CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001397784
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00355
• Publication Date: May 3, 1956

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COPY NO.
I NO. 3256/56
3 -May 1956
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 CURRENT INTELLIG; ;NCE WEEKLY SU
3 May 1956
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET VISIT TO BRITAIN
Moscow evidently recog-
nizes that Bulganin and Khru-
shchev failed to make a favor-
able impression on British
public opinion or to stimulate
Labor Party interest in con-
tacts with the Soviet Communist
Party, The Soviet leaders
presumably did not expect
agreement with British leaders
on substantive issues, but
probably feel that the real-
istic exchange of views was
useful. Khrushchev?s.determina-
tion to continue the present
Soviet diplomatic tactics, in-
cluding high-level exchanges,
is evident in his statement
that the Soviet leaders would
be interested in visiting the
United States,
handicap to the Soviet effort
to establish closer relations
with. Socialists throughout
Western Europe,
Khrushchev, in his Moscow
speech, charged that the Labor
leaders did not reflect rank-
and-file opinion in the party,
and Soviet propaganda has
claimed that they are being
strongly criticized for their
behavior by party members,
This line may indicate that
future tactics to win over
the Socialists will give
greater attention to the mass
membership rather than the
leaders, although at a second
meeting with Labor leaders,
Khrushchev suggested in general
terms the possibility that they
might visit Moscow.
Bulganin and Khrushchev
'must be acutely conscious of
the striking contrast between
the small, cool, and sometimes
hostile crowds which greeted
them in the streets of British
cities and the cheering throngs
they met in India. Khrushchev's
angry reaction to this recep-
tion contributed to'the failure
of the visit from a public
relations point of view.
In his speech at the Mos-
cow airport on his return,
Khrushchev vigorously attacked
"reactionary elements" among
the British Labor leaders, He
is evidently aware that the
heated discussions at the
Labor Party dinner on 23 April
set back the Soviet campaign
to draw the Laborites toward
collaboration with the Com-
munist Party of the USSR and
may prove to be a serious
The Communists' effort to
bridge the wide gap between
them and Democratic Socialists
has thus far been rebuffed
throughout Western Europe as
well as in Britain, but it
remains a major aim of the
USSR,
The Soviet offer to pur-
chase some $2.8 billion worth of
British goods in the next five
years if strategic controls
were lifted was made on the
last day of the talks, and
thus was clearly designed to
impress British businessmen
rather than serve as a basis
for negotiating, The Russians
did not make it clear how many'
of the orders might be placed
if controls were not lifted,
or whether this was an all-or-
nothing offer. They do not
expect to break the British gov-
ernment's adherence to controls
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 6
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 May 1956
at once, but are counting on
long-term results.
The Soviet leaders proba-
bly arrived in London with no.
expectation that significant
progress could be made in
negotiating major outstanding
issues. The results of the
substantive discussion bore
this out, representing neither
a. gain nor a. loss from Mos-
cow's viewpoint. The Soviet
leaders may have been impressed
by the. firmness of the British-
American alliance. In any case,
they made few obvious attempts
to create a division.
In general Bulga_nin and
Khrushchev seemed content with
making a forceful presentation
of their views, in some cases
expressed even more rigidly
than in the past. They went
through the motions of seeking
the re-convocation of the
Geneva conference on Indochina.,
but appeared to be making only
the minimum effort necessary
to satisfy their allies in
Peiping.
The joint statement on the
Middle East added little to the
Soviet position as expressed in
the Soviet declaration issued
on the eve of the=visit of Bul-
ga.nin and Khrushchev. The So-
viet decision to subscribe to
the joint statement's call for
a, solution to the Arab-Israeli
dispute "on a basis mutually
acceptable to both sides" has
caused disillusionment in some
Arab circles. However, the
loss to the USSR of some Arab
confidence probably will not
be permanent since Moscow can
still support the Arabs in any
future negotiations, especially
with regard to the Arab refugees
and Arab territorial claims
against Israel.
Khrushchev's declaration
to the press that the USSR would
be willing to join in a. UN ban
of arms shipments anywhere in
the world served notice to the
West that Moscow's price for
curtailing arms,shipments to
the Arabs would be a commitment
from the West to curtail such
shipments to Baghdad pact mem-
bers. Furthermore, by implying
an intention to use, greater
restraint in "sponsoring" the
Arabs against Israel--possibly
a, reflection of Soviet fears
that further deterioration of
the situation might involve
great-power intervention and
the risk of all-out war--the
USSR has placed itself in a
better position to avoid taking
the blame for existing or future
tensions in the area.
British government leaders
feel that they were successful
in their handling of the Bul-
ganin-Khrushchev visit. British
Socialists saw confirmation of
the wide gulf that exists be-
tween Socialism and Communism.
The many hours of private
talks gave Whitehall the op-
portunity it desired to explore
the wide range of Anglo-Soviet
and world-wide problems, as
much to clarify differences as
to approach agreement. British
officials received dramatic
proof of their expectation of
prolonged trouble from the So-
viet intrusion in the Middle
East by the visitors' bluntly
expressed intention to harass
,Britain there as long as the
Baghdad pact is maintained.
They believe they nevertheless
scored.a tactical point by get-
ting the USSR to join them in
urging support of UN measures
to maintain the peace in the
Middle East.
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 6
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 May 1956
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
apparently believes he so suc-
ceeded in impressing the Russian
guests with Britain's intention
to protect its interests in the
Middle East that they realized
the seriousness of the situation
for the first time.
Khrushchev's treatment of
the disarmament problem has led
the British to anticipate uni-
lateral Soviet reduction of con-
ventional forces. The Western
position of "no,disa.rmament
without German reunification"
no longer exerts appreciable
leverage on Moscow, according
to a senior Foreign Office of-
ficial who states that. Britain
is considering informing West
Germany that Britain might match
any Soviet reduction.
Of all the developments,
Khrushchev's clash with the
Labor Party may have the most
lasting effect in Britain. His
abrupt dismissal of demands for
release of Social Democrats
brought a. rare degree of unity
to the opposition. A resolu-
tion criticizing party leader
Gaitskell's conduct toward the
Soviet visitors received only
ten votes at a. 26 April meeting
of the parliamentary Labor Party.
Ga.itskell told Khrushchev it
was impossible for the Labor
Party to accept an invitation
from the Communist Party, but
left the door open to any later
bid from the government of the
Soviet Union.
In general, Britain's hopes
for early improvement in Anglo-
Soviet relations rest mainly in
the sphere of cultural rela-
tions. London took heart from
the USSR's announced curtail-
ment of its jamming of BBC
broadcasts during the visit.
To encourage Moscow in this
respect, BBC on 26 April cut
down its own broadcasts to
the Soviet Union, since Moscow
had previously justified its
jamming by referring to the
excessive number of frequen-
cies used by Western broadcasts.
The British also hope that
travel to the Soviet Union may
be expanded despite the vague-
ness of the statement the Rus-
sians were willing to put in
the final cbmmuniqud,
Prime Minister Eden's
optimistic public statement
on the USSR's conditional
$2.8 billion five-year trade
offer is likely to encourage
public expectations for a. sub-
stantial rise in trade, despite
Brritain's stated unwillingness
to relax restrictions on stra-
tegic exports and the USSR's
unwillingness to promise larger
purchases of British goods
without an easing of such re-
strictions.
The British'public appears
well satisfied with the govern-
ment's conduct of the visit,
and, as measured by press com-
ment, generally approves Eden's
acceptance of the invitation
to visit the USSR. Khrush-
chev's confident performance,
particularly in handling the
27 April press conference,
fostered the general belief
that he was not, in the words
of the influential Manchester
Guardian, "the kind of Caesar
who would willingly risk war."
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 6