RADIO GUIDANCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06761125
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: May 23, 2025
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2025
• Case Number: F-2020-01047
• Publication Date: October 15, 1953

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October 15, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Director, Radio Division
VIA: European Representative
FROM: President, AMCOMLIB
SUBJECT: Radio Guidance
eTCLOSURE: Six copies of paper. "Improving the Effectiveness of Radio
Liberation."
1. Your attention is particularly invited to the enclosed paper, which
�:ontains a wealth of closely-reasoned material of permanent value; prepared
specifically for the use of Radio Liberation.
2. It will be noted that, for several reasons, very few directives for
the content, tone and "line" of Radio Liberation have been issued. One of
those reasons is that the American Committee cannot accept the charge that
Radio6Liberation is not a true emigre radio, and desires to continue to give
the emigration, in one form or another, maximum freedom in determining those
factors. Another reason involves final responsibility, which still remains
in the hands of the Director, Radio Division, who has consequently been
given as free a hand as possible. Still another reason is inherent in the
many problems surrounding radio propaganda to the Soviet Union, whose solu-
tions are never obvious, but which require continuous intensive thought and
study without much possibility of factual data on audience reception. Part
IV of the enclosure contains an outstandingly able discussion of what has
often been one of the most controversial of these problems, which is the
nature of the most desirable target.
3. There is general agreement that some sort of high level advisory
body is desirable, apart from considerations of sponsorship or prestige,
and this viewpoint is accepted by the Committee. Such a body would obviously
involve other problems, not the least of which would be the selection and
application of its advice by the Director, Radio Division. In the absence
of such a body, your attention has been invited from time to time to what
seem to be the most understanding and valuable viewpoints that have become
available from a variety of sources, including those specially developed
by the.Committee to that end.
4! I have been impressed by the quality and insight of the material
that has been thus accumulated, and, although the usefulness of a more
formal advisory body remains unquestioned, am of the opinion that any mech-
anism would have to be very good indeed to improve upon such papers as that
of Rzhevsky in the Vestnik of the Munich Institute, that forwarded you
under date of April 2, 1953, the series of papers by "Svidetel" (particular-
ly No. 6 and its Supplement), the general viewpoints of "Commentator," and
the paper which is enclosed herewith. Although some selection must obviously
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be exercised by the Dimctor, Radio Division and his associates in applying
all this material since it contains some conflicting advice, there is
emerging a convincing and consistent pattern which, if now applied, should
mark another great step forward in the development of Radio Liberation.
5. The means by which all this material is applied in practice can
only be left to the Director, Radio Division. It is suggested that the
normal way of doing so is to regularly set aside adequate time for its study
and discussion. In any event, it is considered a matter of immediate and
increasing priority. Although Radio Liberation is already widely regarded
as a brilliant effort, it clearly stands in need of broad policy guidance.'
I regard this enclosure and the other papers mentioned in the preceding
Paragraph as major contributions towards this end, particularly in provid-
ing a sound, but unique and continuing foundation, as brilliant as the best
productions.that the radio has yet achieved, for what-is expected to be a
flexible and increasingly effective content and style. The series of
"Analysis of Policy Trends Inside the. USSR," although not phrased directly
in propaganda terms, is on the same level and should be similarly studied
and discussed.
L. C. Stevens
President
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IMPROVING
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
RADIO LIBERATION
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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO LIBERATION
I - PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to present criticism and practical
suggestions which the American advisory personnel and emigre editorial
staff of Radio Liberation can translate readily into more effective broad-
casts. For this reason, the paper deliberately concentrates, as sharply
as possible, on the shortcomings rather than the virtues of Radio Libera-
tion programs to date.
Nothing that is said here should be construed as a value judgment
of the over-all effort in Munich. In view of the external pressures and
difficulties that have hampered the work of both the Americans and the
emigre staff writers abroad, their accomplishments since the broadcasts
began have been remarkable.
II - BASIC ASSUMPTION
I assume that the mission of Radio Liberation is not to conduct
general anti-Communist propaganda for its own sake, but actually (within
the limits of the feasible) to (a) undermine the strength and prestige of
the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union; (b) reduce as much as
possible the willingness of the Soviet Army to fight for that dictatorship;
(c) give more articulate expression and greater cohesion to existing dis-
affection; (d) present realistic and attainable alternatives to the Com-
munist dictatorship; and (e) encourage defection.
I have examined and discussed only the Russian broadcasts, but I
think that most of the principles in this paper will be valid for non-
Russian programs as well.
III THE WEAK SIDE AT A GLANCE
Great improvement in content and form is necessary before critical
Soviet listeners will be willing to believe that Radio Liberation is some-
thing more than an American-sponsored cold war venture and an instrument of
American power politics. Many programs still sound, in whole or in part,
as special pleading for American power...political objectives, or for emigre
ambitions that can only be achieved with the aid of foreign military inter-
vention. Apart from this basic fault, many programs still have the ring of
hollow propaganda "in general", without being meaningfully related to the
actual framework of experience of the Soviet Army and the peoples of the
Soviet Union.
To a large extent, these faults can be corrected by a diligent ap-
plication of a few basic principles, Many of these principles were clearly
formulated in the paper entitled Notes on the Policy Content and Form of
the Ideological Struggle against Bolshevism, forwarded to the Radio Advisor
by the President of the American Committee on April 2, 1953. I have re-read
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this paper against the background of Radio Liberation's programs since
that time, and I am convinced of the basic soundness of the paper. I
recommend that all American advisory personnel and emigre writers study
this document closely and apply ito
I think it useful to recall those pasSages whose implementation
seems vital for any determined effort to improve Radio Liberation broad-
casts. The author writes:
"Since the Soviet intelligentsia considers itself primarily 'Soviet',
i.e., links itself with a certain system and objects to anything alien to
this system, a propaganda campaign addressed to this intelligentsia (the
term "intelligentsia" as used by the author includes army officers, tech-
nicians, engineers, managerial personnel, etc., in fact the vast bulk of
the present and potential audience of Radio Liberation) should not be
under the 'anti-Soviet' flag, and not even under the slogan of 'anti-
Bolshevik struggle'. Many of them are proud of what they consider their
'heroic past' or their present 'achievements' Only with great caution
and extreme tact would it become possible to set off the people against
the vlasti The efforts are being made but unfortunately they lack tact
and only offend the Soviet people... The Soviet people do not want to
hear constantly that they are 'enslaved' The same tact should be ap.
plied when telling the Soviet people about their poverty, their lack of
civilization, their squalid way of living...."
An examination of Radio Liberation's output will show that the above
principles---whose basic soundness is recognized by most sober students of
Soviet affairs -- -are violated at every turn. This is done both semantical-
ly, in the choice of language, and in the approach to specific issues. A
broadcast not long ago which referred to the Soviet Union as a land of
"two hundred million slaves" is but the most striking example. Over and
again, Radio Liberation uses sweeping negative slogans which do not clearly
distinguish between the Communist Party ruling hierarchy and the rest of
Soviet society. This is done in the apparent belief that sweeping "anti.
Soviet" sloganeering, constitutes effective anti-Communist propaganda. All
research studies indicate the contrary.
The same paper pointed out with equal validity that:
"The Soviet man is weary of verbal labels, both of a positive and
of a negative character. He is weary of all rubber stamps of propaganda.
And he wants to be talked to at least seriously, in a business-like manner
and with perfect dignity. And as an equal addressed by equals. �Without
sermonizing and without back-slapping. Without the language of the market-
place and without wisecracking."
Radio Liberation often offends� on all of the above counts. It uses
broad, vague verbal labels incessantly, in newscasts as well as in features.
It employs rubber stamps and cliches every day ("bloody Communist tyranny",
"our heroic army", "our great people", "our long-suffering motherland",
etc., etc., ad nauseam).
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It often declaims and harangues instead of talking "seriously, in a bust-.
nesslike manner and with perfect dignity." (Here the fault is often cmo
pounded by soap-opera production which inflates hollow rhetoric to still
hollower proportions. This fault reached its height during two truly dra-
matic situations in the past few months, the East German revolt and the
Beria purge. In the case of the East German revolt, Radio Liberation
announcers tried to give a theatrical imitation of how a street agitator
would have addressed Soviet troops had he stood among them. This made good
soap opera, but very bad propaganda. This was precisely the time to analyze
quite coldly for the Soviet occupation forces exactly what role they were
playing in the suppression of the anti-Communist revolt. The best of Radio
Liberation scripts during that period did just that, but the general effect
was greatly weakened by the heavy admixture of soap opera and declamation.
In the case of the Beria purge, the same error was repeated. Oratory and
glee about the downfall of the "bloody hangman" Beria could well be regarded
as effective pro -Malenkov propaganda, the last thing that Radio Liberation
intended. Again, the result was to weaken greatly the impact of those
scripts which coldly pointed out how little the peoples of the Soviet Union
could expect from the elimination of Beria by men who were accomplices in
all his crimes.)
Radio Liberation often does not speak to the audience "as an equal
addressing equals." A script which tells Soviet listeners that while their
zampolits are lecturing them on the Supreme Soviet, they would like to be
out playing football or enjoying the fresh air, is really an insult to
listeners who risk their freedom and perhaps their lives to know what Radio
Liberation has to say about the impending session of the Supreme Soviet.
"Back-slapping" remains a common error in many programs. The listen-
er doesn't really want to be told that he is a "hero". He knows very well
that under present conditions, most heroes are dead heroes. A mature
listener will regard most of Radio Liberation's compliments as a proof of
insincerity.
Radio Liberation often descends to the language of the marketplace.
It -frequently substitutes in place of serious argument, name-calling which---
far from being "hardhitting propaganda" (the favorite meaningless cliche of
amateurs in this field)---actuaUy suggests nothing so much as hysterical.
impotence.
As for wise-.cracks, these have a limited place in occasional bits
of sparkling satire, �but they must be used sparingly and with great skill.
Many Radio Liberation satiric programs are anything but sparkling anct,:tbey
are almost invariably too long to be effective. When satire goes beyond
the short and snappy jab, it is self-defeating. It suggests that the sta-
tion has nothing serious to say.
The April 2nd paper also pointed out correctly that "we must avoid
the commonplace,the constant milling around in one place. We should not
speak about the Soviet system or regime in general, except perhaps in a
strictly scientific and objective way, ligH37771-5ricalt digressions and
'exclamations', beloved of our emigre publicists. We must talk about con-
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011.
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crete phenomena, events, persons, taking note of all the beats...of the
pulse of Soviet life."
This obvious precept is also violated constantly. Program after
program reverberates with the same empty thunder about the Soviet system
in general. The fact that the ostensible source is a former Soviet officer
in one case and an extract from an editorial in an emigre paper in another
does not produce the intended cumulative effect. Zero multiplied by fifty
remains zero.
Many otherwise excellent programs lose their strength because they
are richly seasoned with time-consuming "lyrical digressions" and "ext.:lama -
tions" which, again, are an insult to the listener who risks his safety to
hear what Radio Liberation has to say. At the chance of being somewhat
unfair, I would say that nearly three-fourths of all Munich features contain
some of this harmful verbal baggage. The elimination of all adjectives,
verbal cadenzas and closing perorations would go a long way to correcting
this fault. It would also save valuable time.
The actual "pulse of Soviet life" is often ignored in favor of the
pounding pulse of the script-writer who, stimulated by his own pet hates
and loves, generates in himself a pitch of ecstasy or indignation which
the Soviet listener is not too likely to share. One New York script, for
examples which calmly discussed the various intolerable restrictions that
were imposed on Soviet occupation troops and pointed out that no such regu-
lations exist in the British, French, American or other democratic army,
was later seasoned with "no such godless conditions" prevail elsewhere.
It is not unlikely that this touch produced laughter with some listeners,
What purpose it was intended to serve is not clear to this writer. (For
a good discussion of how little such rhetoric affects people behind the
iron curtain, read Milosz's excellent book The Captive Mind).
The April 2nd paper is just as sound when it says that "anti -
Bolshevik propaganda must be built not on the deductive (negation or
recognition of the failure of Bolshevism as a whole --lanti -Bolshevism�,
but on the inductive method, that is by means of proved and demonstrated
worthlessness of separate entirely concrete phenomena of Soviet life - - -
political, economic, etc. The Soviet people must themselves come to the
conclusion (independent, not foisted on them from outside in a priori
form) of the bankruptcy of the whole system in its entirety."
Although the above is obvious -- -no audience in the world wants to
be given all the answers in predigested and question-begging form--a con-
siderable part of Radio Liberation's output, and a great deal of its slo-
ganeering terminology assumes the audience's ripe, complete and conscious
revulsion against the Soviet system from top to bottom. This assumption
is totally incompatible with the continued strength and staying power of
the present regime and with the tapering off of defections in recent years.
What is even worse, Radio Liberation's incessant use of such language and
slogans, in programs and messages of substantially the same generalized
contents makes it appear as if the station seriously believes that all-out,
revolutionary opposition can actually be generated by repeating anti-Soviet
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incantations loudly and pasSionately enough. Such sound and fury truly
signifies nothing. There is no reason why it should make converts. Fur-
thermore, it offers nothing useful to the individual who already opposes
the regime with all his heart and soul. It does not help him to know that
emigres, safely beyond the reach of the MVD2 are brave enough to call Ma.
lenkov names. What he wants to know is what is being done, and what can
be done, in order to bring a better regime closer. And he wants to hear
about this "seriously, in a businesslike manner, as an equal addressed by
equals."
Any given day's output of Radio Liberation will show some examples
0C:ineffectual�and often harmful-sloganeering, scattered through features
and newscasts (where they belong even less) The American advisory person-
nel and the top emigre editorial staff in Munich are certainly qualified
to spot all the faults that have been indicated above and to eliminate them.
What is needed is the incisive use of the bluepencil for scripts that are
otherwise sound (i.e. deal concretely with a situation or present a problem
in a significant light) and the elimination, in their entirety, of scripts
which offer nothing except "we're against Soviet sin", or "we're for country,
for mother, for motherland." Radio Liberation has now broadcast enough
scripts which are concrete, which :Nal inductively with specific issues,
and which address the listener with respect as an equal, so that the stan-
dard can be applied in the future for all scripts.
I have commented at length on the April 2nd paper because the sound
principles it contains come from a qualified Soviet scholar who, without
having an axe to grind, seems to have anticipated many of the most serious
faults which are present in actual Radio Liberation programs. The paper
remains an excellent and compact handbook for the constant use of Radio
Liberation. Naturally it does not supply all the answers. No paper can.
IV - THE REAL TARGET: THE "LOYAIP SOVIET CITIZEN
Eliminating useless rhetoric and propaganda "in general" merely cuts
away dry rot, saves valuable time, shows respect for the listener and paves
the way for better programs. What simple positive principle can actually
give greater impact to Radio Liberation programs?
For working purposes, I think it can be reduced to this basic idea:
The entire output should be such as to raise real doubts and questioning
in the minds of listeners who believe themselves to be completely loyal to
the present regime.
If Radio Liberation's output has this effect on stalwart supporters
of the regime, it will inevitably have greater impact still on all other
listeners. On the other hand, any program which "loyal" Soviet citizens
and "Soviet patriots" can- - -within their set of values and their experience--
laugh off or dismiss as of no consequence, has some inherent weakness in it.
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It seems to me that this principle is much betters for working pur-
poses, than the hopeless search for who is completely sold on the status quo,
who is beyond redeffiption, who is an opportunist, an idealist, a careerist,
a vague malcontent, a disillusioned ex-believer, a conscious rebel, an inert
victim, etc. Endless studies have been written on this subject without
really answering the need of a radio station that will be heard either by
chance or by habit, from sympathetic interest or hostile curiosity, by
listeners whose degree of "loyalty" or "disloyalty" covers the entire pol-
itical spectrum. By directing propaganda at the individual whop on the
surface, seems like the hardest nut to crack, Radio Liberation hammers at
the very foundations of the system. The advantage of this approach should
be clear enough. In his Diary, Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels complained
that too many German officials were on the restricted list that received
transcripts of BBC broadcasts. He complained that many of these officials,
despite the fact that they were relatively high-ranking members of the Nazi
Party, weren't "intelligent" enough to have access to such propaganda. In
other words he was afraid it would undermine their loyalty to the party dic-
tatorship. This insight into the mentality of the ruling caste in a totali-
tarian society is very useful for Radio Liberation.
No one seriously doubts that even the firmest and most ruthless sup-
porters of the Communist dictatorship have problems on their minds which
don't exist for people of comparable standing in a normal society. No Amer-
ican general runs the risk of being shot for associating with an anti-Ado,
ministration member of the Senate. No cabinet member goes to a concentra-
tion camp for differing with the President on the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet
precisely such risks, and a thousand more, affect every high-.ranking member
of Soviet society. In fact, his life expectancy is lower than that of an
ordinary worker or peasant. For this obvious reason, if for no *ler, there
is a great deal which Radio Liberation can--and should - -say that is of di-
rect concern to the most "loyal" Soviet officer or civilian and the most
ardent "Soviet patriot." If such an individual is of good, normal intelli-
gence (and those in the higher echelons of military and civilian power are
at least that), the convincing portrait of a society without the hazards
that exist under the Communist dictatorship, attainable without suicide,
must have some effect on his thinking. That is putting the issue in the
narrowest possible terms, without trying to guess how many Soviet officers
and generals, factory directors and scientists, would like to see a more
civilized, humane government for broader reasons than protecting their own
hides. To gear all Radio Liberation broadcasts so that 'Stich persons will
at least take them seriously.is, therefore, to reach those with the greatest
power to do something about the present regime. This is also the category
most likely to possess radio receivers powerful enough to hear Radio Lib.
eration, and to enjoy the privacy to listen without being detected and re-
ported to the MVD.
What does the application of the principle of keeping all Radio
Liberation broadcasts sufficiently adult to interest the Soviet loyalist)
the "beneficiary of the regime", if you will, mean in practice? Negative-
ly, as already indicated, it means avoiding all generalized "anti-Soviet"
sloganeering, which in any mse does not help the clearly disaffected
either. It also means avoiding all special pleading for America and the
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West. (This is also had propaganda for any audience in the Soviot Union.
An individual may detest the CommUnist Party dictatorship and still reject
foreign tutelage or the sUgeStion that foreign governments are always
guided by noble, disinterested motives.)
Positively, this principle means discussing every issue in such
terms as will compel the ostensible Soviet stalwart and "Soviet patriot"
at the very least to grapple in his own mind with what Radio Liberation
has said. Such an internal debate, within the framework of personal ex-
perience, is the first step on the road to independent political thought.
Independent thought is the start of disloyalty to the dictatorship, the
start of the search for an attainable alternative.
Does gearing programs to this audience - -the one with the best listen-
ing facilities and the greatest capacity for political action--mean "high-
brow" or "scientific" broadcasts which are beyond the mental capacity of
the ordinary soldier or worker who may be listening? Does it mean neglect-
ling the interests of the common people in favor of the interests of the
elite? Certainly not. The best programs of Radio Liberation during the
past few months, that is, the most sensible and thought-provoking ones,
are of equal interest to the general and the private, the factory direc-
tor and the worker, the MVD official and his potential victim. It is not
necessary to be Machiavellian or "clever" to accomplish this. On the con-
trary, the prerequisites are straightforward, simple seriousness and an
equal respect for the mentality and feelings of all possible listeners,
high and low.
Concretely, what can Radio liberation tell a Soviet listener who
thinks Malenkov is doing a fine job? A great deal. Consider the impact
of Malenkov's speech before the Supreme Soviet last August. The Soviet
general or official who listens to Radio Liberation by accidents out of
amused boredom, or because it is his job to follow "enemy propaganda",
may genuinely believe that Malenkov's speech was a masterful analysis of
the internal and international situation. One reason he thinks so is that
Malenkov skillfully juggled facts, so skillfully that most of the deceit
escaped the Soviet loyalist's attention. This is not because this Soviet
listener is less intelligent than the Radio Liberation commentator. It
is simply that he doesn't have access to the information that is necessary
in order to see the gaping holes in Malenkov's argument. When these facts
are soberly and convincingly presented to him by Radio Liberation, he is
no longer quite as impressed with the speech. Thus, for example, when
Malenkov argues that the Party leadership was right, and the Rykov-Bukharin
Opposition wrong, when the former junked the relative liberalism of the
New Economic Policy (NEP) in favor of the successive heavy-industry Five-
Year Plans, the Soviet loyalist may nod his head in approval. He would
approve less wholeheartedly, however, �after hearing in detail how real
wages declined as a result of the Party leadership's program. He is not
aware, in detail, of the extent to which real wages are still below the
NEP high level. About this he hears nothing from Malenkov and in the
Soviet press. But this Radio Liberation is in a position to do simply and
clearly, by a factual summary of the findings of independent economists
on the subject. When the Soviet loyalist gets these facts, he is no longer
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quite so sure that Malenkov was frank in his discussion of the present
problem of living standardb,ih the Soviet Union. This doubt would mark
his first step on the road to independent thought, to opposition. Exam-
ples of this kind caii- be multiplied ad infinitum. The Malenkov speech
alone provided material for a dozen solid, sober scripts which do nothing
except dissect the elements of hishonesty in that important document,
The cumulative effect of a dozen such short, factual analyses�and Radio
Liberation did carry several - -is to reduce the Premier's speech from a
paper of apparent frankness to the sly special pleading of a Stalin-.trained
politician who has a great deal to conceal. The fact that the Soviet
government promptly published five million copies of the speech for large-
scale indoctrination purposes indicates how important such Radio Liberation
surgery is, To stay on the side of pessimism, let us even assume that some
Soviet officials, after listening to Radio Liberation's sober dissections,
will still conclude that Malenkov is very clever to pull so many rabbits
out of his hat. What of it? That is considerably less than Malenkov wants
his Soviet audience to believe of him. As for that large part of the audi-
ence which was genuinely impressed with Malenkovls "sincere" admission that
things were not in good shape in the Soviet Union, such adult Radio Liber-
ation propaganda will leave their initial faith somewhat undermined. And
this would constitute a genuine accomplishment in the direction of under-
mining the prestige of the dictatorship. Thus, although each individual
script is too quiet and sober for the sound and fury school of propaganda,
the cumulative effect -- -when combined with incessant hammering along sim-
ilar lines in other programs - -may be to generate actual anti -Malenkov fury
in the minds of the audience, the only place such fury does any concrete
good.
The same principle of hammering at the mind of the Soviet loyalist,
no matter how highly placed, will pay off in every sphere of Soviet life,
on every subject, and in every purposeful indtctive attack on the founda-
tions of the Communist dictatorship. Let us take the example of religion.
In his own mind, the Party official who listens to Radio Liberation may
agree with the official doctrine that "religion is the opium of the people."
He may think that the survival of the Greek Orthodox Church is a necessary
concession to the residue of "superstition" in the minds of "backward"
elements in the population. He may look on the priest as a relic of the
pre -Sbviet order, who worked with the landowner to keep the peasants sub-
merged in dark ignorance and fear. Furthermore, as we know from the testi.
mony of escapees, many Soviet citizens regard the priest of today as an
MVD man in disguise and equate such priests with religion in general, To
tell such listeners, as Radio Liberation did in a script entitled "The Bap-
tismof Old Russia," that back in 965 A.D. Prince Vladimir selected the
"right" religion when he chose Orthodoxy (a singularly bigoted, irreligious
statement), is to reinforce such listeners in the belief that Radio Libera-
tion lives in the past and speaks for a dead society.
Does it follow that Radio Liberation has no valid religious messgge
for the Soviet loyalist who calls himself a "non-believer?" Not at all.
Even in a free society, church attendance is no sure barometer of a man's
deeper beliefs. A church-goer may be merely a social conformist, and one
who stays at home may be profoundly religious. In Soviet society, the gult
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between what a, man appears oh the SUrface, or calls himself, and what he
is in fact goes flitch deeper This suppressed religious feeling, coupled
with indifferende of hostility to the established church, has been noted
by many foreign correspondents and diplomats in Moscow. What better ex..
ample of this dichotomy than the case of Yuri Korolkov, lifelong Communist
and Pravda correspondent in Berlin, who after proclaiming himself an athe-
ist, stated under the influence of provocative questioning and several
drinks, that "God is in the human heart"---as fervent a statement of re-
ligious faith as any man has ever made. (See The Choice).
How can Radio Liberation translate this inner conflict in the
minds of non-church-going Soviet loyalists into effective broadcasts? How
can it convince such men that they have higher moral obligations than those
imposed by the Party dictatorship? Obfqously by distinguishing between
the trappings of religion and its substance, which reminds people, over
and again, that the state cannot be the final arbiter in matters of con-
science, in the choice between good and evil, in the problems of the human
heart. This type of religious message, as distinguished from the stereo-
type, is already being delivered by Radio Liberation in its Sunday Talks
and in some of Bishop John's messages to the Soviet Army. The least that
such broadcasts do is to remove the sneer from the face of the Soviet
loyalist who calls himself a non-believer, without necessarily knowing
what he means. At the same time, such scripts provide moral sustenance
to all_ listeners and undermine, to some slight extent at least, the au-
thority of the regime which denies these universal moral values. If Radio
Liberation tries to do "more", it does less in fact. Apart from all other
considerations, a jammed radio station cannot oaoture the beauty andlua -
jesty of Greek Orthodox services so as to gratify those many listeners who,
under normal conditions' might be stirred by such programs. And if, as one
great American revolutionary said, "resistance to tyranny is obedience to
God," then informal religious programs such as the Sunday Talks are more
likely to promote both "resistance to tyranny" and "obedience to God" than
official sermons which an important part of the Soviet audience will reject
because of carefully planted prejudices.
Addressing one's self to the Soviet "loyalist" and "patriot" pays
the largest dividends no matter what problem is discussed. Consider how
Radio Liberation should deal with the lessons of World War II. Last July
a broadcast stated that but for "generous" American lend-lease, the Soviet
Union would have been defeated. This sort of statement is ideally suited
to antagonize most listeners, particularly the military who presumably make
up the bulk of the present audience.
In the first place, the Soviet officer has a ready and - -from his
standpoint--complete, answer to this statement. He will say angrily that
while America supplied tanks and guns, Russia shed torrents of blood. He
knows that Russian losses in World War II were many times higher than
American losses. He can tell himself that lend-lease was a cheap enough
contribution in a common struggle, against a common enemy, which bled his
country white. Does this mean that there aren't many facts about World
War 11 which, if properly presented, would interest any "Soviet patriot?"
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Of course not. This is one of the most rewarding fields for sober anti.
Kremlin propaganda, within a framework which most deeply concerns the
Soviet general, officer and solder, The Soviet government tells him
nothing about the costly political and military blunders of the Party
leadership, blunders that were primarily responsible for the enormous
losses of the Soviet Army and civilian population. Again, whether such
evidence undermines confidence in the Communist dictatorship or merely
produces contempt for Radio Liberation, depends on whether it is present-
ed soberly, factually and calmly--as Radio Liberation has done on several
occasions.-.-or whether instead the information is inaccurate, coated with
emotional declamation, and so presented as to offend elementary patriotic
feelings. Any Radio Liberation broadcast that deals with the lessons of
World War II or the dangers of World War III in such a manner as to pro-
duce no impression on a Soviet general or, worse still, persuade hilt that
Radio Liberation is talking through its hat, represents a lost opportunity
to influence the minds of men near the top level of the Soviet power struc-
ture. Nor does inaccurary and declamation help tha onanavy gradier. He
too would prefer the strght goods.
V SENSE VERSUS SOUND AND FURY
A major fault of all generalized "anti-Soviet" propaganda�as dis-
tinguished from sensible discourse on concrete problems which the Communist
dictatorship is incapable of solving�is that it uses violent, emotional
language. Over Radio Liberation we still hear a great deal of "overthrow-
ing", "destroying", "the day of reckoning", "bloodly", "godless", etc.
The few Soviet listeners who are simple-minded enough to take this language
seriously will conclude that the station is staffed by desperados who don't
care how much suffering they inflict on the peoples of the Soviet Union in
the pursuit of their objectives. Most listeners, particularly those who
actually own short-wave radio sets powerful enough to hear Radio Liberation,
will recognize this to be the classical language of political impotence.
Just as they will recognize the Radio Liberation statement that Major
Klimov of the Association of Post-Mar Escapees was greeted in Berlin with
"thunderous applause" as provincial emigre mimicry of Radio Moecow's
bombast:
The average person, whether a common laborer or a factory director,
senses that people� who are confident of the coming triamph of their cause
don't need violent, apocalyptic language to make their pcAnt. And Soviet
listeners know, from their own experience, that when the Soviet regime is
least sure of itself, it also rants and thunders, and greets itself with
"thunderous applause." On the other hand, when the Soviet government has
solid material to work with, it speaks as calmly as BBC, even "objectively."
For example, when it reports that 2,000,000 French workers are on strike,
or that de Gasperi was forced to resign, or that a British conservative
newspaper has criticized American foreign policy.
The principle is plain enough. No adult is impressed with Radio
Liberation sound and fury, whether in the text of a script or in the the-
atrical delivery of an excited announcer. He can be impressed only by
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arguments and facts which make real sense within his framework of experi-
ence. And the less heat that is used in the presentation of such arguments
and facts, the more light they are likely to produce in the minds and hearts
of the listeners. The Soviet listener gets enough thunder from Radio Moscow.
Besides, behind the thunder of Soviet propaganda stands the technological
and military might of the party-state. Behind Radio Liberation, on the
other hand,stands only the power that ideas can exercise over the minds of
its listeners, Therefore, thunder over Radio Liberation is merely ludicuous.
It is the last thing in the world that the sympathetic listener, who regards
Radio Liberation as a friend, wants from the station,
I am aware that some Soviet emigres believe� that Radio Liberation
should imitate Communist sound and fury. Here, too,' the Soviet emigre who
wrote the April 2nd paper presents what seems the conclusive answer.
"Emigrants," he writes, "are not always good advisors. Former
Soviet people, especially, have developed a mimicry, and together with it,
a fear of being suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies, and accused of that
very Bolshevism under which they suffered and from which they flqd. And
in their mimicry and in their fear, they don't always say what they think,
but more often that which in their opinion they think people want to hear
them say."
Clearly these fears are no guide for Radio Liberation. The same--
problem of language in broadcasts to the Soviet public was discussed with Pro-
fessor Isaiah Berlin at Oxford last February. Professor Berlin, who headed
British Information in the United States during World War II and served
with the British Embassy in Mosccw after the war, is Russian-born and speaks
Russian fluently, Here is what he said, on the basis of his experience with
Soviet Russian officials in Moscow in 1945:
"Talk to Soviet listeners in exactly the same way as you would tslk
to any sensible person. What genuinely interests you, is likely to interest
them. The propaganda that bores you, is just as likely to bore them. The
worst thing you can do is to imitate Soviet propaganda style. An imitation
that is 95 per cent perfect is still ludicrous to the listener. Give your
Soviet listener forbidden fruit, the things he wants to hear about, but
doesn't get. Talk to him as an equal, and you'll hold his interest."
Properly applied, Professor Berlin's brief remarks are themselves a first.
class propaganda manual. It can be reduced to this: Don't kid the public.
Radio Liberation still does far too much mimicry of Soviet hot air.
This is particularly true in some scripts by Soviet emigres, both in New
York and Munich, who often seem to possess no other language and no other
ideas except those which originate in the arsenal of the Soviet enemy.
(Incidentally, this fault is quite common in free.-lance contributions to
the Russian desk of the Voice of America as well). The louder such Soviet
emigres thunder against the dictatorship, the stronger their invective and
would-be irony, the more they make the Communist dictatorship seem invul-
nerable. If invective is strong enough, it sounds like the unconscious
idolatry that it is in fact.
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12
This psychological error - -which comes from continuing to live
within the Bolshevik twilight world long after escaping physically from
the Soviet Union - - -is one which pre-,Bolshevik Russian men of letters never
make. Conscientious Soviet emigres can be cured of this bad habit by the
persistent, patient efforts of their older Russian colleagues and by Amer-
ican advisory personnel. Radio Liberation is fortunate enough to have in
Munich several Russian writers of this calibre and it has Americans who
are equal to the job, if they put their minds to it. This does not mean
using archaic turns of speech of pre-Soviet Russia. Here, in turn, Soviet
emigres have an educational job to do. In a number of cases, this type of
close collaboration between pre-Soviet Russian writers and postwar Soviet
escapees has already paid good dividends. The collaboration between
Gazdanoff and Orshansky on the Major Matveyev series is one example. Here
the speech is modern, but the ideas are not imprioned within the Soviet
twilight world in which the leadership of the Communist Party seems like
God Almighty.
This problem of benefiting from the twilight vision of recent es-
capees, while presenting the clear sky and the sunlight beyond to the
listeners of Radio Liberation is one which the American advisory personnel
and the editorial staff in Munich must face at all times. To surrender,
even partially, to the thinking of the Bolshevik-minded anti-'Bolsheviks,,
is only to produce propaganda which will turn the stomachs of Soviet
listeners who are anxious to hear something fresh, promising and sensible
from Radio Liberation.
VI . LENGTH OF SCRIPTS
Many Radio Liberation scripts are still too long. There are many
sound reasons for brevity. The most compelling is that Soviet jamming is
so powerful that the main point of a drawn-out argument is not likely to
register with the listener. He will catch disconnected snatches and frills,
but will probably leave his receiver without knowing what Radio Liberation
was trying to say. (This we know from listening to actual Radio Liberation
broadcasts, as monitored through jamming in Berlin). A second important
reason is the element of risk. The listener may be forced to turn off his
set at any given moment. If he has listened for only three or four minutes,
it is well that this brief period offer him something complete, informative
and intelligible. A third good reason is that by insisting on short scripts,
bombast and nlyricise (i.e. hot air) is necessarily eliminated. If the
script writer is compelled to make his point in 300, 400 or 500 words, he
has little margin for useless rhetoric. Finally, if the program consists
of short features only, the listener gets a more varied diet. At present,
in accordance with Greshamts law, inflated bad scripts drive many hard-,
currency good scripts out of circulation. A five or six minute program,
which could have made its point more clearly in half that time, is enough
to keep two or three good features off the airo
No script can be too short. If it makes its point, it has said all
it should. If it has two important points to make, it should be broken up
into two independent scripts. If a single feature tries to put across two
ideas, neither is likely to register clearly, because of jamming and because
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each idea detracts from the attention the other deserves. Moreover, we do
not know at what point the listener may be compelled to switch off.
A three-minute script can still be two minutes too long. This is
particularly true of satire. The best Oktiabrev features would all have
benefited by cutting to two-thirds Cr half their length. Intelligent,
sharp editing by a fresh eye, not the author's, is essential for effective
satire, the most difficult radio form. On this principle, the Elagin
satiric poems are now only a fraction of their earlier length. They are
much better as a result.
Virtually all Munich scripts would benefit by following New York's
experience in this respect. The Akhminov commentaries, for example, are
almost always too long and too complicated, making it difficult�even when
reading them--to grasp the basic point. Cutting these commentaries down �
to their bone would increase their value and would force the author to
think through his ideas more clearly. The same holds even for such a good
feature as the Gazdanoff-Orshansky Major Matveyev series. These often
quote unnecessarily long extracts from Soviet propaganda, instead of the
exact point they refute, and repeat too many anti...Communist cliches. The
effect is to weaken the impact of the fresh idea which is generally pres.
ent.
At the New York end, we have been working consistently to cut
scripts down to the minimum needed for effectiveness. The What to Do
series, originally several typewritten pages long, are now seldom more than
one short paragraph. The Panin series is generally down to 250-300 words,
sometimes shorter'. Both features are better as a result. New York com-i
mentaries now seldom go beyond three and a half minutest compared to five
or more earlier. Letters to the Homeland must be slightly longer because
they require introducing the author---which is half the point, in Some
cases�and telling something of his story. Even these, however, average
only about four minutes, compared to six and seven minutes a few months
ago. The Sunday Talks have likewise been cut to half or one-.third of
their original length, when the series started. Missing Pages demonstrates
that even the story of a suppressed book, with pertinent extracts, can be
packed into a four and a fraction minute feature. The same technique keeps
How They Were Cured of Communism down to minimum length. When necessary,
two independent features, or even more, provide assurance that nothing vital
is lost.
Munich has not gone nearly far enough in this direction. The answer
is much closer collaboration between writers and editors. The author who
sits off in a corner alone is never a good judge of what is valuable and
what is superfluous in his copy.
The goal, obviously, is to make every minute of Radio Liberation
count. The Soviet listener must feel that no matter when he tunes in, his
precious---and often precarious---time is not wPats.d. He must never feel
that he has been exposed to unnecessary risk in order to listen to copy
that belonged in the wastepaper basket, not on the air. Without clearly
defined editorial responsibility, however, this objective cannot be reached.
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, 11.
VII NEWS
Here the rdadito quick.imbrovement is short and clearly defined.
News should be straightforward, brisk and objective. Al]. comment and
color words should be� eliminated, Editorial skill should go into the
selection of the news., bUt the items themselves must be presented in a comp.
pletely objective manner. Otherwise it isn't a newscast. In content, the
news has improved enormously in recent months, and good� judgment in the
selection of material has been shown generally, But this progress has been
vitiated in part by the choice of language and by emphasis which make it
all too obvious to any listener that he is not getting news, but rather
that news items are used as a vehicle for indoctrination. There is no
valid reason for this, The Soviet listener knows the difference between
news and commentary and the two should not be served on the same platter.
Another fault is that the news generally uses the language of Amer.
ican psychological warfare and presents what is obviously the official
American (or Western) viewpoint� This is true both semantically--the lan-
guage is often indistinguishable from the Voice of America or BBC -- -and.in
the priority given to items that originate in the office of the U. S. Sec-
retary of State or other Western official, There is no reason why Radio
Liberation should duplicate either the Voice of America or BBC in its pres-
entation of the news-,
News can be greatly improved by drastically cutting down on state-
ments by Western officials and by increasing the proportion of information
that deals with events_in the world. Much more news from behind the iron
curtain, of direct interest to the Soviet Army and the Soviet audience in
general, could be obtained by closer liaison with Radio Free Europe. When
such items, having a direct bearing on the struggle of peoples behind the
iron curtain against Communist dictatorship, are presented over Radio Liber-
ation, they should be worded in a manner that arouses the interest, not the
resentment, of Soviet listeners. .Telling the Soviet Army, for example,
that "the Soviet empire" is crumbling is bad semantics. .It is possible to
interest .them in the fight of Czechs, Poles and others for their democratic
rights and independence without holding before their eyes, as Radio Liber-
ation has sometimes done, the image of a catastrophe for the Soviet Union,
A little common sense will solve this semantic problem.
The excessive time devoted to diplomatic talks, the progress of the
Korean conference, and other tedious details of the cold war is another
fault that should be remedied. Perhaps it is the job of the Voice of
America to give the Soviet audience all the details on this (although I
doubt it). It certainly isn't the job of Radio Liberatione The same goes
for the hackneyed device of "diplomatic sources believe." Radio Liberation
is not a government mouthpiece and there is no reason for it to feed the
public such thin stuffs
Much more factual information on strikes in Germany, Poland, agri-
cultural unrest in East Europe, the activities of such organizations as the
ICFTU, the Cultural Congress, Fighters Against Inhumanity, etc., is needed.
But heres toos Radio Liberation newscasts should report what these organiza..
tions are actually doing in the fight against Communism, and omit a large
part of their manifestos on what they intend to dos or what they would like
to do. In every case when such items have been treated in a factual objec-
tive way they have made for good newscasts. The same principle holds for
what the West is doing in the fight against Communism. Actual deeds, not
lofty statements, make interesting news,
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is
, As far as American news is concerned, it is well to lean over back-
ward not to give this too much prominences for the simple reason that the
listener in any event suspects that Radio Liberation is an American cold
war mouthpiece. If this principle is followed, hard news of important
American action will have much more impact than at present, when nearly every
statement by an important American official is given top billing. On the
other hands the purposeful selection of items from Swiss, French, Brikish
and other European newspapers, presented without editorial comment, has
made for excellent Radio Liberation newscasts, There can be more of this
to good advantage.
The actual impact of newscasts would benefit not only by elimina-
ting color words, but by shorter sentences, cutting out the argumentative
tone, and by the elimination of all rhetorical questions and propaganda
slogans. Radio Liberation news should aim for the language and spirit that
a free, democratic newspaper, published in Moscow, would use if such a paper
existed and had access to all news sources.
The news should also steer clear of such usages as "the Great Pow-.
era", "the Eastern Bloc", "the Western Powers" and all other terminology of
power politics and cold war. Such usage tends to equate all regimes and all
blocs. It is a simple matter to say, instead, "Great Britain, France and
the United States" did so and so. This should be done without pomp, as
befits a station that addresses a people over the heads of their government,
Exaggeration and the reporting of improbable rumors as actual news
are other faults that crop up in all anti-Communist radio enterprises,
eluding Radio Liberation, Not so long ago, Radio Free Europe had its fingers
burned by giving a big play to unconfirmed accounts of large-scale distur-
bances in Poland. This gave the Moscow and Warsaw radios a golden opportunity
for effective counter...propaganda, built around the theme that Radio Free
Europe lived in a dream world of wishful thinking. This boner also took
some of the broad psychological impact out of the actual revolt of the East
German workers, Inasmuch as Radio Liberation must always fight for the con.
fidence and trust of its audience, it is sound to stay on the sober side
of the news at all times. (We know from escapees that Sovic.t listeners
distrust every propaganda source, their own and foreign. In fact, "he lies
like the radio" is a popular Soviet saying). For this obvious reasons
Radio Liberation will build up greater confidence by understatement than by
exaggeration, If the listener is finally convinced that Radio Liberation,
never exaggerates, he will be far more receptive to what the station has to
say, in its commentaries as well as in the news. Puffing up minor events
far beyond their actual significance is another aspect of the same propar.
ganda error. In newscasts, et least, the dictum "when in doubt, leave it
out" seems a good one to follow.
Needless to say, Radio Liberation should discontinue the practices
in newscasts, of showing either elation or dissatisfaction with the news.
Nor should it says as it has, "as the Daily Telegraph correctly states."
If the news editor doesn't think the Daily Telegraph item speaks for it-
self, he shouldn't use it, He can't improve on it by such editorial comp.
ment. This merely discredits the news program,
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16
Finally, the effect of overtly slanted news, interlarded with edi-
torial comment and slogans, is to dilute the impact of other features and
commentaries. The result is an unbalanced, undifferentiated diot. Five
minutes of brisk, objective news, carefully selected, will make a much
better news program. On days when there are momentous developments, this
period can be extended, but the principle of well selected straight news,
without comment, should still be observed.
VIII - SINCERITY AND "WARMTH"
Some advocates of emotional language, soap opera production and
invective believe that without such devices the station would be lacking
in "warmth"- and that it would be difficult for the audience to identify
themselves with it. Enough has already been said on the general subject
of boMbast, and how it produces the opposite of its intended effect. As
has been already pointed out, some Soviet emigres talk in these terms be..
cause they are hypnotized by the facade of Soviet power. But the same bad
advice sometimes comes from Americans who confuse American commercial ad-
vertising, for the American public, with the problems of a radio station
whose "customers" risk their careers and their freedom to listen. The best
way I can deal with this confusion of American advertising and American
public relations with propaganda beamed to a police state, is by a concrete
example from my own experience. As an inveterate Yankee fan, I often
listen to Mel Allen's broadcasts from the Yankee Stadium. These are spona.
sored by. Ballantine. I have heard Mel Alien say "Ask the man for a Ballan.
tine" so often, that I buy Ballantine beer. I pretend to believe that
Ballantine tastes better. In a blindfold test, I probably couldn't pick
it out from any other beer of about the same content. But I amp of course,
a willing victim, aware that I am being taken in, and also aware that Bal-
lantine is no worse than another beer that sells for the same price. And
so I get an additional glow out. of Ballantinel a voluntary accomplice in
the great game of American advertising. On the other hand, if I were star.
ving to death and I had to choose between Ballantine and another beer that
contained greater foOd valuer or between Ballantine and a half pound of
beef, I wouldn't pay any attdntion to Mel Allen. The Soviet listener can-
not afford to play the games that are a normal and innocuous part of life
in a free society. He can't be "sold" by Radio Liberation huckstering.
Far from considering verbal and production devices that try to create the
illusion of warmth and intimacy as proof that Radio Liberation is "his"
station, such devices antagonize him. To him they are evidence that the
station is not very sincere and doesn't really take him seriously. (Mil-
osz's book The Captive Mind shows clearly how super-sensitive people in
a police state have become toward any kind of Western "shallowness" of
this variety).
How, then does one achieve "warmth"? Very simply. By speaking in
honest, frank and straightforward terms, without pose or affectation, as
one actually talks to a personal friend. Between friends, there should be
neither flatterly nor insinuation. The Soviet public gets all the sugar�
coated lies, the cynical flattery and the exaggerated compliments in the
world from its despots, big and small. It sense3that such devices are em.
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played for selfish and cynical reasons. Nothing can come as a more re-
freshing contrast. than the voice of a true friend who does none of these
things, who is always honest and above-brPrd. No Radio Liberation listen-
er would feel anything except pleasant surprise if, for example, he heard
the station admit fromtime to time that it had made a mistake. If it should,for
example, "In our broadcast the other day, we incorrectly stated that the
Minister of Internal Affairs Nruglov was formerly chief of Smersh. That
statement was incorrect. We are sorry we made that mistake." Such state-
ments, unless themselves used archly and "cleverly," help, build up confi-
dence in the station.
True "warmth", like true affection can't be manufactured out of
empty words. It cOmes only by a constant attitude which convinces the
listener that he is dealing with a real friend. Excessive flattery,
suppression of significant information on the theory that the listener
isn't intelligent enough to receive it, undue familiarity, slanting inf or..
mation for immediate tactical gains (which almost always backfires in the
long run)--these are all means for creating a chasm rather than a bridge
between the station and the audience. Radio Liberation has made such mis-
takes on a number of occasions. For example, one New York script said
that "most field commanders of the Soviet Army are members of the Communist
Party." At the Munich end, the word "most" WAS changed to read "many."
What was accomplished by this fraud? At the last Party Congress, Marshal
Bulganin reported that 86.4 per cent of such officers were members of the
Communist Party or the Young Communist League. Radio Liberatiom/s primary
audience--the military--is well aware that "most"--not "many" �officers
are in the party. The broadcast thus suggests to the audience that Radio
Liberation doesn't know much about the composition of the Soviet Army,
or that it is trying to be arch. Presumably, the change was made in the
interests of "better" propaganda, to make non-Communists feel better.
Actually, it undermines the authority of the station.
Radio Liberation has also shown itself to be unduly coy with re.,
spect to the most obvious unpleasant facts about the chauvinistic policy
of the Communist dictatorship, apparepAy on the theory that this establishes
a warmer bond with Russian listeners Than frankness can. For example,
Peter Pirogov wrote in a script that the Soviet Army was being compelled
to play the role of "gendarme of Europe", just as it had under Nicholas I.
His mript was in connection with the revolts and unrest in the satellites.
The reference to Nicholas I was deleted, presumably not to offend the
memory of that monarch, whom all Russian historians recogni7e to have been
a true reactionary. Whose feelings did Radio Liberation .pare by this
deleti60? Certainly not those of the average Soviet officer, who has also
been taught that Nicholas I was a reactionary. The only effect was to
deprive the term "gendarme of Europe" of the historical connotation which
would have made immediate sense to the listener, and would have suggested
to him that the present dictatorship was following in the footsteps of a
reactionary ruler whom even Soviet textbooks criticize.
On the same principle of avoiding frank talk about the dictator.:
ship/s attempt to exploit Russian patriotism for ends which in the long
rung harm the Russian people, no use was made of a script which discussed
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- 18
how Stalin's synthetic (kvas) patriotism had backfired and caused discon-
tent in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. A real friend can
speak frankly about such things. Radio Liberation certainly should in
its Russian broadcasts. It should not have such a patronizing attitude
toward Russian listeners to believe that they aren't mature enough to
think about these matters. Moreover, by talking about such matters frankly
and honestly in Russian broadcasts, an example of tolerance and understatd-
ing of the genuine aspirations of non-Russian peoples is demonstrated.
Such an attitude can only be helpful in bridging antagonisms between Rus-
sians and non-Russians. It is unfair to the Russian public to believe that
they are pleased with the abuse of Russian traditions and Russia's cultural
heritage for purposes of brow-beating and oppressing other nations and
peoples.
A final example along the same lines: In a script entitled "Decay
Begins on Top", written shortly after the Beria purge, it was pointed out
that many actions of the Soviet dictatorship show manifestations of irra...
tionality that are zilaracteristic of all decadent and destruction-bound
systems. The audience was reminded that Rasputin was one such symbol of
the impending downfall of Tsarism. The reference to Rasputin was deleted�,
although it was a meaningful and vivid analogy, again on the apparent theory
that some monarchists wouldn't like it. That makes no sense whatsoever,
particularly when one recalls that Rasputin was as much detested by many
members of the Imperial Court as by members of the Dumas
The excessive use of the form "dear friends" seems like another ex..
ample of unwarranted familiarity which is more likely to produce resent-
ment than "warmth". The form may be good for the Matveyev series, which
is written genuinely in that spirit. It may also be proper in some Letters
to the Homeland when the author is speaking to his actual, personal friends.
It doesn't belong in general to commentaries and messages. When used in
this manner, it is likely to produce this negative reaction: "Who says
youlre a friend?" The rule can, perhaps, be formulated in these terms:
Don't talk to the audience in a manner that you wouldn't want people to
talk to you. Real warmth will come from playing square with the listener
at all times. This plus the regular featuring of actual Soviet emigres
on Radio Liberation, andebaling with problems that genuinely concern the
listener will produce both "warmth" and light. Skip the hearts and flowers.
A word about the use of music to achieve "warmth" and "atmosphere."
This is another device of very little value. In the pre...broadcast stage,
we experimented with musical introductions. They seemed good in theory.
In the light of experience, however, plus the fact that _lemming wrecks
music, the use of music is all but worthless. In the case of serious
scripts, it actually injects a note of insincerity. This was very pro-
nounced in the case of one of Bishop John's messages to the Soviet Army.
It is bad, for the same reason, in the Surdpy Talk, although experiment..
ally it seemed like a good idea. These programs should be allowed to stand
on what they have to say. In their simplicity lies whatever strength they
have. Music in very Small quantities may be effective with satire. Other.
wise, its complete elimination will help to make Radio Liberation sound
more sincere.,
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19
IX e-TBE ,USE OF IIEFEbTORS
New defectors ares.of course, a star attraction for Radio Liber.
ation, But they must be used properly. The talk by Major Ronzhin on
July 24th was a classical example of what not to do with a new Soviet
escapee., Here was a man who was still in the Soviet army at the time of
Stalin's death. Instead of talking with his fellow-officers behind the
iron curtain about actual conditions in that army, as he knew them, how
his unit reacted to Stalin's deaths how the zampolits dealt with it, what
the soldiers and officers in his unit said privately, etc., Major Ronzhin
delivered a tedious political discourse which sounded as though it had been
written by someone who had worked on an emigre paper for years.. He said
nothing that indicated that he was a man fresh out of the Soviet Army.
His talk ranged from the Kronstadt revolt of 1921 to "the veritable slaugh-
ter for occupation of the throne" in the Kremlin. This should never be
repeated. New escapees should discuss the concrete things they know better
than anyone in the West, and leave the theory to theoreticians, of whom
there are very few. The same principle holds for older escapees as well.
Too many of them have mastered the propaganda cliches of the political
emigration and no longer speak to their fellow-countrymen at all. Neither
as individuals nor as a group (pr groups) should they engage in general-
ized harangues. They should speak soberly, on specific concrete issues,.
Such broadcasts, Ef they present something fresh each time, will always
interest the audience&
X �-� ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
Assuming that in the weeks and months ahead, the shortcomings .disc,
cussed in I.IX:supra are corrected, Radio Liberation must' still develop
more positive content than is evident in present programs. This is as much
a challenge to the New York Program Section as it is to Munich. It is
not enough to wage even the most skillful campaign to undermine the pres4.p
tige of the Communist dictatorship,. Mere destructive criticism, however:
convincingly presented, can have a bad cumulative effect. It can suggest
that only continued tyranny or new catastrophe lies ahead.. From the tes.-
timony of many escapeesp.we know that a major barrier to positive political
thought in the Soviet Army and population is the fear that any basic change
in the country must be of a catastrophic character, accompanied by new
bloodbaths, civil war, starvation, and perhaps new despotism. It is there.
fore necessary, at all timesvto hold before the minds of the audience the
image of a better, more humane society attainable without external or in.
ternal catastrophe.
The way to begin is to turn away' from the idea& as well as the Ian..
guage, which suggests that an apocalypticsblood-sb170 climax to the-pres-.
ent era in Russian history is inevitable,. That means honestly believing,.
as well as sayingo.that neither an atomic.-hydrogen world conflict nor a
bloody civil war is inevitable for the Soviet Union. It means recognizing
that other alternatives exists.alternatives that lie within the capacity
of the Soviet Army and population.. It means recognizing that there is no
preordained road to ciVilized� responsible, representative government in
Russiao
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2b
To translate this into better programs means to think and talk
always in terms of positive objectives, positive goals, goals that go hand
in hand with a democratic society. "Anti.-.Bolshevise without positive
democratic objectives is either no viewpoint at all, or it is a warmed�
over vereion of the totalitarian "Anti�Bolshevism" which Hitler tried to
impose on Western Europe and Russia. Moreover, the "Anti...Holshevism" of
the chauvinist fringe of the Russian emigration cannot help to bring about
a common front of. Russians and non�Russians in the Soviet Union in the
struggle for a better society. For the alternative this brand of propa.
ganda suggests to the non�Russian peoples of the Soviet Union is in no way
more. acceptable to them than the present Communist dictatorship�
Democratic education, in the broadest and deepest sense of the word,
is the sole common denominator for uniting all who desire a more civilized
order. It opens new vistas to the thoughtful. "Soviet patriot" no less than
to the conscious rebel who cannot visualize, a constructive future.. It sug...
gests to Russians and non�Russians alike those broad areas for common ef...
fort and understanding that are indispensable in the future, no matter
what that future holds in store.
Herb there is a partial exception to the general injunction against
slogans. The repeated suggestion bY Radio Liberation that "only a govern�
ment of freely elected representatives of the people can meet the needs
of the country" is a positive and constructive idea to fix in the minds
of the audience. It contains nothing that repels either the "Soviet pa.-
triot" or the rebel. But this idea should not itself degenerate to a
cliche. It should be given content, day by day, through concrete examples
in terms of -very aspect of Soviet life. Radio Liberation should show
why Soviet workers need free trade unions; why all citizens will benefit
if peasants can choose their own form of land tenure (whether the individ�
ual farm or the voluntary cooperative); why the Soviet scientist needs a
much broader freedom of inquiry and research than he now has; why factory
managers must have greater personal responsibility; why arts and letters
cannot flourish without freedom of expression and free intercourse with
other culturespetc. These ideas, too must be presented within concrete
settings, in concrete terms, and without sermonizing�
All of the above, and much more, comes under the heading of the
permanent campaign of democratic education which must go together with
purposeful criticism of the Communist dictatorship. Constant self�education
by American advisory personnel and emigre writers, in New York and Munich,
is an inescapable part of meaningful discourse with the Soviet audience.
Self�education requires the persistent study and reexamination of Soviet
lifepIt means recognizing that life in the Soviet Union is not static, that
what was true five years ago, or six months ago, may no longer be true today.
It means fighting against the permanent danger of succumbing to one's own
Imperfect image of present Soviet reality,
Accentuating the positive through democratic education and sober
discourse becomes even more imperative if the present Soviet drive to raise
living standards gets beyond the realm of promises to the area of even
partial achievement. As against any appreciable improvement in Soviet
living conditions, the only effective political weapon is the weapon afdernocratin
education, the argument that actually persuades decisive elements in that
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Soviet audience that the edonomic concessions of the dictatorship are no
adequate substitute for democratic safeguards and liberties; for responsi.
ble, representative government; for normal relations with other countries;
for an enlightened foreign policy that ends the menace of a third world
war�
The most spectacular thing Radio Liberation can do is to talk plain,
hard sense, and nothing but sense, seven days a weeks 365 days a year. If
it does0 it will gradually win an interested and perhaps crucial segment
of Sovidt opinion to a clearer understanding of the need to replace the
present regime with a government that menaces neither its own citizens nor
the rest of the world. No propaganda weapon can do more.
-1:-iHHHHH;-*
FOOTNOTE ON SEMANTICS
A dictionary of "good" and 'bad" usages for Radio Liberation is
not practicable� For this purpose, a treatise on the semantic shadings
of each operative word p in a wide variety of contexts, would be needed�
The same difficultyarisesin attempting to define when an ordinary word
or phrase (as distinguished from an obvious stale figure of speech or
hackneyed string of adjectives) is used as a cliches and when the same
word or phrase is used as a tool for meaningful discourse�
To illustrate this problems and to emphasize the need for much
closer editorial attention to the "meaning of meanings" in future Radio
Liberation programs, I have invented two fictitious broadcasts. In each
of these, the words Communism, Soviet Unions peace�loving,. Russian, Russia,
tyranny, justices democracy, truth, freedom, Western culture, Karl Marx,
propaganda he, free world, Christian, America and Bolsheviks appear.
In the first broadcast, each usage would contribute to awaken the
maximum hostility of almost any Russian listener against Radio Liberation
and against the West generally, and would tend to strengthen whatever
loyalty, however slight or great, he feels toward the present regime. In
the second broadcasts the same.wordss both because of their context and
because they are used more concretely and meaningfully, would not antago.,
nize the identical public. Somewhere between the two deliberate extremes
presented here, is the average Radio Liberation broadcast. By a constant
awareness of the vital importance of the semantic problem, that average
can be improved each day. The good intentions of the script writer are
not enough, for "it is the tone that makes the music" and if "the strings
are false" then the message reaches neither the heart nor the mind of
the audience�
1.
"On his release from the Allied prison in Spandau$ the noted fighter
against Communism, Admiral Doenitzs told an audience of former SS officers
that the Soviet Union was a threat to all peace.loving peoples. Be predicted
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that RUssian tyranv would not prevent the ultimate triumph of justice,
democracy, truth and f7eedom0 He said that Western culture owed an ex�
ternal debt to doebbeis for his vigorous propaganda in exposing Karl Marx
as the philosopher of the lie. Admiral Doenitz pointed out that under
Nazi leadership, the Third Reich had stood as the bastion of the free world.
Just as all true Christians had supported Adolf Hitler in his crusade against
the Bolsheviks., concleed Doenitz0.so they would support America in
the coming war against Russia.
2.
n 'Some of the most notable contributions to Western culture in
the 19th century and to the development of literature in America came from
such Russian writers as Tolstoy� Turgenev and Dostoevs171, said George
Kerman, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union.' Speaking before
a group of former Soviet officers in BerliRTEnnan said that no one who
respected truth would seriously maintain that the Russians, as a people,
were less peace-loving than Americans. He claimed that the workings of
the jury system in Russia from 1864 to 1917 had shown that the average
Russian worker and peasant had a highly developed sense of justice. He
pointed to the work of the zemstuos and the four State Dumas of 1906 to
1917 as hopeful beginnings of democracy, both at the local and national
levels. Kennan took issue with those who maintained that Stalin's tyranny
had destroyed the desire for freedom in the Soviet Union.
" 'Merely because some dogmatists have tried to make Karl Mars an
infallible prophet', continued Kerman, ' is no reason to go to the other
extreme and brand as a lie his criticism of certain abuses of the capi-
talist system of a century ago.' The former American ambassador maintained
that the struggle against these abuses had motivated some of the early
Bolsheviks who left the party when they became convinced that it did not
serve the interests of the working people. He said that a regime which
sends millions of human beings to concentration camps cannot claim to be
guided by the principles of Communism, as the first Christians understood
and practiced these principles, and as they survive to this day in some
religious sects and monastic orders.
It ' The free world will become a reality, instead of a vague
propaganda phrase', 7711717ded Kennan, 'when people in Warsaw, Leningrad,
Kiev and Shanghai enjoy the same political and economic safeguards as those
who live today in London, Paris and New York.'"
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