PREPARATION FOR PEACETIME INTELLIGENCE - CHINA THEATER AREA - LEE, DUNCAN CHAPLIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005657668
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Case Number: F-2009-01397
• Publication Date: August 30, 1945

APPROVED FOR RELEASEfI
DATE: 08-Jun-2011
HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF BTBATBIiIC BERVtCEB
CHDPA THEATER
APO 8t7
OPY .~ 1 GF 4
REGISTRY NO.
Intelligence Diviei0a
3o August 1945
9ubjeett Preparatloa for Peacetime Intelligence - China Theater Area
To I Lt. Col. Paul L. E. Helliwell, Intelligence Officer. Ou"S/CT
From ~ Major Duaoew C. I'se end Ensign Beurt~5ex'9eae
(The following is s statement of the assumption.
approach, objectives and implementing steps cam-
cerniag the preparatica for peacetime iatelligeme
activitiae is the Chine Theater area. it is pro-
posed ea a basic guide for briefing all personnel
concerae8 in this activity to insure ualfom policy
aid ectica.)
1. Short Toan Task. During the next four or five moathe
the mediate latelli~nee mission of OSS will be to service the
Cammemdiag Generals China Theater. and subordinate Theater a?effta
and agencies with the infoxmatloa they will require during the perlad
before their withdrawal txm the theater. Intelligence directives for
these menthe have already been sent to the field. afr' edditicnal requests
will be 8lapatahed from time to time ee they are received frog customer
agenoiee.
2. ~g ~ ~~? When the II. S. Theater eetabliahmeat
leaves Ch1ae. GSS ee s compoaeat military organization will go with it.
Before we go, howaoer, it is General Doawen~a desire that everything
possible be dace to prepare and ley the foundatioae for a permanent
 interests and security. If possible we hope to leave behind a nuclear
organization which een either ooatinue operations withart interruption
or can et least be activated at a later time when required, fficept for
this poaeible stay-behind group. there can be no coaneaticn or organize-
tioael continuity between the present QSS end the future intellig sacs
service. dll preparatory plaguing etid actica during this perio8 of transi-
tion moat be based upcm the following nostulatear
e. It is not certain that say II, S, peaoetime intelligence
organization will funotion in t;:is area, If there ie sae. it is highly
uaoertain what agency will run it. what funds will be evffilable. eta.
All planning sad arraogementa moat be deai&aed to Pit into any poaeible
orgaaizatiaaal setup sad control. The only assumptions made is thin paper
are. (1) that the work will be done sod (2) that ml'nt,n,m necessary ttwda
therefor will be available.
b. It is certain that for peacetime work ccatrol end direc-
Lion of aotlvitiea moat be ezercised from Weshingtca, The recrVitiag en8
trffining of ley persanael. their briefing end the setting up of their
oetimunieatlma moat for the moat pert be dcae there. Thin ie made neo-
eeaery by esaurity coneideraticna ea well es by the fact that all intelli-
gence customers will now be !a Y:eshington rather then in the field.
a. Anything dose is this peria8 will be dace user conditions
of eztreme political delicacy, The pe riod of wartime unity ie over. and
our Allies. who formerly welcomed or at least tolerated our eotivitiee when
directed against the eommm sassy. will now inevitably effi rightly regard
themselves ea the tareete fort!, S. intelligence work. They will take
 Intelligence Gffiaer ~ 3 3G August l9ta,5
iacreasingly atringent oounter measures to oppose ue, The conaeQieace
oY exposure might xell be a ma3or diplomatic incident which wou]d not
only do inaelauleble harm to ttm successful prveeaution of this work but
might also have eztremely serious coneaquencea for our international re-
lations, One consequence of this is that we mqy assume that ecaredited
II. S. diplomatic repreaentatlves will usually be at the best timorous am
at the worst eatively hostile and obstructive. It folloxs that extreme
eaution moat be preserved is everything that is Bane at this time= that
xhere s~aalculatad risk is to be assumed. the 8eeieian to do so moat
came from the very few officers at Headquarters CSS/CT who know the
complete piaturei and that the strictest discipline must be preserved by
ell personnel ccacerned.
d, .For the reaecaie discussed above. it is obvious that the
highest possible security Est be maintained with respect to every phase
of thin work. It moat be remembered at ell. times that every eation taken
to implement this program is taken uffier cover. At the moment our cover
is for the most part a military cavern but the work ie ao less undere war
for that, Aa few people as possible should ]mow that xe are pleasing or
even thinlotng Sa farms of peacetime eativitiea, This means that es fax
peoplo ea possible even in 05: should be approached regarding the poaei-
bility of future work. and those who are approached moat be told ea little
ea possible ar:d aeutioned to maintain the highest security.
3, Obiectivea. Our ob~ectivea during this time of preparation
will be the folloxiag.
 e, Survey of potentially ueeilil personnel and contaota.
b. Recruiting end placing certain key personmel?
c. Survey of operating methods mid praceduies.
d. Assembling orerational intelligence.
!~? Surve of personnel ~d con s.
e, Potentially useful personnel may ba U. S. citiaeae.
non U. S? Sliropeans or natives oP the particular area. They may be used
ea key members of the organization working full tip, as conscious part-
time participants or as unwitting infoxments? They mqy work voluntarily
or they may be paid, i'ie wit to know abaft all such pd entially useful
personnel who might be used in say we of the wgYS indicate8 above. First
priority. obviously. are those who can be used m the basis of full cat-
aciaus participation since these will be the key members of the field eartr-
b. 111 field tame moat immediately commnce a survey of
potentially useful personnel. The dossier on any individual should include
the following infozmationt
I
(2) Type of intelligence work for which ho
would be suitable.
(3) Why it is believed that he world be suit-
able for aueii work. i.e. ed~tcttlon? lenguagee~
jobs associatlona, interests, etc.
(4) Yihet covers has he or could he use.
(,y) Are h1e motivation, loyalty and security such
ea to pannit,hia use for the work proposed,
 (6) How he should ba approached, cmteated
emd rocrultrA at the ;.roper time, in-
oludiag any aeaeaeary spaniel arrange-
monta.
iQB Where en individual ie naturally easooiated with other potentially
useful peramnel es, e.g. is a merketi.ng organizatim. etc., the orgeaiza_
tim ahmid be reported ea such with the individuals grouped together.
Atteahed 18 a suggested report foam for individual dossiers.
c. For the reasons stated above in paragraph 2 ~ chi g geyY
roach s_,,Ya individual diraotly or indirectly it th a v~ ~ ~ruitina
him for post war ww+rk within t direct authoriaetion frr_am this heedauartere.
The following, hou~ver, may sad should be d me.
(1) Make es many contacts as possible with
potentially useful personnel
(2) Within the dieorotlon of the group leader,
enlist the assistance of suitable individuals
in conneoti m with the short range Satelli-
gence tasks of the next few mmthe. This
will still be work for the Theater Commander
on which we presumably will cmtiaue to have
the cooperati m of our lilies. However,
great ae!itim moat still be used, and it
should be borne in mind always that a man who
works for CS for a few months now may well
be blown so completely that he aennot be used
later. Cutouts esd other eeourity devicda
should be used to protect ~y such individual
rho was potential fl~ture value.
d. Where the coated approaches as 0.S officer and applies
for peacetime work, the latter should say simply that he knows nothing oP
future plena but that he will report the offer in case anything ahauld
develop.
 e. Present 058 personnel and other U. 3. military personnel
is the theater should be oerefully surveyed by this heedq?iartera sad by
the commending officer of eanh field teen for its particular eras. IDcaept
in caeca where ao other procedure is poaeible. the field group leader
should amt approach ~y such personnel but should simply make sure that
they check Sa at the office of INDIV upon their return to this heedq~iartere.
5. Reonritiaa std lp acins certain key pera~nel.
e. Ae stated above. no recruiting may take place except ea
speoifioally authorized end directed from this headquarters.
b. Since oux poat~withdrawal recru!.ting will largely depend
upon reports received ea a result of the personnel survey. it becrn~ea moat
important that the survey be ocmmenced ae acon ea poaeible and that the
results ba reported to this headquarters without delay.
6. Survey of oneratiaa methods.
e. 0.53 ie nos operating 1II a peMod aP transition in which
conditions will become increasingly like those of peacetime (see paragraph
2 o and d above) i.e.. conditims in which only under cw operations ere
poaeible.
b. During Shia period the ahort.raige Sob of intelligence
collection is reapcaee to immediate Theater directives should be used 88
the occasion for experimenting is end teatiag operating methods which can
be used in peacetime.
c. It ie recognized that during this period we will continue
to do moat of our intelligence collection Lhrough the comparatively open
methods employed until now. Obviously our U. 9, personnel cannot themselves
 go auddealy under twat. They shcu]d. hoiever, attempt to preserve and ex-
tend the undercover contacts they have already developed ~d to make new
ones; remembarln~, always that now as never before the highest security sad
teution is necessary.
8. Ezcept in a fes exceptional cases (e.g. Phoeniz) existing
undercover chains or contests, or those which may be 8eveloped during the
east few months, oanaot, for security reasons, be used by any peacetime
organization which may succeed the military GSS. F1eld personnel moat be
instructed that what they now build undercover will 1n almost every case be
used to praduee (1) immediate intelligence end (2) experience and doctrine.
They are not to consider that they era establishing aSent chains which will
survive our withdrawal. Cf course, partlcular individuals or groups who may
have ihture value should be reported to this heed quarters.
e. Each field team should report fully on operating methada
end procedures applied in their particular areas.
7. Cal~ledti~ of onerati mal intelligence.
a. By operational intelligence is meant all intelligence on
ccnditiens in a given. area which should be known for the emdsot of succeea-
ful operations there. Names of and data on poteatielly useful personnel sad
contaote end the results of experiments with operating methods and procedures.
both already cwernd, are examples. Other eaamplea arcs
(1) Local security conditions sad controls,
CE orgffiizatloa ~d measures, etc.
(2) Releveat infoffiation cn local political situa-
tion, e.g. officials who may be useful to us
becaiisa of their political position.
 groups of the local populatica.
(4) Co?tuiicaticma feailities.
(5) 9tratagic positions, geographically and
is terms of contests, where men should
be placed and set up.
b?. X11 field personnel shaul8 be ca the alert at all
times to collect this category of information e~ to report it promptly
end fully to this headquarters.
8. Revorte azd follow-un.
e. The ]ong-range preperati ai work outlined eb we fe un-
doubtedly our moat importemt teak during the coming months. It will el
be more difficult to eccampliah they the collection sad reporting of day
to day intelligence end coneaquently there will be a tendsnoy to defer it.
b. In order to iasure that this work is receiving priority
attention, the following procedure is proposed:
(1) This program moat, for security reasons.
be presented orally to area base end
field teaao: commeediag officers. MaJor
Lee and hhsign Ses9eee will visit all
Yield inetallatloas during the nett
few weeks for this purpose. To insure
adequate uaderstending of present opera-
tions end continuitq in the future conduct
of three operations each cf them will be
eacompenied by a member of the Operations
Section acncarned with the particular
area,
(2) a weekly report on progress made on ell
phases oP this pivgr~ will be aubffitted
by each field teem.
(3) there neeessary. follow-up ~aeedle? tripe
by headques~tera olPicere will be made. end
field team personnel will be pulled beck
to heedqu~^ters for further consultation
end briefing.
 (!y) The tiadng oP inPo~ation moat be set
to meet the deadlines required by the
praducticn of the master lntelligence
plan Por the China Theater areas.
D[lNCAN C. IEE
Mayor. AS18
BEQK!' SERVA48
~hai~~ V3JR