SOUTH AFRICA: DEFENSE STRATEGY IN AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE WORLD ANNEX F

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05741269
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-00226
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
-Secret �
South Africa: Defense ,
Strategy in an Increasingly
Hostile World
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Annex F
Scud
NI JIM 79-10025/F
January 1980
Copy 3 i
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SOUTH AFRICA: DEFENSE
STRATEGY IN AN INCREASINGLY
HOSTILE WORLD
ANNEX F
Information available as of December 1979 was
used in the preparation of this memorandum.
�5feltrr�
Met I
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FOREWORD
This publication contains Annex F of the previously issued
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum with the same title as that
appearing on the cover of this issuance. Annexes A through E, as one
package, were also published separately.
On the first page of each annex, including this one, is a note stating
which components of the Intelligence Community prepared the annex
and a telephone number for directing comments or queries. The
publication as a whole was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa
/,.1111/111.11
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SECRET
Annex F
Nuclear Policy
South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
1. South Africa can certainly produce nuclear
weapons during the three-to-four-year time frame of
this assessment, possibly in less than a year. Moreover,
it has the capability to design simple weapons that can
be delivered to targets in neighboring territories, using
aircraft now in the South African inventory�Mirage
jet fighters, for instance.
2. It is likely that South Africa had accomplished
the design and construction of at least one complete
nuclear test device, minus only the highly enriched
uranium components, at the time the facility in the
Kalahari desert was discovered in 1977. Highly en-
riched uranium probably was not available in signifi-
cant quantities before late 1978, but since then enough
material likely has been produced at the Valindaba
enrichment plant to permit fabrication of one or
several devices. A nuclear test certainly would be
desirable to establish the reliability of any nuclear
weapon system, though South Africa probably could
develop a workable nuclear weapon without testing. A
greater technical motive for South Africa to conduct a
test, if it has not already done so, could be to support
the development of a weapon that, in addition to
being reliable, would be efficient in the use of scarce
fissile material.' Whether or not the South Africans
have believed a nuclear test to be necessary in their
pursuit of an adequate nuclear weapons option, the
gap between their present capabilities and the ability
to deliver a finished weapon to a target may be
relatively small.
Note: Questions and comments on this annex may be directed to
either the Office of Scientific Intelligence of the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Office of Politico/Military Research
(Nuclear and Scientific Division) in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
Strategy
3. There are several strategies that South Africa
could follow in carrying out its nuclear weapons
program:
� Clandestine development but not assembly of all
weapons components.
� Clandestine assembly of all components and the
placing of untested weapons -on the shelf- for
military use in a last-resort situation.
� Clandestine testing of assembled weapons.
� Open testing of assembled weapons.
� Overt deployment of weapons.
In the past, plans apparently were made for overt
testing of at least one nuclear device, but those plans
were shelved in 1977. Either subsequently or coinci-
dentially, plans may have been made to conduct
nuclear tests that would not be detected or conclu-
sively attributed to South Africa. The current strategy
probably includes at a minimum the further produc-
tion of highly enriched uranium and may well extend
to the fabrication of certain weapons components. The
deployment of nuclear weapons probably is not part of
the near-term strategy.
4. At this time, the pace and boldness with which
top leaders will pursue the nuclear weapons program
are still strongly influenced by the political and eco-
nomic costs that South Africa would incur if the extent
of the program were to be admitted or otherwise made
obvious to the outside world. Such costs have borne
most immediately and directly on another strategic
goal�advancement of South Africa's peaceful nuclear
energy program. These costs are examined below for
each of three weapons program options�maintaining
the program at present levels, cutting back the pro-
gram, and advancing it.
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5. Maintaining Existing Weapons Program Lev-
els. South Africa would continue to pay a variety of
economic penalties if it should maintain its present
technical capabilities but not move ahead with weap-
ons development. International concern about South
Africa's nuclear weapons capability has resulted in the
loss of foreign assistance for peaceful nuclear develop-
ment that the government had been counting on. The
Safari nuclear reactor is practically shut down for lack
of fresh, highly enriched fuel. (The South African
Government has apparently decided not to use domes-
tically produced fuel in order to avoid revealing that
its enrichment capabilities are suited to the production
of highly enriched uranium.) The Koeberg nuclear
power station near Cape Town probably will suffer
delays in startup because the necessary enrichment
services cannot be secured abroad. Domestic capacity
cannot meet the demand until one or two years after
the scheduled startup of the Koeberg reactors.
6. In addition, plans for a commercial uranium
enrichment plant have had to be shelved because vital
equipment could not be procured abroad. South Afri-
can industry probably will not be in a position to
produce the necessary equipment for many years.
These penalties have not been so severe as to move the
South Africans to take anything other than cosmetic
steps to allay international concerns, however, and
there is no reason to believe that these penalties will
come to be perceived as more intolerable in the next
five years. However, if additional penalties were
developed�if France were to refuse to honor its
contractual obligations to fabricate fuel elements for
Koeberg, for example�the consequences could be
much more severe, particularly if South Africa were
unable to acquire suitable fuel-fabrication technology.
7. Cutting Back the Weapons Program. South
Africa's use of this option is unlikely. For one thing,
because its nuclear weapons work is secret, there
would be little good will to be gained from cutting
back part of the program unless at the same time the
program's full extent were revealed. But such a revela-
tion would likely arouse as much concern and suspi-
cion as it allayed, or more. Even if Pretoria placed all
nuclear production facilities under international safe-
guards, for example, foreign specialists would reason
that a previously amassed secret stockpile of weapons-
grade uranium probably was being maintained.'
Even in the absence of such a stockpile, the current expansion of
enrichment facilities would give South Africa a very short leadtime
for the production of weapons-grade uranium.
8. There are nonetheless certain sp
ate benefits South Africa could expect
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)�and
tively fixing the weapons option as a 1
Africa probably would expect eventuall
for its research reactor, fuel for the K
assistance for its commercial uraniu
program, and help in the constructio
nuclear power stations. While this is
itself, the South Africans probably wo
win concessions on other subjects fro
that have most vigorously urged South
cation of the NPT.
9. Why, then, has the treaty not
Basically, the South Africans are reluct
international commitment when they f
being accepted as a full member of t
community. More specifically, South
cerned that the promised resumption
assistance would be subject to future
sion or suspension. Also, perceived fun
lems with the treaty (or with the perfor
countries professing adherence to the
an obstacle, in which case South Af
willing to adopt full-scope safeguards w
refusing to be a party to the NPT.
reasons:
cific, immedi-
by signing the
thereby effec-
st resort. South
to obtain fuel
eberg reactors,
enrichment
of additional
onsiderable in
Id also hope to
the countries
African ratif
� The South African Government
cided to sign the treaty once furt
made toward the establishment of
ons option that can be preserve
after, the accumulation of a cert
highly enriched uranium bein
prerequisite.
� South Africa may wish to maintai
become an overt nuclear weapons
the political and economic trade-
with such an advancement of the
gram suggest that such a course wil
attractive to Pretoria.
been ratified?
nt to make an
el they are not
e international
Africa is con-
of US nuclear
nilateral revi-
amental prob-
ance of other
reaty) may be
ica might be
ile steadfastly
ther possible
� The South Africans may not yet
reveal the weapons-related capa
Valindaba enrichment plant, a r
would result from establishment o
guard mechanisms.
ay have de-
er progress is
read y-weap-
intact there-
in amount of
a possible
its option to
tate, although
ffs associated
weapons pro-
never appear
prepared to
ilities of the
velation that
suitable safe-
10. Advancing the Weapons Progra . Significant
and rapid advancement of the nuclear weapons pro-
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gram would be difficult without risking its disclosure.
A small group of scientists and engineers, however,
could in secret experiment with high explosives to
develop workable weapons designs. A few weapons or
the finished components thereof might be constructed
although the
existence of such physical evidence would be an
additional security risk to the program. As a further
advancement of the program, the Valindaba uranium
enrichment plant could be used to produce more
weapons-grade uranium. This, however, would mean
that Valindaba could not simultaneously be used to
build up a stockpile of reactor-grade uranium, which
South Africa will need to fuel the Koeberg power plant
complex if foreign enrichment services remain
unavailable.
11. In light of the possible�and as yet uncon-
firmed�nuclear event on 22 September 1979, there
has been speculation that South Africa may have con-
ducted a clandestine nuclear test. If South Africa has
tested a nuclear device�and we have no hard evi-
dence upon which to make this judgment�it may
elect to deny having done so while exacerbating
uncertainty in the international community with re-
spect to its nuclear intentions. If South Africa were to
conduct a clearly attributable nuclear test, set up a
new branch of the armed forces for nuclear weapons
exploitation, or otherwise make obvious its nuclear
weapons program, the government certainly would
anticipate serious repercussions. The UN Security
Council very likely would impose a mandatory em-
bargo on all foreign inputs to South Africa's nuclear
program, an event that would shut down ongoing
power reactor construction programs. Broader eco-
nomic sanctions might also be adopted which, even if
not fully observed, might discourage foreign invest-
ment in South Africa. Aside from political repercus-
sions, the impact of these actions on South Africa's
economic interests would appear out of proportion to
the gain in security that the government could reason-
ably expect from such overt nuclear activities.
12. We conclude, therefore, that the nuclear weap-
ons program probably will remain clandestine unless
South Africa were to perceive a drastic deterioration
of its security situation. Once a ready weapons capa-
bility is assured, Pretoria may well be willing to sign
the NPT or at least accept international safeguards,
particularly if Western suppliers of nuclear-related
materials were able to convince the South Africans
that supply for peaceful purposes would be secure.
F-3
Political-Military Usefulness of the Nuclear
Weapons Program
13. The South Africans have been deliberately am-
biguous with respect to their nuclear weapons poten-
tial and goals. For example, the apparent ambiguity of
some statements by South African Government offi-
cials disclaiming responsibility for the 22 September
possible nuclear event monitored by the United States
may serve Pretoria's strategic interests. Whether or not
South Africa has tested a nuclear device, some of the
recent statements fit into Pretoria's consistent policy of
calculated ambiguity with respect to its nuclear goals
and achievements. South Africa has now gained con-
siderable credit for its nuclear weapons capabilities,
without suffering the stigma of overt weapons testing.
14. Since neither neighboring states nor nuclear
powers can be certain of the extent or intention of
South Africa's nuclear weapons program, Pretoria may
be in a position to extract concessions even if it is not
actually in possession of usable -nuclear weapons. The
South African Government conceivably anticipated
foreign intelligence detection of particular weapons-
related activities, and then used the ensuing public
discussions to imply what its nuclear weapons poten-
tial might be, without actually crossing the weapons
production threshold.
15. South African nuclear energy officials an-
nounced in July 1979 that the republic would be able
to produce its own Safari research reactor fuel within
three years. Pretoria may use its capability to produce
weapons-grade uranium to pressure Western and
neighboring states for concessions during this period.
While publicity regarding South Africa's nuclear capa-
bilities has resulted in suspension or delay of Western
nuclear contracts, the South Africans may believe that
they can eventually restore Western cooperation on
nuclear and other issues in return for actual or appar-
ent curtailment of their weapons program.
16. The immediate political-military benefits from
fabrication of nuclear weapons would be less tangible.
Possession of nuclear weaponry, even if not publicly
acknowledged, would bolster national self-confidence
and give South Africans a symbol of their technical
and military resourcefulness. Strategists in Pretoria
may calculate that overt or covert demonstration of a
nuclear capability would make the West less likely to
undermine South Africa's security situation lest a
desperate South African Government provoke a nu-
clear confrontation in the region or be succeeded by
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an unstable nuclear-armed black regime. Pretoria
could also attempt to intimidate neighboring states,
although this would risk provoking the Soviets into
making new commitments to their clients in the
region.
17. The probable nature of the weapons that South
Africa could deploy would make them useful in a
strict military sense only in extreme circumstances.
For the next several years, the principal military
threats to the government are likely to remain insur-
rection in black urban areas of South Africa and
guerrillas operating from domestic or border-state
rural bases. Nuclear weaponry would be inappropriate
against such challenges. Nuclear weapons would be
useful to South Africa only as an implicit or explicit
threat against neighboring capitals and ports, against
large concentrations of troops and equipment massed
on its borders, or against nuclear weapons that might
be deployed in the region.
18. In the more distant future, if the conventional
threat were to grow, nuclear weapons would acquire
more utility as a deterrent or retaliatory force. This
capability may well be an important consideration for
Pretoria's nuclear strategists, who likely fear that
heavy Soviet military involvement against the republic
could eventually wear down its conventional armed
forces. Pretoria may calculate that a South African
nuclear capability would give the Soviets serious
pause, encourage the West to intervene on Pretoria's
side, and, if all else fails, prove effective in combat.3
Implications for US Policy
19. Proliferation. Revelation that South Africa pos-
sessed nuclear weaponry would�as it would for any
country�further weaken the international Nonprolif-
eration Treaty system, undercut US nonproliferation
policy, and encourage the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons by other countries. Other African countries might
seek long-term development of nuclear weapons or�
much less likely�stationing of superpower nuclear
deterrent forces on their territory. Several states (such
F-4
as Pakistan, South Korea, Iraq, Ar ntina, Brazil,
India, Israel, and Taiwan) might feel f wer inhibitions
about developing nuclear weapons or enly publiciz-
ing their nuclear weapons capabilities f South Africa
suffered no serious international reper ussions.
20. Nuclear Technology Embargo Confirmation
of South Africa's nuclear weapons prog am would also
greatly increase pressures on the U ited States to
strengthen international nuclear exp. controls. In
one sense, South African weapons dev opment might
add important domestic and internatio al support for
the US position. Other nuclear suppli r states might
become more receptive to US nonpr liferation poli-
cies. On the other hand, even thou h US nuclear
cooperation with South Africa might ease, depend-
ence on South African uranium or the � esire to market
nuclear-related products could well led other coun-
tries to cooperate with Pretoria in p aceful nuclear
programs after a few years.
21. Soviet Involvement. South Afr
of nuclear weapons would alarm reg
open an opportunity for intensified
southern Africa by the Soviet Union a
Neighboring African states might see
protective guarantee from Moscow.
almost certainly would not offer an
commitment to an African client,
counted on to issue generalized but
and to step up conventional arms an
ance. The United States could be fac
regional polarization, intensified Sovi
and diminishing influence with regar
and the protection of its interests in
22. Multilateral Initiatives. Inte
for UN sanctions would be virtually
Africa were to become a nuclear
Following the revelation, for example
indications that a nuclear event may
22 September 1979 in the southern h
Third World and Soviet bloc nati
presumed that South Africa had de
weapons and hastened to denounce
further revelation should occur, Sovi
particular would push for UN ac
embarrass the West as well as h
Africans. South Africa's recent exp
International Atomic Energy Agenc
India may have been based in p
reaction to allegations of South Afric
ons activities.
can acquisition
onal states and
'nvolvement in
d its associates.
some form of
hile the Soviets
xplicit nuclear
they could be
minous threats
advisory assist-
d with growing
t involvement,
to both events
he area.
sified pressure
certain if South
weapons state.
of US technical
ave occurred on
misphere, many
ns immediately
eloped nuclear
this activity. If
bloc nations in
ons that could
t at the South
lsion from the
conference in
rt on negative
n nuclear weap-
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