USSR: FIRES AT CHERNOBYL INCREASE PRESSURE TO CLOSE SOVIET-DESIGNED REACTORS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06795614
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 23, 2025
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2025
• Case Number: F-2016-02406
• Publication Date: November 5, 1991

Approved for Release: 2025/03/25 C06795614
(b)I,(3)
Directorate of
Intelligence
�Top Secret..
7111.IMIM71(b)(3)
Science and Weapons Review
Tuesday
5 November 1991
--TorSeer-et__
SW SWR 91-079CX
Sc 02268191
5 November 1991
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Science and Weapons Review
A Publication of the
Office of Scientific & Weapons Research
Tuesday, 5 November 1991
3
USSR: Fires at Chernobyl' Increase Pressure To Close Soviet-
Designed Reactors
Fires at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 11 October and 1 Novem-
ber, reported by TASS, have increased pressure on Ukrainian authorities
to close the station's older reactors. Replacing the electrical output of
Chernobyl' will be problematic for the Ukraine, given its coal and oil
supply difficulties.
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5 November 1991
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USSR
Fires at Chernobyl'
Increase Pressure To
Close Soviet-Designed
Reactors (b)(3)
(b)(3)
THERE HAVE BEEN two fires within the last
month at the Chernobyl' nuclear power station.
The first, caused by the failure of an electrical switch,
occurred late on the evening of Friday, 11 October
1991, at the Unit 2 reactor. According to TASS, the
reactor was being shut down for maintenance when the
switch reconnected one of the two generators to the
electrical grid. As a result, the generator began to
operate as a motor. The resulting very high current
melted electrical connections, releasing and igniting the
generator's hydrogen coolant. The fire rapidly spread
to the roof of the generator hall, collapsing the roof over
the affected generator (see figure). Some 300 firemen
and 60 fire trucks battled the fire for over three hours.
No radioactive material was released, and the Unit 2
reactor was safely shut down. The station's other two
reactors were not affected and reportedly were in opera-
tion as of Sunday, 15 October. (b)(3)
On 14 October a special commission led by Viktor
Gladush, state minister of the Ukraine, arrived to inves-
tigate the accident. ,Also on 14 October, Vladimir
Yavorivsky, chairman of the Ukrainian commission on
the Chernobyl' catastrophe, called for immediate
closure of the plant. On 16 October the Ukrainian
"green" movement demonstrated in Kiev, announcing
the beginning of an "active struggle to have the
Chernobyl' plant closed." According to local press
reports, on 29 October the Ukrainian partiament
decided not to restart the damaged number 2 reactor and
to advance the shutdown of the other two reactors from
1995 to 1993.
SC-02268/91
(b)(3)
On 1 November 1991, the Ukrainians announced a
second fire, this time at the Unit 1 reactor. This fire also
involved the generator hall but apparently was much
smaller and was quickly extinguished by the station's
fire crew. No radioactive material was released. Unit 1
reportedly had been shut down for scheduled main-
tenance when the fire occurred.
Comment:
These accidents will increase the pressure on nuclear
authorities in Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to shut down all reactors
that do not meet the high safety standards required in
the West. The 11 October fire was one of the most
serious accidents and certainly the most photogenic
since the fourth reactor at Chernobyl' was destroyed in
an accident in 1986. Had emergency response person-
nel been unable to contain the fire, essential equipment
could have been destroyed, leading to fuel melting and
release of radiation. The enormous scale of the 1986
accident, however, almost certainly, could not have
been repeated.
Despite intense popular pressure to close all reactors at
the plant immediately, the economic value of its output
is forcing Ukrainian authorities to adopt a more
measured shutdown plan. While still a net exporter of
electricity, the Ukraine relies on imports from Russia
for over 40 percent of its fuel needs. Disruptions in
these supplies, combined with falling coal production,
prompted officials in September to restrict electricity
use by 15 percent. Viktor Gladush, in a 15 October
press conference, cited extremely limited organic fuel
resources and emphasized what he characterized as the
fairly substantial social damage caused by the loss of
Unit 2's 700 megawatts of generating capacity.
Gladush gave kudos to the plant operators, emphasizing
that in the 11 October accident, unlike the 1986 acci-
dent, the public was kept fully informed and station
rsonneia�d efficiently, decisively, and confidently.
The cost of repairing the extensively damaged tur-
bogenerator in light of the rescheduled shutdown in two
years probably accounts for the reported decision not to
restart Unit 2. The future status of Unit 1 in the wake of
5 November 1991,
SW SWR 91-079C7(
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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the 1 November accident is presently unclear, but the
reactor probably will return to operation if the damage
is not extensive. Replacing the electrical output of the
Chernobyl' station will be problematic for the Ukraine,
given its coal and oil supply difficulties. The current
moratorium on completing new nuclear power plants,
5 November 1991
SW SWR 91-0790C
enacted by the Ukrainian legislature last year, prevents
using three modern, considerably more safe VVER-
1000 reactors, which could replace thecapacity of the
Chernobyl' station within a few years.
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