FOLLOW-ON STUDY OF STRATEGY TOWARD THE INDIAN OCEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-10-5-16-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 22, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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1\1? Cibiectim t? Dec
? ?
OSD, NSS review
completed.
abti opal ecurity Study Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT': Tallow-on S tudy of Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean
As a follow-on to the study developed in response to NSSM 104, the
President has directed that a further study be prepared outlining
alternative U.S. strategies through 1975 for dealing with the increase
In Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean area. Whereas the NIISM 104
study concentrated on Soviet naval threats and friendly naval force and
basing alternatives, this study is to provide the broader framework
necessary for judging a naval response in the context of other possible
strategies.
This stu4y should provide answers to the following questions
1. What is the political significance in the Indian Ocean context
of the Soviet naval presence? In each case, 'Mention should be
given to the effect of the passage of time.
--What states in the area are more susceptible and less susceptible
to this sort of Soviet influence?
-In what specific ways in these stets* could the Soviet Union be
expected to *ahem* its influence by increasing its naval activity?
-la what ports of the area could local tensions develop to the point
of (1) tempting Soviet exploitation and (2) producing local invitation
for Soviet involvement?
what specific ways in these *tate. could an Lacrosse in Soviet
presence be expected to work to Soviet disadvantage?
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Pr? ? -
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- these stakes, how does Sov ZOLV81 acttvity ceupsre in
effectivenes* with military aid, economic aesistanee,
support and local Communist parties as devices for inesessing
Soviet inane/we
Doe. Soviet political influence increase c =twat ately With
creases in Soviet naval activity?
2. What is the srtilitary and political significance Soviet
naval deployments in the Indian Ocean viewed in the conteat of
globiilS?vtet naval strategy and overseas deployments elsewhere?
-What are the principal views of the relationship between Soviet
naval and political strategy?
--Against the background of th. global cont
Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean?
--In what Indian Ocean states is the Soviet Interest greatest and
least?
3. What is the political significanc, of Chinese Cerranuntst
sotivitiee, a. g. IC/31k4 testing sad political relations with littoral
,*ate.?
4. What are the U.S. options in setting a *trot toward this
area? The INISSM 104 study outlined options for a naval response.
The purpose of this study would be to develop a political framework
Lox the naval response.
--In which Oates are U.S, and allied interests greatest and least?
hat activities other than naval Zr. potentially useful devices in
countering Soviet influence? note do thee. differ in various littoral
states or regions?
In whim ways can Soviet activities be made more costly politically
for the Soviets?
--Whet U.S. responsee are most likelyto
reopens,* by allied governments?
NtOcerr
? or discourage
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11.
What U.S. -allied responses are more and lea. likely to elicit
? stile and friendly responses from the indigenous nations?
--What is the appropriate political posture for the U.S. to take
with the states in the area in connection with each strategy option
S. If there were to be a U.S. and allied naval response to the
Soviet buildup. which is the more appropriate timing for the U.S.
and allied response? Is it better to move quickly to try to
pre-empt further Soviet buildup or to keep pose with the Soviet
buildup?
This study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Ms Group to be chaired
by * represeatetive of the Secretory of State. ft ahoold he submitted
by January 22, 1911.
Henry A. Kiseinger
co: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
,T
H,H,Saund rs:trnt 12/18/70
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1111 IP
INFORMAT
24303
12)
S CRET December MI, 1970
lharMORANDUkt FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM;
SUBJECT$
Henry A. Kissinger
Indian Ocean Shwas'
As you know from your briefing memo for Prime Minister Heath's visit*
we have been engaged in a joint study with the British of the Sovist thront
La the Indian Ocean. The purpose of this memo is simply to inform you
of the state of that work and the follow-on to it.
The main British point ha* been that a collection of recent Soviet actions
seem to add up to a now Soviet emphasis on establishing a presence in
the Indian OCOST13
--Soviet naval ships are increasingly active.
--The Soviet air presence in the UAR could reach into the Red Snit
and Western Indian Ocean as well as into the Mediterranean.
-They have acquired access to port facilities in a general way through
fisheries agreements with 13 countirlao.
--They have the potential in Aden and Mauritius for developing over the
long term arrangement* such all they now have in Alexandria.
The initial U.S. sleety -- on which we have compared notes with one of
Prime Minister Hoath's principal planner* -- concentrated on this Soviet
naval threat and possible U.S. and allied naval responses. When the Senior
Review Group discussod this first study, it wee decided that a further
paper was needed to put the naval response into the content of possible broader
diplentstic and economic responses. This follow-on study has now beim
ordered via the attached directive. As soon as it is completed, recoil:unloads-
'dons will be sent to you.
SECRET
EIHSaunderstimp:12 /18/70
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,.#
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11, k-kC`
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FR.01.4: Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
K. 'Wayne Smith
Hohnut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Follow-on Indian Ocean Study
ACTION
24303
December 18, 1970
Attached 4s* N874 ordering the follow-on study which you requested
at the MG discussion of the Indian Ocean last week. It wax drafted
by Saunders and incorporates the suggestions of all your staff with
responsibilities in this area.
The NOM, is built around the four questions you put at the SRG.
The responsibility for this study is shifted to an NSC Ad Hoc Group In
State in order now to cast the broader political net you have asked for.
Effectively this NSSM will give the Job to Cargo's shop?presumably to
Tom Thornton who produced the political input for the past study.
At tab
Tab A: The draft NSS14 for your signature.
; A memo reporting this exercise to the Preside (including
'Thomeon's presentation to the SRG).
b C; A final summary of his views which Thomson left.
This is being sent to you in the immediate wake of the Heath visit so you
can review it in the light of thous talks and get it out promptly if it is
consistent with what was agreed.
RECOMMICND#V0N4:
1. That you sign the NSSM at Tab A.
Z. That you send the memo at Tab B to the President if you think it
desire/de. Much of this was already reported in the memo for
the Heath visit.
\ A
CONCURRENCES: Marshall
gECRET John Holdridge
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CON VT DrilY .4 'Xi
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The Indian Ocenrt Area - Soviet ;Ind Chinese Canabilities,
Intentions .pportunitie
-Sovi t CaTiabilities at Present
The Soviet Squadron in the Indian Oceant:though'it
.eannot always be at operational readiness has _the caPability-
-
of being the most Powerful naval force in the area. With
their facilities-at-airfields-in the-UAR:the Russians c
-fly reconnaisOance, air cover and strikemissions over the.
Red Sea, Persian Gulfand the Arabirni Sea. The-port:
:facilities which they have acquired, e.g.: in 'Aden and through
- - .
fisheries agreements with 13: Countries in the area, could',..
help to maintain their military presence.
Aid agreements
-
and political support have giVen,the,Vussiana additional
. -
:influence in a.number of countries, e.g. .India and PRSy.
With these resources the-Russians:are-capable of giving aid
1 -
and comfort to friendly governments or opposition parties in
such a way as to intimidate their domestic opponents end to
inhibit Western intervention. They have also a modest
capability to interfere with the large amount of Western
shipping in the grea. But the most important cePabilitY
they have so far achieved is a foot in the door, that iq t
say the cenability of expandinc, their power and influence
o that it might come to rival that which Britainformerly
?
exercised in the area.
Soviet Potential Cambilities
2. With the Suez Canal open and Alexandria available
naVal L will 11 0 - ?nFl 7 4 ,aepi
to maihtain their presence .:.41..nd_o'oera.tionl eff$,cikney in the
Indi'Pn Ocemi- tad-I-Mlle their Ilavnl.111periority ,nr-, hcr-
- th---
will also be-able:to reinfotce it -more quicklY;'-.IfstheY Wrc
? 1 -
CON PI DPI TT AI
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--77w
to acquire a ndval and air base within theq area, e.g. Aden,
their operational readiness and power would be still more
enhanced. - They would be betterable to shadow Western
surface forces in the area.: they would also ,be better able
-
- threaten Western shipDing and they .couid:effeCtivelY deny
_
certain parts of the sea to it: they would t have a. consid-
erable capability to 'intervene in internal _security situationa .
.in -favour of their. friends: they might thus % be .able to secure
pro-Russian governments in such countries as MauritiUs4- PRSY.
and Somalia. :Finally. they would be able to --o1Pce consider-
able inhibitions irthibitions on Western freedom of action while at the
- -
same time increasing their oWn optiojle.
Chinese Activities end Intentions
? 3.. In the'next .5 -years the .Chinese- will not make muCh'.'
'-headway in the Indian Ocean area as a whole, . although they.
will .make a -major effort - to, secure ..the success Of the Tanz.m
-Railway, will take a- close interest- in. Pakistan,
-Ceylon and PRSY and will --enter intoreiationa;- with nearly_
all the countries in the area'. Just as the Russians have
au. anti-Chinese motive and Will be spurred on by Chine-Se,-
-
? activitieS,:sc the Chinese .have
- .
_
The objectives of the two oountriee are different end the
.
Chinese will probably be moreinterested then the Russians
, , -
in, Creating political instability and fragmentation in the
an anti--Russj.an incentive.
-
area. China will probably not be in a gi'eat h y,if only
boause her resources are so compar.atively slender.
?.C.ONPIDENTIa'
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((ir T T:JtPir\T.
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Soviet Intention !-1 end OPportunities
4. . The Russians are acquisitive of power for its own
sake. They think of it like money in the bank - if you
have it people respect you. You can always use it if you
want - or not use it. It gives you freedom of choice. The
Russians are determined to be a super power on the American
scale. They intend to have their views taken into account
when anything important is done anywhere. They want a
finger' in every pie. Little by little they intend to
accustom the world to this Situation and to the reality of a
Soviet military presence. They will exploit the freedom
of the air and of the sea. They will probe Western
reactions and seek opportunities to enlarge Soviet innuence.
These are the main intentions underlying the ?expanding
Soviet power in the 'Indian Ocean area. At present the
Russians are operating on an experimental basis. If the
results look good they will press further.
5.. .Soviet policy is opportunistic in the sense that it is
looking for opportunities to enlarge Russian power and to
damage Western and Chinese interests. It is also opportun-
.-
istia in the sense that the Russians are prepared to deal
differently wit the different parts of the area. The
Soyiet leadership (as apart from - the. Soviet Navy) probably
.do not seethe area as a unit. Despite the growing amount
of Soviet merchant Shipping in the Indian Ocean the
Russians do not have a very strong defensive reason for
exercising military:_PoWer in the area, The o7fence
the homeland 4 !". nr-rot.ity of c:::ovi,,t tlF,f(?rnc:.
and at present the security of 1=;h0 .T.SR is net directly..
menaced from the Indicn Ocean area, Thus as things Aael.
3
CONFT DEITTT AL
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111
the Indi6n Ocean area does not have a very high 'place in
Soviet military priorities. The gains they seek there
are primarily political. Their first priority in the
area may be to drive the West out of the Arab countries
and to acquire the use of local naval and air facilities,
leading on eventually to the establishment of subservient
governments. Their second priority may be to gain as
much control as possible over every aspect of Indian
policy and in this they will not neglect Pakistan and
Ceylon. Their third priority may be to acquire the use
of naval and air facilities and to .encourage the form?
ation of friendly governments in other strabetic countries
e.g. Mauritius and Sormlia. But in trying to recreate for
themselves something approaching the former British
dominance in the area, the Russians will not be bound by
pre?determined priorities. They will probe where there
seems to be weakness and take opportunities as they find
them, for example social and political instability in
Mauritius, or black/white tension in Southern Africa. They
will be on the lookout to create opportunities both by
overt and also by covert means, e.g. to supplant the
Chinese in TtAzania or to overthrow the Sultan of Muscat
and Omani :With some luck and depending on the Western
response, the Russians could before long be a highly
influential power in the area; they might well dominate
critical parts of it. They are already. well on the read
to chi oal,
December, 1970
COfTFT DENT' A. I,
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