JUSTIFICATION FOR POST-WAR SECRET INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005374720
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00165
• Publication Date: August 24, 1942

MEMOt:%.NDUM FOR TH: DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION:
Suhjtact: Jut-ti:ication for Post-War Secret Intelli.geneer
1. The justification for post-war secret intelligence
on the pert of G-2, War Department General Staff, can be summed
up as analogous to the justification for the maintenance of
adequate national defense. At the and oi this war the United
States 411 find itseli the richest and most powerful country in
the world with the greater,t wealth and power In the world. A:: a
result, based on the experience of history, the United States will
be the object of jealousy and nations may band together to compen-
sate by secret alliances for the balance of power which has always
been a factor in the sorld after all Brest wars. The only thing
to do for both the preservation of peace and for the protection
of the United State: is to provide for absolute national defense
by superior intelligence.
2. The post-war period will develop political and
commercial rivalry between two great powers, the United States
and the Soviet Union. This rivalry will not merely be between
two great nations but will re~:resent a battle to the death of
opposite ideologies in vnieh all of the "have-nots" in the world
may follow Russia against the "haves". Russia maintains and
operates a Secret Intelligence system throughout the world not
only for the purpose of obtaining information but to nurture and
spread an ideology opposite to that of the United States. An
authentic report places one thousand Soviet secret agents in Nor-
way alone. Secret Intelligence on our part is therefore unavoid-
able and necessary in sell-protection.
3. Before the advent of World War II our diplomatic,
military and naval strategist:- believed we had certain natural
boundaries of defense which at least gave us considerable tine to
prepare for war. Our allies and our friends did our Secret In-
telligence work for ua, since we found that what they learned,
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 09-Jun-2009
 Howevorp we no longer can depend on th, Secret Intelligence Of
Englaod and of Fr,,,noo bee-tuse Of the modern concept of tin* and
because the next war may realign the nations of the world into
a now mosaic, Judging the future by the past, it is Possible
that some of the victors of today may ally themselves With the
vanquished or that &,ome of the victors of today will combine
against a richer and more powerful partner.
4. The progress of oot*uoo and its application to
war has never been so marked eta in the last five years. In the
future, secret intelligence will be needed to obtain information
on row weapons and now facilities which $61datiots will ~4v*IOY
that say well revolutionize the, concepts of future warfare.
Those scientific invoutionf, and developments will of course be
unavailable to normal intsiligence.
5. The Britj~ih Empire is duly grateful that our land
lease and our help came in the nick of time. let they have al-
ready stopped treating us as allien In son* respects. Proof can
be furnishad that in the last aix months the British forbVL the
fAu,ther importation of l*athor belting from the United States to
India and insisted that leather be imported to Inets. only from
Englando although the leather in England is land-lease leather,
visa is granted an American business man going
no
passing In the last year
to or ? part of the British Xopire vinlose the
British Board of Trade agrees it is good. for British business.
The British and the United Mtoa agreed to keep insurance man
out of North Africap yet the British sent Inowtince Son there in
uniform.
its present pro-
The future of the United States in
victory periodt the post-mar period and the period thereafter is
definitely based on both the efficiency and the independence Of
its secret intelligence. By secret intelligence is meant the top
secret operations of intelligence which SMOt be oarefUllY scrssn*do
maintain absolute internal security of tho highest tYP*# and which
the re&ll-r "hoto informations (1) secret
supply a large proportion of
intercept of communications of other covixtrien and cryptOKIDS-17biv
ortanizationo or *dark ChAMberal; and, (2) Espionage, bothp (a) direct
(indepon4ent secret agent$4 and (b) indirect --_(secret use of int0r0a
tional commercial organizations for high level intelligence pUrPoses).
The American democratic spirit and mentality has never comprehended
or considered secret Intelligouco in the p%st except in time of war
and tbfn usually Only aF & temporary expediGnt to be solved by now
 and ii_,.i.:: fort u:~ui liy hh:;t;d Jn paa;onal or ;,oliticai influences,
.no short: rather than in conjunction nisi: the trsined innomin: to
men of ti.c militi.rv and the State Department. The horrible ex-
amp-es of the G'vti War Pinuertons nd Colonel Bz,Ker, the absolute
non-existence o recrot intelligence going into or coming out of
the last world war and the termination of the d'arK chamber during
the peace and disarmament conferr.nce;s between tae last war and
this. one nre too well-Kna+nx to need comment.
t. From the nays of the Bible to the pre..ent, secret
intelligence and ni.ieionage has been needed to save nations and
Lives at, well as unfortunately being a Major tool in the hands of
ambitious tyrants. Mithriditer before the advent of Christ almost
conquered the then Known world by methods very similar to Hitler
and by an outstanding secret intelligence in which he himself was
a major :rotor. Today, a whisper in Moscow can be heard in a frac-
tion of a second in the Argentine or the Antipodes] a spoken message
can be sent several times around the world from Berlin or Loadon to
one hundred million radio receivers and a traveler or a thousand
super-bombers can fly from ant continent to another in a few hours.
3, rhea the world hat become that small, the United
States can no longer isolate itself and therefore must concern
itself with the econo.,ic, commercial, political, ideological, mili-
tary, naval and air information, not as publicized by the country
concerned or as colored by other countries, but realistically and
as weighed directly for or ag:;inst the United States and American
Interests. In addition, normal intelligence collected by ac:cr+:dited
intelligence agencies, militz:r? attaaches, observer:, etc., is today
no longer sufficient and combat intelligence, tomorrow, shall only
begin after the next war has started. If we are not careful we are
!Italy to find that we have helped win the present war only to be
solo down the river by cnyland, Russia, or China; hated by France
or Poland; plotted af;a:tnst by Argentina or Spain. Today also there
is the greatest internal danger in the history of our country as
r~diaei ideology is rampant throughout the world.
C. Secret intell&aance (Lsniona e) Should Lc a_F ctio of ,
1. 1?ollowing the ex srience of many centuries, Secret
Intelligence activities should be conducted under the War Depart-
ment (L.D.G.S.) and the Stt.te De;artment (F.C.). It should be con-
trolled directly by old-line government atrencles. It should have
a direct tie-up with military inteligance so that the Secret Intelli-
gence activities may be properly correlated and evaluated with nor-
mal intelli ence and with the Foreign Correlation Hr.M?h of the
0
 t~; 1 t: j t;aant who e, itAti. ,., r"ri r aio,,a;u. to M.'.,11 to T'y
Du,%a.rtaenL. The
of e...~i.,nexou, particul;a'S.y ii. ~ Facu-hlm,:, .:,ould r,c: controlled
the ii.oelli,,onee Civie.ion of tl,t P7ar i%r7;r,rtment bpd t:,e For-
eign Carral(Ation Department or. the St :.t. La?artnent me should
not in any we,,, o,. connected with politic:;, )oily clam or sub-
jest to the. vicienitude;, o.:.' int4.,Ve.?oncr, of uny ternportry ap;enci..::-
Lniti;:,,ed by polit.ic;.l influ'.nce or r: particular edminiatr;,lion.
Action in peacetiuae, fx:;;ed .n rosult.r of ,secret intelligence, is
(1) diplomrtie,by the 8tats De; ;rtment, end (2) milits,ry, by the
War Department.
. The gatherii;,; of .secret intelligence it; a highly
apecialisedtask calling for especially trained paroonnel. It
is a professional and not an amateur undertaking ce,lli.nE; for the
highest type of discipline and devotion to duty and it naturally
falls within the functions of the military forces. It is especi-
ally based on experience and not based on manuals, books, laws or
rules, nor on reputation or publicity.
's. Espionage activity in the post-war period should
not be conducted by the uffiaa of Strr,teF,ic services. This agency,
due to its wartime creation and purpose, had to a_,row rapidly and
has as a consequence been tr