EVACUATION OF NHA TRANG BASE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05802873
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01666
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975

Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
17 April 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Station, Vietnam
MEMORANDUM FROM: Chief of Base, Nha Trang
SUBJECT � Evacuation of Nha Trang Base
1. Attached is a chronology of the evacuation
of Nha Trang Base, covering the period 27 February to
1 April 1975.
2. Several points, problems and lessons are
highlighted below for your information and considera-
tion.
A. Base intelligence was vital to the ConGen
planning and implementation of, evacuation. Firstly,
the GVN authorities had decided not to inform the
Americans in advance of their abandonment of Kontum
and Pleiku and secondly, the ConGen's info from their
contacts in MR-2 painted a more optimistic view than
warranted. The ConGen has told the COB that he could
not have handled the situation without our "inside
information." On the other hand, our intelligence did
cause some problems, not so much with the ConGen but
with some of his subordinates, regarding the serious-
ness of the situation. The COB was able to deal with
this problem by separating the issues to the validity
of intelligence and the safety of Americans.
B. As the military situation continued to
deteriorate, there was no question that the NVA had
overwhelming superiority. The recurring intelligence
questions were "will the NVA continue its onslaught?"
and "will the ARVN fight?" There were those who felt
Approved for for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
it 1
the NVA would be constrained by lengthening supply
lines or political considerations, as well as those
who thought the ARVN would "fight to the death." All
the COB could do was to present the facts and his own
realistic assessments repeatedly, in fact, daily as we
moved down the wire.
C. In a crunch, only the Base had reliable
communications with the provinces. The ConGen had long
atUmw stopped 24-hour coverage. Therefore, the Base
provided not only continuous commo to certain ConGen
ProvReps, but secure channel via voice code. However,
this created problems, as ProvReps have charged that
we haventsinterpreted their reports and requests, as
well as giving them unauthorized orders. This happened
in the case of the evacuation of Tuy Hoa. When the
COB was instructed to take charge of the evacuation
of Phan Thiet, he played it safe by putting a ConGen
man on the radio to convey orders.
D. Any evacuation or drawdown of personnel
risked creating panic among the locals. Accordingly,
the ConGen will always play it on the slow side. None-
theless, it is possible to stay within ConGen strictures
and still play it safe by thinning out early.
E. Late in March the ConGen permitted dependents
of local employees who wanted to quit and leave. The
Base followed suit. This created certain problems as
essential services were being reduced. A particular
problem was guards. We met the latter problem by con-
centrating our personnel to a few-locations for residence.
F. You can count on phone services being
curtailed or lost in an emergency. For two weeks we
relied on portamobiles for commo.
G. As the situation deteriorated, the curfew
will be lengthened. It was 2000 hours in Nha Trang.
We met this problem by having the communicators and the
COB live on the ConGen compound.
-2-
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
HUM.
H. While the Base has no regrets or complaints,
Nha Trang's drawdown was complicated by the need to
assist our colleagues from Danang.
I. Because most aircraft were used to move
people, Base had a difficult time moving out official
property and personal effects. Our log officer spent
most of his life at the airport and managed to move
two planeloads, plus nickel-diming another 3,000 lbs.
deserves credit for saving 90 thousand
dollars of official property and moving of the personal
effects of at least five PCS officers.
J. Another problem re the local personnel
was their anxiety and panic. In fact, the congestion
at the ConGen a few days before the full evacuation
was caused by FSLs, both ConGen and ours. One of our
officers spent his full time for almost a week taking
care of such problems. For the POICdoms which were closed,
we paid the employees off (severence pay and other benefits
gave them a good stake which eased our conscience and
gave the FSL a chance for a new start). We also termi-
nated some Nha Trang personnel on RIF and/or voluntary,
basis for the same reason. As it turned out, only 50
percent of our locals showed up in Saigon. Perhaps, the
rest couldn't make it. On the other hand, some might
have stayed behind; others who had been paid off might
be on their own somewhere. All our locals who are in
Saigon have been paid off or reemployed or both.
K. Staff personnel with emotional attachment
to a single local or a group of locals can be a problem.
The trick is to move them early by fix wing So their single
attachment can go with them. Those who worked with larger
groups and perforce are emotionally involved must be
moved before the crunch. Otherwise, there could be a
1 disaster. At Cam Ranh an officer refused to board a
plane reserved only for Americans and TCNs without his
two locals. If this was allowed, hundreds of refugees
nearby might have stormed the plane. Thanks to the
judicious handling by serious trouble was
averted.
-3-
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
FEFT L
L. Dependents are usually reluctant to leave
at first and some won't leave unless ordered. Almost
a week before the end, the city was an ugly place.
Get all dependents out before that happens.
M. Most staff personnel won't want to ask
to leave, even the ones who are nervous. Command must
be exercised to move all but the essential few. There
are a lot of jobs which simply disappear or become
unnecessary. A good sense of timing is also important.
You don't want to move too fast nor to slow. We need
not be constrained by political or cover considerations.
However, we should be cognizant of the implications of
the time of the move, those who interface with liaison
and our local staff. COB handled this problem by assign-
ing double duty to some and allowing others to leave.
N. During the week of 17 March, Base began
to reduce its files and by 31 March was on a read and
burn basis. Because we wished to reduce panic among our
local staff, we went very slow in purging the files
maintained by our locals. There were essentially four
sets of such files: card and subject files maintained
on VC which were based on SB info, incident reports
provided by Sector and SB, copies of captured VC docu-
ments and administrative/logistics files. While these
files were not classified per se, they should have been
destroyed. We had earlier checked to insure the absence
of any classified info and took the calculated risk that
we would have time to destroy them at the eleventh hour.
In fact, we did not, as time ran out and our local staff
disappeared to take care of their families.
O. In terms of final file storage, Base sealed
all safes except the vault where all classified went
in at night. Therefore, in the final moments we did not
have to go around checking where the classified material
was being held in the Base.
3. Finally, there will be a lot of confusion,
frayed tempers and misinformation. Common sense, discipline
and retention of sense of humor were musts. When evacua-
tion was determined to be likely, Base got ready, stayed
-4-
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873
ready and progressively reduced its responsibilities
to the exigencies of the situation.
Attachment
Chronology h/w
Distribution
Orig - COS w/att h/w
-5-
Approved for Release: 2022/02/08 C05802873