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June 22, 2015
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June 25, 2009
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April 26, 1961
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CIA. HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED 1997 26 April 1961 APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE: 24-Jun-2009 MEMORANDUM-FOR: Lt. Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF J-5, OJCS 1. Enclosed are the following documents: / Attachment A - A brief aa.rrative of the air activity (TS-155685-.A) ~ ~W Attachment B - A chronological sequence of events (TS-155685-B) ~~~~~ Attachment C - A report returned from Tide on aircraft, crew, target and departure time (TS-155685-C) Attachment D - Training received by the pilots Attachment E -Support drop missions flown from D-Day through Dt2 ~.ttachment F - A list of personnel involved in .the .training of the pilots and their background (TS-155685-D) Attachment G - Composition of base unit at Tide. This does not include .the air unit, which consisted of twenty people, the majority of which were the Operations Staff. (TS-155685-E) STANLEY W. BEERLI Colonel, ~ USAF ~T-.T,-rP, ~ f+ ~~.~c rQ. .._.:::~ . --. n v.,~..~. - - ... .. T D0. NOT. N~;S`i'ROY, ~..^.~r CY t ~` r. ^r~ PBk!~NEI. I. Dcvslopment Projects Division (~~~f) -Agency afr operations (Washington) A._ ~ ~~d,'~i~X. Headquarters, Washington, Personnel Support. #Nt ~4~ totem ~i5~~r~~y', ~Qwer,..A`th~ia. Fc~, M~-teriel~, 6 ~ar~f w A~ aac##~a~ .. ~?pexStf~?7G~B, +~'+~ath~r, ~irte11, dcbri.n, +rity.. etc, ~ glu# ta~f~ities t3rgaair~stioxi_ ~ ~liQ-LQ'i~ ~ea~hfngton la !~ ~ ~~ CiQ~O]1!!~ ~1r ~ll~ CQI~fI!'~~II~ ~IJt; ~~ ~Q~ hours $. ~~ ~PQ8r8 ~' ex'Vi+cet eaaiY~e overt Q"i?'~!.'~ t~peratfo~ ?~iutza ~i9~1; .Air rtsc~; 26 corm rnii~4iox~s Wiy ~. Va _~3p~ra#ione ~ta~f h#.8#~q 4ua~3~ied tx` 8~ ogeratioae o~fias~ra.- c. All support chiefs within DPD long. experienced in covert operat~i ~.. ~~~ - ;, } 3~b (1~T Cuban* X59 ,tie=ieaa} i9x 1. ,~~s unit - ti~~- ~.~ a~ad ~' (20) ~~. ~ 3 :~~t~oxs~.+d'ic+~rs ~ ~ gatsx e. , ~1.~+~trati.4zr < ~. $ecuri~y ~t~anam e~ .~ :f. Q~~ Narrative of Air Activity 1, Qn 6 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director (Pleas). Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, DFD, which outlined the proposed plea of air operations for Project JMATE and Sub-Project JMFURY. Targets were as cited in DPD Air t}peraNoas Play 240-1 with the exception that Targets 1. Z, and 3 were to be strack oa D-3 as a portion of Project JMFURY. Project JMFtTRY involved target 1, San Antoaio'de Los Banos, two aircraft; target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft] target 3, Santiago de Cuba, two aircraft. Z, On 9 ~-pril the briefing team departed Washington for JMTIDE. The parpos~ of this. trip was .to brief the combat elexaeats. of the proposed :plan of activities. ,After two days target stadq at JM'TIDE, a rec~lmaaeadatioa eras submitted to Headquarteae which recommended assignuaaeat of three aircraft each to Targets 1' and 2. This change was effected. 3. On 15 April Project Jl-dFtTRY was implemented with strikes occurring at dawn. A Z4 hour d?lay received 13 April ehsnged air strikes from D>3 to ~. ~_2, Results of that strike were believed ttA have been destruction of TO to 80 percent of r,,QG~s_co~anbat ais_~bilitjr, l~snages sustained by attacking air- craft were as follows: ~e aircraft and a:ew destroyed by anti aircraft fire eventually crashing into the sea appre~cimately 30 miles north of the Cuban coast attempting to reach Baca Chien l~taval Air ~atien. 4ae aircraft loaded at Grand Gaysnaa short of feel, Cln,~ aircraft leaded st Boca Chico Naval Air Station, ao battle damage had been incurred. The reason for leading at the . Boca Chien Naval Air Station was dae to this aircraft attempting to escort a crippled-B-26 to Boca Chico which later crashed intt~ the sea. The aircraft which landed at Boca Chico and Graced Cayaoan were eventually returned to the launch base. 4. On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed to deatrop the remainder of COC o~ieraNon l _ai.r.c~pability. Be~reen-..the hours of 2100 local'and x100 iocah:dnriaa the night,36-1T Ap~dl the target assig~~ut was changed prohibiting air strike of nay airfields the trsorning of D day. All aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area. ~. On D day 5 C-46~s and one C-54 snceessfnlly dropped_the..airbornc battaifon at`~e s~ppoiated DZ's withtn~Tit a objective area, These aircraft returned to the launch base. 8-26 aircraft were rotated over the beachhead throughout the day. The 8-26 aircraft reporting the sinking of one gun boat, the destruction of one Sea Fury and one B-26, numerous strikes on ground , Y jv ~; ~ L.l7 ~ targets and one C-4b aircraft by evasive attack caused an attacking Sea Fury aircraft to crash into the sea. Four B-26 were lost late oa D day to enemy T-33 aircraft. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman with one engine shot out. One aircraft landed at Boca Chien dne to pilot fatigue. It should be'pointed out that all Cuban air crews had at this paint been up 36 to 48 hours without sleep. Thirteen (13y actual combat ~[orHes were flown on D day, All sorties were in support of the amphibious lgnding on the beachhead. At this point it became clear that enemy air activity utilizing T-33 aircraft could destroy the more obsolete B-2b type aircraft with relative ease cad a decision was made to attempt to destroy the remaining GOC aircraft at night oa the ground thrangh successful bombing raids. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike the m:in base of operations in two waves of three each during the night of 17.18 April. The aircraft aborted on talcs off. Heavy haze and low clouds prevented three aircraft froaa finding target cad one aircraft attacked Sea ,Antonio de Los Banos. 6. On D plus 1 it became necessary to utilize Ameriea.a civilian pilau to protect the beachhead area dne to the fact the Cubans were either too tf~s d or refused to fly. .Sox sorties were flown during the afternoon of D pins 1. Reported damage by GOC sources iadieated 1800 casnalities and destruction of seven tanks. 7. C)n the morning of D plus 2 American pilots again were pressed into service for protection of the beachhead area for two reasmns ~l~ the reluctance of the Cnbaa pilots to fly more combat sorties without air to air cover and (2j the AaAericans were attempting to build morale and develop a will to win, Two American crews were shot down with no survivors in the morning of D plus ~. Both aircraft were lost to T-33 aircraft. All sorties IIown oa We morning of D plus 2 were scheduled during the one hoar period Navy air cover was supposed to have been provided the beachhead area. 8. In the afternoon of D plus Z a radio message was received from the ground Brigade Commander stating that he was destroying his equipment and "heading for the hills', IIpon receipt of this massage ail air activities .in support of the beachhead area ware termiaatad, Cl-?~~~~rGL~.r~ICAL ~~~4.,, vF~'CF QF EVFiVTS Tire e - Santi.a~o de Cuk,a - ;i~ecial Projec4: '. ~s>~i. (~~71f.; `, ;'c ~ u} 11 ta,?;:.;ets scheduled (Deletes. 1 C~ aircraft con~r~itte~:' fct? _~~-:i~a;~ 6. :~-1 (GL.::~~i.`` ~>913} a, ta:?~ets scheduled (1-2.-~,-".A) 5 aircraft corr:.r-,itted far .i:+- i:~a}r 7. D- Day (1'l Ara::=.~i1) No day targets (strateF;ic) ..~ ~~+ All aircraft car:~x-rlitted aura part (~:~,^T,; X923) .I beachhead fox D- Day z?. D-.Day (~~T,t,~~'. ~f66t:~) i~.sax effort ni~~it attacl