HISTORY OF THE MOUNTAIN SCOUT PROGRAM OCTOBER 1961 - FEBRUARY 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05657460
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01666
• Publication Date: February 1, 1962

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inclusively in the cities leaving the country-side to the nomadic Manta-
guard tribes, and the VC cadres who lived with
VC control of the Montagnard was based on several factors. Firsts
propaganda promising an antonomaces region for the Montagnard tribes.
This particularlly appealed to the Meade, the most politicelly advanced,
who had revolted against *1-4 OW in 1957. Secondly, ruthless, illegal
and denigrating exploitation of the Nontagnards by the Vietnamese had
resulted in distrust and antipathy. Third/Y, the VC were the only
people; aside from the Catholic priests, shol,.^ 7 concern matter what'
itst motivation) for the Mtntagnards. Forth:LT the GVW had no positive
program of any immediate magnitude to attract the Montagnard.
HISTORY OF THE MOUNTAIN SCOUT PROGRAM
October 1961 - February 1962
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The autum of 196]. saw a rapidly deteriorating security situation in
Central Highlands of South Vietnam. In-reals by viet Cong cadre among the
Montagnard population was extensive and increasing in strength.
This proto-malaysian population racially and culturally and his-
torically opposed to the Vietnamese in many cases initially inlcomed the
V.C. as an alternate to their traditional Vietnamese enemies.
Numbering approximately 600,000 as -against 12,0001000 Vietnamese the.
Montagnard inhabited 62% of the geographical area of South Vietnam. In
1954, at the departure of the French, the Montagnard represented almost ;cc;
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the only inhabitant of the high plateau. �owever, by 1961 approximately
1,500,000 Vietnamese had moved into the highlands. They resided almost f�
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On the other hand, the CVN had several asers, .althonh few were of
their own making. Primarily, the VG in the final analysis increased
control through terror. While their agents may have propogated the theme
of autonomy, the arrival of VC troops quickly negated the good wiil with
derands for food, labor and personnel backed by the threat of force and/or
terror. This imposed a. great hardship on the tribes since they raised
only what sufficed for themselves. The VC could give nothing, but only
take from the sehsistance level of the Ifentagnard. Secondly, the Catholic
priests had made considerable progress in converting the Ment44nard.
Kontum Province is a particular/1y Sharp etemple. Being anU-coememist
by religion and pro-IIVN by politics the Catholic church ?err d a strong
opposition to the in-roads made by .the TO.
Certainly the :Above applied in oaring degrees to the spectrum of
tribes with perhaps the Keho most influenced by the VC and the primarily
Catholic Bahnar the leant influenced. Others; Shade, their cousins the
Jarail Chem and so forth fall between the extremes. Nevertheless, it lc
possible to hazard a conclusion that' the Mentagnard was caught between the
VC hammer and the Wig anvil.
Reture4nE to the security situation of autumn of 19615 the province
of Xontum, Pleilint, the highland areaz of Quang Nam, Clang Ngai and Binh
Dinh a total of 21 districts were considered ripe for cerOlete Vt con-
trol. It might be noted here that Phu Bon Province was later created
out of part of Pleura and quang Tin from part of quang Nam Province.
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Indeed, the VC had captured a district headquarters in Kent= tad held
it for a day. Some estimates stated that Kontun had 5,= IC troops
capable of taking over the 'whole province including the city of Konya
and creating a capital-for the V.C. Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
Se it as it may, there is little question that the nittAtion as serious
and beyond the control of the ARW-1. Antler, the Civil Guard and Self
-Defense Corps were corneet and ineffective ciphers.
To meet the problem it was necessary to do several things, On the
Vietnamese side obtain agreement, reluctant as it was, to mploy and -
arm Montagnards. On the American aide it as necessary to obtain
only CAS approval but also Country Team approval. In this case that
meant General McCarri.6, Chief of MAAG, and the Ambassador's- okay.
re obtain Vietnamese approval. Captain Ngo Van i!ung, head of the
Montagnard Service in Hue was approached and a plan ,,,jointly discussed -
and agreed to was developed. It i3 interesting to .nate, that the Non-
tagnard Service .and Capt. Hung suffered from the uslisCi Vietnamese
political -bidextreusness. That is, the Service was directly responsible
to the President, the Minister -of Intarier, Cal. Le Quang Tang's PSO
(later Snecial Forcea), Mr. tige,Dinh Can the Presidents brother and
virlandarin in Residence,' in Cectral Vietnam. Approval also had to be
obtained from concerned province chiefs, the 1st Corps Comander, Lreatext2
Don, and II Corps Commar.der, General Ton That Dinh.
Few,if any, of the individnals concerned appeared to have either
coinan interests or similar points of view. Obviously., instructions
had to be forthcoming from high enough authority to gain or force the sup-
port from the various persealities. The key %Ls Ng� Dinh Can. lie
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approved the program, wrote or spoke to the various groups and a green
light glowed on the Vietnamese -e.
The pill was sugared however, personal briefing 0 discwjsxoua,
and suggestions of all concerned. Col Tri, CO- 22nd Divisive briefed
General Dinh who obtained Presidential approve/. The resulting personal
relationships did mueh to smooth over future preblema.
On the timerican side, PAjor (later Lt. Col.) Melvin Price, of MAAO
Operations Section and the author rented the USW plane and traveled to
Hue. The object of this trip waa to briefMajorPrice and gain NW
support and ultimately country team support. Major Price and -the 'writer
briefed the Cerps adeisorg�sector advisors, and province chiefs in
both 1st and II nd Corps on the program. At the end of the trip Price
and the writer wrote a sumary and favorable recomendatioee to General
McGarr. Here it might be note worthy to point up General Times' 'thusly
support and understendirg for the concepts of a program which waa esene
daily pare militery0 payeer and intelligence./ at any se, the program
was finally approved by General McGarr and the AMbeesidor.
funds and arms were obtained by cable with in 48 hours.
Thus by 10 MoveHhereafter, six weeks of effort, the..
approval
mrk and
Planning had been aceomplishei.--We were ready to implement the plan.
The PM concept
am waste create and Pr01.0y a force ..cf
local residents fight.ng for local issues. The emphasis on the local
concept resulted from a lock of local identification and undersrendirg of the
national ideate. -Saigon to the local Montagnard was either Lee-Another
world or a syMbal oloppressieb.--
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In conversatiours with Col. Layton, Chief of MI it was dewrtined
that tear�s, of 15 men with great fire power heavily armed -with Automatic
weapons }1111,s plus grenades and grenade ladrichers could defend them-
selves against heavy VC attack. At the sere time the relatively small
size of the teams per-Tined great local mobility and speed of movatent -
an essential in counter-guerrilla warfare.
Other key advantages in usias. leoal residents stoke fcrthcoming.
geing nomadic the Ifontagsard had a built-2-th intelligence biovledge
that was irreplacable. He !crow the terrain, trails and most of the VC
areas, indeed, in many instances he knew the VC. cadre. He vas at
"liege" with all the into once that a lifetime of residence can On.
He also was known by the population. Fie was generally trusted by
the local residents most of' wham were known by name or association
(family, friends, tribe). Problems, cultural,. economic, social and
security were the sane for the cesurando or scout, as he later became,
as with the population ant importantly he had been placed in a pa...'tion
to do something about these probIns. In essence the use of local per-
sonnel in local areas had ne t the retpsirement of guerrilla warfre of
being one with the people. Thus, the problem of an outei4er, er a
nebUlous ideal of national government gaining the confidence of au
ethically different group was resolved.
Finally, being in his home area the logistical4reb/em was greatly
cut down. Teams could live off the country side as a matter of custom
vithout offending the populations Hswever, other political and psy-
cologieal problems ha?. to be overcoms:.
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One, the Vietnamese greatly feared an independent 3fontagnard force.
The Rhade revolt of 1957 had rade a singular impression on Vietnamese
officials. Thus, it was agreed that operational control of the teams
would rest with the District Chief and that the teams would operate
from District Headquarters through the province chief. This also supported
the need for immediate local reaction to VC activities.
Secondly, the teams must he loyal to the,OVN and .understand not
only :their role in fighting, paywar and civic action efforts but also
that it was the GVN which was supportingthamin their efforts to achieve
a better situation in their home areas for themselves and their people.
Thus three things were done; one, all team members were recruited
by District Chiefs from among those residents known to ts-Anti�VO and
loyal to the GYN. Surprisingly, many were formerly in the French Army.
Secondly training was carried out by a mixed group of Vietnamese and
Montagnard Officers. This vas to overcome language and cultural differ�
ences and to prove the cooperation between the Vietnamese and Montagnard
to the trainee. Thirdly, ft heavy course of political indoctrination
was given to the trainees. This of course haa two results. First
indoctrinated the soldiers and secondly, it trained him for his osywar
job with his own people.
While much emphasis has been placed on the paramilitary values of the
Montagnard commando or seamy:program, it miSht be of value here to note
several thin. The part military effort wasdesigned only to mpet the
requirement of establishing security conditions adequate to carrying out
the other equally inportant rissions of psycological warfare and civic
action. The ultimate objective yaa to sea�9tip /Mostagnard from the
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VC, thus depriving the C of local resources. Thus, the Objettiv4was
not, as many today seem to believe to kill Vhile the teams were
taught the tactics of.arnbuSh, scapulae, deceptisn etc, the essentials
of anti-guerrilla warfare, they were not of a Size to .eradicate the TC
or physically to control an area against adatermined VC effort. That
was the job of ARVN*
The secondary Objectiveldrnitidly as to harass the VC. However,
only to the point of discouraging the enemy ,and *pressing the population
with the strength of the GVN forces.
As will be noted below the phasing :of the overall program included
the relocation of Montagnerds who deserted the Wand re-Ur:mod to the
Also included in :the concept of the overall program was the establish,
scent of an intelligence service capnble of meeting local conthat And psy6.
cological requirements*. 4nd finally the-arcingsf loyal lientagnard villages
to resist VC, incursions.
The intellineaceprogram, while supporting the tens, was concieved
as a separate, if you will, compartmented operation. Teams were not to
be auare of agents or the system employed.
The mission of the intelligence operation was to provide thatinfor-
mation necessary to the success of the teams and to supplement. the
existing intelligence :operations at District-4nd Provincial level.
Further, the intelligence agents were to spot cadre :within the herniate
and villages who could be erployed as covert Agit/prop-assets ageitAt
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The intelligence officers were recruited fron their nativedistriots
for the same reasons as the team. Bath intelligenteufficervaS respon-
sible for running�eperationsl not himself, ollectiag inforn3Stian. District
Chiefs were desirous of semi:Lig the Dis into VP territory to cellect
information. This unadistoursged. The 10's recruited agents in place
And mobile or traveling Agents in order to provide tea And target cov-
erage. Standard trade. craft was employed.
DistrictiOts. were to set up an iota center for the dstict chief
that included mapiand up to daze information. Semites sere -given pspodomms
and vere�notto be revealed -to the District or Province Chiefs.- Nape_ _
Checks were run throwh the Zile center prior to recruitment of agents.
A total of 21 I0vs were trained. They intern recruited 135 !gents
covering the 21 districts.
Finally in areas Whore the villagers were loyal and .capable of being
trainedi or had been trained they were to beermed,as AdefendedIvor
"combat" villages. 1200 8pringfields .03 were given to C. Tri of the
22nd Division for this purpose. Rearmed 900 veterans trainedbylMajur
Ink of his staff in December 1961-inlientomprovince.
The plan was broken-dOwn- into three,phases,. The first from November
to March and covered five provinces. The secondand thirdphase' covered
a total of 17 provinces-, all of the Central Rithlsnds.:
At any -rate, by 10 November the-go:ahead Signal U0s- given to recruit
the personnel for the tescisand intelligence groans.; They ware to arrive
in Hue 1 December for one months trainin.;�,
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The camp with a roperity of 500 was built in two weeks. This camp
building was constructed with bamboo frames thatched roofs, and run
The walls were painted with cement 'when dry and whitewashed.
Arrangements were made for mess facilities, medical facilities, clothes,
and all the 'various items necessary. Total cost: approximately $20,000.
Instructors were obtained from the 11(ongaguard Service, these were
themselves Mantagnard officers, Captains and below, and the 1st .Division.
The 1st Division officers were all graduates of Fort Benning and Fort Bragg.
The training program was jointly drawn up. Col. Layton of CS]) went
over the program and :nada several valuable contributions. In particular on the
training with automatic weapons, ambush, defense, and etc. Evphasis of
the PM training program was on deception, surprise, mobility, however,
political indoctrination, psycological warfare, civic action and intelli�
gence had equal emphasis.
The Intelligence officers were trained in separate area in the city
of Hue. The ctiiirsec�tif one month covered tralecraft, target analysis,
operational testing, recruitment, dead drops, live drops, safe areas,
corsanding and so forth as well as the administrative and reporting system
employed.
In December first 350 trainees arrived and started processing..
Those with malaria and other curable disease were cured, five or six
were returned to their district and replacement sett to Hue.
The training schedule was planned a tightly as possible._ Every hour
was filled. This was necessary to keep morale. high.: Food was excellent
and vitamins were provided for all to build physical resistance..
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On January 1. 31362 the training was �comple' ted. Trainees were re-
turned to their districts to begin operations.
A point should be noted hers. Radio operators had been a serious
shortage. Since each MO was to be linkad with Hue and Provincial Head-
quarters by radio puma 25 Radio Operators he to be trained and given
radios. This was done by Captain Duong, one of President IA personal
radio officers in Saigon. Training was accomplished in gaigon. RS-51s and
RS-61s were provided.
The tens began operatie.s in the first week of January with the
excepdon of Binh Dinh P. lince where the province chief capridously
gave them 10 days leave. It developed that in VC controlled areas the
VC did not permit some 10 team members to return and thus they were lost
to the operation and had to be replace.
In late January 700.000 piasters of civic action materials were
distributed by the teams as tart of their psycolo0.cal warfare effort.
Contact was made with various Montagnard villages requesting they tome
Into the government coattaled areas for resettlement.
By February 1962 assecsmPnt was possible. The intPlligt=e side
appeared to be gaining well. Recnatment of such agents hal prov-essed
almost to the point of the 135 programed.
However, radio communications were rill a. problan. Radio operators
were still scarce fie lack of experience with the RS-5 insi 6 resulted
in unsatisfactory use of those sets. As an emergency measure the NON
.NOR-9s system los enployed.
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Al.:3 Also in February a captured VR document in Kontum Province stated
that VC were not to go into villages since villagers were armed and would
kill them. Further ARVN 22nd Division C-2 indicated VC .strength had
fallen in Routum to less than 500.
Ralph Johnson
ALLIA-1,IN if
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