DOC IS REPORT CONCERNING AN OFFICIAL OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN NORTHERN ITALY WAS THEN IN SWITZERLAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRANSFERRING INTO SWISS FRANCS MARKS BELONGING TO MEMBERS OF KESSELRING'S STAFF. - (DOC UNDATED - PUB DATE EST

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00033855
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01506
• Publication Date: April 1, 1945

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I. On 23 February OSS 6orn signalled that source "PONTORMO" (836)
had reported that an official of the German Embassy in Ncrthern
Italy was then in Lwitzer...and for the purpose of transferring into
Swiss francs some marks telonging to members of Kesselringts staff.
EoUrce stated that Kesselring and Rahn -(former German ambassador to
Italy) were ready to quit and even to' fight against Hitler if the
Allies could offer them a quid 2E2 quo. The German official stated
that Kesselring was moved by the feeling that his ultimate destiny,
as things were going, was (1) to wind up in the Alpine "reduit"
subordinate to SS officials, or (2) to die in a final resistance or
be killed for not resisting. Ls _Long as he was in Italy, Kesselring.
still had power and was willin; to use it by surrendering in return
for some concession. It was not ciear 'whether it was a question of
concessions to Kescelring and his staff or troops personally, or
whether it was a question of concession to Germany in general. At any
rate, Kesselring and his staff appeared to'want usable post-war funds.
Source did not disclose name of German Embassy Official but
would do so and himself step out of the matter if Allies were interested.
The official was to come to source agaia seeking help to sell the free
marks at a good rate. Source stated that he would string him along
in order to delay him for a few days.
OSS representative in Switzerland commented that he did pot rate
source very highly but did have independent reasons to' believe that
it was not impossible that Kesselring and Rahn might be preparing for
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something like this. He added that he was investigating the rumor
through more direct and reliable channeis.
24 February. OSS Caserta wired OSS Bern that AFHQ Was
definitely interested in getting positive and authentic information
to support the aii.eged disposition of Kesseiring. The story had
cropped up repeatedly, but there had never been proof of its accuracy.
If Kesselring had wanted to dispatbh an emissary with an official
message it was thought that he could find ways of doing so. Meanwhile
AFHQ would certainly not recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
any modification of unconditional surrender such as would be involved
in promises, commitments or bargaining. Although Kesseiring as a,
prisoner of war would undoubtedly be given the customary privileges of
his rank, it was extremely deubtful that any modification of uncondi-
tional surrender would be Made.
The London Daily Desoatch on 24 February carried the story from
Charles Clarke, its correspondent in Bern, that Kesselring had made
secret overtyres to the Allies, quoting a statement said to have been
made by a member of Kesselrinc,Is entourage reported at the time to have
been in Switzerland. According to Clarke's story, Kesselring offered
to withdraw under Al.Lied pressure leaving Northern Italian cities
intact and preventing their destructicn by Nec-Fascists. In return,
Kesseiring was said to have asked for a free retreat toward German '
_
territory where his soldiers 'could be used to maintain order. He, also
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asked for assurances that he. would not be considered e war criminal.
IV. i MarCh. OSS Bern signalled that a second source had arrived
in Bern 75 February having left. Vienna ca or about 18 February.
Source for several years had been acquainted with one Hottel, described
as one of the SS chiefs in Vienna who knew vaguely that scurct had
indirect contacts with Americans in Switzerland. Before his departure
from Vienna source had been informed by Hottei that Kaltenbrunner,
Chief of the SD, wanted to see him. Kalteribrunne� informed source that
he and Himmler were most anxious to cn4 the war and, as a first step,
were contemplating the liquidation of "war-mongers" within the Nazi
Party, especially Bormunn (Chief of Staff of the Chancery of the Party;
member of War Cabinet; SS Obergruppenfuehrer; after 1941 Hess's
successor in office). Himmlor And Kai.tenbrunner were most anxious to
�
establish contact Pith the British and Americans and asked source
to make an effort in this direction on his trip to Switzerland. They
contemplated sending to Switzerland a high SS official who would
speak on their behalf provided contact could be established.
Source, on his own initiative, suggested Alfred Potocki, brother
of the former Polish minister to Washington, should be permitted t.o
go to Switzerland with him as he felt Potocki had first class contacts
with the British. Hottei immediately arranged an exit visa fcr
Potocki and his mother. Potocki expected tc proceed first to
Leichtenstein where on I March he had not yet arrived.
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OSS representative in Bern stated that while he believed the
source to be "rather light-weight," he ccnsidered the above approach
interesting as a sign of the increasing disintegration within the
Nazi Party and as an indication of Himmicris antics to prepare alibis.
According to source, Himm_er -.vas then organizing the defense on the
Eastern Fruit and was largely in command of that theatre of war.
V. 3 March. OBS representative ia Bern reported that further
coniersation with source mentioned in Paragraph IV above, indicated
that his SD contacts and information had more importance than was
originally believed. Information from other good sources tended t
bear out the indications given by source that Himmler, Kaltenbrunner
and certain ether high SS officials might not go along with the die-
hard fanatics and might try to gain some immunity by serving in a
transitional regime between Hitler and the occupational forces.
They might possibly prefer this to the alternative of joining Hitler,
Bormann, et al in the German "reduit." OSS representative again
pointed cut the statement earlier contributed to Kaitenbrunner that
Himmler was anxious to liquidate war-mcngers such as Bormann.
OSS representative further stated that, althoggh perscns cf the
Himmier, Kaltenbrunner type couid naturaily gain no immunity froim us,
as long as they believed this were possible, it might give us an
opportunity to drive a wedge in the SD and thus to reduce the effective-
ness of enemy plans for the German "reduit." Stating that he had no
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conscience about double-crossing types like Himmier and KaItenbrunner,
he said that through indirect channels he was arranging to have Hottel.
come to the Swiss Frontier where a trusted intermediary would meet
him.
VI. 5 March. OSS representative in Bern signal.Led that through
two close friends in the Swiss secret intelligence he was advised
that an important Italian industrialist named Baron Parelli (the
spel_Ling of his name was uncertEin) wished to facilitate contact
between important German officials in Northern Italy and the Allies
with the general view of terminating German resistance in Northern
Italy. One of above-mentioned sources was a person well-kncwn to
the War Department"under (?) number 6028." Baron Pareiii had been for
many years Italian representative of Nash Kelvinatcr and claimed to
be veil-known in Detroit.
After a meeting between Baron Parelli and an Intermediary, it
seemed desirable to follow up the matter and rather unexpectedly OSS
representative had been advised late on the day of 2 March by his
- Swiss secret intelligence friend that Standartenfuehrer Dollmann and
Zimmer, who was reputedly Dollmannts aide, had.arrived at the Swiss
Frontier. Reports had it that Do.I.Lmann was exceedingly influential
in Rome prior to its liberation and that he apparently c.A.aimed credit
for having saved Rome from destructinn. Aeputediy he had built up
a considerable fortune in connection with the ransoming of important
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He speaks fluent Italian, and resided in
individuals and generaLLy, though sometimes for a price, had shown
some sympathy for Italians
OS intermediary, who was proceeding to Lugano on other
business, met Dolimann, Zimmer and Pare,..11 and a Swiss intelligence
officer at Lugano on 3 March. To the Swiss intermediary, Dolimann
had apparently claimed that he represented Kesseiring, Rahn (Nazi
diplomatic representative in Italy), Wolff (senior ES and police
leacier, Italy), and CarEtor or Harster (identity unknown); but to
OSS intermediary he never specifically so stated. To the latter
he indicated only that after consu-Ltations at Fasano (Fasana ?
Venice area or Istria'?), and subject to confirmation on b March,
he would return to Switzer,,and on Thursday, 8 March, with credentials
and definite proposals. The nature of the proposals were not indicated
but from other talks. which intermediaries had, OSS representative_
assumed that they would bear upon the future disposition of German
forces in Northern Italy.
As a real test of DoilmannIs sincerity and ability to act, it
was suggested that the release of certain Italian patriots be
promptly effected. (One of these being Parri, otherwise known as
Maurizio, a CLN representative who had been arrested by the Germans
in Turin. On 8 March OSS representative signalled that he had been
told Parri was being released. See paragraph VII below.) OSS
intermediary gave Dollmann no name; Dolimann probably believed that
he was associating with a representative of the State Department.
*Eugen Dollman has been described as Himmleris personal envoy in Italy,
where he has lived for years.
Rome before liberation.
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On 5 March OSS representative stated it was not yet clear
whether this move of Dollmann's was separate from or parallel to
the earlier negotiations mentioned.in paragraphs IV and V, but he
was inclined to believe that as far as the North Italian situation
was concerned, they would merge if, in fact, Dollmann was, acting
for Kesseiring, Rahn, et al. Without clarification of Dollmannts
role, there was natural.y no mention made of the Himmler, Kaltenbrunner
line. �
OSS representative stated that if Dollmann returned he would
arrange to find out what he had to say. If this should be of
nature to facilitate unconditional surrender of the German forces
in Northern Italy, he suggested that it might be desirable to arrange
a military contact to take place on the Swiss side of the Frontier.
He remarked that in spite of AFUlts observations that if
Kesselring wished to dispatch an emissary with an official message
he could always find ways of doing it, it should be remembered
that those around Kesselring who might wish to facilitate a surrender
could act only with the greatest secrecy lest their movements be
betrayed by fanatic Nazis in Kesselringis entourage. Thus, he pointed
out, the normal procedure of sending an airplane or messenger to our
lines might prove difficult, though. it was relatively easy for high
officials to come to Switzerland, as they had been doing continuously
over a long period, without arousing suspicion.
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OSS representative in Bern stated that he had confidence in
the Swiss through whom he was dealing and further pointed out that
all Swiss interests lay in the facilitation of a peaceful surrender
of Germans in North Italy.
'VII. On 8 March, OSS representative in Switzerland signalled that
Waffen SS General Karl Wolff, together with an OKW representative
presumably from Kesselringts staff, plus Dolimann and Zimmer arrived
in Lugano that morning allegedly prepared to talk definitely. If
this were confirmed, he would see what they had to say. He had been
told also that in answer to his request Parri was about to be liberated.
If both these reports were true, OSS representative suggested that a
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high SACMED authority be prepared to go to Bern. Said representative.
could, with absolute secrecy, arrange entry into Switzerland in �
civilian ciothes, and secret cooperation of local authorities could
be assured. There was nothing unusual in this as high military
authorities from &LAU constantly came to Bern.
OSS representative thought that the potentialities of these
developments were so far-reaching that they justified immediate
.congideration in the highest quarters. If Wolff were really working
� with Kesselring, these two might effect an unconditional surrender
provided absolute secrecy could be preserved.
The question remained, how much did Himmler know about this?
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VIII. Meanwhile, on 12 February, OSS Caserta had signa.ded Bern
that an officer named Adrian() of CLN, Venice, would shortly
arrive in Switzerland and seek to contact OSS. According to reports,
he would bring information about severa.L. nigh German officers in the
Venice area who were said to be part of a German insurrectionary
movement and disposed to collaborate with Allied forces in that
area. It was stated that our primary interest would be to ascertain
everything possible about said German officers: their aims and
activations, and the strength, composition leaders and disposition
of the alleged insurrectionary movement.
facilitate contact and advise if contact
that an attempt might be made to sell an
OSS Bern was told to
were made. Warning was given
elaborate military plan
which should be treated rith great caution.
Connection between the reported Adrian() deal and the alleged
arrival of Wolff, Doilmann, Zimmer et al is not apparent, nor has
there yet been reported the arrival of Adriano in Switzerland.
IX. 1-,eference the Adrian() story, the following was reported from
OSS Florence:
I. Starting 10 February, military command of Venice was in
contact with Venice Platzkommandantur, who, in turn, stated he
represented German insurrection movement and was in touch with Kesselring.
Desired to meet Allied officer to present proposals and receive a reply
for a surrender of troops operating in Italy. On 10 February, Liberation
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Headquarters had sent Adrian� to Switzerland to contact OSS and
make the proposals. It was said he could approach Kesselring with
the following:
1) Through Paulus to persuade Von Arnim to join Anti-Nazis.
2) The three Generals to bring about collapse of the Front.
3) Allies to land at several points on the Adriatic.
4) Parachutists to ..and in Upper Brenta Valley to isolate
Kesselringis HQ from Germany.
45) Guarantee Kesselring and a few others not to be considered
war criminals.
6) Guarantee German people not to be exterminated nor sterilized.
7) Leave the three Generals with an appearance of authority,
presumably as police service.
Reliability of above report is questioned.
2. A second North Italian Source reported 10_February that from various
Sub-sources, chiefly German Consul in Turin, the Germans had declared that
they would like to make a separate peace in Italy and to meet an American'
Officer to present their proposals.
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X. On 8 March, OBS Caserta notified OSS'representative that AM%
was considering the question of whether or not a representative
should be sent to Switzerland for a possible' meeting with German
authorities. In the meanwhile,OSS representative should promise
nothing but should secure Whatever information he could, especially
on the reliability of the parties involved and details of the
Xesselring - Himmler relationship._
XI. 9 March. OSS representative in Switzerland Signalled that Wolff
had indecated a willingness to attempt developing a program to take
Northern Italy out of the conflict. Wolff considered that a mere
military surrender would be difficult to effect. Be preferred that
capitulation be preceded by a statement to the German people from German
leaders in North Italy. that any further struggle was hopeless and would
merely cause needless German bloodshed and daotructIon. Wolff stated
that Rahn was in accord with him but that Xesselring whose adherence
was essential had not been won over.
Wolff was proceeding immediately to Jain Xesselring and endeavor
to sell his program to him. Wolff would keep in touch with us.
. Wolff had enquired about an alleged British agent, _one Captain
Ducker, Who had recently been turned over to him by Grasiani and
released to return to SUM= via Switzerland (apparently with the idea
of helping to negotiate a surrender). Wolff was puzzled as to What
role Captain Ducker was really playing.
(On 13 March, OSS Bern signalled that Ducker had. turned out to
be a British SOB agent named Lt. Millaby who had used this clever ruse
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in order to get out of Italy and report to SOB. Being out on parole,
he proposed to return to Wolff's HQ where two other British officers
had been left as hostages. Ducker had already spent a week in a
Swiss internment camp, and OSS representative* without disclosing the
background, had arranged that Wallaby wait in Switzerland as there
was no time limit on his parole. If there were a further meeting
with Wolf(, the matter could easily be cleared inaemuch as Wallaby's
story checked with WoIff's).
.Parri ("Maurizio", CLS agent mentioned in paragraph VI above)
had. been delivered in Zurich unconditionally and even prior to any
indication that OS representative would see Wolff. OSS representative
had seen him in good health the night of 8 March. Parri, at that time,
did not know how he bad been released. Stating that it was important
that the circumstances of his release be ittpt secret. OSS representative
proposed that When Parri's presence in Switzerland became known, it be
hinted that he was freed in exchange for a German P/W.
Truthfluly or not, Wolff claimed that Bimmler was unaware of his
activities.
Since Wolff apparently controlled all police on entire Swiss
Italian frontier, it was thought that we now had a.means of quick
contact with top German personalities in Northern Italy. An intermediary
(Y) was to have further mooting with Wolff on 9 March and a full report
would follow by regular channels.
M. On 9.14orch. OSS Caserta informed OSS representative (who shall
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henceforth be called X) that Yield Marshal Alexander had outlined
to Marshal Brook & proposed plan involving the di:patch to Switzerland
of two senior staff officers who night meet with German representatives.
OSS had been directed to submit& plan for all necessary steps, including
arrangements for a meeting place in Switzerland and transportation to
and from that place to Annemasse or vicinity. In Addition 05$ would
be called upon to provide cemmanications, clerical assistance,
interpreters ind all necessary safeguards for the security of the
operation which, within OS, was to be known by the code name SUNRISE.
* * * *
(Larlier in the day, Colonel Glavin had called a meeting of
staff officers to outline the developments and to determine the manner
in which OSS might meet whatever responsibilities it was asked to
undertake. He cautioned that the success of the project depended upon
absolute secrecy).
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XIII. 10 March. A sapplementary report from X stated that Wolff
had been accompanied to Zurich by Dollmann; Lt. Co].. Wenner, his
military expert: Zimmer and. Baran. X had consented to see only
Wolff who, accompanied by a Swiss intermediary, came to his itpartr.-,
on the evening of 8 March. X and Y (the intermediary mentioned in
paragraph XI above) than talked to Wolff alone, and. Y later interviewed
Wolff and Dollmann.
It was apparent that Wolff was a distinctive personality.
Emprything indicated that he represented the more moderate element
in the Waffen SS with a certain mixture of romanticism. Re was the
most dynamic personality in Northern Italy and - after Eosselring -
the most powerful.
Wolff stated that the time had come When some German with the
power to act should lead Germany out of the war. To end useless and
material destruction he was willing to act and felt that he could
persuade Resselring to join him. As far as Northern Italy was
concerned, he and Xesselring controlled the situe.tion; and as far as
Western Austria was concerned, his own authority included the
Vorarlberg, Tyrol and the Brenner Pass with both Northern and Southern
approaches. In contrast with the situation of 20 July 1944. Hitler
and Rimier would be powerless to take effective oounterneasuree were.
Wolff and Resselring.to take jOiAt action. Particularly because many
Generals on the Western 'front were waiting for someone to take the
lead, their joint action would have vital repercussions. As far as .
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his own personal safety was concerned. Wolff made no requests.
To bring about action Wolff envisaged the following proceeure:
1) He would meet Nesselring, with whom for several
years he claimed the closest personal.relations,.over the
weekend of 10 - 11 Rarch with the purpose of obtaining a
definite commitment. Keeselring, who had insisted that
throughout his long military career he had always kept his
oath of allegiance and was now too old to change his ideas,
would have the problem of reconciling our such proposals
with his oath; but Wolff believSd that Kesselring could be
won over to the futility of the struggle and that, above
his duty to the ruehrer, was his duty to the German people.
2) With Kesselring he would draft an appeal to be signed
by Kesselring, Rahn, himself and others, setting forth the .
uselessness of the struggle, their responsibility toward the
German people to terminate it, and an appeal to military
commanders and all concerned to disassociate themselves from
the Rimmler - Hitler control; The Germans would end all'
hostilities in Northern rtaly.
S) In order to reach the German leaders and the German
people, a radio and leaflet campaign would be prepared.
Wolff believed that were Kesselring von over, he would ooms
seoretly to Switzerland to meet Allied military� representatives and to
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coordinate purely military measures of surrender based on the above
appeal. Apparently no one in Kesselringis immediate staff was suite.*
to do this for him; Boettige.r, his Chief of Staff, was not yet
acquainted with the project.
In addition to the release of Perri (already reported). Wolff,
as evidence of his ability to act. prepared;
1) To discontinue active warfare against the Partisans,
keeping up only the necessary pretence pending execution of
the plan;
2) To release into Switzerland several hundred sTBDS
(Jews or Jedburghs 7) interned at Bozen. Wolf claimed that
he had refused whatever ransom money had been offered for them,
and if it had disappeared, it had been swailotsfed up by inter-
mediaries;
3) To assume full responsibility for the safety and
treatment of 350 British and American prisoners, of whom 150
were in the hospital at Mantua and 200 on the southern
outskirts of that city. This, he claimed, accounted for all
the British and American prisoners held in Northern Italy as
the rest had recently been transferred to Germany;
4) To release into Switzerland Sogno 7ranci if said
individual, who was a well-known patriot working with CLNAI
and the British whose release Parri particularly desired,
could be found:
5) To facilitate, insofar as he could, the return to
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North-Italy of all Italian officers than held in Germany
who might, in the post-hostilities period, prove useful.
6) Wolff would welcome the help of Neurath whom he
felt had considerable influence on Kesselring. Re would
invite Neurath to Join him in Italy.
Narly in February Wolff had. seen Hitler and 1;immler and
advised them of the general 'hopelessness of the North Italian
sttuation but had received from them no definite instructions.
X commented that, while it was necessary to withhold final
judgment until the results of the Wolff - Kesselring conversations
were known, he believed that this might present a very unique
opportunity to shorten the war and to permit the occupation of Northern
Italy and possibly, even, the penetration of Austria under the most
favorable conditions. It might, also, wreck German plans for the
establishment of a Ma4pL1s. X trusted that if he got word that
Kesselring or another 'high military authority were coming to Switzerland,
with the power to alter the course of military affairs. SACKED would
be prepared to send to Switzerland an appropriate military representa7
tive. X wiehed it clearly understood that he had engaged in no
negotiations; he had merely listened to Wolffis presentation and had
stated, with no refutations on-Wolff's part, that unconditional
surrender was the only possible course.
X knew of no particularly close relation* between Kesselring
and Rimmler.
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XIY. On 10 March, full details of the sf.rsalsa plan as approved by
Anci, were wired to Bern (and Washington). Col. Well with fourteen
personnel would proceed to Annemasse 11 March to join Crockett who .
arrived -there 10 March to confer with X. tits personnel %mild be
kept in irence as a pool to supplement whatever X could. provide.
They would be introduced Into Switzerland only as they were needed
and as security was assured.
had designated Col. Glavin as
Secretariat for the conference, and he and one interpreter would
accompany XYHtl staff conferees on tha date later to be announced..
%eau to have fall 4.aaw*LiOeetm On tha final choice of a meeting site.
X
I was to secure from Wolff a statement that he. Wolff, and his
selected associates would proceed to Zwitzerland at a date chosen
by Arliq. When X had notified Caserta Lht arrangements were completed
Anlq would move_eithin twenty-four hours.
XV. On 11 March, X signalled that success of the operation depended
upon complete secrecy,Mointing to the fact that he had not yet had
final word from Wolff and that the cooperation of Xesselring was
essential, It. nevertheless implied that if this were acceptable to
Mg. the two senior staff officers might well come to Annemasse in
readiness for proposed meeting. In all events, he could meet with
initial personnel requirements provided. OSS Caserta sappliod ths
communications. It. haa uLt. yet; mentioned tho affair to his British
SOS or SI colleague*. though he could readily work with either or both
if it were .so desired.
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NO word whatever would. be given to the Germans until OK had
given him clearance. In any event he did not expect to hear from
the Germans until 12 March at the earliest. ,
XVI. Col. Glavin signalled X that Weil and Party had left early
that morning before the arrival of X's signal described in paragraph XV
�:.
above.
Since APN had placed full responsibility on OSS alone to
hapdle all arrangements, he did not deem it necessary or desirable to
consult British colleagues.
XVII. On. 12 March, X signalled that Parelli had just returned from
seeing Wolff. Parent stated that when Wolff had reached Pesano (HQ, South),
he had telephoned Xesselring's kg, only to find that Xesselring had just
been summoned to Hitler's mt. Wolff expected him back within three days,
but there was a chance that he might never return. The meeting was,
therefore, postponed pending word from Xesselring. X suggested that
Alaq consider whether they would be interested in contacting Wolff,
assuming, of course, that he had a plan of action. Wolff had said that
he would come to Switzerland at any time.
I had suggested to Parent that Wolff indicate (a) What he
proposed to do if Xesselring did not return; (b) What he would do
if he likewise were ordered to report to the Paehrer; (c)' If he
refused to report, what WAS his plan, and what forcee would he &tows.
of to carry. it out; (d) What areas could. ha temporarily control for
possible contact with Allied forces even if thetprincipal Army commanders
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did not cooperate.
X surmised that. Xesselring's call to the Fnehrer's sq might
foreshadow an attempted evacuation of Northern Italy and that if
Kesselring did not convince Hitler and. Rimier that he would coopers;
he might be given either a new command or prison.
XV/II. Supplementing this message (Set paragraph XVII above) completing
Parent's report, X submitted the following:
� 1) Upon his return to Italy, Wolff had received a telegram
from Kaltenbrunner advising him to avoid establishing contact
in Switzerland as it might mean catastrophe for Kaltenbrunner's
own plans. Upon investigation, Wolff had discovered that '
Harster, at the time of Dollmann!s first trip to Switzerland,had.
wired Kaltenbrunner advising him that an attemPt might be made
to effect contacts in Switzerland. According to Parent. Wolff
felt that this '4. re Yas sent to cover Dollmann's track, and
that Ulster was dependable. (X considered this explanation
possible but difficult to verify).
2) Based on information that Mussolini had obtained Spanish
consent for entry and was preparing to flee to Spain, he Would
be placed under armed guard.
3) Wolff considered that Obersturmbannfuehrer Vuenschet
now believed to be hospitalised in France, might-hi:Useful to
' further his plans. (X asked l'aris to give Bern full information
on Wnensehels availability and sentiments.
Waft
Approved for Release: 2023/07/17 C00033855..
Approved for Release: 2023/07/17 C00033855
VOINIF*
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4) If trustworthy and available, Whensche might be
used as an exchange to cover the disappearance of Perri Which
Wolff, reputedly. was having difficulty explaining.
5) Wolff had claimed to have three milliard nominal
value shares in Italian companies on the disposition of which
he asked advice.
6) He had again enquired as to whether we had any requests
for the facilitation of a return from Germany to Northern Italy
of Italian officers who might be useful in the post-war period.
�
(See paragraph XIII above). X had suggested no action which
might compromise an already highly involved situation.
X/X. On 13 March. X signalled that for reasons of security Glavin
and staff conferees should eventually enter Switzerland via Basel.
As neither Wolff ;or eventually Xesselring could be absent for any
'length of time at this crisis without awakening serious suspicion, the
meeting place should be somewhere near the SWiSS Italian bordere-.
Be had selected a quiet spot near Aosconia.
)1(1414i
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