw no sign that the Prime Minister was relax-
ing his position.
The Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal last
week that the joint committee on Sino-Soviet river
navigation meet this month in the Soviet far east.
Peking instead renewed its proposal of last
year--which Moscow rejected then--that the com-
mittee take up territorial issues.
From 1956 through 1974, the committee met an-
nually, alternately in China and the USSR, to dis-
cuss routine navigational matters along the rivers
that form the de facto Sino-Soviet border. China's
attempts to broaden the agenda of the talks and
the Soviet refusal resulted in a postponement of
last year's session. Riverine traffic was normal
last year, and it is likely to be normal again
this summer even in the absence of talks.
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Top Secret
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