THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST 18 JANUARY 1962

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005992147
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 18, 1962

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
18 JAN. 1962
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1. Dominican Republic
2. Djakarta asks for
U.Thantt mediation
with the Dutch
C
A. We believe General Rodriguez Echevarria
can maintain his civilian-military junta
only by strong repressive measures. At
its inception it faces widespread,public
repudiation, active opposition of all
organized political groups, and disunity
within the armed forces themselves. The
two Balaguer holdovers intend to repudiate
the junta and may soon seek asylum in the
US Consulate. Other members have little
if any public following and the new
regime now depends primarily on individuals
discredited during the Trujillo era.
B. We feel the genuine Communist threat
is now likely to grow as more Dominicans
feel impelled toward violent action which
the extremist-controlled 14 of June party
is preparing to lead as an underground
organization.
C. Rodriguez continues to bold 4 former
members of the State Council while
pressuring our Consulate to accept a
letter to President Kennedy.
A. Indonesian Spokesman say this is the
last hope to avoid war. The Dutch success
seems to have taken Djakarta by surprise.
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not be prepared for "large scale" opera-
tions before late 1962.
B. Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Sudarso
lost his life commanding the abortive
operation on Monday. Jones describes
Sudarso as strongly anti-Communist and
pro-American.
C. Sukarno, still protecting his rear, has
arrested 12 opposition political leaders.
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3. Laos
A. No meeting of the Princes yet in
Geneva but hope is expressed for a
session with the co-chairman by tomorrow.
Meanwhile the US-UK-USSR seconds continue
to work on their respective and opposing
Laotian principals. Boun Oum has rejected
the draft protocol provisions on neutrality
and the continued French military presence
in Laos. I From the tough- 50X1
ness of their stand so far and statements
made while transiting Thailand, we,
suspect Boun Oum and Phoumi may have
decided on a separatist effort in southern
Laos should an impasse result and we
withdraw our support. We know Phoumi
has taken contingency steps for a pull-
back to Savannakhet and.the bulk of Lao
regular forces is located in the south.
B. The Thais, encouraged by our recent
reassurances, are discussing Laos prospects
more rationally. Still dead against
Souvanna, they are now push4ng Phoumi's
favorite gambit-the King as chief
executive. While appreciative of US
support, they could not resist one more
swipe at SEATO's ineffectiveness.
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4. French await new A. They expect a major rebel campaign
outbreak of Algerian against the Secret Army Organization (OAS)
terrorism to begin this week end. Although fore-
warned, security officials doubt they
can head it off. Yesterday Paris
experienced the heaviest)seriesof.
OAS bomb incidents.this year. They
followed announcement of government
determination to halt OAS violence
in Algeria by any means including
use of De Gaulle's "special powers."
.....believe further deterioration of
public order may impel recourse to
martial law--a step which would nullify.
De Gaulle's efforts to reduce direct
army involvement in administration.
B. While both sides hope for further
progress in negotiations, each believes
the other has stiffened its position.
The recent Algerian "declaration of
war" against French extremists has
complicated relations and we do not
expect a quick settlement
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5. Soviets badger U Thant A. Soviet-delegate Arkadev "vehemently"
on UN Gizenga action and "heatedly" told off the acting
Secretary General, reminding him of
Hammerskjold's problems from his
attitude toward Lumumba. Thant feels
the "honeymoon is over" and expects a
follow-up blast from Zorin.
B. Bunche specul tes Thant is becoming
disenchanted with his post and may not
seek re-election in 1963.
C. The Soviets are not the only ones
unhappy with the UN's African role
C I
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS--17 JANUARY 1962
No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action in the immediate future.
Berlin: Communist military activity, as in recent weeks, does
not suggest that the Communists expect to risk serious military confronta-
tion over Berlin in the immediate future. Harassments over access and
over East-West contacts, however, can be expected to continue.
Laos: Although it is unlikely that there will be any large increase
in military activity in Laos while the three factions are meeting in
Geneva, localized military engagements will probably continue.
South Vietnam: Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military
activity continues at a high rate, despite counteractions in various
regions by government forces. The Viet Cong has the capability of
conducting large-scale attacks on preselected targets in some areas
of the country at any time.
Indonesia: Following the 15th of January clash between Dutch
and Indonesian naval units, Sukarno will probably accelerate prepara-
tions for an attack on West New Guinea. Meanwhile he will look for
an opportunity to take retaliatory action. He is likely to take a
more passive role in arranging negotiations for a political settlement.
Cuba: The possibility of a Cuban air attack on Guantanamo naval
base on 21January, is considered
unlikely, but the Castro regime may engage in spectacular demonstrations
to coincide with the OAS,Conference scheduled to begin 22 January.
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NOTES
A. The Panamanian press and radio again publicize Mands
for full canal sovereignty. President Chiari's coalition
government is vulnerable to extremist pressures on this
issue should radical leftist and pro-Castro elements choose
to push it on the eve of Punta del Este.
B. Yesterday morning, just 24 hours after their previous shot,
the Soviets again successfully test-fired a second-een7ration
ICBM--making it four-in-a-row this year.
Their extended
period on station and the December space failure suggest
the Soviets have encountered unexpected difficulties in
their orbital recovery program.
D. While we note recent signs of indecision and uncertainty in
Soviet foreign and domestic policy, our evidence fails to
support press speculation that Khrushchev's leadership may
be in jeopardy. We believe PRAVDA's attack yesterday on
Molotov was aimed at invalidating Western press reports
that his return to Vienna indicated rehabilitation and a
political defeat for Khrushchev.
E. Sihanouk has confirmed his charges last week of a local
Communist plot against his government. He says the matter
is serious and has him "deeply worried".
it has similar effect on bloc chiefs of
Nothing has yet appeared On this in the Cambodian
mission.
press.
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G. Guatemala's foreign minister announced reconsideration of
a diplomatic break with London over British Honduras and has
agreed to "informal" talks in a neutral country--probably
the US.
H. Bent on enhancing Ghana's influence in Africa, Nkrumah is
expanding his armed forces. He has ordered a parachute
battalion, tank squadron, and three infantry battalions
formed this year to supplement his present four infantry
battalions. A military delegation is en route to Moscow,
reportedly to acquire jet fighters and feelers are being
made for Soviet at well as British and American -armor,
I. The Japanese Socialist Party convention opening Saturday
brings to a head the bitter struggle for control between the
pro-Communist faction and the present moderate leftist
leadership. At stake is whether the party emphasizes parlia-
mentary processes or mass action and violence to achieve its
ends. Strong adverse public reaction to the extremists recent
reaffirmation in Peiping that American Imperialism is the
"common enemy" of China and Japan has weakened the pro-
Communist bid for control.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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