STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ON MAY 19, 1958, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON RECENT INCIDENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA, LEBANON, AND ELSE.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00321R000400110042-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: May 19, 1958
• Content Type: MISC

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STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE.ROBERZAL'. MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDER.
SECRETARY OF STATE, ON MAY 191 1958; BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE; ON RECENT
INCIDENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA, LEBANON, AND ELSEWHERE.
Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with'yOurjnvitation of May 161.1 am appear-
ing in behalf of the Department of State to-diScuSs with the
Committee in Executive Session the recent incidents in Lebanon,
South America and elsewhere. I would say first that the
Department is grateful to the. Committee for this opportunity,:,
bo!ch.to provide whatever information it can, and especially to.
have the benefit of the Committee's wisdom in matters which are,
? of pressing importance to our country. It is my purpose to
reply frankly to any questions about which information is .
immediately available to me. Where I do not have it, effort will
be made to supply it promptly.
We all share, I believe, your distress over the indignities
suffered by the Vice President of the :United States in Peru and
Venezuela during the 'course of his recent tour of eight South
American countries. As you know; his tour was incident to the
Vice President's attendance at the inauguration of President
Frondizi of our sister Republic'of'the Argentine at Buenos Aires.
It should be said that the purpose of the Vide President's
tour was to promote better understanding and good will between
this country and our southern twighbors. .They had been kind
enough to extend invitations, in most instances quite insistent
invitations. .The Vice President's acceptance was in accordance
with practice: of long standing to exchange visits of prominent
personalities between our countries. It reflected among other
things a desire to demonstrate the importance and value this
country attaches to close and friendly relations with our sister
republics to the south. It was based on an awareness of the im-
portance of first-hand exchanges of views with government offi-
cials and other opinion leaders. The Vice President, with ,tirer
less.energy, successfully made similar trips to Southeast Asia
and to Africa and Central America. These trips have gained
political advantages of considerable importance to us.
.In discussing this subject perhaps you will agree that we
should examine the manner in which it fits into the .general,
pattern of world affairs. At present .our country is involved in
a highly4competitive situation. There continues a world-wide
wave of nationalism. This has found expression in the creation
since the war of some twenty new nations. In other areas addi-
tional countries are in the formative stage. Instill other
areas the old order is in .process of change. This fermentation
often provokes conflicts and offers opportunity both for con-j'
structive effort as well as exploitation by political opportun-
ists. There is evident a world-wide'ground swell Of desire for a
0 better life. Thip:?ften generates intense resentments, envy and
even hatreds. There is the inevitable distrUst by-the have-nots
of those who have. There is also the implacable crusade of the
ideologists
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laeologists intent on destroying the capitalist system off free
enterprise and individual democratic liberties. They are-deter-
minectto replace it by applying the principles of Marxism-
Leninism in the promotion of the totalitarian state. The Soviet
Union not. without success blends this effort of international
communism with skillful promotion of old fashioned Russian
expansionism.
Soviet-Communist Efforts to Foster Anti-Americanism
The Soviet 'regime and the world Communist movement since
their inception have constantly sought to exploit--in Marxist'
language--"contradictions" or differences both between "leadihg,
imperialist powers" and between "imperialist" and "colonial 1t''
or 'underdeveloped countries. The dominant theme in these pro-
vocative efforts since World War II has been ant1-Americanis6'.-
Under the leadership of the Soviet Union the world CoM!-,
munist movement has made energetic efforts to organize and,6-X.,
ploit hostile sentiments toward the United States. American'
"ruling circles" are depicted in Communist propaganda as the
dominant imperialist force in the world, everywhere seeking to
oppress smaller nations and to undermine the influence of other.
"imperialist" countries--notably France and the Netherlands but
also including the United Kingdom--in order to extend the domina-
tion of American capital. The anti-American orientation of the
world Communist movement was clearly evidenced in the November
? 1957 Moscow "Declaration" of twelve Communist parties and "Peace
Manifesto" signed by 65 Communist parties which singled out the
United States as the main threat to ,"peace" and called for, .
united action to fight for "peace," i.e., the interests of the
Soyiet bloc.
The Soviet Government itself has directly used its pro-
paganda and diplomatic apparatus to foster anti-American senti-
ments. In areas such as Latin America, where the United States
represents the leading outside influence, Soviet efforts have-
IOng concentrated on channeling local resentments into resent-
'tont against the United States. In South Asia, the Middle
East, and North Africa, where other Western countries are
-prominently involved, the Soviet line has been that the United
States is the principal enemy of the local countries, sometimes
using other Western powers as its "tools" but always seeking to
supplant their positions. Similarly, the Soviet Government has
persistently sought to turn French, British or Italian opinion,
as the case may be, aga nst the United States.
In regard to recent manifestations of anti-American
sentiments in South America, Algeria, Lebanon, Indonesia, and
Burma, the anti-American content in Soviet propaganda directed
at.these areas has been at a high level fora considerable
period of time. There was no marked step-up in Moscow's pro-
paganda immediately prior to the events in these areas, either
in the degree of attention to the United States or in the
violence :of its charges,: although,in several cases Soviet pro-
paganda media has sought to exp101t these.events after they
occurred.to the discredit of the United States. '
:There is .
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There is no evidence at present of a. Soviet effort to
0 effect a coordinated world-wide demonstration of anti-Americanism
coinciding with Vice President Nixon's visit to ,Latin America.
While there is evidence of direct Communist complicity in, qev-
eral of the recent anti-American incidents--in South America,
Indonesia and Burma--the circumstances leading up to these in-
cidents occurred more or less independently of Moscow's will.
Thus, the coincidence of these outbreaks, so far as their timing
is concerned, would seem to be largely accidental. However, all
of the recent incidents are related in that there has been a
? conscious, continuous effort by the Soviet Union to exploit and
exacerbate potential or actual misunderstandings in these areas
about the United States. These incidents, particularly those
in which there was direct Communist involvement, demonstrate the
scope and intensity of Soviet long-term efforts to discredit the
United States.
Security Measures
Those of you who personally have had experience with mob
action and group violence need no reminder that the element of
surprise frequently plays an important role. Not so long ago in
our own capital of Washington we witnessed a savage attempt on
the life of our President then in residence at Blair House. We
also shared the indignation of the Congress over the dastardly
shooting in the House of Representatives of several of its dis-
411 tinguished members. We were aware of the possibility of such
dangers. Our security measures were believed adequate. Yet
even in our solidly established system grave incidents like
those were possible. How much more so is it true in those coun-
tries where freshly established governments have not had time or
others have been unable for various reasons to develop adequate
security organizations. The recent deplorable assassination of
the President of our sister Republic of Guatemala ia a tragic
case in point.
South America
Problems and issues in Latin America were known and the
Vice President was briefed on them. There was nothing in the
past history of U.S.-Latin American relations to indicate the
possibility of substantial violence against our representatives.
In addition, innate Latin American courtesy and their respect
for the guest relationship of persons coming to their homes or
country were taken into consideration. After Lima and the embar-
rassment which the incidents there had caused to both the Govern-
ment and most Peruvians, it was felt that the governments and
-
public opinion in the remaining countries would do their utmost
to prevent similar embarrassments. As the tour progressed, and
particularly after Peru, the increasing amount of communist-in-
spired and directed tactics was known and reported and the
increasing possibility of trouble in Venezuela was understood.
It was also understood by the governments concerned.
Prior
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Prior to Lima, it was not even deemed necessary to seek any
specific assurances: of adequate security.. After Lima, the
.
assurances given.by.the-Ecuadoran, Colombian and Venezuelan .
governments appeared adequate, as they proved to be in Ecuador.
and Colombia: -It seems evident that the trouble in Caracas was
caused by the. intensive exploitation by Communist and other,.
anti-American elements of grievances against our policies and
the failUre to take adequate measures to prevent demonstrations
and activities of. which the Government was fully forewarned by,
Its .own security people and by reports from, our Embassies and
investigative agencies.
.1' think' it is important to emphasize that while there hap
been a, known resentment in Latin America over;certain issues, and
that protests concerning them could.be? expected, thisAs the
first time that minority groups have been able to exploit these
issues to incite actual violence against an important" American
representative. This is something new in Latin America and
therefore it 'was not expected.
There is considerable evidence that the demonstrations in
the various countries visited.: by the Vice President followed a
pattern and were Communist-inspired and staged'. Slogans on the
banners carried by students. and others were similar. "Little
Rock," "Guatemala," "Yankee Imperialism," "1011 Street Agents,"
"McCarthyism," "Colonialism," "Nixon Go Home" were among those
repeated. The tactics were much the same, with young students
urged on by older persons leading.the.activities. Intelligence
reports from Latin American- capitals ,also support the conclusion
of a leading Communist role in the demonstrations.
There is no indication of unusual efforts by Radio Moscow
to step up its exploitation of anti-American sentiments immedi--
ately prior to or during the Vice President's trip. Although
Soviet commentaries carried the normal type of anti-American
statements and Soviet bloc propaganda output to Latin America
increased somewhat--a normal oocurence during any major event--
the-demonstrations and scattered violence were not excessively
stressed during Mr. Nixon's trip. Moscow Radio warned its Latin
audiences of the "exploitative" motives of the Vice President's
trip, designed to counter the "discontent over U. S. policies."
The majority of ?the commentaries relied to a great extent on
quotations from American newspapers and stressed that even the
U. S. press "has been forced to admit" that the anti-U. S.
demonstrations are not the intrigues of Communists, but the
result of U. S. "discriminatory" economic policy toward Latin
America. Without attacking the Vice President personally, the
Moscow propaganda machine asserted that "Nixon's fiasco was
actually the fiasco of U. S. policy toward Latin America."
On May 15,
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On May 15, according to FBIS, Radio Moscow began in
? earnest to exploit the anti-American incidents during the Nixon
tour. However, Radio Moscow directed no commentaries at
Latin American audiences, the target of most of Moscow's
comments prior to the Caracas events. In these latest ef-
forts, Moscow is attempting to exploit the incidents to
foster anti-Americanism in other areas of the world.
Uruguay
We knew, took into account and reported to the Vice
President before his departure, the following matters: informa-
tion concerning Uruguayan resentment of U.S. economic policies,
particularly the countervailing duty on wool tops; the fact
that the Soviet bloc diplomatic missions in Uruguay have been
activeA.n many sectors of Uruguay; the fact that recent ap-
proaches have been made to Uruguay by the Soviets for increased
economic intercourse; and finally that there was a possibility
of student antipathy or even anti-U.S. demonstrations at the
University.
There was no indication that violence would ensue, and
there was none The Vice President was able by debating with
the students to win them over, and his visit to the University
ended with a resounding ovation and acclaim for his forthright-
410 ness in standing up to the students in friendly discussion.
Argentina
The political situation in Argentina and the circumstances
surrounding the Frondizi Government were explained in briefings
to the Vice President. The delicate political situation caused
by the coming into power of a new Government, the activities
outside of Argentina by Peron, and the fact that the Communist
Party in Argentina had become the largest in the hemisphere
were all included in the briefings and fully discussed. There
were rumors that pro-Peron or other groups might state demon?
strations in opposition to the Vice President. The economic
difficulties facing President Frondizi, the difficulties with
economic problems which might involve the United States were
discussed before the Vice President left and were discussed
by him with Argentine leaders in that country.
There was no indication that any violence could be expected,
nor did any occur. On the contrary, the reception accorded
to the Vice President in Argentina was extremely friendly.
The minor incidents in connection with the late arrival
of the swearing-in ceremonies of President Frondizi in which
there were scattered boos for Mr. Nixon were highlighted in
the United States press but were given little importance in
Buenos Aires.
Paraguay
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Paraguay
Vice President Nixon was aware that in Paraguay there
might be some attempt at demonstrations or in other countries
on the question of a visit to the present Paraguayan Government.
Recent attempts by opposition groups to overthrow the Stroessner
regime had been the subject of intelligence and Embassy re-
ports several weeks before the Vice President departed. These
facts were included in briefings, as were matters regarding
anti-Paraguayan acts involving the Provisional Government of
Argentina which was in power prior to Frondizi's inauguration.
The warm reception given to the Vice President in Paraguay
was naticipated and there were no untoward incidents to mar
the visit.
Bolivia
The tense political situation which has existed in Bolivia
in recent months and which broke out into disturbances in the
mining areas in March, involving mainly the two factions of
the governing MNR Party, were also included in briefings of
the Vice President. Bolivia's difficult economic situation,
the part which the United States is playing in helping to
solve Bolivia's problems; the difficulties involving the
mine owners of the expropriated mines (including U.S. owners)
and the Bolivian Government, were well known. The existence
of communist and Trotskyite groups in Bolivia and the dangers
which the Vice President's party might possibly encounter in
passing through the narrow streets of La Paz were explained
in briefings with the Vice President and to the Secret Service.
The potential of communists to incite anti-U.S. actions in
Bolivia was considered but not deemed sufficiently strong
to cause any change in plans.
There was no violence in Bolivia, and the hostile demonstra-
tions,,were negligible. The fact that there was no violence
there:was a factor in considerations concerning the rest of
thec.tour.
Peru
Dissatisfaction in Peru over the US restrictions and
tariffs on certain basic agricultural commodities exported by
Peru is of long standing. More recently, threatened restric-
tions on lead, zinc and copper had led to bitter criticism.
This was further inflamed by the report of the United States
Tariff Commission on lead and zinc. Recent strikes, demonstra-
tions and lawless acts in various parts of Peru, for which the
communists were in a large measure responsible, had been re-
ported by Embassy and intelligence sources and were part of
briefings held on Peru. The fact that there had been increased
lawlessness within Peru in recent months was also known and
considered. The status of the University of San Marcos as
an autonomous university, proud of its independence and heri-
tage, was also known. There was, however, nothing in intelli-
gence reports to indicate the real possibility of violence in
Peru. Demonstrations were considered possible. The fact that
ani-4-TTC
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anti-US demonstrations of the nature which occurred have not
ill ,.heretofore been knOwnAm'Lima-arid-the historic ability-of
the Peruvian Governmenttocontend with lawleSsness were im-
portant,fa6torsztaken-intoeconsideration:in" making decisions
.on,theYvlait to Peru.. Peru's record of close association and
ties with the United StatesA.s historical.
At the time of the Peruvian Visit, mounting evidence of
the?possibility-of,student tlemonStratione' was known.
,Th anti-US demonstrations were the reSuIt of a small
minoritT, estimated between 30 and 40 persons, obviOusly.com-
munist led and inspired. They did not represent the attitude'
of Peruvians, much less that of the Peruvian Government. The
demonstrations seemed to snowball once they were incited, and
there is-no evidence that large Mass demonstrations were planned.
Ecuador
Intelligence reports received prior to the arrival of the
Vice Prebident in E:Alador showed that the communists had under-
taken conEiderable -donning and as of May 9 their activities
had been limited to fly sheets and wall paintings. It had
been expected that anti-Nixon demonstrations might include
throwing of water and fruit. Elaborate plans to embarrass
the ,ice President during his visit to the Central University
0 failed to materialize because the visit was cancelled.
Other communist plans in Ecuador by students were said
to include:
.
Presentation of what would appear to be an honorary
diploma, but actually would portray imperialist domina-
tion of Ecuador.
2..A receiving line to turn its back on Mr. Nixon upon
his arrival.
,-AA! commUnist student leader to read a lis-t'of United
-F,tateis, acts of intervention in Latin America during
yes.rs.
:21;1Jdnt$ to walk out on Mr. Nixon if there had been
any.at,temp.:6 to -quiet communist- ,q)eakers.
IntelligenCe.reports'indicated that other plans which did ?
not Materialize becuse of the Ecuadoran Government's:excellent
security efforts and apparent poor coptunist organization in-
eluded shouting squads along Mr. Nixon's travel-route, throwing
water and rOtten,fruit and display of derisive signs.
PedroSaad,-Secretary General of the Communist Party in Ecuador,
orderbd-nO violence (according to reports) but he hoped
? riot would occur at the football game.
Mr. Nixon's
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Mr. Nixon's planned meeting with communist and other labor
leaders was cancelled. This cancellation as due in part to the
Embassy's decision that such a meeting would not be productive
and might give communist leaders a propaganda weapon. Communist
plans to challenge Mr. Nixon to meet labor leaders publicly in
communist-controlled quarters did not materialize.
Two important factors in the failure of any demonstrations
in Ecuador are believed to be the excellent security measures
adopted by the Ecuadoran Government and the fact that Ecuadorans
made an attempt to counteract the incidents in Peru. In any
event, the reception in Ecuador was cordial.
Colombia
During the past ten years Colombia has been the scene of
much violence, including the famed "Bogotazo" of 1948. Deaths
are reported to have totaled some 200,000 in Colombia during
this period, due to guerrilla activities and other political
violence. The political situation in Bogota prior to the start
of Vice President Nixon's tour was a confused one. Elections
were scheduled for May 4 but no candidate had been chosen one
week before the elections. The nomination by both the
Conservative and Liberal Parties of Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo
produced a profound effect and gave civilian groups high hopes
for political stability. Lleras' nomination, however, evoked
a reaction in certain circles. During the last days of April
General Rejas Pinilla moved to the Caribbean from Europe and
there was an attempted coup by sympathizers of Rejas on May 2.
Details of this attempt were reported to the Vice President in
Buenos Aires and elsewhere en route and the political impli-
cations and chances of political turmoil in Colombia were fully
explained.
A rumor that an attempt might be made to assassinate the
Vice President was reported to Embassy Bogota prior to the Vice
President's arrival. Rumors of possible student and communist
demonstrations were also reported. A detailed report dated
May 10 from reliable sources concerning communist and communist-
front groups' attempts to organize student demonstrations was
recorded and the Vice President's party informed. This report
included plans to distribute leaflets; plans to demonstrate
at wreath-laying ceremonies; alleged plans to throw tomatoes,
eggs, etc., and to "duplicate the Lima student incident." There
were meetings of communists to arrange for these demonstrations
and there was some talk of having weapons and a possible assas-
sination attempt. This information was relayed to the Nixon
party. It was stated that communists would play an insignificant
part and that the greatest danger came from the followers of
ex-dictator Rejas Pinilla in order to discredit the present
Government.
The assassination
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The assassination talk was assessed as being largely bravado.
0 It was concluded that it was not probable that serious
incidents would occur because the Colombian Government was aware
of the possible dangers and was well prepared to meet any
trouble.
?
The reports in Colombia centered largely on Colombia's own
political turbulence and on rumors which arose following the
incidents in Lima. The failure of an attempted coup on May 2
and the subsequent election of President Lleras Camargo on
May 4, as scheduled, helped dissipate concern over any serious
trouble in Colombia. None occurred. Consideration nevertheless
was given to the cumulative chain reaction which seemed to be
building up as the tour progressed. This fact was assessed,
along with the assurances given by the Colombian authorities.
It was decided that there was a possibility of demonstrations
but that the Colombian authorities were prepared to keep them
under control. The few minor demonstrations were completely
overshadowed by the friendly reception accorded the Vice
President. This reception was particularly warm and friendly
in the workers' and poorer districts where some thought trouble
might have been anticipated.
Venezuela
From the very start it had been anticipated that there might
be more danger of distrubances in Venezuela than in any other
place. This was made known to the Secret Service officers
accompanying the Vice President prior to the party's departure
from the U.S. and it was also made known to the Vice President.
The unsettled political situation in Venezuela which has
existed since the overthrow of the Perez Jiminez regime in
January had been the subject of many reports. The rapid return
of the communists to Venezuela from exile and their intense
activity in labor, student and other civilian sectors following
the overthrow of Perez Jimenez were reported and considered in
planning the visit. In February a report was received from
non-communist labor leaders that the communists were back in
force in Venezuela and working very assiduously in the labor
field. The prominent role played by communists in organizing
opposition to the Perez Jimenez regime and the communists'
efforts to discredit the United States were well known. The
many facets of Venezuelan political difficulties, including the
delicate balance between the civilian and military power in
Venezuela were also known.
The Venezuelan criticism of U.S. voluntary restrictions on
petroleum imports; the inflammability of this issue in
Venezuela; the protest by many Venezuelans and particularly
leftiat groups against the issuance by the United States of visas
to ex-President Perez Jimenez and his security chief, Pedro
410 Estrada, were reported to the Nixon party both before and during
the trip.
The agitation
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The agitation of university'stude.ntSYbn the visa Issue, as
well as their criticism of the United States for allegedly
supporting the Batista regime in 'Cuba', were also fully re-
ported and taken into consideration in deciding on the visit
to Venezuela and the question of a visit to the University.
On April 22 prior to the departure of the Vice President,
a report was received that there might be demonstrations at
the University of Caracas.
? As Vice President Nixon's tour progressed, and particularly
after the events in Lima, increased reports concerning the
possibility of serious disturbances at the University in
Caracas fomented by the Communists were received. The Embassy
consulted with the Venezuelan Government Junta and the Junta
recommended that the Vice President cancel his proposed visit
to the University. The Vice President agreed to do this and
requested that the Venezuelan Government make public the fact
that disturbances might be anticipated.
A report that rumors were being received of a possible
assassination attempt at Caracas against the Vice President
was sent ahead to the Nixon party by telegram on May 9.
By May 11, rather complete reports concerning preparations
being made by students and others in Venezuela for anti-U:S.
demonstrations were being received and forwarded on a regular
basis to the Nixon party and, through the Embassy, to the
Venezuelan Government. Details of these preparations and
renewed recommendations that the Vice'President not visit
the University of Caracas were accompanied by assurances from
the Venezuelan Government that it was aware of these plans and
was prepared to accord full protection.
?
On May 13 a report was received that the Minister of
Education had received assurances from all political parties,
including the communists, that they would avoid acts of
violence during the Vice President's visit. to Caracas.
Three reports of possible assassindtion attempts were
forwarded to the Vice President, and the matter was made public
by the Secret Service on the eve of the Vice-President's
departure from Colombia for Caracas.
On May 10 an intelligence report commented that it be-
lieved the student manifestations would be limited to a strong
verbal harassment witout resort tO. physical violence, but that
this could not be guaranteed. In a telephone conversation with
the Department on May 13, Ambassador .Sparks reported that the
University visit had been cancelled and that while difficulties
in Caracas might be anticipated, the .Government was taking
security measures. ;
In view
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In view of the total of the foregoing information, it was
recognized that demonstrations might omm in Venezuela. The
cumulative effect of the demonstrations in Lima among the stu-
dents was discussed and considered in planning for the visit to
Caracas. It was also considered that the events in Lima might
cause the Venezuelan Government to take more precautions in
order to avoid similar demonstrations. On the basis of as-
surances by the Venezuelan Government of its security measures,
violence in Caracas was not anticipated. The intensity of the
demonstrations which followed and the failure of the Venezuelan
security forces to act effectively were not foreseen.
Lebanon
We do not believe that the subversive activities now
going on in Lebanon in an effort to overthrow the regime of
President Chamoun and the destruction of the USIS library in
Tripoli and the USIS reading room in Beirut are part of a co-
ordinated Communist effort connected with the attacks on Vice
President Nixon in South America and the developments in Algeria.
The principal source of instigation for the troubles in
Lebanon are extremist nationalist elements inside and outside
Lebanon aided and abetted by violent propaganda from Radio
Cairo and Radio Damascus. This is supplemented by arms and
armed men infiltrating from the Syrian sector of the United
Arab Republic. The purpose of this attack is to overthrow the
pro-Western regime of President Chamoun. We have no doubt that
Communist elements in Lebanon are helping to fan the flames of
this insurrection, as it would seem most unnatural for them not
to seize upon this opportunity to create trouble for the United
States and for a country friendly to the United States. We are
inclined to believe that the troubles in Lebanon, although they
are doubtless being exploited by the Communists, arise out of
developments primarily concerning the Near Eastern Arab world
and are not directly connected widathe situation in Algeria
or recent events in South America.
The USIS installations were burned by the extremist mobs,
perhaps with Communist participation, because they were easily
accessible symbols of the principal Western power and the nation
which symbolizes the political principles to which the present
Lebanese Government has given its support. The Arab extremist
nationalists oppose what they consider to be U. S. efforts to
line up the Arab world on the U. S. side in the East-West
struggle. The Soviet Union through inflammatory broadcasts in
the Arabic language is attempting to exacerbate the situation
in Lebanon.
There is
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There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is attempting also to
influence Cairo and Damascus in their propaganda and other activity
directed against the present Government of Lebanon.
The earliest available Soviet broadcast on the Lebanese crisis
(May 12 in Arabic) consisted of a news account of events and a direct
comment that "it is difficult for anyone to deny that the foreign policy
imposed on Lebanon by the Eisenhower Doctrine has brought forth
,dangerous and destructive consequences." An Arabic broadcast of. May 14 declared that the United States seems ready to interfere in
Lebanon's "internal affairs" and charged that the ?colonialists," whose
alleged practice is that of describing popular movements as Communist,
are seeking to intervene in Lebanon. The broadcast added that the
Lebanese people will give "an appropriate answer to the American
colonialists." ,On May 15 Radio Moscow Charged the United States,
according to the AP, with open interference in Lebanon's internal ?
affairs and asserted that the Lebanese authorities were "planning to
use these American weapons to fight the anti-imperialist popular move-
ment."
ALGERIA
There is no indication that the recentdevelopments in Algeria
have been in any way related to other simultaneous disturbances in
the world. Nor is there any indication that the Algerian incidents were
directly Communist-inspired.
The Algerian explosion is an expression of the intensity of feelings
on the part of the French, particularly those in Algeria, on this neuralgic
issue There has always been a possibility, of which we were long aware,
that the French settlers in Algeria might try to take matters in their own
hands, if they suspected that the French Government might change its
policy on Algeria.
A series of circumstances combined to favor the events which occurred
last Tuesday. There was an absence of governmental authority; given the
cabinet crisis and the absence of Minister Lacoste from Algiers. The
French settlers feared, moreover, that the designated French Prime
Minister, Pierre Pflimlin, might negotiate with the Algerian rebels. They
therefore decided to had Massive protest demonstrations to discourage-.
Pflimli n' s investiture.
The demonstrators
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The demonstrators were estimated at around 50,000 and, incited
by extremist elements, soon got out of hand. In addition to ransacking
our USIS offices, the mobs finally took over the local government
building, the Ministry for Algeria. It was at that point that the
military came upon the scene and took over control, setting up a
Committee of Public Safety.
It is, of course, possible that this coup was planned well in
advance and not the sudden result of unpremeditated mob action.
If so, it was planned by French settlers and certain French military
elements -- neither of whom, to our knowledge, have any sympathies
with the Communists. That these events occurred on May 13 was due
to the fact that it was the day that Pflimlin was scheduled to come up
for Parliamentary investiture.
The ransacking
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The ransacking of the USIS library was only an offshoot of the
larger action by the mobs. The library is centrally-located on the
ground floor along one of the main streets of Algiers. Certain ele-
ments among the French settlers have felt that we were not solidly
behind France's insistence on maintaining Algeria as an integral
part of France. It is likely that in the mood they were in at that
time, some of the demonstrators were incited by extremist elements
to wreck the USIS premises. There have been no indications that
these elements were Communist or Communist-inspired.
The Soviet propaganda line in regard to Algeria is designed to
excite anti-US sentiments among the French. Moscow has consistently
alleged that the U. S. sought to oust France from North Africa and to
install itself there militarily, politically and economically. Sahara
oil is said to inflame U. S. desires and North African bases to play
an important role in U. S. strategic designs. Such moves as the
supplying of arms by the U. S. to Tunisia and the good offices mission
were said to have the aims of increasing U. S. domination over the
area. According to Radio Moscow, the U. S. "intends to supersede
France in North Africa as in Indo-China." Moscow has simultaneously
attempted to create hostility to the U. S. among Algerian Arabs by
charging that the U. S. was attempting to supplant France as the
colonial master. There has been, however, no marked intensification
of anti-American propaganda in connection with the Algerian coup.
BURMA
According to a preliminary check of Soviet bloc propaganda output,
there has been no unusual propaganda activity on the part of the USSR
or Communist China in connection with the incident which took place
before the U. S. Embassy in Rangoon on May 12. According to the
Embassy report, about 100 persons paused for 3 or 4 minutes before
the chancery while parading in formation along the street returning
from a nearby meeting of the Communist-front World Peace Congress.
The crowd stopped only long enough to leave some placards bearing
slogans against SEATO and against nuclear weapons, including one in
English reading, "American war mongers -- don't interfere in our
internal affairs". Local press treatment of the incident was entirely
perfunctory.
INDONESIA
Since the Indonesian rebellion in February, Soviet propaganda in
close consort with that of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) has
portrayed
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portrayed the issue to Indonesians as one between patriotic defense
? of Indonesian nationalism and sovereignty on the one hand, and
foreign-inspired imperialism on the other. The U. S. is identified
as the major inspirer of the "separatists" and is charged with inter-
vening by military aid to the rebels.
The increasing trend of the propaganda toward pinpointing the
U. S. as the major force of intervention is seen in the Soviet Govern-
ment's statement of May 14 in which it charged:
II.... in a number of instances weapons have been and are
being delivered to the rebels directly from the U. S. ... a
number of U. S. leaders, Secretary of State Dulles among
them, unequivocally called for the setting up of a new govern-
ment in Indonesia .... In the light of the events taking place
in Indonesia, it is difficult to assess such statements otherwise
than as direct incitement to the overthrow of the legitimate
Indonesian Government."
The PKI has consistently echoed the main lines of Soviet propaganda
against the U. S., relating them specifically to the internal scene. The
overall goal has been to identify the U. S. as the real national enemy
behind the rebels, and the PKI as the foremost patriotic party. Taking
? advantage of the momentum generated by Premier Djuanda's April 30
statement and Sukarno's May 2 speech charging intervention and taking
the U. S. to task, Indonesian Communists have initiated threats of
direct action against U. S. interests. PKI Secretary General Aidit in
a May 1 telegram to the U. S. Embassy threatened action against U. S.
economic interests in Indonesia if U. S. arms to rebels were not
stopped. In a speech published May 6 Aidit threatened that the PKI
would launch a campaign for taking over U. S. enterprises in
Indonesia as was done with the Dutch unless the U. S. stopped arms to
the rebels.
A Communist-dominated "Mass Movement to Oppose Foreign
Intervention" was organized on May 7 (probably a crystallization of
an "anti-foreign intervention group" formed on May 4 by Communist
unions, youth and student front groups) and called for a mass rally
on May 16 in front of the U. S. Embassy to protest U. S. intervention.
The rally was subsequently postponed to May 20. The group may be
identical with an "anti-Foreign Intervention Movement" which on May 9
reportedly cabled 20 international organizations throughout the world
asking for "solidarity" in condemning foreign intervention in Indonesia.
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JAPAN
There occurred recently a massive but-peaceful manifestation,
reportedly involving some forty thousand persons, before our Embb,ssy
in Tokyo. This was a protest against continued-testing of nuclear
weapons. This is an active popular issue in Japan resulting from
wartime experience as a target of atomic weapons. In this case there
is no clearcut evidence of Communist direction. It is an issue
agitated by the USSR on a worldwide basis. There is continuous
effort by Communists to exploit the issue locally against the United
States.
* *
State---FD, Was1.1`.;
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